





THE

BIBLICAL REPERTORY

AND

PRINCETON REVIEW

FOR THE YEAR 1859.

REV. CHARLES HODGE, D.D.

VOL. XXXI.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY

PETER WALKER, 821 CHESTNUT STREET;

AND SOLD BY

CROSBY, NICHOLS & CO., BOSTON; R. CARTER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK; WILLIAM S. & ALFRED MARTIEN, PHILADELPHIA; AND TRÜBNER & CO., LONDON.

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THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1859.

No. I.

ARTICLE I.—The Service of the House of God, according to the practice of the Church of Scotland. By the Rev. Wil-LIAM LISTON, Minister of Redgorton. Edinburgh: 1858. Pp. 411. 12mo.

Presbyterian Liturgies, with specimens of Forms of Prayer for Worship, as used in the Continental Reformed and American Churches: with the Directory for the Public Worship of God, agreed upon by the Assembly of Divines at Westminster: and Forms of Prayer for Ordinary and Communion Sabbaths, and for other Services of the Church. By a Minister of the Church of Scotland. Edinburgh: 1858. Pp. 120. 8vo.

In taking a survey of existing churches, it is curious to observe how far their maturity and strength are from bearing any uniform proportion to their age. While the largest division of the Christian world professes to have come down, almost in its actual condition, from the time of the Apostles, and the "Orthodox Oriental Church" lays claim, with equal justice, to a like antiquity; while the Vaudois place themselves as high upon the scale, and are never placed by others lower than the close of the twelfth century; while all the reformed national churches of Europe—German, Swiss, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Scotch, and English—owe their birth to the great moral revolution of the sixteenth century, and the *Unitas Fratrum* to the

Hussite movement in the one before it; it is nevertheless true that some of the religious bodies now most flourishing and widespread, in America especially, are still comparatively young, and several of the most robust and thriving not yet past the period of infancy. The Independents and the Baptists, as distinct organizations, reach no further back than the seventeenth century; our own church to the beginning of the eighteenth; Wesleyan Methodism to its first half, and American Methodist Episcopacy to its middle; while our New-school sister, although scarcely out of her teens, is already the young mother of at least one hopeful child; and the Free Church of Scotland, one of the most vigorous and fruitful of the same great family, has not yet seen the close of its sixteenth year.

This last allusion vividly recalls that interesting juncture, when the hearts of thousands, even in this country, were absorbed in the exciting movements which preceded and accompanied and followed the Disruption of our fathers' church in Scotland; when our own pages were for some time filled with news and arguments respecting it; and when, with all our cordial sympathy and interest in that most majestic exodus, we could not but lament what seemed to be an irreparable breach, not merely in external bonds and organizations, but in spirit and affection, between these two rival representatives of that united body, which our own church loves to call

its mother.

We rejoice to say that these forebodings have been mainly disappointed; that the worst divisions of a later date have been within the bosom of the Free Church, although such as, we sincerely hope, will yet be overruled to her increased prosperity and active usefulness; while on the other hand, so far as we can judge or ascertain at this great distance, the asperity of feeling between that church and the one from which it went out has been gradually softened; and although the points of difference remain unaltered, we no longer hear the charge of Judas-like treachery, and utter destitution of all godliness, alleged against the old kirk, and we do hear very gratifying testimony to the piety, ability, fidelity, and usefulness of some among its ministers, not only from their own communion, but from the two great Presbyterian bodies which have sprung up

by its side, as witnesses against it and co-workers with it. We mean of course the Free and the United Presbyterian churches, out of both which we have heard but one voice in relation to the merits of such men as Caird, Macduff, and McLeod.

Those whom we have just named are already favourably known to many of our readers as religious writers; but the two books placed at the beginning of this article, the latest which have reached us from the Church of Scotland, represent another phase of its religious literature, and one of them at least is symptomatic of a movement more important in itself, and far more interesting here, than either of the books themselves. To what is thus suggested, rather than expressed, we shall advert at some length, after a brief notice of the volumes now before us.

It is a fact, often noted upon both sides of the controversy as to Forms of Prayer, that their existence does not really depend upon their being written, but that even in the absence of liturgical prescription, the devotional performances of every church assume a form peculiar to itself, if not in individual expressions, yet in general tone and character, indefinitely modified of course by personal and local causes, and exhibiting a sensible, though almost indefinable mutation, corresponding to the general change in modes of thought and forms of speech, from generation to generation, and from age to age.

Of no church is this more true than the Church of Scotland, and in no religious body has there been, from the beginning, a more settled inclination to a rigid uniformity, within much wider limits, it is true, and with a far more scriptural and apostolic liberty, than in the Church of England. The tendency of which we speak is even more observable in some of the affiliated churches, both in Scotland and America, for instance, with respect to Psalmody, the use of tables at the Lord's Supper, and especially the multiplied and solemn services by which that ordinance is introduced, accompanied, and followed. But the uniformity to which we now especially refer is that belonging to the ordinary acts of worship, and particularly that of prayer. It is an interesting study to observe how far the Presbyterian worship has remained unchanged for ages, and throughout the world, without the aid, and with a positive repudiation, of all rubrics and obligatory forms. Of this remarkable phenomenon all travellers are sensible, who visit Scotland for the first time, and attend upon its worship, as established both by law and custom; and who sometimes have expressed the wish, that the impression could be reproduced, however faintly, on the minds of Presbyterians at home.

This end may be promoted, in a limited degree, by such a work as that of Mr. Liston, which was written for the kindred, although very different purpose, of enabling those who are detained from public worship, to go through its customary forms in private, thus affording them, as far as possible, the same advantage that belongs to the members of the Church of England, who have all the prayers of that church in a single volume. (Preface, p. viii.) The only difference, and that a vast one, but arising from the nature of the systems, is that the Presbyterian worshipper, in such a case, can only have a specimen or specimens of what he hears in church, and those dependent on the piety and judgment and devotional experience of the writer who affords them. Still, regarded even as mere samples, they are interesting, both as proofs of the essential uniformity of Presbyterian worship, and as indications of the differences which it does exhibit.

It is only from a prefatory notice to this volume, that we learn the fact of its being a republication of another, which has been "long out of print, and in great demand" (p. xv), and also that it was the first book of the kind prepared in Scotland, with the single exception of a small work published in 1802, as "The Scotch Minister's Assistant," and again in 1822, as "The Presbyterian Minister's Assistant," after the death of its reputed author, the late Rev. Dr. Ross. This adds still further to the interest of the volume, as a specimen of what is going on from Sabbath to Sabbath in the Church of Scotland, and of which we now propose to give our readers a condensed account.

The author's plan is to exemplify the usual service in the country churches during the winter season, when the two discourses are delivered at a single "diet" or meeting for worship;

whereas in the summer, and throughout the year in large towns, the two services are separate, as among ourselves.

For the sake of some variety and interchange, the author gives a service for three Sabbaths, perfectly alike as to the parts and order, although different of course in form and substance. Under each, the first place is assigned to the morning prayer, which in all three cases—and the same indeed may be affirmed of all the prayers here given—is of reasonable length, devout and reverential, and distinguished by that copious use of Scripture phrases, which is characteristic of all genuine Scotch prayers, but which is never so impressive upon paper as when uttered viva voce and ex animo, especially when void, as in the present case, of all extraordinary warmth or unction in

the prayers themselves.

This is followed by a "Lecture," or expository sermon on a passage of some length, (here the parable of the virgins, Matt. xxv. 1-13,) which is also a fixed feature of the Scottish worship, almost rubrical in constancy and uniformity, but eminently useful in making the whole service scriptural, and giving to the people their extraordinary knowledge of the Bible, not in scraps and patches merely, but in its original connection. As our purpose is rather to describe the service than to criticise the specimens here given, we shall merely say of this, and of the other sermons in the volume, that they are correct in style, and suited to be practically useful, though without pretensions to originality or eloquence, or even that experimental light and heat which may accomplish more than either. This homiletical deficiency, however, though a literary blemish, really enhances the value of the work, considered not as a mere personal performance, but an average example of a large and most important class. The lecture is followed by the "intermediate prayer," so called as separating the discourses and the two parts of the double service. This prayer, according to the rule propounded in the Preface (p. ix.) is not, like the morning prayer, a general supplication, but has reference to the subject of the preceding lecture or discourse, pressing it home, in the form of a direct address to God, on the hearts of the audience, and concluding with a glance at the subject to be treated in the subsequent sermon. That subject, on the first

of the three Sabbaths, is the omniscience of our Saviour, as a proof of his divine commission (John i. 48, 49.) The "public or concluding prayer," which follows, is described by the author as containing "public prayers or supplications for public blessings" (Preface, p. x.) This completes one Sabbath, and the other two presenting only different examples of precisely the same service, we shall merely mention that the subjects of the second and third lectures are the parable of the talents '(Matt. xxv. 14-30,) and our Lord's description of the judgment (Matt. xxv. 31-46,) the three thus forming a continued exposition of the chapter. The subjects of the second and third sermons are the sempiternal existence of Christ (Rev. i. 18,) and his ascension (Mark xvi. 19.) This choice of subjects shows at least an orthodox belief in the divinity of Christ, and a correct appreciation of his true position as the centre of the Christian system.

Having thus exemplified the ordinary Sabbath service, Mr. Liston does the same with the communion-service, as conducted in the Church of Scotland, and including, in addition to the day of actual celebration, what is called the "Preparation Sabbath," and the "Fast Day," but omitting what takes place on the ensuing Monday, as to which there may have been a change of usage, although this was formerly by some regarded as the great day of the feast. For the Preparation Sabbath we have, first, an appropriate morning prayer; then a sermon on the character and office of John the Baptist (Luke i. 76); then a public or concluding prayer; and lastly, an address, announcing the Lord's Supper and a previous day of prayer and fasting. The services for this day are a general or morning prayer; a sermon on Christ's being sent to bless us by turning us from our iniquities (Acts iii. 26); an intermediate prayer; another sermon on the love of God in sending his Son to be a propitiation for our sins (1 John iv. 19); and a concluding prayer, as usual. For the actual communion we have, first, a morning prayer; then a sermon on the duty of washing our hands in innocency in preparing to approach God's altar (Ps. xxvi. 6); an intermediate or specific prayer; and then the "fencing of the tables." This, which is well-known as one of the most cherished usages of old Scotch Presbyterianism, consists in an address to the communicants, stating the required qualifications, and excluding such as are without them, whence this part of the communion service takes its name. After this a psalm is sung, and while it is singing, the minister descends from the pulpit, and, the psalm being finished, reads the words of institution; the elements having in the mean time been set upon the table by the elders. Then comes the "first table service," which includes the "consecration prayer," and the first administration of the ordinance, and is followed by the 103d psalm, and four other "table services," including the administration to as many successive companies. In some churches each of these concludes with a psalm, in others, only the first and last, immediately before the "exhortation or concluding address," and the "prayer after the communion," which is here followed by a second sermon on the duty of bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus (2 Cor. iv. 10,) and the "public or concluding prayer."

The Ordination Service, as here given, opens with a morning prayer, followed by a sermon on the fear of the Lord as the only principle of a good life, (Ps. xix. 11,) and the act of ordination, which agrees precisely with our own familiar practice, except in what relates to patronage and presentation, and is therefore necessarily peculiar to established churches. The ordination prayer and the right-hand of fellowship, are followed by an address (or what we call a charge) to the minister, another to the people, and a public or concluding prayer. The service for the ordination of elders comprehends the questions to the candidates, the ordaining prayer, and two addresses to

the "intrants" and the people.

The Baptismal Service, after morning prayer, contains a sermon on the sacrament of baptism, (Matt. xxviii. 18, 19,) followed by an address to the parent, only one being mentioned, either here or in the preface, where the author speaks of it as interesting to the pious mother to peruse this service, "at the same moment that her husband is taking upon himself, in the house of God, the baptismal vows in behalf of her young infant" (p. xii.) This may refer, however, only to the case of unavoidable detention, which the author has in view throughout the volume. The address is followed by a prayer, in the midst

of which the act of baptism is performed, as with us, the only variation here observable being the use of the plural pronoun you in reference to a single subject. There is, however, one variation in the practice of the Scottish church itself, as to the unimportant question, whether the child shall continue to be held by the parent during the address, or returned to the nurse after presentation till the moment of actual baptism, which last is preferred by the author as more ancient and expedient, since the other may prove inconvenient "from the noise which the child sometimes makes," (p. 336.) The Marriage Service is extremely simple, consisting of a prayer and short address, with a few rubrical directions as to postures and certificates.

The remainder of Mr. Liston's volume contains three occasional sermons, which were not in the first edition, and appear to have been actually preached in the course of his official ministrations. The first is a funeral sermon, on the death of the Rev. Dr. Taylor of Tibbermore, (Ps. xc. 12;) the second a national fast-day sermon, on account of the Crimean war, (Isaiah i. 19, 20;) the third a national thanksgiving sermon for the peace which followed, (Ps. 1. 17—23.)

The book which we have been describing, unpretending as it is, deserves the praise of being one and homogeneous, the simple unmixed product of respectable old-fashioned Presbyterianism, in its most sedate and least eccentric form, and therefore well entitled to be called, although not actually called, a "Presbyterian Liturgy." In this respect it differs greatly from the volume which does bear that name, and which we have associated with it. This is no less remarkable for want of unity, and the crude mixture of incongruous materials, implying a deficiency of clear and strong convictions on the part of the compiler. The comparison is easier and the contrast stronger from the fact, that the third division of the book, comprising the last ninety-four pages, is precisely on the plan of Mr. Liston's, and in execution so much like it, that it might have passed for a continuation, or a second series, but for its nearly simultaneous appearance, and a few points of difference in the arrangement. For example, it begins just where the other ends, with

Marriage, giving very much the same forms, or rather the same substance in another form, and then proceeds to the Baptismal service, with the same peculiarity of noticing the father only, but without the plural pronoun in the form of baptism. The Funeral Service is a single prayer, to be offered at the house, either before or after "the distribution by attendants of the customary refreshment handed round to those who are inclined to partake of it." Although we are reporting not reforming, we venture to suggest that this venerable usage is at least as dangerous as that of praying at the grave, which all Scotch Presbyterians seem to hold in such abhorrence as a Popish superstition. The "Sabbath Service," in this book, is only for a single day, and gives no samples of the lecture or sermon, merely indicating their position in relation to the prayers, which are exemplified, and strike us, on a hasty glance, as very similar, in tone and sentiment, to those of Mr. Liston, but with somewhat less of the accustomed Scripture phraseology, and somewhat more that tastes like rinsings of the Litany and Collects, which are never less acceptable to us than when they are diluted or acidulated by too weak or too strong an infusion from written or unwritten "Presbyterian Liturgies."

The Communion Service differs in this book from that of Liston in a very significant and symptomatic manner, by omitting the Preparatory Sabbath and the Fast Day, as belonging to a system of observance, of which "some there are who think that there is a spirit of formalism in these preliminary arrangements;" which may all be very true, but not the less suggestive of this writer's own position in comparison with Liston's. A communion-sermon is inserted on the Death of Christ (John xix. 30), followed by the "Fencing of the Tables," and four "Table Services," with prayers annexed or interspersed, and an afternoon communion-sermon on the "House of many Mansions" (John xiv. 23), with a general Concluding Prayer.

Besides forms for the Ordination both of Ministers and Elders, very similar to those in Liston, this book gives us one for the Licensing of *Probationers*, a term which we should like to see revived in our own usage, as exactly descriptive of the thing, and suited to correct the growing disposition to con-

found probation and possession, or the preliminary trial of a man's gifts with their permanent official exercise.*

We have now described the last part of this book, corresponding to the whole of Liston's, with a few slight variations, some of which, however, seem to indicate the author's stand-point, as a little doubtful between strict and liberal Presbyterianism. This impression is confirmed by his introducing, in the middle of his volume, the entire Directory for Public Worship, as prepared by the Westminster Assembly, and adopted by the Church of Scotland in 1645. There is, of course, nothing unpresbyterian in this, except the want of any reason for its publication, and the vague suspicion thence arising, that the writer thought it an approximation to those "Presbyterian Liturgies," which seem to have unsettled his convictions and associations, without absolutely doing them away. This doubtful state of mind is still more visible in the first division of the book, which we have now reached in our backward march, and which seems to be the reprint of an article on Mr. Baird's volume, as edited in England by the Rev. Thomas Binney, and contains large extracts both from that work and the Mercersburg Review, in the shape of liturgical attempts and samples; while the Scotch Reviewer seems to halt between the Old and New Light, denying the primitive use of written prayers, and the expediency of their coercive or exclusive use, and yet apparently distracted by a vague desire to get at them, though he knows not how. His state of mind, and no doubt that of many others, in relation to this matter, may be shadowed forth or symbolized by an occurrence in the Church of Scotland. which we now learn for the first time from the book before us, and which seems to have a sort of typical significance. We refer to the fact, that the old Greyfriars Church in Edinburgh, where the National Covenant was signed in 1638, and which has ever since been visited by strangers, as the monument of that event and those connected with it, has been lately turned into a modern gothic structure, full of

^{*} In both these volumes we observe the inexact expression, concio ad cleros, as if clerus meant a clergyman (confounding it with clericus) and not the clergy. The correct form (concio ad clerum) is still current, both in Old and New England.

painted windows, without gallery or pulpit, with a platform something like an altar, written prayers, responses, kneeling at prayer, and standing up at praise, the service in the forenoon almost wholly devotional, the sermon, which has hitherto occupied so prominent a place in Scottish worship, being reserved for the afternoon; all which is understood by Dr. Robert Lee, the pastor, to be strictly in accordance with "the spirit of the Westminster Directory"! Not one of these things is unlawful; but how pitiful they look just there, among the graves of the Scotch martyrs, with the old ungainly outside of the church which, we are glad to hear, is insusceptible of renovation. If there is anything on earth that is lawful but not expedient, it is such a violation of historical congruity as this, the utter disregard of what a nation or a church has been becoming through a course of ages, and the effort all at once to make it something else, no matter how much finer or more beautiful. Such taste is really as barbarous as its opposite, the old iconoclastic vandalism which defaced and demolished, but for conscience' sake. Let old Greyfriars, with its new interior, still remain a witness of what was, and a prophetic sign of what is yet to be, within the bosom of the Scottish Kirk. Our nameless author does not praise this revolution; he begins as if he meant to blame it; but before he gets so far, his courage fails him, and he begs to be excused from saying what he thinks, but owns that some reform is needed. "The 'preaching,' the 'hearing' of so and so-the manner in which the worship of the Almighty, which ought ever to be gravely and decently conducted, is too frequently compressed into a corner, that greater scope may be afforded for a sermon of extreme length, too often places the instruction, nay even the pandering to a false and vicious taste on the part of the hearers, -in the foreground; while in many congregations, from want of proper training and help, the only portion of the service in which the congregation can as yet take part, is miserably ill-conducted" (p. 5.) This inelegant and only half-intelligible sentence is entitled to attention solely as a poor translation into words of the idea more effectively expressed by Dr. Lee's removal of the sermon from the morning service at old Greyfriars, namely, that the Pulpit is a movable appendage to the Altar and the Reading Desk, which has become too prominent, and must be pushed aside or back into its proper place. This is the plain Scotch or English both of this and of a dozen other tentative approaches to the same point from as many different directions upon both sides of the water; and we therefore think it no unseasonable process to examine it with some deliberation and attention, both in the light of history and argument, both as a question of experience and principle. We do not mean at present to reopen the discussion as to Forms of Prayer; we do not ask attention to the quality and method either of our Prayers or Preachings, but to their mutual relation as integral parts of Public Worship, and to the truth or falsehood of the dogma which would make the one exclude the other.

If it be true, as some affirm and more believe, that Preaching is a foreign and intrusive element in Public Worship, which may well be tolerated for the sake of some advantages attending it, but when it seems to interfere with our Devotions, must be checked as an excess, if not abated as a nuisance; we may naturally look for some expression of this mutual relation in the early history of our religion. We may certainly expect, at least, to find the solemn public service of the church, from the beginning, represented either by express description, or, if that be wanting, by the incidental use of names, implying that its character and purpose are essentially Devotional, and not Didactic. But is this the case?

We shall not push our inquiry back into the old economy, the ceremonial character of which might be not unjustly thought to detract from its authority as an example for our spiritual worship. It may not be useless to observe, however, even in passing, that among the most peculiar features of the Mosaic ritual, is the almost total absence of liturgical forms of speech, and indeed its almost unbroken silence with respect to prayer, as forming any part, or even a required accompaniment of the ceremonial service. But as this is no less true of preaching, it affords us no aid in our present inquisition.

In the Gospel History, or Life of Christ, we find the Synagogue extremely prominent, both as a Jewish institution, and a means used by our Lord himself for gaining access to the peo-

ple. We are far from being satisfied with what has now become the stereotyped doctrine in relation to the origin of the Synagogue, to wit, that it arose in the Babylonish Exile, as a succedaneum for the temple worship, and was afterwards maintained by the restored Jews in the Holy Land. We cannot see how a purely spiritual service could replace one purely ceremonial, nor believe that the older Jews, when not in actual attendance at Jerusalem, were wholly without public worship. We are strongly inclined to the opinion, that the Synagogue was originally nothing but the ordinary meeting (συναγωγή) of the people for this purpose, in their several neighbourhoods, and under the direction of their local elders; that this obvious and almost indispensable arrangement was a part of their religious system ab initio; that it was carried with them into exile, and there, of course, assumed somewhat more of a distinct organization, which perhaps continued after their return; but that the minute and complicated system of government and discipline, now found in Jewish books, and regarded by some Presbyterian writers, more especially since the days of Vitringa, as the model of our own organization, is of later date than the destruction of Jerusalem, and had its birth in the exclusion of the Jews from Palestine by that event and those which followed in the reign of Adrian. If this be so, the present Synagogue arrangements furnish no conclusive proof of what existed . in the time of Christ; and yet it is only from these later Jewish customs and traditions that we know anything of public prayer as forming part of the old Synagogue Service. We have not the least doubt of the fact, or of the truth of the tradition as to this point; but we think it a remarkable and interesting circumstance, though purely negative and therefore not at all subversive of the proof just cited, that although our Saviour is so often represented in the Gospels as attending at the Synagogue, and although the reading of the Scriptures is distinctly mentioned upon one occasion, and his preaching upon many, there is not the least allusion to the act of prayer, as forming part of the accustomed service.* We are sure, as we have said

^{*} See Matt. iv. 23, ix. 35, xii. 9, xiii. 54; Mark i. 21, iii. 1, vi. 2; Luke iv. 15, 16, vi. 6, xiii. 10; John vi. 59, xviii. 20.

already, that it did so; but this omission in the record, even if it be entirely fortuitous, is very far from showing, that in the worship of the Jews at that time, Prayer was every thing and

Preaching nothing.

But the ministry of Christ himself, and by necessary consequence the history in which it is recorded, belong not to the new but to the old dispensation, of which they are indeed the winding up, and at the same time an immediate preparation for the new economy or Christian church, which dates from Pentecost. We have but one contemporary history of this church in its first stage of developement and progress; but happily for us, that one is not only authentic but inspired. Now, in this authoritative narrative (the Acts of the Apostles) we may naturally look for something to confirm the postulate, so hastily assumed by many in our own day, that the ordinance of Preaching forms no part of Christian worship, but is only an appendage to it, which may be contracted or dispensed with, at the pleasure or discretion of the church, without impairing the integrity of her divinely sanctioned institutions. In search of some such confirmation, we go back to the beginning of the history, and there find prayers not only mentioned as an everyday employment,* but in two instances formally recorded,† vet of such a character as shows that they formed no part of ordinary Christian worship, but had reference to special and unique occasions, which accounts for their insertion in the narrative. On the other hand, a much larger space is occupied with Peter's sermon on the day of Pentecost, and on several subsequent occasions, t besides incidental statements of a general kind, which show that this was one great function of the apostolical office, from and after the effusion of the Holy Ghost.§

Such is the tenor of the history in reference to Prayer and Preaching, till we reach the sixth of Acts, and the first recorded institution of a Christian office after that of an apostle, and as such affording promise of some welcome light upon the question now before us. In connection with this

^{*} See Acts i. 14; ii. 42.

[†] See Acts i. 24, 25; iv. 24-30.

[†] See Acts ii. 14-36; iii. 12-26; iv. 8-12; xix. 20; v. 30-32.

[¿] See Acts ii. 40; iv. 31; v. 28, 42.

great transaction, it may not be wholly useless to observe, that although the principles on which the church and ministry were to be organized had been determined and revealed from the beginning of the new dispensation, the actual organization was effected by degrees, to meet emergencies as they arose. The basis of the system was the Jewish Eldership, the only permanent essential office of the ancient church, which was tacitly transferred from it to the new, without express or formal institution, except in Gentile churches, where no such office had a previous existence.*

On the other hand, the office of a stated Pastor and official Preacher seems to have been gradually introduced during the itinerant ministry of the Apostles, and of the Prophets and Evangelists, who under their direction did the work of preaching for the first generation of believers, but whose places, as they died off one by one, appear to have been filled by that ministry which still continues, and which really existed from the first in the bosom of the local eldership, though not developed as a distinct office until rendered necessary by the disappearance of the inspired preachers, who began the great work of enforcing and diffusing the new doctrine.

So too the Diaconate, or permanent provision for the charitable functions of the church as a society, appears to have been instituted in an emergency, arising from the jealousy between the two antagonistic races of Hebrews and Hellenists, or native and foreign Jews, a jealousy not wholly left behind by those of either class who were converted to the Christian faith and helped to constitute the primitive or mother church. When this spirit found expression in relation to the daily distribution of assistance to the widows of the new society, the Twelve, in the exercise of their authority as organizers of the church, directed the selection of seven persons by and from the body of believers, who should take charge of this delicate and interesting business, while the Twelve themselves should be exclusively employed in more essential functions. "But we," as distinguished from the Seven to be designated under

^{*} Compare Acts xi. 30 with Acts xiv. 23.

their direction, "will give ourselves (literally, stick fast, constantly adhere) to prayer, and to the ministry (or dispensation) of the word,"* the Christian doctrine, or the gospel, in a wide sense, as denoting the whole system of divine and saving truth, contained in the New Testament or Christian Revelation.

The antithesis or contrast here implied, or rather expressed by the adversative conjunction $(\partial\lambda\lambda\dot{a},)$ settles an important question as to the priority or relative importance of teaching and alms-giving, or bodily and spiritual nourishment, as functions of the church and ministry, and thus prospectively determines a dispute which has been needlessly revived in later times by some who, not contented or perhaps imperfectly acquainted with the apostolical decision, would if possible reverse it, and at least by implication cast a censure on the Twelve themselves for not leaving praying and preaching to their helpers, and devoting their own time to the more urgent task of "serving tables," or supplying men's temporal necessities.

But what do we here learn as to the other question of precedence which has been suggested, namely, that respecting the comparative importance of the two great functions, which the Twelve put in opposition to the ministry of tables, and to which they express their resolution to devote themselves, as something more incumbent upon them than charitable distribution? These functions are described as "Prayer" and the "Ministry of the Word." The former cannot mean mere personal devotion, secret prayer, any more than the latter can mean private study of the Scriptures, or even a less public exposition of them, but must necessarily denote the work of preaching in the highest and the widest sense, as appears not only from the nature and the circumstances of the case, but from the use of the word "ministry" or "ministration" (διαχονία), which originally signifies the service of the table, or the furnishing and distributing of food, and in its figurative application to religious duties, necessarily implies both public and official action, which by parity of reasoning must extend to the other act or function here in question, and determine it to be the conduct of the Common Prayer or joint worship of the people; so that both together are descriptive of that worship in its two great parts or aspects, the DIDACTIC and DEVOTIONAL, the latter comprehending Praise, whatever may have been the form in which it was presented.

But while it is thus evident that the Prayer and Ministration of the Word, to which the Twelve so solemnly devote themselves, were public functions of their office, it by no means follows that the corresponding private duties are excluded, as less urgently required or less morally incumbent, but rather, on the contrary, that these are presupposed, as the invisible or less apparent springs from which the others were to flow as constant and abundant streams; in other words, that they must meditate and search the Scriptures, and commune with God in secret, that they might in public give themselves, with more effect, to Prayer and to the Ministration of the Word. This appears again, not only from the nature of the case, and from the necessary mutual relation of the private and the public duties here in question, but from the recorded practice and example of the apostles who, like their Master, sought for opportunities of personal devotion, and whose preaching was not only in the great congregation, but from house to house.*

Let it also be observed that this expressed determination of the Twelve has reference, not to extraordinary temporary functions of their office, not to miracle or inspiration, not to that immediate attestation of Christ's life and death and resurrection, which could only be afforded by that single generation,† but precisely to those duties which are common to the apostolic body with the permanent and uninspired ministry, of whom the terms employed are no less predicable, and who are equally entitled and required, in their place and in their measure, to repeat them.

This consideration makes it not a curious speculation, or a mere historical inquiry, but a practical question of some interest and moment, what is the mutual relation of these two great

^{*} Compare Acts x. 9, xx. 20, xxii. 17, &c.

[†] Compare Acts i. 8, 21, 22, ii. 32, iii. 15, iv. 33, v. 32, x. 41, 42, &c.

ministerial duties? Is it one of absolute equality, or one of primary and secondary rank? And if the latter, upon which side is the dependence or inferiority? There is nothing, as we have already mentioned, in the words which we have quoted (Acts vi. 4), or their context to resolve this doubt. The question of precedence there is not between Praying and Preaching, but between these, viewed as one, and the sacred but more secular employment of relieving the necessitous. We are clearly taught by apostolical example, that the latter must not take precedence of the former; but we are not here taught to discriminate at all between the two great parts of worship, the Didactic and Devotional. That the question is not settled by the order of the words, or by the fact that Prayer is mentioned first, is clear from Paul's inversion of that order, when he speaks of every creature being "sanctified by the word of God and prayer" (1 Tim. iv. 5).

If then we would make this invidious distinction, we must find its ground and warrant elsewhere. But how are we to find it, even elsewhere, in the Word of God? The Apostolical Epistles make perpetual allusion both to Prayer and Preaching, but with this distinction, that the latter, ex vi termini, invariably implies some measure of publicity, whereas the former, with a very few exceptions, may be understood, in all these passages, of private prayer or personal devotion, and even in the few referred to as exceptions, there is no limitation of the public act to any class or order, as its proper and exclusive function.*

When we turn from the Epistles once more to the Acts, we find the two things either joined, as in the case already cited (Acts vi. 4), so as to seem one and indivisible; or one is evidently put for both, as if they must of course suggest each other. The only deviation from our own familiar usage in the dialect of this book is, that whereas we are accustomed to describe the assembling of ourselves together (Heb. x. 25) by the name of Public Worship, the Scripture usually makes the act of Preaching, or Religious Teaching, or the Word, consi-

^{*} See 1 Cor. xi. 4, 5, xiv. 14, 15; 1 Tim. ii. 8. The other cases are too numerous for citation, but may be collected by the aid of a Concordance.

dered as its source and subject, the more prominent idea. It would be easy to evince this by a copious induction of particulars; but want of room, and some regard to the patience of our readers, will constrain us simply to refer in a foot-note to a number of the most important passages, which go to prove the general proposition, that although the Sacred History mentions a multitude of Christian assemblies, and although there can be no doubt that every one of these was sanctified by prayer as well as by the word of God, there is perhaps not more than one case of the many now referred to (viz. Acts xx. 36,)* in which prayer is even casually mentioned, whereas preaching is invariably represented as the prominent transaction. † This may prove, what we have no doubt is the truth, that Prayer was so essential an ingredient in Christian worship as to need no formal record; but it cannot prove that Preaching was a mere subordinate or incidental service, which might or might not have been added to the more important service of Devotion.

Such, so far as we know, is the sum and substance of the information which the Word of God affords us, with respect to the priority of Prayer and Preaching in the primitive assemblies, namely, that the first is scarcely ever mentioned, while the other is continually used to designate the whole of what we now call Public Worship. That this usage long survived the Apostolic Age, and even lasted through the first six centuries, is a proposition which we verily believe, and could easily establish from original as well as second-hand authorities; but hampered as we are by want of time and space, we must again content ourselves with a general reference to the best books upon Christian Antiquities, and with a summary assertion, that from Justin Martyr and Tertullian to Origen and Cyprian, from these to Chrysostom and Augustine, and from these to Leo and Gregory, both called the Great, Preaching continued to give name and character to Christian Worship; that the first two writers

^{*} Acts iv. 24 may be added, although scarcely a specimen of ordinary public worship.

worship.
† Compare Acts viii. 25, 35, ix. 20, x. 42, xi. 19, 20, 26, xiv. 1, 7, 21, 25, xv. 35, xvi. 6, 10, xvii. 2, 17, xviii. 4, 11, xix. 8, xx. 7, 20, 31, xxviii. 31.

[‡] The Greek verb from which liturgy is derived, and which occurs in Acts xiii. 2, is there explained by Chrysostom to mean preaching.

just named, in their description of that worship, make it prominent; that all the others practised it incessantly; that Ambrose represents it as the great office of a bishop; that the church at Rome was censured in the East at one time for appearing to neglect it; that so far from being generally slighted, every possible variety of preaching which has since been known, expository, textual, doctrinal, rhetorical, and practical (except perhaps political, or preaching to the times) was constantly familiar to the ancient church, and carried to a high degree of relative perfection; that this great engine of instruction and conversion, far from being a mere adjunct or appendage to the Prayers, was rather treated as an independent and coequal part of Worship, with appropriate and brief prayers of its own, distinct from the more formal Liturgy, when this had once been introduced: and lastly, that the same surprising disproportion in the frequency with which the two are mentioned in the Scriptures may be traced in the writings of the most illustrious Fathers, so that even in Augustine's days, when liturgies had so increased, the Psalms and Lessons, from which Preaching was inseparable, are mentioned perhaps fifty times in his Sermones, where the public prayers are mentioned once.*

The turning point or critical transition in this matter must be sought in the pontificate of Gregory the Great, who, though himself a powerful and constant preacher, represents that juncture in Church History, when doctrinal discussion gave way to liturgical observance, and when much of the attention which had previously been given to the settlement of great theological disputes, began to be expended on Gregorian Chants and Canons of the Mass. It is not perhaps till then, and as a necessary consequence of this great revolution, that we find the Pulpit severed from the Altar, or removed to one side as a species of incumbrance, and retaining that position through the Middle Ages. But even in that period of prevailing darkness, the remaining representatives of earnest zeal and Augustinian

^{*} We refer the reader, for the proof of these assertions, to that rich store-house of information on this subject, the fourth chapter of the fourteenth book of Bingham; to Augusti's rearrangement of the same matter both in his larger and his smaller work; and to a clear resume of the whole in the eighteenth chapter of Dr. Lyman Coleman's "Ancient Christianity."

doctrine were precisely those who, like Bernard of Clairvaux, notwithstanding their gross errors and ascetic superstitions, still maintained the honour of the Pulpit, not only as the great appointed means of propagating truth, but as the central part of Christian worship; so that it may be said of all the earlier reformers, such as Wickliffe, Huss, Savonarola, and a multitude of others, that the Pulpit was their $\Pi \theta Y \Sigma T \Omega$ when they moved the world; and that what is written of the first missionaries sent forth from Jerusalem, might be equally applied to them, that in person or by proxy, they "went everywhere preaching the Word" (Acts viii. 3). On the other hand, the disuse or undue depreciation of the Pulpit, as compared not only with the Bench, the Bar, and the Chair of academical instruction, but also with the Altar and the Reading Desk, became one of the surest signs, because one of the most efficient causes, of the general and growing corruption; so that towards the close of the dark ages, preaching had in many parts of Europe been almost forgotten, as a duty which the lower clergy could not and the higher clergy would not undertake;* while in due proportion grew the zeal and the punctilious care, with which the same men went through what was now called the Liturgical part of divine service.

From the very beginning of the great Reformation in the sixteenth century, the restoration of the pulpit to its proper place in Christian worship was a breaking point, a shibboleth, an issue, which divided the two parties. It was by what some would call excessive preaching, it was by what some would call a disproportionate protrusion of the pulpit, so as often to eclipse the fald-stool and the lectern, that the church was under God reformed, and when she needed it, reformed again. This is perfectly consistent with the fact that since the Reformation, Rome, instructed by experience, has stolen an arrow from the quiver of her enemies, and that in some parts of that church, but chiefly in the freer and the more enlightened Gallican communion of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the art of pulpit eloquence was not only practised, but advanced almost to the acme of artistical perfection, and that

^{*} See McCrie's Life of Knox, p. 15 (American edition).

even in our own day, the same engine has been used with mighty and destructive force by such men as Lacordaire and others, in defence of Romish error, as well as of the truth still mingled with it. But it nevertheless remains true that the Pulpit, the Didactic part of Worship, is less dear than the Devotional, or rather the Liturgical, to the inmost affections of that church, in whose practice, if not in her theory, ignorance is the mother of devotion, and of those in other churches who still breathe her spirit, and whose tendencies in this respect are marked by nothing more distinctly-for example, in the Romanizing party of the Church of England—than by this unprotestant, unscriptural, and anti-apostolical depreciation of that very part of worship, which throughout the New Testament, and the early ages, and the Reformation, was habitually used to designate the whole. Even this, however, might be still a lesser evil, if confined within the definite, and well-known lines of real or mock Popery. But there is ground at least for serious reflection, when we find the same morbid tendencies developed in the purest churches; when even from the bosom, or at least from some remoter members, of the unritual and austere Presbyterian body, there is now and then a voice raised in complaint of the excessive prominence allowed to Preaching in our common worship, and the deficient quantity and quality of what is more immediately and formally devotional. As this is sometimes if not always, the expression of a conscientious and sincere conviction, it may not be useless to inquire for a moment upon what foundation that conviction rests.

So far as we know, all the reasons ever urged in its behalf may be reduced to one, to wit, that that part of a religious service which is addressed to God is, from its very nature and the necessary circumstances of the case, more solemn, more essential, and should therefore be more prominent and more attended to, than that which is intended to communicate instruction, and excite religious feeling, and induce right action on the part of human worshippers.

To that part of the argument derived from the comparative "solemnity" of this or that religious service, we may answer, in the first place, that the word is vague and dubious, conveying more to one mind than to another; in the next place, that the

thing itself, according to the usual acceptation of the term, is a subjective exercise, affection, or impression, and as such unfit to be the measure of our duty; in the third place, that "solemnity," depending as it does upon imagination, taste, and sensibility, if made the rule or standard of religious duty, would infallibly conduct us far beyond what any Presbyterians now contend for; not only to the dim religious light, dramatic forms, and artificial music of the Romish and some other rituals, but also to the fearful scenes presented to the trembling neophyte in ancient mysteries and modern lodges; in a word, to every artificial means by which "solemnity" can be promoted. Nothing indeed can be more clearly symptomatic of erroneous judgment and diseased affection with respect to public worship, than the disposition to approve of any innovation or revived corruption, on the simple ground that it is "solemn." So far as this means any thing susceptible of definition, it is something intrinsically neither good nor evil, something not religious in itself, but owing its religious character, if any such it has, to its association with divine truth, or to an express divine command. We admit, indeed, that both these conditions are complied with in the case of Public Prayer. It is associated with divine truth. It is commanded by divine authority. It has been practised in the church from the beginning. It is known by the experience of ages to be necessary to the life of all religion. It is therefore every way entitled to the epithet of "solemn," in the best and highest sense of that equivocal expression. The only question to be answered is, not whether it is solemn, or whether its solemnity entitles it to be performed with reverential awe, but whether its solemnity is so much greater than that belonging to the act of preaching, or the didactic part of public worship, as to make the latter an inferior appendage or a mere convenience, added by usage or authority to our devotions.

The only ground on which this can be even plausibly alleged is, that our prayers are addressed to God, and our preachings to man. But in the first place, we must take into account not only to but from whom these respective acts proceed. If our prayers are dignified by being uttered at the throne of grace, to Him who sits upon it, are they not degraded, in the same

proportion, by coming from a company of miserable sinners, whose infirmities are aided by the Holy Spirit, it is true, for otherwise they could not pray at all, but whose petitions need another intercession to render them acceptable, that of Him who offers them to God, perfumed and sweetened by the incense of his own exhaustless merit. On the other hand, if Preaching is subordinate to Prayer, because addressed to sinful mortals, is it not dignified in turn, and clothed with a solemnity which may be looked upon as awful, by the circumstance, that all lawfully commissioned preachers are, in a real and important sense, the mouth of God, of Christ, and of the Holy Ghost, to sinful, ignorant, and ruined souls, or at the best to souls renewed, but only partially sanctified and made acquainted with the truth? This fearful trust may be neglected or abused; but that cannot change its character or meaning as an Embassy from God to man (2 Cor. v. 20), or make it any the less solemn as a part of worship, even in comparison with Prayer addressed to God himself.

In the next place, let it be observed that solemn as Prayer is, and absolutely necessary both as a duty which we owe to God, and as a means of spiritual progress to ourselves, there is a sense in which it may be said that Public Prayer is not so indispensable, on either of these grounds, as Preaching. In our own experience they are happily inseparable, both as privileges and as duties; but we can easily conceive of their divorce, and no less easily perceive that, although written forms of prayer have sometimes, as in Germany and England, kept alive the popular religion, even after the defection of the clergy, yet apart from these exceptional and temporary cases, and supposing both to be dependent, as they are with us, upon the piety and knowledge of the very same persons, the devotion of our churches could not long survive the silence of our pulpits, for the simple but unanswerable reason, that the truth is indispensable to pure devotion, and that although private prayer might, for a time, and in a case of great emergency, preserve the spirit of devotion, though our public service were didactic only, private study could not long supply the place of public teaching-unless the ministry be quite superfluous. If, on the contrary, it is essential, as a part of the Divine plan for preserving and diffusing and enforcing truth, its place can never be supplied by mere liturgical performances, nor even by genuine devotional approaches to the throne of grace, however humbly made, however graciously accepted. In a word, the want of public prayer could be more easily supplied in private than the

want of preaching.

But in the third place, even granting that the act of Public Prayer is in itself more solemn, and in the true sense of our Directory for Worship (chap. vi. 4), "more important" than the act of Preaching, it does not follow that in practice, in experience, it is more incumbent or more indispensable. Nothing can well be more fallacious than to measure the immediate claims of different duties by their relative intrinsic moment, irrespectively of circumstances. No one doubts that what we owe to God is higher in its claims than what we owe to man. Yet who would hesitate to interrupt, or even to forego, an act of worship, for the sake of rescuing a human life, or even of allaying human sorrow? The intellectual employments of a public institution, such as a theological seminary, are per se inferior in dignity and obligation to its spiritual exercises. Yet the necessary absence of the person who conducts the latter creates less confusion and does less harm than the necessary absence of the person who conducts the former. Why? Because his place may be more easily supplied; because there is a greater number qualified, by previous training or immediate preparation, to perform the higher act of leading men's devotions, than the lower act of giving them instruction. Now what is true of such an institution or society is true, and for precisely the same reason, in the great congregation and the church at large. In other words, that part of worship which is commonly regarded as intrinsically more important and more solemn, may be also more within the reach and the capacity of ordinary Christians than the part which, although less imposing in its form and its pretensions, presupposes a less usual and general preparation. The fact which we have here assumed as true, to wit, that the capacity for public prayer is more diffused than the capacity for preaching, we shall not attempt to argue, but appeal to the experience of multitudes of ministers, who often feel how much their most elaborate and really successful efforts to expound the truth would be enforced and carried home by the prayers of some among their humblest hearers, rich in faith and practised in devotion. Yet the same men would not for a moment think of yielding their responsible position as expounders of divine truth, even to the most intelligent and eloquent of those committed to their care. These are the rational considerations upon which, in their connection with the previous arguments from history, we venture to dispute the popular idea that the Pulpit, the Didactic and the Hortatory part of worship, is a mere appendage, much less an incumbrance, to the part too commonly

regarded as exclusively Devotional.

Having thus theoretically stated what we honestly believe to be the only true corrective of a prevalent and hurtful error, it remains to be considered how it may be usefully applied in practice. As to this point, we appeal to our younger ministers and students of theology. We earnestly advise them to regard the "Ministry of the Word" as the grand distinctive office which they hold or seek; the Ministry of the Word, not in the narrow sense of speaking from the pulpit, but in the noble, comprehensive sense of all official and authoritative teaching on religious subjects. Let the truth of God lie back of all their efforts to promote God's glory and to save men's souls. From this untainted and perennial spring let all the streams of their religion and their influence for ever flow. But while they make this the foundation and the centre of their public ministrations. let it never be divorced, in theory or practice, from its natural concomitant, the work of Prayer. Whatever might be lawful or incumbent in the case of some conceivable emergency, not likely to occur in our experience, and therefore not requiring forethought and provision, the public duty of the working minister is one and indivisible. Prayer and Preaching must accompany and supplement each other; the one must have its root or fountain in the other; the one requires training no less than the other; and he who would conform to apostolical example must give himself to both with equal diligence and equal zeal.

But while all this is true of public ministerial service, it implies and presupposes one more private, and exactly corres-

ponding in its necessary functions. As public teaching will be absolutely worthless without private study, public prayer will be unedifying without prayer in secret. Out of this, if we may here resume and carry out a thought before suggested, as from a hidden but abundant source, the stream of public ministrations must be fed, or it will soon be dry or noxious. Not in public only, therefore, but in private also, ministers must "give themselves to prayer and to the ministry of the word."

This recurrence to the words of the apostles on a memorable occasion, and to their concise description of the permanent and spiritual part of their great office, necessarily suggests the thought, that he who does these two things, with their necessary adjuncts, faithfully and fully, both in public and in private, will have no need of additional employment. None of us, without presumption, can expect to do more than was done by the Apostles. And if they could not combine the tasks of serving tables and of preaching Christ; if they devolved the blessed work of charity on others, that they might be wholly given to their spiritual labours; we have small encouragement to hope that our versatility and busy zeal will ever solve the problem which to them remained insoluble, the problem, old but ever new, of doing everything at once, which is continually tempting the ambition and the vanity of Christians and of Christian ministers, and under the delusive hope of doing more for God, and for the church, and for the souls of men, too often leaving them to the disgrace of doing little or the guilt of doing nothing. From a prospect so discouraging the best relief is that afforded by the language and the conduct of the Twelve on the occasion so repeatedly referred to (Acts vi. 4.) The example there held forth is admirably suited both to kindle hope and regulate exertion. On the one hand, the great business of the ministry is here presented; on the other, it is shown to be sufficient to engross their highest powers and their best affections, and to occupy their whole time till the end of life. Let this then be their principle, their maxim, and their watchword. Let them be prepared to say, without a murmur or misgiving, If others can combine this work with secular employments, or with intellectual and literary labour not directly bearing on it, let them do so. If some can conscientiously prefer the secular or charitable aspects of the work itself, without impugning their sincerity, or sitting for a moment in censorious judgment on their acts or motives, we say, let them do so. To their own Master let them stand or fall. Let others, better than ourselves, do as they will, or as they can, or as they must. But we (let those whom we are now advising say) but we, knowing our own infirmities, would rather cling to apostolical example, and on that ground, if no other, "we will give ourselves continually to prayer and to the ministry of the word."*

ART. II.—Three Discourses upon the Religious History of Bowdoin College, during the administrations of Presidents McKeen, Appleton, and Allen. By Egbert C. Smyth, Collins Professor of Natural and Revealed Religion. Brunswick: published by J. Griffin. 1858.

In these judicious and timely discourses Professor Smyth has made a valuable contribution to our means of understanding what has hitherto been very imperfectly understood by the public—Religion in Colleges. In our last, we noticed the discourse of Professor Fisher on the History of the church in Yale College, chiefly, however, with reference to its theological bearings. We shall now have occasion to refer to it, along with

* Since this article was in type, we have met with the following illustration of the quarter from which, and the spirit in which. Preaching was depreciated two hundred years ago. It is from a charge by Bishop Leslie, a noted persecutor of our Presbyterian fathers in Ulster. "Preaching amongst you is grown to that esteem that it hath shuffled out of the church both the public prayers which is the immediate worship of God, and the duty of catechizing, and is now accounted the sole and only service of God, the very consummatum est of all Christianity, as if all religion consisted in the hearing of a sermon. Unto whom I may say in the words of the apostle, 'What? is all hearing? is the whole body an ear?' or tell you in the words of a most reverend prelate [Laud?], that if you be the sheep of Christ, you have no mark of his sheep but the ear-mark." (See Reid's History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 3d ed. vol. i. p. 229.) This witticism, poor at best, is rendered poorer still by the absurd implication, that the ear is used only in hearing sermons.

those of Professor Smyth, in treating the subject which we here propose to consider. We invite the attention of our readers to some considerations which we shall offer on the subject of religion in the Christian colleges of our country.

An impression widely prevails that colleges, however indispensable to intellectual discipline and culture, are dangerous to the morals of young men. This impression arises in part from causes, which render them, in comparison with other spheres of youthful training, quite the reverse. The fall of a young man in college is a fall from a high elevation. His peculiar pursuits, associations, opportunities, surroundings, are high and ennobling. Usually too, the class of families from which students come, is such as to create a presumption of superior early training and privilege, fitted to refine and purify the mind, and kindle high aspirations and hopes. Not only so. The fall of such an one is made conspicuous by the discipline of the college, administered for his own recovery and the protection of his associates. From all these causes, the fall of a student at college is notable and conspicuous, as compared with that of youth in other spheres of life. But it is no less evident that they all combine to environ the student with influences, not elsewhere found, favourable to the development of his better nature, and constantly counter-working the tendency to vice and debasement, which is so generally active at this critical and volatile period of life. The same tendency to dissipation and worthlessness in a single student, which, in a dozen apprentices or merchants' clerks, would awaken slight remark, will turn a wide circle of friends into lamentations over the perils of college life, or of some particular college. Another circumstance which renders college irregularities noticeable and obtrusive, is the fact that the wayward members of the institution living together often act in concert, and make the impression upon the uninformed and undiscriminating, that the vices of a few taint the whole body of students. In point of fact, however, if we compare those who enter our colleges, with those who leave home at the same period of life to be trained for mercantile or mechanical employments, we shall find, 1. That a far larger proportion of the latter than of the former become wrecks in society. 2. That by far the larger proportion of those supposed to be spoiled in college, had started in their downward career before they entered its precincts. A somewhat long and careful observation enables us to give this statement all the authority of a valid induction. Among the reasons of this superiority in the moral results of college training, we specify the following.

1. We may say negatively, that there are no temptations of any account, in colleges, which are not everywhere incident to youth withdrawn from the influence of home, and from the immediate oversight of their own parents. Place them where we will at this susceptible age, unless we withdraw them from the society of men, and from the great spheres of human occupation, they come into speedy contact with those of their own age and social rank, who are vicious in their tastes, debased in their habits, and yet fascinating in their personal traits and manners. Such as are inclined to make this class their boon companions, or are not fortified by principle and habit against their seductions, will find them everywhere, preëminently in all the large cities and centres of mechanical or mercantile activity. They will find them in larger numbers, in greater abandonment to their lusts, than are ever tolerated within the precincts of a college, and with far more copious and alluring means of gratification than can exist in convenient nearness to the great mass of our American colleges. What are the facilities and allurements to dissipation within reach at Amherst, Williams, Princeton, Cannonsburg, in comparison with those which obtrude themselves upon the unwary youth on every street of our large cities?

Most of the dangers of college life arise from nothing peculiar to colleges as such. They pertain to the period of life of the student. It is with most students the period of transition from boyhood to manhood; when the self-control and liberty of the latter begin to be assumed, while as yet the levity and inconsiderateness of the former have not been put away; when the passions peculiar to approaching manhood begin to fire the soul, while the regulative principles that should curb and guide them, and which mature with riper growth and fuller experience, are but feebly developed. It is the period when, emerging from and impatient of the control of others, man is gene-

rally unfit to govern himself. It is the period of self-esteem and self-assurance, of urgent appetitite for self-indulgence, and indifference or contempt for the counsels of mature wisdom and experience. Of course it is besieged with peculiar perils, against which wholesome Christian nurture and the grace of God are the only sure defence—perils, however, against which a well-ordered Christian college offers more safeguards than almost any sphere of life, and to which we think fewer students proportionally, unless possibly agriculturists, fall victims, than

any other class of young men.

2. Among the counter-agents which colleges furnish to perilous temptations of this period of life we mention first, the character of the student's pursuits and occupations. The culture of the mind, its advancement in knowledge, its constant contact and occupation with the sublimest truths, beget a taste for intellectual pleasures, a capacity for supersensual delights. So of academic excitements, contests, emulations; however exceptionable in some aspects, they still have an elevation about them that belongs not to commerce, manufactures, or other material and money-making pursuits. All these, as far as they go, counterwork lustful and animalizing tendencies, as no other sphere of youthful occupation does. This is no mere theory. Experience constantly brings to view the influence of the high intellectuality of academic life in stimulating the higher and reproving the grovelling propensities of our nature.

3. The class of youth sent to our colleges gives the student access to the most select and elevated class of associates in our land. It is obvious, that whatever bad elements may steal into our colleges, the class of youth who aspire to a liberal education, are, as a whole, among the most elevated, the very flower of American young men. This appears not only from the very nature of the case, but from various collateral circumstances. The large majority of students in our Christian colleges are sons of pious parents, and have received careful Christian training. Beyond any other class, Christian parents seek a liberal education for their children. Very many send them to college in the hope that they will become ministers. This is eminently true of ministers themselves, who almost without exception put their sons upon a liberal course of education, unless

hindered by insurmountable obstacles. The number of ministers' sons in the College of New Jersey is usually not less than thirty, or from one-eighth to one-tenth of the entire number. A large number besides are the sons of elders; and of both these classes a large number are pious, or become so during their college course. All who are preparing for the ministry become members of our colleges. Few classes now graduate of which from one-fifth to two-fifths of their members do not ultimately find their way to our Theological Seminaries, while they include in their ranks many other pious members destined to other spheres of life. More than half of the last graduating class of the College of New Jersey were or soon expected to be professors of religion. Besides, these colleges always contain a large number of young men of moral and blameless deportment, many of whom are seeking an education as a means of livelihood, and are far enough from exercising any corrupting influence. Where else can a youth find so large a body of pure associates from which to select safe and congenial intimates? What but his own corrupt bias can prevent his availing himself of these high and ennobling social resources? What other sphere is so surrounded and pervaded with them? There are, indeed, other and corrupt social currents in colleges. Where are they not? But it is the student's own inexcusable fault if he place himself in their sweep. It is not because those of a very different character are wanting, or difficult of access. They are always at hand, inviting and alluring him to their bosom. Nothing but his own sin, his own determinate bias towards the "baser sort," can separate him from these high and blessed influences.

4. The discipline of our well-ordered colleges is powerful in checking and narrowing the corrupting social tendencies to which all large bodies of youth, promiscuously gathered, are liable. The intent and tendency of it is to reclaim the wayward, and remove the incorrigible. It is a force constantly operating to expel moral poison from the social veins of the institution. It indeed brings the disorders or vices which find place there into prominence and notoriety. When a youth is suspended or dismissed from college, he excites a sensation in the town, neighbourhood, or circle to which he belongs, and frequently awakes loud clamours in regard to the moral dan-

gers of colleges. Yet that which excites these clamours is the very means employed to deliver them from such dangerswhich are by no means peculiar to them, but prevail whereever large numbers of growing youth, of all shades of character, have free and constant access to each other. The difference is, that other communities have less power to check or purge out these noxious influences. There are few villages, and no cities, where the proportion of vicious, corrupting, ensnaring youth to all others, is not far greater than in college, and where it is not far more difficult to counteract their influence. Many students are restrained by dread of the discipline, or fear of exclusion from the privileges of college, from vices which they practise without fear and without restraint in their native villages. Thus by excluding the incorrigible, and restraining or reforming such as remain, the whole standard of practical morality is toned up. Much as we could wish otherwise among youth in colleges, yet, considering the proportion of moral and pious students, and the disciplinary influence, gentle, persuasive, severe, or decisive, as emergencies require, which bear upon all others, we unhesitatingly assert that no other sphere affords so bracing a moral atmosphere.

5. Positive Christian agencies and means of grace are brought to bear upon youth in colleges in greater abundance, variety, and certainty, than in any other sphere of life. They are required to attend public prayers twice daily, together with public worship on the Sabbath. Is not this more than can be ensured with regard to many of them any where clse? Is it not more than is accomplished with regard to many sons of Christian parents, as they approach the age of self-control, even while they dwell at their own homes? How many of these largely shun family and public worship, and cannot be regularly drawn to either by parental authority or influence! But if they are in college, they must attend these exercises as a condition of continuance in the institution. Many are thus put in constant contact with the truths and services of religion in college, in a degree unknown to them at home, and unattainable elsewhere. It may be said indeed, that this attendance on religious services is forced, and therefore formal and unedifying. Let every reasonable concession be made on this score. After 5

all, will any one contend, that there is not greater hope for a body of youth who attend daily worship and the weekly preaching of the gospel, than for those who are strangers to public worship, who are seen only occasionally and irregularly in a Christian assembly; or who live like heathens in the very bosom of Christian families, and under the shadow of the sanctuary? It is doubtless true, that the means of grace in whatever form, by perversion become to many a savour of death. This, however, is no argument against their use, and beneficial efficacy. It is in and through the word of grace and prayer for grace, especially in the great congregation, that this grace is borne by the life-giving Spirit to the souls of men. And how many of those who regularly attend public worship, whether in colleges or elsewhere, from considerations other than their own taste and inclination, from time to time catch heavenward impulses, and inhale a divine breath which proves to be the upspring of a divine life! This is so in all, and remarkably so in academic communities, notwithstanding any levity and indecorum which some, alas, at times manifest, and which not infrequently become the arrows afterwards rankling with that remorse which the blood of Christ alone can assuage.

To this must be added the Christian instruction which, in various degrees, forms a part of the academic curriculum in Christian colleges. In nearly all, Natural Theology, Moral Philosophy, and the Evidences of Christianity, form a part of the course. All these tend to radicate religious and Christian beliefs in the soul. The same is true, in a high degree, of intellectual science, and of all the physical sciences. Indeed, all truth culminates in God. All the rays of light which emanate from nature, providence and grace, converge in Him in whom all things are headed up-Head of the church, Head over all things to the church, the way, the truth, and the life. Much indeed depends on the faith, zeal and tact of the instructor as to the extent to which his department is made auxiliary to religion. But in some of our colleges all the sciences, physical and metaphysical, are so taught as to corroborate and enforce the claims of experimental religion. Nor are these studies ineffective for practical religious purposes. We have now in mind, students in Princeton College, who had been trained up among sceptics, and whose scepticism was not only undermined by the study of the Evidences of Christianity, but was supplanted by a living faith in Christ. Besides the foregoing exercises which have a religious bearing, in Princeton regular study and recitation of the Scriptures are required every Sabbath, of all the students, while the Freshmen recite once a week in Coleman's "Christian Antiquities," and the Sophomores in "Hodge's

Way of Life."

Beyond all this, those less formal services, attendance on which is optional, prevail in our colleges. Meetings for conference and prayer, conducted by members of the Faculty which usually comprises a large clerical force, and often by the students themselves, abound. Personal and private persuasions are also abundantly employed according to the zeal and skill in this delicate work, which God distributeth to each one severally as he will. So by manifold appliances, which for abundance and variety have no parallel in other spheres of life, religion is taught, enforced, and applied. By cogent argument and gentle insinuation, in private and in public, it is brought into contact with the springs of the student's intellectual and

moral being.

6. The intense social interaction of an academic community conduces to the rapid and effective propagation of religious feeling. We have already observed that the social influence in these institutions, supposed by many to be propitious only to vice and immorality, is no less efficient for good than for evil. Nay, we are of opinion that it is productive of much more good than evil. The whole body of youth in a college are in such constant and immediate contact, that what is felt by one member is quickly felt by all, and transmits itself with electric rapidity. If one or a few who have been heedless or wicked, show themselves wrought upon by the powers of the world to come, all are more or less awed. Vice and frivolity are checked by the sense of God's presence. Often the sacred fire kindles from one to another almost instantaneously, until the fear of God has come upon every soul. In circles where one week recklessness and profaneness reigned, the next, a solemn stillness reigns, broken only by the question, uttered

in fear and trembling, What shall I do to be saved? We know of no community so susceptible to quick, powerful, and all-pervading religious impression as that composing a Christian college. And in truth, there are none in which revivals have been as frequent, powerful, or universal. We well remember how a state of prevailing thoughtlessness and irreligion, scarcely disturbed by the few professors of religion among the students of Yale College in the year 1831, was quickly supplanted by a seriousnes so profound and universal, that, for days, the hum of conversation was hushed at the meals in the commons at which from two to three hundred were present. And no articulate exhortations impressed us like this voiceless eloquence.

The following account of what transpired in Princeton College nearly a century ago, is from the pen of the late Dr. John Woodhull, of Freehold, New Jersey, then a member of the institution. It will be found in Dr. Green's historical sketches of the college. We transcribe it, because, aside from its circumstantial details, it is substantially an account of what has often occurred in this and other Christian colleges of our country; because it shows that revivals in this college have been coeval with its existence; and because it forcibly illustrates the rapid transfusion, through the power of the Holy Ghost, of religious concern from one or a few to the mass of the students. Says Dr. Woodhull:

"As to revivals of religion, there were some partial ones in college before Dr. Finley's time; but in his time there was something general. It began in 1762, in the Freshman Class, to which I then belonged. It was a pretty large class, containing between twenty-five and thirty members. Almost as soon as the session commenced, this class met once in the week for prayer. One of the members became deeply impressed, and this affected the whole class. The other classes, and the whole college, soon became much impressed. Every class became a praying society; and the whole college met once a week for prayer. There was, likewise, a private select society. Societies were also held by the students in the town and in the country. I suppose there was not one that belonged to college but was affected more or less. There were two members of

the Senior Class who were considered as opposers of the good work at first, yet both these persons were afterwards preachers of the gospel. The work continued about one year. Fifteen, or about half of my class, were supposed to be pious; and in the college about fifty, or nearly one half of the whole number of students."

This simple recital unfolds better than any argumentation the relation of the intense social influence in colleges to revivals of religion. It may indeed be rejoined that an instrument so powerful for good may be powerful for evil. So it may, and, alas, often is; yet there is a difference. For the morality and piety of college are always counter-working, often too feebly indeed, yet always to some extent, corrupt and demoralizing excitements. Even if the moral and pious succumb too far, as they often do, to the overbearing pressure of a momentary phrensy, still their morality and piety fetter and weaken, if they do not utterly prevent their coöperation with the perverse and insubordinate. They for the most part erect a formidable barrier against the incursion and spread of evil. But when the impulses of their fellow-students are heavenward, all their sympathies, efforts, and prayers, enter into such a current to increase its volume and momentum. The conscience of the college acts not, as in the former case, as a brake to check, but as a propelling force, to accelerate the movement.

7. Youth cannot be trained in any other sphere which so largely enlists in their behalf those "effectual fervent prayers of the righteous which avail much" to ensure the blessing of God, in the copious effusion of his Spirit. Christian colleges are the creatures of the church. They are established by it for the purpose of christianizing education, supplying a learned and able ministry, and replenishing all the spheres of life with competent and upright leaders. These institutions have been founded and reared by sacrifices and prayers of holy men, for the glory of God, and the advancement of his kingdom. They were consecrated from the very beginning Christo et ecclesiæ. From this cause they have always shared largely in the prayers of the ministry and church. There is another reason which largely enlists for them the intercessions of those who have power with God and prevail. As we have already seen, the

vast majority of the youth in them are sons of ministers, elders, and pious parents. No earthly objects so engross their affections and solicitudes as these sons at this critical and formative period of life. If any are regarded as the hope, and pride, and flower of the family, they are those on whom is bestowed a liberal education. Removed from the restraints and refinements of home, parents and friends have but one resource for influencing them beyond epistolary correspondence. That is prayer. That is always available. They can always betake themselves to Him who is their refuge and strength, and present help in trouble. Thus there is at all times a mighty current of prayer ascending from closets and firesides all over the land, for the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon colleges and their members. That these prayers have power, all Christians must believe. To those who believe otherwise, we do not address ourselves. We quote in confirmation and illustration of these views, the following from Professor Tyler's premium essay on Prayer for Colleges.

"But the chief reliance of pious friends at a distance must be on the power of prayer. However separated by distance, they can meet their sons, if pious, every morning and evening at a common mercy-seat; and if not pious, they can reach them at any time through a presence which they cannot escape, and a power which they cannot resist; not only meet or reach them, but lay their hands, as it were, upon them, and leave a blessing on their heads! What a blessed medium of approach and influence over those far away! Nor is this fancy or enthusiasm. Facts go beyond imagination in regard to this very power, as it has been exerted on members of college, especially in times of revival. After one of these happy seasons, of which there have been so many at Amherst College, President Hitchcock addressed a letter to the parents of the converts, and found to his surprise, (no, we will not say to his surprise, for he seems to have expected it, but to his wonder and delight,) that in a majority of cases, parents and friends at home had felt an unusual solicitude for these very youth. Even though they had heard nothing of their state of mind, and knew nothing of the state of religious feeling in the college, still they were waiting with unutterable longings, or with confident expectations, to hear of the conversion of their impenitent children.

"Another very interesting fact, which was developed in this revival, and which has been found to be equally true of many others, is, that a very large proportion of the converts were children of the covenant; a fact full of encouragement to those who dedicate their children from infancy to the Lord in the ordinance of baptism, but which also illustrates forcibly the responsibility of parents for the salvation of their children. Of sixty-three who were admitted to the church in Yale College, as fruits of the revival of 1802, all but eight were children of the covenant. Of twenty-two who were received to the communion as fruits of that of 1808, every individual had been baptized in infancy; and of seventy who professed religion after the revival of 1831, all but ten were children of pious parents. If pious parents would but watch for the souls of their sons in college, as they care and toil for their worldly prosperity; if the church would but do her duty to the baptized children of the church, who are members of college, what a redeeming and sanctifying element would, by this means alone, be infused into our literary institutions!"

The efficacy of prayer for the furtherance of religion in these institutions, and the inestimable importance of such a blessing, have been so deeply felt by the church, that with great unanimity it has set apart the last Thursday in February for special and extraordinary prayer, public and private, in this behalf. The wonderful increase of religion in our academic institutions, in connection with and evident response to this special prayer of the church, will be brought more distinctly to view, as we proceed to test the position we have taken, by a reference to the actual facts in the case. We appeal, therefore,

8. To the Christian results accomplished through grace in our colleges. To this test all theories must come at last. By their fruits ye shall know them. It must be observed, however, in regard to the older colleges of our country, that they not only shared in the religious decline which the convulsions of the Revolution brought upon the American church, but they suffered in ways peculiar to themselves, far beyond most other Christian communities. They were disorganized, and nearly

or quite disbanded. Nassau Hall was turned into barracks for the soldiery, and her President, Dr. Witherspoon, was for years mostly withdrawn from his academic duties to the councils of the nation, where he exerted a powerful and benignant influence in moulding our nascent civil institutions. Dr. Daggett, Professor of Divinity and Pastor of Yale College, was seriously damaged in health by the abuse he received from the British soldiery, in his intropid endeavour to intercept their approach to New Haven. The students of our colleges largely enlisted in the army, and did not escape the taint of the camp. These institutions required years to become re-organized and regain their former position, as to numbers and discipline. The great body of the young and middle-aged men in the Presbyterian and Congregational churches, which were the great centres of patriotic and revolutionary zeal, entered the army, and were subject to its vitiating influence. The heart of the people, including their ministers, was absorbed in the exhausting and eventful struggle for their altars and firesides. All was at stake. They waited each returning post for the news which would determine their independence or their perpetual vassalage. Civil institutions were unsettled, families broken up, Christian ordinances irregularly administered, the whole social organism in an abnormal and chaotic state. In this precarious state of things, the mind of the whole people was of course diverted for the time from the eternal to the temporal. Few young men made a profession of religion in this country from the period of the Revolution till after the beginning of the present century. The downward religious tendency induced by the war, was greatly aggravated by the flood of French infidelity which swept over the land at this period. Few pious youth entered the colleges, because there were few pious youth in the country. The scepticism of the time found a ready welcome among the irreligious minds in college, who, before fathoming the depths of true knowledge, which genders humility, must first experience the self-conceit incident to the first awakening of intellectual activity and insight. The colleges, therefore, as the centres of youthful intelligence, were the strategic centres in which this infidelity entrenched itself, and in which it was first vanquished, by the Christian eloquence of the Smiths and Dwights who presided over them, and confronted this malign foe with the weapons of Christian learning and oratory, in demonstration of the Spirit and of power. In the colleges preëminently those revivals of religion appeared in the early part of this century, and have reappeared with increasing frequency since, which have resuscitated the American church, and have given it an expansion and growth almost commensurate with the immense increase of our population by birth and by immigration.

Professor Smyth says of Bowdoin College, "during the first four years of Dr. McKeen's administration, (1802 to 1806,) though some of the students were thoughtful, upright, and possessed of fine intellectual abilities and social qualities, there was not one, it is believed, who was a member of any church, or believed and hoped in Christ as his Saviour! "Religion," writes one who was then a member of the college, "was connected with the college only in the person of President McKeen. He was a Christian, courteous, accessible, venerable, and universally beloved: but what could this avail, when, in each college room, there was a side-board sparkling with wines and stronger stimulants?" Again, in the year 1811, under President Appleton, during one term, there was not a student who was a professor of religion. "The greater part of the students appear to have been thoughtless. Not a few were reckless and openly immoral, some of whom formed habits of intemperance, which clung to them in later life, and brought them to a dishonoured grave."

But from this time, although not without alternations of great depression, the cause of religion has been steadily prospering in this institution. The Spirit was from time to time poured out, and has continued to be vouchsafed with increasing frequency and power, especially since the year 1825. Professor Stowe, who was there as a student in 1825, and as Professor in 1850, says, "if the religious character of the college gains as much from the year 1850 to 1875, as it did from 1825 to 1850, it will be all that the most ardent friends of the Lord Jesus can reasonably hope for before the millennium. There is indeed very much to be done, much that is deficient, much to mourn over, but I am merely bringing 1825, 1850, and 1875, into

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immediate contiguity for the sake of comparison." The gain is sufficiently manifest in the fact that in 1850, 23.25 per cent. of all the graduates of this college had become ministers of the

gospel.

In Yale College, a period of similar depression followed the Revolution. The number of professed Christians had dwindled to eight or ten, and at one communion, near the close of the last century, but a single undergraduate was present. Says Professor Fisher, "it was in this state of things that Dr. Dwight assumed the Presidency, and began to exert his commanding influence to stay the progress of error. He preached to the candidates for the Baccalaurate in 1797, his celebrated sermons on the Nature and Danger of Infidel Philosophy. These masterly discourses turned the tide of feeling against the opponents of Christianity, not only in college, but throughout the country, and in Great Britain, where they were soon republished, they greatly strengthened the cause of religion. . . . The spring of 1802 marked the commencement of a great revival in the college. . . . Of two hundred and thirty students then in college, about one-third were converted. Of these about one-half entered the ministry. Yet as soon as they left college, and their places were filled by new classes, the number of professing Christians again dwindled to twelve or fifteen. This circumstance shows how speedily the religious aspect of a college may be entirely altered by the departure of one company of students, and the arrival of another of a different character." Another revival, however, was enjoyed in 1808, and still another in 1813, and yet another in 1815. Since 1820 few classes have left the institution, who have not passed through seasons of religious attention of greater or less power.

We have referred to Bowdoin and Yale, because we find authentic data in the excellent historical discourses of Professors Smyth and Fisher, which we hope will be followed by similar historical accounts of religion in other leading colleges. For lack of this, we must refer to such sources of information as we can command. We find in Professor Tyler's Essay a statistical table of the total number of students, of professors of religion, and of candidates for the ministry in the New England colleges in 1853. In eleven colleges the whole number of

students was 2163, of professors of religion 745, of candidates for the ministry 343. The proportion who enter the ministry is usually increased, as the students come to determine their professions. Our observation convinces us, that of the professors of religion in our colleges full two-thirds enter the ministry. It is well ascertained, that of these full one quarter are hopefully brought to Christ during their collegiate course.

Passing now to the colleges of our own church, we are dependent on such scattered and fragmentary sources of information as Providence has put within reach. We know that in recent years, there are few of them that have not been blessed with frequent and powerful revivals of religion. This has been made familiar to all who read the religious journals. Many of them are of too recent an origin to have a history reaching further back. In regard to Jefferson, we have somewhere seen the statement, doubtless true, that a very large proportion of its graduates from the first have become ministers of the gospel. We believe the same substantially to be true of Washington College, in its immediate vicinity. Washington College, in Virginia, has its religious character and influence sufficiently attested in the constellation of Presbyterian ministers, whose names are enrolled among her alumni-scarcely less illustrious than any equal number whose memory is embalmed in Sprague's Annals of the American Pulpit. To this august company of divines Hampden Sidney has also contributed its quota. Of our more recent institutions, it is well known that many of them have been largely blessed with revivals of religion, and have contributed materially to replenish the ranks of our ministry.

In regard to the oldest and largest of them all, we have had occasion already to mention some facts, in illustrating the position we have already taken. The College of New Jersey is but the development of the Log College, which was its germ. This was as much a school of piety as of learning, and was chiefly a nursery of Presbyterian ministers. The early classes of Princeton sent a large majority of their members into the ministry. Many of them also became eminent Christian statesmen, among whom we notice Oliver Ellsworth, Tapping Reeve, and Jesse Root, preëminent among the Christian jurists and civilians of Connecticut. Judge Root was the

leader in repelling the stealthy incursion of Massachusetts Unitarianism into Connecticut, in the person of his own pastor, the Rev. Abiel Abbot, of Coventry. His firmness, sagacity, and doctrinal insight were proof against the insinuating artifices and dexterous evasions of his Socinian pastor, and successfully counterworked them. The case was brought before the General Association of Connecticut, which, under the lead of Dr. Dwight, without splitting hairs about jurisdiction, or the want of judicial power, as in a recent case, vindicated the course of Judge Root and his coadjutors. This body uttered a decisive testimony in the premises, and, for the time, raised an impassable barrier against the soul-destroying heresy.

We have already seen that in Princeton, from the first, there were considerable awakenings from time to time, till in 1762, a profound concern in regard to religion pervaded the whole college. We have somewhere met with a statement that some student or students were awakened in consequence of an interview with President Finley on his death-bed, in 1766, and that thence an extensive attention to religion prevailed in the college. We are unable to find any authentic voucher for this, unless the following from Sprague's Annals be an allusion to it. In the notice of James Power, D. D., vol. iii., p. 326, it is said: "He was one of the students of the college, who visited Dr. Finley on his death-bed in Philadelphia; and the affecting scene left a powerful and enduring impression on his mind." However this may be, it appears that of the class of 1770, one-half, and of the class of 1772, fifteen out of twentytwo became ministers. The late Dr. McMillan, in an autobiographical letter to Dr. Carnahan,* says: "I entered college at Princeton, in the spring of 1770. I had not been long there, until a revival of religion took place among the students, and I believe, at one time, there were not more than two or three but what were under serious impressions." It is also related* that Rev. Lewis Feuilleteau Wilson "was first brought into sympathy with religious things, during a revival which took place in the college in 1772." To these delightful scenes the disorganizing effects of the Revolution soon succeeded, which

^{*} Sprague's Annals, vol. iii. pp. 350-1.

were signally disastrous to this college. The heavy shadows of Infidelity and Deism, French and English, deepened and prolonged the eclipse of religion which followed. To other disasters was added the burning of the college in 1802. Under the brilliant administration of Samuel Stanhope Smith, its temporal losses were speedily retrieved, and it arose to unprecedented prosperity. But the few italicised names on the triennials for a long series of years, prove how deeply its religious condition suffered from that state of things in our country, in which, as Professor Smyth observes, "it was a rare spectacle if a young man confessed before men his Redeemer."

In due time, however, the Spirit of the Lord lifted up a standard against this enemy, which came in as a flood. The great revival of 1815, in the early part of Dr. Green's Presidency, raised religion to its due supremacy in the institution, and supplied to the American church some of her brightest luminaries. Since then, it is rare that any class (if any) has graduated, some of whose members have not passed from death to life during their academic course. In recent years revivals have increased in frequency and power. The memory of the great revival, some ten years ago, is still fresh. In the spring of 1856, and again in the spring of 1858, a large number were hopefully brought into the kingdom, many of whom are now looking forward to the ministry of the gospel, and have contributed to the present unexampled accessions to our theological seminaries. More than one-third of all the students, in some classes about one-half, are professors of religion. Of the last graduating class one-half were professors, and of these about one-half became so during their connection with the institution. Nor is the effect of the moral and religious influence in this and other colleges fully presented, without bringing to view the additional fact, that very many, who have not before seen their way clear, make a profession of religion shortly after leaving college. Some one has said that nearly all students who have been religiously trained, and do not become fatally apostate, make a profession of faith either before, or within a few years after leaving college.

It is quite obvious that there has been a great advance in the moral and religious condition of colleges, since the general observance by the church of the annual day of Prayer for Colleges. It began to be partially observed as far back as 1820. Since that time its observance has been constantly extending through most branches of the American church. It has year by year enlisted the colleges and churches, until now it commands the earnest sympathies and hearty observance of the great mass of praying people. "It has been estimated that fifteen hundred students were made the hopeful subjects of grace in thirty-six different colleges, from 1820 to 1835 inclusive." Another noticeable fact is, that most of these revivals have occurred in immediate connection with this day of Prayer for Colleges. This has been so with the recent revivals in Nassau Hall. As far as we have been informed, it has been so with nearly all the memorable revivals in literary institutions during the past year. The period immediately following this concert has been the time of the spiritual renovation of multitudes of students who are now preaching the gospel, or propagating it as teachers, or in other spheres of professional and public life. And why should it not be so? Does not God hear prayer? Will he not be inquired of by the house of Israel to do these things for them? If the whole church is looking with intense anxiety upon these young men, and pleading with God for them, if pious friends are tenderly persuading them, and beseeching God in agony of desire for them, can they help thinking of their own souls, of God, of eternity? Can they avoid the conviction that it is high time for them to awake from their guilty slumbers, and flee from the wrath to come. or that, if they now neglect the great salvation, they have just cause to fear that God will leave them to despise and wonder and perish? We reckon nothing more important, than that the heart of the church should be still more thoroughly and warmly turned towards this day of united supplications for her educated youth. With larger faith, and more persevering and universal and importunate prayer for their conversion, what has not the great Head of the church encouraged us to expect? May we not look for their conversion on a scale beyond all precedent? Much as has been done for moral and religious advancement in our colleges, much, very much, remains to be done! And what blessing can be compared with that of rendering the great body of educated youth, who are destined to be leaders and commanders of the people, holy and devout men? Surely every interest of the church and nation, temporal and eternal, is bound up in this. Surely, then, may we not say to all who pray, for this object pray without ceasing?

The decided advance of our colleges in religion has been marked by equal progress in order, diligence, and morality. Of students not professedly pious, the great majority are earnestly prosecuting their studies as a means of support and success in life. Although immoralities and disorders worm their way into academic precincts, they have place there only by stealth, and, for the most part, shrink away in an atmosphere of diligence and order, of high-toned intellectual activity and generous emulation. The Temperance Reformation has doubtless contributed much to the safety of young men in colleges, as well as elsewhere. While no community is exempt from those harpies that thrive on the vices of young men, the admitted fact that intoxicating beverages are noxious, and only noxious, to young men, warrants college authorities to prohibit all use of them, by the most stringent regulations and decisive penalties. The sketch given by Professor Smyth of the fashion as to drinking in Bowdoin College half a century ago, is but too true a picture of what was prevalent among all young men, and in all colleges at that time. We learn from Professor Fisher's discourse, that at an earlier period, the Corporation of Yale College, after a series of ineffectual enactments to arrest expensive drinking entertainments at Commencement, ordered that none of the candidates for Bachelor's degree, "shall have in their chambers, in college, or in the town, any kind of strong drink, besides one quart of wine and one pint of rum for each candidate in a chamber." Surely the world moves, and its movement is not all toward degeneracy.

We think it has been abundantly shown, that our Christian colleges are,—not free from all taint of corruption, or sources of contamination,—but that, compared with other spheres of youthful training, occupation, and exposure, they occupy an enviable position as to their moral and religious influence. This is shown to be so, whether we look at them a priori or a posteriori, whether we consider antecedent probabilities or

actual results. That some young men grow dissolute in college is undeniably true. Where is it otherwise? That the few wrecks of this sort have attracted the gaze of that class who think of colleges as moral cess-pools, while they overlook the vast body of students who become pillars and ornaments of the church and state, is equally true. That of these wrecks, the most had contracted the fatal taint before they set foot within college precincts, is also undeniable. But we ask with all confidence, where else does so much surround and penetrate a youth, fitted to purify, ennoble, refine, and christianize him? Where can he find access to such a body of intelligent, high-minded, moral, and pious associates? Where else has he such materials from which to select genial intimates and boon companions? Where else are looseness and depravity hedged in by more powerful restraints? Where do so large a proportion of young men, between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one, become hopefully pious? Where else have so large a proportion of the great lights of the American church first dedicated themselves to the Lord?

We admit that any youth may find and embrace polluting associates in college. Where may he not? If he takes these in preference to the good and worthy, that is his responsibility. It cannot always be prevented in college or elsewhere by any vigilance of parents, teachers, pastors, or other guardians. But it is his own preference. It is not any fault of colleges, much less any special or peculiar fault of colleges, as compared with other communities. We are convinced that few pass through such colleges as we are familiar with, whatever may be the issue, who do not in their course feel the pressure of inflences for good, such as they rarely have the opportunity of obeying or resisting in any other sphere of life. If, despite all this, they will sow to the flesh, of course, they must of the flesh reap corruption. But let not such an one or his friends charge his ruin to the college. He has committed moral suicide, notwithstanding the mighty agencies employed to prevent it. As well might the profligate in any Christian community, charge his ruin upon the church and pastor who have done their utmost to arrest his mad career.

A college is not the place to which vicious young men should

be sent for correction and reformation. The risk is too great for others, the chances too slight for themselves, in any large body of susceptible youth they may enter. They are more likely to deepen and disseminate the poison than to be purged of it. We have indeed known miracles of grace in some cases of this sort. We call to mind those who entered college dissolute, and after subjection to the severest discipline short of final dismission, became new creatures in Christ, and leaders in powerful revivals. Such cases, however, are exceptional. We cordially adopt the language of Professor Smyth: "Let youth never be sent here to be won from evil courses. A college is not a school of reform, nor a house of correction." It cannot afford to be. The probable evil is too great-the youth thus exposed to contamination too precious. One of its prime duties is, as far as possible, to keep itself clear of corrupt and corrupting inmates.

The most serious moral evil, in itself and its fruits, which still infests our colleges, is the feeling so largely prevalent among students, that their interests are in conflict with those of the Faculty. Out of this arise the evasion, duplicity, and equivocation which characterize many of their communications with their instructors, and which sometimes entrench themselves in the execrable Jesuitical maxim, that lying to the Faculty is justifiable. Of course, only the most unprincipled go this length. But very large numbers go greater or less lengths in this direction. They flatter themselves that they may go thus far and stop, preserving their general character for veracity and uprightness unharmed. This is a deplorable error. It fixes a taint upon character which will always defile it, unless purged away by future tears of bitter repentance. It is implicated with the most serious perplexities of college governments. If these views were once eradicated, the regimen of these communities would differ little from that of the best regulated Christian families. Thus would be obviated the necessity of all those regulations which are rendered necessary by the disposition of the student to offer feigned pretexts, or to do acts which annoy the Faculty indeed-but only because they are injurious to the real interests of the students. We are persuaded that this subject demands the earnest attention

of the friends and guardians of colleges. He who should discover an effectual remedy for it, would confer upon society an inestimable boon, and be one of the greatest of public benefactors. We cordially endorse Professor Fisher, in the following remarks quoted from him, and enforced with emphasis by

Professor Smyth.

"There is another class of sins, which, it is to be hoped, the good sense of young men will before long entirely banish from American colleges. They are the sins—duplicity and direct falsehood being the worst—which spring from a fancied diversity of interest between the pupil and his instructor. A little reflection in after life commonly exposes the plea on which these immoralities are justified. But the effect of them on the conscience and character is not so easily escaped. He who would respect himself, and claim respect from others, must make sincerity, integrity—open and upright dealing with all men—his first virtue."

ART. III.—The New Testament, Translated from the Original Greek; with Chronological arrangement of the Sacred Books, and improved divisions of Chapters and Verses. By Leicester Ambrose Sawyer. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co. 1858. 12mo. pp. 423.

Most of our readers have already some acquaintance with this book, if not by personal inspection, yet by means of the critiques which have been published, and which very fully reproduce the first impression made on various minds by the salient features of this bold experiment, but not without an undue prominence of oddities and startling innovations, and an undue stress upon the simple violation of our old associations, which is after all a secondary ground of judgment. On the whole, however, very ample justice has been done by contemporary journals to the faults of this translation in detail, and we feel neither called by duty nor disposed by inclination to

pursue that process any further. But as all translations of the Bible have an interest for us, and some degree of influence on others, we propose, now that the first storm of derision and exposure has blown over, to supply our readers with a perfectly dispassionate and fair description of the book, with its pretensions and performances, by this means enabling and allowing all who choose to draw their own conclusions.

It is no disparagement of this or any other book, to say that it claims nothing upon any ground but that of its own merit. No appeal is made to any previous performance of the author, or the least light thrown upon his antecedents. We refer, of course, to what appears upon the face of the work itself; for we know the practice of "the trade" too well to hold the author responsible for Mr. Jewett's advertised description of the volume as "the greatest work of this age, or of any age, since King James, 1610," and as "a labour of twenty years, by one of the best Hebrew and Greek scholars in our country, an indefatigable worker and a true man." We can readily suppose that Mr. Sawyer never heard of this description till he saw it in print, and are willing to believe that he considers it as fulsome and absurd as we do. But apart from this professional fanfaronade, the public is acquainted with the author only as a writer on church-government and moral science, and perhaps some other topics of inferior importance, all which he has treated, it may be, respectably enough, but not in such a way as to be speak for this last effort any confidence beforehand, which he therefore very prudently foregoes, and lets his new tub stand upon its own bottom. Not only is the title-page entirely free from all pretensions founded on the past, but even in the Preface, the demand for approbation rests exclusively on what has been accomplished in the case before us.

As the Preface, just referred to, has attracted much attention, and is really, though not so meant, a curious piece of self-description, we begin our notice of the book with some account of it. The first paragraph defines the author's intellectual position, and affords the key-note of the whole performance, by explaining what a good translation ought to be, and stating what this new translation actually is. The author speaks of aiming, it is true, but without the slightest intimation of a fear

that he has missed the mark. "This is not a work of compromises, or of conjectural interpretations of the Sacred Scriptures, neither is it a paraphrase, but a strict literal rendering. It neither adds nor takes away; but aims to express the original with the utmost clearness and force, and with the utmost precision," (p. i.) These are high pretensions—strictness, clearness, force, precision, and the uttermost degree of each—and fully justify the use of the severest tests in ascertaining their validity.

The Preface then proceeds to represent the book as being not a mere "contribution to biblical science," but "a still more important contribution to practical religion." Here again, what is formally described is the "design"; but the tone of the whole passage irresistibly applies the language to the execution. We do not question the sincerity and earnestness with which the author here anticipates a better moral and religious

influence from his translation than from all before it.

The Preface then repudiates the common practice of apologizing for such efforts, and defies beforehand all attempts at opposition and resistance, very clearly showing, although in the form of a historical allusion, that the writer is prepared to brave the ordeal of "fire and sword," and even to accept the "crown of martyrdom," though not without a brave hope that his version, like those of Wiclif and Tyndale, shall live to see its persecutors in the dust, and laugh them to scorn. We regret this waste of moral heroism on so slight an occasion. We have not the least belief that Mr. Sawyer will encounter any persecution worse than that of laughter, which may possibly be unjust and malignant, but will only be promoted by these prefatory demonstrations.

After some instructive statements, clearly and concisely given, as to the dates and authors of the older English versions, with an obvious view to the conclusion, that it is high time to provide another, Mr. Sawyer, with unnecessary violence, attacks the supposed prepossession of the public mind in favour of collective and against individual labour. "Councils did not make the Bible at first." "A council did not make Paradise Lost, and could not; nor has a council ever produced any immortal work of genius or learning, unless it is the

English Bible of King James." "As individuals, therefore, have been eminently successful heretofore, let it be hoped that they may be so again." (P. vii.) However just all this may be, we fear that it will only serve to point the weapons of sarcastic warfare against the book thus tacitly, if not expressly, classed with Paradise Lost and the English Bible, as an "immortal work of genius and learning."

Having shown that a new version is required to make available the vast accumulations in biblical learning since King James's times, the Preface notifies the reader, that the text assumed in this translation is the text of Tischendorf, not merely the critical principles and general conclusions of that justly celebrated writer, but all his emendations of the text, with only two exceptions, which are specified (p. ix.) This entire renunciation of all private judgment, and this wholesale adoption of a single critic's labours, without any reference to those of others, and without distinguishing between the clearest and most doubtful cases, even those in which the critic hesitates himself, and varies in his different editions-this is something so unusual in our age of critical scepticism, that we think the author is entitled to a clear recognition of it, in defining his position and determining his literary standing. It is rendered still more striking by the fact that, while he does not think the work of criticism finished, but believes that future writers will make great advances upon Tischendorf himself, he allows no such advances to be now attempted, but practically treats the text of Tischendorf as perfect. "Readers will be able by this to see what is the Bible, and what is not." (P. ix.)

The re-arrangement of the books, announced upon the title-page, and represented in the Preface as a great improvement on the old one, claims to be "chronological." This might be understood as referring to the subjects of the several books; but as the dates of some are given in the Preface (p. x.), and as Paul's epistles are arranged in what is now very commonly regarded as the order of their origin, this would seem to determine the true sense of "chronological," as having reference to the date of composition. And yet the four historical books, though long posterior in date to most of the epistles, are placed

first, as in the old arrangement.

Another "great improvement," mentioned both on the titlepage and in the Preface (p. ix.), is the new division into chapters and verses. It is well known that the old divisions are entirely without authority, comparatively recent, and of no use, except as mechanical facilities for reference, precisely like the pages of a printed book. In this respect they are invaluable aids; but their value depends, not upon the skill with which they were originally made, but wholly on their long familiarity and general reception. The loss of this advantage would be dearly purchased even by the most artistical or scientific distribution of the matter, such as threw the clearest and most welcome light upon interpretation. Mr. Sawyer's change of the division into chapters seems entirely arbitrary and mechanical, intended for the most part to reduce the number, but in Luke increasing it to thirty-two, retaining some of the most awkward and unskilful of the old divisions, and introducing several still more so.* As to the verses, they are simply thrown together . in larger paragraphs. The only practical effect of this "improvement" is to make collation and comparison between the old and new translations, if not utterly impossible, yet so extremely inconvenient as absolutely to prohibit it in practice. An analogous "improvement," in a different department, would be to re-arrange the alphabet in lexicons and dictionaries, so as to separate the consonants and vowels, or on any other pretext purely theoretical, without regard to the only true use of the alphabetical arrangement, namely, the facility of reference.

With a singular conception of his work as a translator, Mr. Sawyer undertakes, at the conclusion of his Preface, to settle one of the most vexed questions in what is technically called Introduction, by affirming that St. John was not the author of the Book of Revelation. The gratuitous nature of this dictum, its irrelevance as prefatory to a mere translation, upon which it could not possibly have any bearing, the entire omission of all other kindred questions as to authorship, (for instance in the Gospels, Acts, Epistle to the Hebrews, 2d Peter, 2d and 3d John, James, Jude,) and the one-sided argument adduced, all

^{*} See Acts ix-xi, where the old division is retained, and p. 237, where the beginning of Paul's third foreign mission ends a paragraph and chapter.

make us fear that he has hastily caught up some partial statement of the case and swallowed it, without knowing upon what grounds it has been rejected, even by some of the latest and best German writers, and without suspecting that the very circumstance he mentions, i. e. the use of the name John without additional specification, is regarded by that class of writers as among the strongest proofs of apostolical authority and origin.

With equal coolness, and we must say shallowness, he marks two passages of some length as interpolations, without appearing to suspect that there are two sides to the question, much less that the other has been clearly proved to be the right one.

Having now allowed the author to define his own position, and to characterize his own performance, it remains to consider how far this position is tenable and this estimate correct. These questions we desire to settle, not by general and vague description, but by actual exemplification, shunning at the same time an empirical detail of insulated faults and failures, or appeals to prejudice and fixed association, and endeavouring both to save space and secure completeness, by a classification of the facts which we adduce, and an exhibition of the principles on which the version is constructed.

We begin by stating what some of Mr. Sawyer's critics have entirely ignored, if not explicitly denied, to wit, that on the supposition of a new translation being called for, or regarding this as nothing more than a corrective comment on the authorized version, there are some undeniable improvements, chiefly consisting in the change of ambiguous terms, or such as have entirely lost their ancient meaning, for unequivocal and clear equivalents. Most, if not all of these, have been suggested by preceding writers, and can scarcely be regarded as sheer innovations. Such is the change, in many passages, of meat to food, masters to teachers, doctrine to teaching, charity to love, sitting (at table) to reclining, room to place, prevent to anticipate, and several others. Sometimes the change rids us of an awkward periphrasis not in the original, as in the substitution of paralytic for sick of the palsy, expired

for gave up the ghost, dysentery for bloody flux. Sometimes a figure, not in the original and in itself objectionable, is expunged, as in the change of winked at (Acts xvii. 30) to overlooked. Sometimes, but very seldom, the correct sense, as now commonly explained, has been restored, as in the change of all appearance to every form (of evil, 1 Thess. v. 22.) Sometimes, where the meaning is more doubtful, the expression is at least brought nearer to the form of the original, as in the change of private interpretation to own solution (2 Peter i. 20,) and the root of all evil to a root of all evils (1 Tim. v. 10.) Sometimes the same thing is effected with respect to the precise form of the syntax or construction, where the sense remains the same, as in the substitution of the participial forms, the lost and the saved, for the enfeebling relative construction, them that perish and are saved (1 Cor. i. 18); the multitude standing and hearing for the people that stood by and heard it (John xii. 29.) Sometimes in addition to the restoration of the Greek construction, a material error is precluded on the part of the unlearned reader, as when should betray him is exchanged for was (or was about) to betray him (John vi. 64.) Now and then the improvement has been borrowed from the margin of the English Bible, which is part and parcel of the authorized version, as when the paraphrase, the law is open, is exchanged for the translation, court-days are held (marg. kept, Acts xix. 38.) To these may be added some few cases, one of which has been already cited for another purpose, where the version is improved by the omission or insertion of the article, according to the requisitions of the modern philology. But these cases are outnumbered by a multitude of others, where the same rule is applied empirically and without discrimination, as if an article must always stand in English where it stands in Greek, and vice versa, without regard to difference of idiom, which extends to this as well as to the other parts of speech.

While we recognize the merit of these changes, as improvements on the common version, most of which had already been proposed or introduced in exposition, we are bound to add that they are few in number, and that many similar amendments, no less obvious, and at least as necessary, are entirely omitted

in this new translation. It may indeed be stated still more generally, as a characteristic of the author, that he does his work by halves: that even what he seems to recognize as great improvements, he has failed to carry out, except in a few cases, which engross his whole attention, or withdraw it from a multitude of others of precisely the same nature; thus imparting to his version an unfinished and one-sided character, of which its enemies may take advantage, unless corrected in a new edition. To facilitate this process, we shall now exemplify the general description which we have just given, by enumerating some specific cases.

One of the most striking features of this version is the absolute exclusion of some words which have been hitherto considered indispensable in biblical translation, because expressive of ideas inseparable from the Christian system, because no equivalents are furnished by the language, and because the terms before used have been wrought into the very texture of religious phraseology. Among these words are gospel, church, repentance, and temptation (with the cognate verbs repent and tempt.) Some, unacquainted with the author's boldness and decision, will be slow to believe, what is nevertheless literally true, that excepting a few cases where he has forgotten his own rule and inadvertently employed the tabooed forms. and a few more where he has been forced to add the word church in brackets as a sort of note or comment, these familiar terms are universally replaced by good news, assembly, change of mind, and trial.

That the author should have thought it an advantage per se to get rid of these words, and to tear up by the roots their manifold associations, we are neither willing to believe, nor able to imagine, but are bound to take for granted that he felt himself constrained by some inexorable law of language to make this sacrifice, so painful to himself and others. If so, it is easy to perceive that this inexorable law was one requiring words to be translated in accordance with their primary and "proper" meaning, as determined by their etymology or derivation. Thus the lexicons give change of mind, assembly, trial, and good news, as the original idea or essential meaning of the Greek words, μετάνοια, ἐχαλησία, πειρασμός, εὐαγγέλιον. Mr.

Sawyer, therefore, substitutes this primary import for the conventional translation, with a care and uniformity which show how much importance he attaches to the principle.

But if the principle is sound, if words must always be translated by their primary and etymological equivalents, why is the application of this law to be restricted to the few words above given, and perhaps as many more of less importance? Why are angel, elder, deacon, disciple, synagogue, apostle, gentiles, and a multitude of other secondary senses, here retained, to the exclusion of the primary and strict ones, messenger, old man, waiter, learner, meeting, missionary, nations? Above all, how can baptism and baptize be reconciled with this inviolable canon of translation, which requires words to be taken, not in their conventional and customary but their primary and strict sense? Mr. Sawyer's practice as to gospel, church, &c. is a full concession of the ground on which the Baptists urge a new translation.

But while the principle, if true, must be applied to all these cases, irrespectively or recklessly of consequences, it is proved by the cases themselves to be a false one. If in all the words which have been cited, the New Testament usage is derivative and secondary; if, as a general rule, admitted by all sound philologists, classical terms, applied to Christian subjects, undergo a modification of their meaning to adapt them to their purpose; if such changes are in fact what constitute the Hellenistic dialect, as differing from the Attic, or the xoun dialexτος; and if no reason can be given for excepting those which Mr. Sawyer has excepted; then we fear that in order to be decently consistent, he must either go a great deal further or go back to the familiar but despised words, gospel, church, repentance, and temptation. These are in fact the only single representatives or equivalents of the corresponding Greek words. It is just as certain and as clear as any other fact of lexicography, that ἐχχλησία, in the Greek of the New Testament. does not mean an assembly, simply as such, but a body of men called out and called together by divine command for a religious purpose; that πειρασμός never denotes trial in the general. but trial of character, especially by giving men the opportunity of doing either right or wrong, and for the most part more specific-

ally still, by direct solicitation or incitement to sin. To render such words by the vague terms trial and assembly, is as incorrect in kind, though not in degree, as it would be to render Busileiz a ruler, or $\theta = \delta z$ a spirit. The case is still worse with the other two words, gospel and repentance; for the sense attached to them is not the primary and strict one after all. In the classics, εθαγγέλιον never means good news, but a reward for bringing it, and in the Greek of the New Testament, specifically good news of salvation, sent from God to man. According to the best etymological analysis of μετάνοια, its primary import is not change of mind, but afterthought, reflection, while in the New Testament it always means specifically change of mind (i. e. both of judgment and feeling) upon moral subjects, with particular reference to one's own conduct. To translate terms thus used change of mind and good news is as incorrect as it would be to exchange prayer and sacrifice for wish and slaughter. With respect to this whole notion of insisting on the primary or "proper" sense of words, without regard to their conventional or actual usage, we shall only quote (from memory) what Sydney Smith said of the Quakers' objection to the names of the days of the week, as heathen in their origin, that if we go so far back, we must take sincere as a synonyme of unwaxed, and consider as meaning to put stars together.

Another instance of one-sided inconsistency in urging some things and neglecting others of the same kind, is the constant use of the uncouth form Nazorwan, as an epithet of Jesus. What we object to here is not the restoration of the adjective or gentile form instead of that used in the common version (Jesus of Nazareth.) Such a change is desirable, at least in exposition, on account of the prophecy in Matt. ii. 23, He shall be called a Nazarene. But why must this familiar and endeared form be exchanged for Nazoraun? On the principle, that every proper name must be exactly reproduced as it is written in Greek letters? Even granting that the form Nαζωραῖος is the true text, has it any more claim to be thus carefully preserved than Jesus, Elias, Eliseus, Osee, Cis, which Mr. Sawyer has, with great alacrity and wisdom, written Joshua, Elijah, Elisha, Hosea, Kish? These are not even Hebrew forms, but English ones, familiar to the English

reader, although far less dear to him than Nazarene. After swallowing these camels of orthography, it does seem pharisaical to strain out or to strain at such a gnat as Nazoræan.

Another instance of this disproportionate attention to a single class of objects, while a multitude of others, not unlike them, are neglected, is afforded by the zeal and assiduity with which Mr. Sawyer explains ancient measures, weights, and coins, by printing within brackets what he takes to be their modern equivalents. It might be asked on what consistent principle these comments have been introduced at all into a simple version, and why either one or the other equivalent was not suppressed, as in the rest of the translation. But apart from this general objection to such glosses, as belonging rather to interpretation, it may still be asked what special value or importance can belong to these particular specifications, rendering it necessary to define them with elaborate precision, not omitting fractions. Even granting that the values are correctly given, which is doubtful, as the best authorities often vary as to such details, why is the reader any more interested to know how many mills would make an ancient penny, or how many pecks would make an ancient bushel, than to know a hundred other things left unexplained? The information thus imparted is by no means always necessary to the just interpretation of the passage. For example, when our Lord says that a candle is not lighted to be put under a bushel or a bed, why are the precise dimensions of the bushel any more important to the sense than the dimensions of the bed, since both are used for the same purpose, and that a purpose not at all connected with their size? In fact, the modius is mentioned not as a measure at all, but as a vessel or utensil, which might have been exchanged for box or basket, without any variation in the sense.

But even granting that such comments are legitimate and needed, why restrict them to this single class of words? On what intelligible principle are metretes and denarii and stadiums to be left in the text of the translation, with a bracketed gloss annexed, while synagogue, and proselyte, and cohort, and centurion, and legion, are left unexplained, and prefect, lictor, procurator, proconsul, athlete, Sanhedrim, Tartarus, and

Hades, are introduced for the first time without a word of explanation? It is plain that consistency requires one of these two courses; either that the same mode of explanation should be equally extended to all Greek and Latin words retained in the translation, or that those denoting coins and measures should be treated like the rest, and left to find their definition in the lexicons or expositions. The truth is, that these matters are determined by a sort of fashion, and that Mr. Sawyer, with all his independence and decision, has been led into these inconsistencies by imitating others. We are glad that he has not gone the whole length of his models, or he might have revived the inextinguishable laughter raised by Campbell in his Dissertations on the Gospels, at the expense of the unhappy Frenchman, who reduced the five and ten pounds of our Lord's instructive parable, where all depends upon proportion, not upon intrinsic value, to the fractional equivalents of French or English currency. Such cases are instructive as disclosing the false principle involved in others not so palpably absurd, or even plausibly defensible upon some utilitarian pretext.

We have hitherto left out of view one most essential feature of this version, upon which its claims as a competitor or rival of King James's Bible must materially rest. We mean the English into which it is translated. Mr. Sawyer may not be aware, but we must venture to inform him or remind him, that the English of the present day is not a single, narrow, straight canal, nor even a broad river with a single channel, but a mighty flood with many affluents and branches, overspreading a large portion of the earth, and wherever it flows, presenting some peculiarities of course or surface. Here the stream has brought down more, there less, of the old drift-wood; here it is coloured more than yonder by the soil through which it percolates, or by the scenery which overlangs it. Or to drop the metaphor, though just and natural, the dialects of English, as now spoken, even by the educated classes, differ greatly in their measure of adherence to old usage, both in lexicography and grammar. Forms are still used in New England which are elsewhere obsolete; the same is true of Virginia and Jamaica, Scotland and Ireland, and of different places, classes, and conditions in England itself. The further we depart from the cradle of the language, the more we find a tendency to drop what still remains in use there, whether absolutely or in exchange for new and local forms. This process, naturally tending to impoverish the language, may be checked and counteracted by a common literature, and especially by cherishing the old part of the language, not attempting to accelerate, but rather to retard that process of mutation which is really essential to the life of every spoken tongue, but which will always travel fast enough, without the use of artificial means to quicken it. It will therefore be found, in every civilized nation, and especially in every English-speaking country, that while common parlance and the usage of the newspaper press are constantly producing innovations, some gratuitous and others unavoidable, the influence of scholars and of cultivated tastes is to withstand this process, so as to retard but not entirely to prevent it. This conservative tendency is powerfully aided by the continued circulation of old English books among us, by the more or less extended use of Shakspeare, Milton, Addison, the English Prayer Book, and the English Bible. These exhaustless wells of English undefiled are constantly neutralizing and diluting the new waters, fresh and bilge, flowing in from other sources.

It is natural enough for those who know all this to be a little jealous of proposed improvements, and especially when any of these ancient safeguards is attacked in this way, to inquire who it is that is attempting it, by what attainments or experience he is qualified for such a task, and by what means he undertakes to do it. Should such a reformer, in reply to these inquiries, say he knows or cares nothing about old English, that to him the language is identical with what he learnt at school and has since read in the papers, without any reference to what is used in England, India, or Australia, or to what was used a hundred years ago; the answer would be perfectly decisive, if not wholly satisfactory.

But from this ideal case we turn to that before us and endeavour to describe, as fairly as we can, the dialect in which this version is composed. And first, we may premise that there is nothing to imply unusual familiarity with English classics, old or new, nor any of that curiosa felicitas and copia verborum,

which commonly bear witness to the love and study of the best models. In addition to the meagreness arising from the absence of such culture, there is what may be called a voluntary poverty, like that of the monastic orders, a deliberate attempt to cut off all variety of forms, all choice between alternative expressions, and a settled resolution to say every thing according to the stereotyped formula of some provincial school or circle. Thus the English verb, but poor at best in temporal and modal forms, is here reduced to its most beggarly condition, stripped of its subjunctive mood and forced to be exclusively indicative or jussive, even when the sense to be expressed is a contingent one. If it be, if it were, which every gentleman in England, and a multitude in these United States, still use for the expression of a shade of meaning different from if it is and if it was, are here confounded with them and rejected as superfluous. This single instance may illustrate a whole class of such grammatical excisions, all resulting in a paucity of forms and a rigidity of sameness. How "thoroughly modern" this translation is in point of English Grammar, may be gathered from the constant use of eat as an imperfect, and the occurrence of such forms as have drank (p. 416,) preach you (p. 265,) and to have go (p. 231.)

As we must deal in examples, and yet cannot cite more than a few, we choose such as represent the greatest number of particular cases, or in other words, such as are most frequently repeated. One of these, which stares the reader in the face on almost every page, and which illustrates more than one point of the author's English, is the merciless proscription of the plural brethren, and the constant substitution of what grammarians call the "regular" form, brothers. We have noticed only one place where the former has been suffered to remain, but whether inadvertently, or on some secret ground of lawfulness in that one case, we dare not even guess. Now why is this change made? Not because the one form is more "regular"; for surely Mr. Sawyer would not, if he could, say oxes, childs, and mans, instead of oxen, children, men, though this is the unquestionable tendency of much that is esteemed grammatical correctness among modern pedagogues. Is it because brethren is not fully understood by every child and slave who

speaks the English language? The Bible itself has nullified this reason, and the same end is promoted by the use of the term, not only in religious but in social and political parlance. The only ground for the exclusion then is that the other form is younger, having come into common circulation since the Bible was translated. But this would only be a reason for preferring it, in case the other had gone out of use, or ceased to be intelligible; whereas both have continued side by side, the younger denoting the mere natural relation, while the older comprehends a variety of others, all included in the usage of the Greek ἀδελφοί, to which brothers, therefore, is not an equivalent. This is one out of a multitude of cases, in which overstrained precision aggravates the evil which it seeks to remedy. But over and above this reason for retaining the old word, as in many cases necessary to a strict translation, it deserves to be retained for the very reason that it is old, and has never lost its place in current English, and is just as clearly understood as brothers, from Valentia to Victoria, from Calcutta to Chicago. What a dialect must that be, in which brethren is as strange a word as church or gospel!

Another sample of the same impoverishing process, and the same provincial narrowness of usage, though unworthy of attention but for its perpetual occurrence, is the constant substitution of the pronoun you for thou and thee and ye, thus happily reducing, at a single stroke, four distinct and most familiar forms to one. It might be plausibly alleged, that this monotony ought rather to be shunned than sought; that the use of one form in so many senses is as contrary to good taste as to sound philosophy; that the change in general colloquial usage is itself a reason for maintaining the old forms in books: that their continued use among the Quakers, and in many parts of Britain, renders this still more allowable. But no, our author is inflexible. He finds one form for both the cases and both numbers of the second person to be quite enough for him and his, and he resolves that others shall have no more, either in talking or in reading the Bible. The consistency of all this is presented in a bright light by the one exception, that of prayer to God. And why is this excepted? Simply because modern English practice happens to retain it, without any valid reason. and in opposition to the foreign papal usage, which, with some show of reason, uses the more courteous form in prayer as well as in polite conversation. Thus the tendency is still to lop off and to tear away the few remaining boughs of the old English tree, yet clinging to King James's Bible, and to make the language just as bare and lifeless as a maypole or an awning-post.

There is one prevailing weakness, as to English words, from which our author seems entirely free, the rage for Saxon vocables, to the exclusion of all French and Latin forms, as if the former by themselves would make a language worth preserving. Mr. Sawyer, far from giving into this extravagance, most evidently verges towards the opposite extreme, and always gives the preference to what is not of Saxon birth, whenever he can choose between them. To this happy prejudice we owe the introduction of such fine sonorous forms as subjugate, excavate, circulate, criminate, extinguish, aliments, insipid, argument, precipitate, compensate, athlete, cauterize, crystallize, archetype, perceptive, libation, and some others, which have too long been excluded from the English Bible. Hence the happy substitution of collect for gather, conceal for hide, product for fruit, select for choose, exterior for outer, mortal for deadly, injure for hurt, pure and impure for clean and unclean, even in speaking of corporeal washing; and of eternal for everlasting, even where the reference is only to the future. Another symptom of the author's taste is the increased number of original Greek forms retained in the translation, and to be henceforth reckoned as good English. Besides certain names of coins and measures, which have been already mentioned as accompanied by explanations, we have also, without note or comment, such euphonious forms as athlete, myth, iris, chiliarch, hades, tartarus, &c., to which may be added, drawn from oriental sources, the Hebrew sanhedrim and the Persian khan, the last as a more popular and modern synonyme of the obscure old English inn. Sometimes, instead of retaining the original, the translation is enriched by a supposed equivalent in Latin, such as lictor, procurator, proconsul, cranium, all which, except the last, are pure gain to the Greek text as well as to the English Bible; or by a mongrel combination of the Latin prefix co- (so much more modern and expressive than fellow)

with a Greek or English word, as in co-laborer, co-presbyter, and co-elect. Sometimes the improvement is in Natural History as well as English, for example in the change of brimstone to sulphur, husks to carob-pods, and tares to poisonous darnel.

Too much credit cannot be awarded to the author for his strenuous exertions to distinguish things that differ, where the difference is so important as to make it worth the trouble. We have seen that the distinction between thou and thee, ye and you, is not considered worth preserving, even in such a case as Luke xxii. 31, 32, where the line is drawn so clearly, by the use of the singular and plural pronouns, between Peter and his brethren (O sit venia verbo!) We have seen that everlasting and eternal are confounded as convertible expressions. But when we come to the distinction between baskets, there is no such indiscrimination practised. As the words used in the two creative miracles of feeding the multitudes are not the same, and as that by which Paul was let down from the wall of Damascus, is called in 2 Corinthians by a third name, the author could not conscientiously confound them, and accordingly translates them, travelling-basket, store-basket, rope-basket. Without stopping to dispute the truth of these distinctions, it may still be questioned whether it would not have been a more exact translation of three single words entirely unlike, to use as many corresponding forms in English, such as hamper, crate or hurdle, unless these are all extinct in "modern style," than to let the English reader think that a word meaning basket is employed in all three cases, with a qualifying epithet prefixed to each. Another nice distinction is between the words άγαπάω and φιλέω, both translated love in the common version of John xxi. 15-17. To mark this, which the author seems to think important, he translates the second verb, I am a friend (to you.) This singular precision as to love and baskets. makes it more unfortunate that in that famous pair of verbs (γινώσχω and ἐπίσταμαι) which no interpreter has ever thoroughly explained, the author gives it up, and modestly transcribes the common version, Jesus I know and Paul I know (Acts xix. 15.) Other words where he has failed to show the same discriminating gift as in the baskets, are the twenty verbs translated show in our Bible, the fifteen rendered bring

forth, the eleven answering to consider, the one-and-twenty to depart, and the same number to take. We do not mean to say that Mr. Sawyer has retained all these, for we have not examined; but we do make bold to say that he has not found as many corresponding terms for these important words as for those denoting baskets.

Besides the changes which appear to have resulted from the preference of Greek and Latin forms to those of Saxon origin, we now proceed to specify a few which can only be ascribed to the author's taste for "a thoroughly modern style" (Preface, p. 1), even where the sense is not materially affected. Under this head we may place such forms as fishermen (for fishers) of men, white washed tombs (for whited sepulchres), private rooms (for secret chambers), picking heads (for plucking ears), pasturage (for pasture), precipice (for steep bank), girl (for damsel), perform (for do), do no business (for have no dealings), on my account (for for my sake), good courage (for good cheer), avarice (for covetousness), servitude (for bondage), pious and piety (for godly and godliness), died for nothing (for died in vain), anger (for wrath), speaks still (for yet speaketh), leads off as prey (for carries captive), chief guide and perfecter (for author and finisher). It would be so easy to extend this process on the same rule, or rather without any, that we know not whether to regret that it has gone so far, or to wish that it may go still further.

In this conversion of an antique into a "thoroughly modern style," it would have been surprising if he had not sometimes hit the wrong nail on the head, and changed the sense as well as the expression. Thus brokers, goods, custom-house, and sailing-master, are all thoroughly modern terms, but unfortunately not expressive of the things intended. The construction, too, is sometimes missed, as in the question of the magi, Where is the King of the Jews born? and in many other cases, which we have noted but need not specify, where the

sense is either wrongly or inadequately given.

When we open a new version of such high pretensions and containing multitudes of changes which we are obliged to take upon the author's credit, it is natural to turn up some of the hard places, where the common version has been long regarded as defective, in the hope of finding some desirable improvement. In pursuing this course we have found with some surprise that several of these places, and among the most important, stand unaltered, without any means of ascertaining whether they were simply overlooked, or whether we are now to look upon the old translation as the right one after all. As samples of this class we name the well known case in Matt. xxviii. 14, where the best interpreters are now agreed, that both the form and the connection peremptorily require a reference to judicial hearing in the presence of the governor, and not an accidental rumour. The new version changes the expression, but retains the sense (if this is heard of by the procurator.) Another is the famous phrase, I see men, as trees walking (Mark viii. 24), where the old ambiguity, to say the least, is still retained, and English readers left to construe walking not with men but trees, which is impossible in Greek. A third case is the old mistake of cloven tongues (Acts ii. 3), here simply changed into divided, whereas usage peremptorily requires distributed (among them.) The inexact translation, save yourselves, instead of be saved, is retained in Peter's pentecostal sermon (Acts ii. 40), in the midst of many less important changes. The paraphrastic version, put to death (Acts xii. 19), remains unaltered, though the literal translation (led away) sufficiently suggests what followed. The retention of the old phrase, should be kept (Acts xxv. 4), is more remarkable because it not only disturbs the sense but is also a subjunctive form, not found in the original. The only other case which we shall mention is the strongest, that of live in Acts xxiii. 1, where the whole sense is affected by this strangely inadequate translation of a Greek verb which can only mean to be a citizen or act as one.

It was not to be expected that the author, in adopting a "thoroughly modern style," would be able to succeed at once in purging out the old leaven of antique expression from the text of Scripture. This can only be effected in a series of editions, such as those which formed and settled the Greek text in the sixteenth and succeeding centuries. In aid of this important work, we venture to suggest the following words and phrases as scarcely falling under the description of "thoroughly

modern." Ship of old was equivalent to vessel, but is now restricted to a certain class. The word boat has been substituted sometimes but not always. Fishes is not the modern plural of fish, which serves both turns, as you does four. Watch is not modern in its primary sense of wake, but only in its secondary sense of quard. Bottles is not the modern name of skins for holding liquids, the material having now become no less essential than the use. Legion is not a modern military term, and ought to have been either changed or explained in brackets. Platter may be modern in some places, but is not so in all dialects. Draught of fishes, to be modern in the sense of this book, should be haul of fish, and herd of many swine should be a large drove of hogs. Whomsoever (for whoever), lightly (in the sense of easily or readily), besought (for begged), espoused (for married or engaged), behold (for see, or look here), blessed (for happy, fortunate, or lucky), harlot (for prostitute), husbandman (for farmer), householder (for housekeeper, landlord, or the like), mansions (for residences, homes, or dwellings), lord (for master, as opposed to servant), bonds (for imprisonment), nourished (for supported), oracles (for words or revelations), are all more or less infected with the vice of being old expressions. The same thing may be said of certain phrases, such as bill of divorcement, children of the bridechamber, take counsel, set at nought, use it rather, reasonable service, blackness of darkness, come short, in a figure (and of certain collocations and inversions, such as, neither tell I you-I go to try them-when came you hither-whence he is-him he hears-will one die-begat he us -seal not up-and all heard I. Not one of these properly belongs to the "thoroughly modern style," in which this version is composed, and into which all this must be translated, if the work is to have any consistent uniformity of diction.

Among the old forms thus retained, we have observed a few, which do not seem to have been clearly understood, or perhaps are retained in a modern sense, distinct from that belonging to them in the common version. Such are the words offend, offence, which Mr. Sawyer seems to understand as meaning displease, displeasure, as he sometimes changes in or at to

with. We need not say that in Old English, as in Latin, these words have a far more comprehensive meaning. Another such word is the verb to reason, which has very sensibly modified its usage. Injurious now means hurtful, but of old retained more of its moral sense, implying violation of right. Inform is several times used in the old legal sense of accusation, whereas now it would convey the bare idea of communicating knowledge. Ought, the imperfect tense of owe, is not a mere auxiliary form, but a distinct verb, and requires to be otherwise expressed in modern English. Ought not Christ to suffer these things? means far more than was it not his duty? which is all that the translation now conveys to English readers. The retention of these old forms, which have changed their meaning, in the work before us, makes us apprehensive that the author has not constantly "translated from the Greek," but sometimes made his labour easy by attempting to improve the common version.

There is one class of changes which we must not pass unnoticed, as the author seems to have bestowed considerable care upon it, and no doubt attaches much importance to it. We refer to the euphemistic changes, or removal of indelicate expressions, which is always a severe test of the writer's taste. and serves to show whether he is really refined or only nice, according to Swift's famous definition. From the nature of the subject, we can only give a few of the substituted phrases, with a reference to the places where they are inserted. To the earth (Matt. xv. 17.)—Put on manure (Luke xiii. 8.)—Became pregnant (Luke i. 24.)—Became a mother (Heb. xi. 11.)— Gave it birth (Rev. xii. 2.)—Gave me being (Gal. i. 15.) -Obtained him in my bonds (Phil. 10.)-Become an unborn infant of his mother (John iii. 4.) - Of foreign birth (Heb. xii. 8.)-Marriage life without blame (Heb. xiii. 4.) We must confess that most of these corrections seem to us entirely gratuitous, and all of them unskilfully performed, especially the last but one, where foreign birth, as used in modern English, gives a sense wholly different from that of the Greek νόθοι, the equivalent of which is spurious (illegitimate), not foreign (or outlandish.)

Whatever be the value of the foregoing strictures, every reader will perceive that they are not the fruit of casual or cursory inspection, but of thorough and deliberate examination. All the examples cited, and a multitude of others necessarily omitted, have been noted in the course of a continuous perusal, and then carefully digested under heads, as we have here presented them. By this laborious induction of particulars, we have endeavoured to avoid a superficial and empirical mode of treatment, and to put it in the power of our readers, who are not themselves acquainted with the book before us, to sit in judgment on the truth or falsehood of a few summary conclusions, which we now feel justified in drawing, for the sake of recapitulation and conclusion, not from abstract premises, but from the very data which we have already furnished and could easily increase fourfold.

1. The first of these conclusions is, that this translation does embody a few obvious corrections and improvements, which have long been floating on the surface of our exegetical literature, consisting partly in the dropping of ambiguous or wholly unintelligible terms, and partly in a simplification of the syntax by a nearer approach to the original construction.

2. In making these legitimate corrections the translator often changes both the sense and the construction for the worse; while on the other hand defects and imperfections, no less obvious and commonly admitted than the few which have been rectified, are left entirely untouched, either through ignorance or inadvertence.

3. In many cases, where there seems to be no effort to improve the sense, the form is gratuitously marred, by the exchange of words still perfectly familiar and intelligible, either for pedantic and exotic synonymes, or for equivalents no more expressive or exact, and generally less so.

4. This arbitrary process has been pushed so far as to exclude from the translation some of the most precious and familiar terms of our religious phraseology, their places being filled by vague and inexact equivalents, and sometimes by diluted paraphrase, the whole proceeding on a false principle of lexicography and a factitious canon of translation.

5. The English dialect adopted in this version is a hard and meagre one, rejecting all variety of forms in lexicography and grammar, and excluding, as obsolete or incorrect, expressions still entirely current and familiar in the best usage both of England and America, thus assuming as the standard of the language what appears to be by no means the most eligible even of its local or provincial variations.

6. Even in carrying out the doubtful or erroneous principles already mentioned, there is no consistent uniformity, the process being pushed to an extreme in one case, or one class of cases, while in others wholly undistinguishable from them, it is either not applied at all or so imperfectly, that what is changed and what is left produce the painful and incongruous impression of an old but still sound garment gratuitously patched with undressed cloth of the crudest quality and coarsest texture. This is the secret of the shock which every cultivated reader feels on opening the book, it scarcely matters where; a shock which could not be produced by simple innovation, how extravagant soever, but which really arises from the motley piebald mixture of incongruous materials, constraining every one not "thoroughly modern" in his taste and education to cry out, in a paroxysm of æsthetic nausea, "the old is better!"

7. The impression irresistibly produced upon the mind of the unbiassed reader, in relation to the author, is extremely favourable to his honesty and courage; to his honesty, in thinking that a great and glorious work is to be done, and that he not only is raised up to do it, but has actually done it; to his courage, in deliberately setting at defiance the religious prepossessions and associations of at least two centuries and many millions; the taste of the whole English-speaking race insensibly matured and chastened by a matchless literature, secular and sacred; and, to a great extent, the actual colloquial usage of the two most enlightened and instructed nations in exist-tence.

8. It is scarcely requisite to add, that this translation is not likely soon to supersede the English Bible; that even if its merits were as great as Mr. Jewett represents, the power of old prejudice and fixed association would be still too strong for it.

However wrong and foolish it may be, the very errors of the old translation will prove more attractive to this evil generation, and to many after it, than Mr. Sawyer's most superb improvements; so that "fire and sword" would be as powerless in forcing this new version down the throats of a regorging public, as in quelling his own manful resolution so to force it.

9. We regret to be obliged to say that, even as a modest contribution to the great work of revising and correcting the old version, Mr. Sawyer's book has no extraordinary value. This is only a corollary from the facts already stated, that he leaves untouched some of the places most in need of retractation, and that a vast proportion of the changes which he does make are either without use or for the worse, in point of taste, exactness, or correct interpretation.

10. This being the case, the interesting question, as to the retention or revision of King James's Bible, stands precisely where it did before the sudden apparition of "the greatest work of this age or of any age since King James, 1610." And as this great question must continue to increase in interest and importance for all English-speaking Christians, they will naturally look to other quarters for the hope and means of its solution. Their attention will especially be turned to the accomplished scholars of Old England, equally familiar with the ancient and the modern, with the classical and biblical authorities, a class represented by the present Dean of Westminster, nearly all whose corrections and improvements Mr. Sawyer claims to have anticipated (Preface, p. ix), but of whom we may take an early opportunity to show, that unlike his American competitor, and like a scribe discipled into the kingdom of heaven, he brings out of his treasure things both new and old.

ART. IV.—The Position of Hosea in the Scheme of Divine Revelation.

Der Prophet Hosea erklärt und übersetzt von Dr. August Simson, u. s. w. 8vo. pp. 352.

THE Old Testament consists of thirty-nine distinct but not unrelated books. It is not an aggregate of treatises having no other bond of union than that they chance to be bound together in the same volume, or have proceeded from the midst of the same people, or contain an exposition of the same system of religion. Nor is the whole truth exhausted by saying that they are all alike inspired. They contain the record of a divine scheme of training, under which Israel was placed with reference to the future Messiah and the dispensation which he was to introduce. The unity and consistent progress of this scheme involve the unity of the Old Testament and the intimate relation of all its parts, which thus conspire together to one predetermined end. This being so, to be studied aright this portion of the sacred volume should be treated as one harmonious whole, and the endeavour made to understand its various parts, not in themselves alone, but in their relation to the rest, and the place which they severally occupy in the general plan. As God is the wisest of teachers, we may derive instruction from his methods, as well as from his lessons; and it behoves us to give heed at once to the truth and to the fitness of his teachings, both as respects the general design and each particular emergency.

The structure of the Old Testament in its main divisions is obvious and simple. The books of Moses, which form its earliest portion, and lie at the foundation of the whole, record the constitution which God gave to Israel as his chosen people, and under which they were to be kept in pupilage until the times of the Messiah. The historical books exhibit this constitution in actual operation, and show the conduct of the people under it, and the leadings of God's providence with respect to them and it. The poetical books reveal the divinely guided struggles of the pious as they strive to realize the perfection of the law in

themselves, or to understand the consistency of its teachings with the ordinary experience of the world. The books of the prophets recall the transgressing people to the law by reenacting its precepts and solemn sanctions, and by a growing fulness in their exposition of the goal to which all was

tending.

Prophets had been raised up amongst the chosen people from time to time, from their first settlement in Canaan. But it was not until the reigns of Uzziah of Judah, and the second Jeroboam of Israel, that the conjuncture arrived in both kingdoms which called for the permanent recording of prophecy. The kingdom of the ten tribes was then upon the eve of its rejection and downfall. The mighty ministries of Elijah and Elisha had been tried upon them, but had failed to turn the mass of the people or their rulers back to God. The partial reformation of Jehu had never advanced beyond the abolition of Baal-worship. The idolatrous service of the calves and the schismatical separation from the temple at Jerusalem still continued, and the moral corruption consequent upon religious apostasy made the people an abomination. The instrument of their destruction was already preparing, and that generation would see its accomplishment. The last king of vigorous and successful sway was on the throne; from that time onward the history of Israel presents a constant succession of regicides, usurpations, anarchies, and civil wars, until the Lord in anger cast them out from his presence. But before such an extraordinary step was taken as the excision of ten-twelfths of the chosen people, it was important for the justification of the ways of God, the warning of future transgressors, and the consolation and information of the truly pious, that the grounds of it should be clearly stated, and left in a permanent form. Consequently the prophets, who were commissioned to make the last unsuccessful effort for their reformation, were instructed to make it appear both to their hearers and to all future ages, that they suffered as they did, not from the inability of their covenant God to protect them, for he had repeatedly warned them of this, and himself brought it upon them; and that he was not herein unfaithful to his promises made of old to their fathers,

for Israel was dealt with justly, and those promises should after all be fulfilled.

At the same time that crisis occurred in the affairs of Judah, which led to a new form of prophetic labour, and to the reduction of prophecies to writing in that kingdom likewise. Judah was not utterly apostate, and was not to suffer total rejection; but she was entering upon a new and important stage of her history, the meaning of which needed to be explained to herself and others. A recent writer has suggested that the history of the chosen people may be regarded as successively typical of the three offices of the Redeemer. As organized under the Levitical law given in the wilderness, they appear in their sacerdotal character, containing in the midst of them the atoning sacrifice and the interceding priest. They had not yet attained their ultimate form of civil organization. This was reached under David, when they became a kingdom with a line of princes upon the throne, to whom perpetual sovereignty was promised. When in later years the glory of the kingdom waned, the prophetic character of the people stood more distinctly forth in the new prominence of the prophetic order, and in the nation being itself made the teacher of the world, and spreading abroad the knowledge of the Messiah's mission and character as had never been done before. By others the history of the chosen people has been regarded as typical of the two states of Christ in an inverted order: the glory of the kingdom under David and Solomon setting forth his state of exaltation, its subsequent depression his state of humiliation. which was nevertheless in the case of the type as well as of the antitype, a passage-way to new splendour and elevation.

It is with this last period, which according to these views presents Judah in her prophetic character, or in her humiliation, that we are now concerned. The sins of the people were such that they needed severe judgments to purify them, and bring them back to God, and keep them from turning aside completely from the fulfilment of their high destiny. This work of judgment was to proceed even to the extent of dispersing them widely among the nations, thus scattering everywhere the seed of the divine word, and preparing auditors in every land for the gospel when it should come to be preached in its fulness. The

hostility of the surrounding heathen was made the instrument of effecting these ends; especially the great Asiatic empire, which bearing essentially the same character, and embracing the same territory, changing only its centre and seat, was successively known as the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian, and subsequently fell under the Greek and Roman dominion. This was to be the rod of Judah's chastisement, and the instrument of their dispersion. It was besides to accomplish the work among the heathen themselves of breaking up their separate nationalities, and reducing them to one homogeneous mass, governed by the same laws, and amenable to a common authority, over which, when the proper time had arrived, the gospel might spread without encountering the obstructions which the existence of petty and independent States would everywhere

have interposed.

Upon the threshold of these grand movements in Judah and in the heathen world, the prophets were commissioned to unfold their design and the duties which they involved, for the instruction and comfort of their contemporaries and of succeeding generations. Unexplained they would have presented a most perplexing and distressing problem, fraught with temptation, on the one hand to unbelief, on the other to despondency. The people of God were to be depressed while the heathen triumphed over them, even to the destruction of their State, the overthrow of the city where God had recorded his name, the burning of his temple, and the exile of the people from the land which he had given them. This would give occasion to the unbeliever to say that the gods of the heathen were mightier than the God of Judah: it would suggest to the heart of the believer the desponding conclusion that God had cast off his transgressing people, and that his covenant with their fathers was annulled. The prophets give the solution of this anomalous condition of affairs. They show the people that what they were enduring was both just and necessary. This humiliation and suffering was needed to purge them from sin; it was by this means they were to accomplish the task, assigned them in preparation for Messiah's coming, of making his mission known among the nations: it would, when its ends were answered, lead to the glory, which belonged to the true people of the living God, the certainty and character of which were now set forth with new and increasing clearness. On the other hand the exaltation of heathen nations, and especially of that great power which then oppressed the people of God, was provisional and temporary. God's instrument to chastise Judah and to subject the nations, they should be cast down when their work was done, and "the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven be given to the people of the saints of the Most High."

Quite distinct ministries were thus demanded from the prophets of the two kingdoms, conditioned by the circumstances in which, as we have seen, they were respectively called to act. The books of the prophets, whose general intent and aim has already been stated, naturally divide themselves accordingly into the prophets of the kingdom of Israel, and those of the kingdom of Judah, each having a function to perform in the economy of the volume of revelation peculiar to themselves. If again we proceed to examine the history of Judah from the beginning of written prophecy to its close, we shall find it governed by three great crises which bound its successive periods. The first is the Assyrian invasion under Sennacherib in the middle of the reign of Hezekiah; this power having overthrown the kingdom of the ten tribes, threatened destruction to Judah, but was miraculously defeated. The second is the Babylonish invasion under Nebuchadnezzar, which not only threatened but actually destroyed Jerusalem and the Jewish state, and carried the people into exile. The third is the decree of Cyrus permitting the exiles to return to their own land. These great providential events with their causes and results may be said to govern the prophetic themes, each in their proper period. They determine the circumstances and spiritual necessities of the people, or supply the most impressive and needed lessons. The inspired instruction which is given gathers about them, or takes its rise from them, and to whatever expansion, elevation, or far-sighted penetration it may attain, still borrows from them its form and its direction. Conformably to these hints the prophets of Judah are readily divisible into four classes. The first comprises those who uttered their prophecies before the Assyrian invasion, or immediately subsequent to it, and while this was still the most prominent subject before the people; the second those who prophesied before Nebuchadnezzar's conquest, or immediately after, as long as prophetic labours continued among the wretched remnant of Judah; the third those who were in exile; and fourth, all after the edict of restoration to the cessation of the spirit of

prophecy.

Each of these classes of prophets will be found to have characteristics which are peculiar to themselves and distinguish them from others, growing out of the circumstances of the period and the condition of things in which they prophesy. Each age had its special wants; and the inspired communications were adapted to those wants. And not only were the amount and character of the prophetic revelations of each period thus determined by the general plan of God, and the particular junctures of his providence, but special functions were assigned likewise to each individual prophet within his own period. One was commissioned to meet the existing spiritual necessities of the people upon one side, another upon another. They thus mutually complete each other, and it is by the combination of the whole that their appointed task is fully accomplished.

The utterances of the prophets accordingly exhibit neither a dull uniformity nor a disordered confusion. There is a reason why they are what they are, and are made when they are; why, for example, the revelations of Isaiah were granted to him rather than to Amos, and why neither saw what was disclosed to Daniel. There is a divine mechanism here; a skilful disposition of parts, and a close concatenation, such that all is made to fit harmoniously together, and to tally precisely with the concurrent developments of Providence, thus plainly showing, behind the human agents and above them, an all-embracing Intelligence, directing the whole agreeably to one preconceived, consistent, and admirable scheme; and the more this is studied, the more wonderful it will be found to be. And hence may be derived a fresh check to the unwarrantable procedures and conclusions of such unbelieving critics, as setting aside the well attested evidence of the genuineness of the books of the prophets, have, from newly invented criteria of their own, ascribed them to different periods from those to which they really belong. Every alteration is a derangement. It is like taking out a wheel at random from a complicated machine, or altering the position or proportions of a limb or member in a finely modelled statue: the result can only be confusion and deformity. A right conception of the whole will of itself justify the proportions and adjustments of the several parts. And in like manner when the genuineness of paragraphs or sections in particular books is denied, the completeness and symmetry of an individual ministry is oftentimes defaced thereby. The writings of the prophets are not random and fragmentary compilations of stray discourses casually brought together. There is a method in them, even when they contain the record of the longest ministry, which verifies their unity, and forbids the mutilation of their various parts.

It is not our design at present to evince the truth of these remarks in regard to the prophets generally, but simply to make a few suggestions touching the position of Hosea in the scheme of prophetic communication. This will require us to glance at the mission of the period to which he belongs, the function assigned to himself in particular, and the plan or

arrangement of the book which bears his name.

Eight prophets, one-half of the whole number, belong to the first prophetic period, embracing the reigns of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah of Judah, and extending from the reign of the second Jeroboam of Israel to the destruction of the kingdom. Of these, three exercised their ministry in Israel-Hosea, Amos, and Jonah; and five in Judah-Joel, Isaiah, Obadiah, Micah, and Nahum. It will not be necessary to delay upon the proof that the minor prophets succeed each other in the canon in their true chronological order, which for reasons deemed sufficient is here assumed. Nor need we stop to show that Hosea was a citizen of the ten tribes: the arguments of Hengstenberg and others have set that quite at rest. Nahum, though born in the territory of the ten tribes, is classed with the prophets of Judah, because the former kingdom was in all probability already destroyed when his prophecy was uttered. and it is expressly addressed to Judah, (i. 15.)

This division of the prophets, agreeably to the sphere of their labours, into those of Judah and of Israel, though important

to a correct understanding of their respective ministries, must not be too rigorously pressed. They are in some respects analogous to the circumcision and the uncircumcision as separate fields of apostolic labour, which general division however did not hinder Paul from writing his Epistle to the Hebrews, nor Peter from preaching the gospel to Cornelius. Though politically severed, and though from their diversity of character and circumstances requiring a different treatment from the inspired messengers sent them, the two kingdoms were not entirely distinct. The twelve tribes formed the one people of God, and neither the prophets nor the pious inhabitants of either kingdom recognized the legitimacy of the sinful schism. Pious princes like Hezekiah failed not to assert the claims of the theocracy over both realms, (2 Chron. xxx. 1-11.) It was on the ground of this unity that we find in this period one prophet taken from each of these kingdoms to minister in the other. Amos, like the man of God in the time of the first Jeroboam, (1 Kings xiii.) was sent from Judah to Israel, and Nahum from Israel to Judah. It is for the same reason that Hosea and Amos direct occasional admonitions to Judah, though the main body of their prophecies is addressed to Israel. Isaiah also (xxviii. 1-4, etc.) and Micah (i. 5, 6,) take a like attitude with respect to Israel, the latter even emphasizing his position by including Samaria as well as Jerusalem in his title. It need scarcely be added that no sanction whatever is given by the above division to Maurer's totally unfounded idea that the prophets of Israel taught a different doctrine from those of the rival kingdom, being the pliant tools of those in power, and winking at if not sanctioning the established idolatry of the golden calves.

The prophets of the two kingdoms are distinguished both in the tone and the contents of their respective prophecies. The tone of those ministering in Israel is severely denunciatory. The books of Amos and Hosea are filled with withering rebukes of sin and fearful threatenings of punishment from beginning to end, with but one ray of mercy in the closing verses of the former, and a few interjected gleams in occasional verses of the latter. Jonah had been commissioned before the period of written prophecy properly began, to utter the last promise of

temporal prosperity made to his own generation, (2 Kings xiv. 25,) which had not however its designed effect of winning the people back to God. In the book of Jonah, Nineveh repenting at the preaching of the prophet rises up against obdurate Israel to condemn them; and the sparing of the former stands in silent but unmistakable contrast to the doom which must await the latter. The kingdom of Israel was sunk in apathy and sin, and had reached the very verge of judicial abandonment. Nothing would answer here, therefore, but the language of rebuke and denunciation, which might startle them if possible from their security, or leave the evidence that their doom had been plainly set before them if they perished. Only so much of promise appears in each, expressed in Hosea and Amos and inferentially in Jonah, as is always found in every message of God to men, that he is faithful to his own word of

grace, and that the penitent shall find mercy.

The kingdom of Judah, on the other hand, although sinful and needing to be rebuked, had not like Israel openly renounced the true worship of God. They were yet the chosen vessel of God's mercy, from the midst of whom the salvation of the world was to proceed. The tone of the prophets here is accordingly quite different. It is prevailingly consolatory: as compared with the prophets of the other kingdom, or with Jeremiah of the subsequent period when Judah had become far more corrupt, and a large portion of it was on the point of being cast away. it is strikingly so. This enlarged consolation is given both negatively and positively; positively, by the increased space now devoted to promise as compared with denunciation. Exactly one-half of Joel is promissory. Isaiah, besides abundant passages of the most joyful character, some of them spreading over several consecutive chapters in the first part of his book. devotes himself in the last twenty-seven chapters expressly to the work of comfort. The space given to consolation is proportionably large in Micah likewise. The negative consolation is that afforded by the denunciation of their heathen foes and oppressors; for the overthrow of these was in mercy to God's people and in vindication of them, and the breaking down of the ungodly kingdoms of this world is represented to be in order to the transferring of the dominion and power to the saints of the Most High. This is the entire sum of Obadiah and Nahum, and enters more or less prominently into the predictions of the other three prophets likewise. The prophets of Judah speak of the heathen temporarily triumphing over the people of God, but never fail to add in the same connection that the former shall be ultimately cast down, and the latter shall be finally victorious. This the prophets of Israel never do. Hosea and Amos plainly and repeatedly declare that the ungodly kingdom of the ten tribes shall be overthrown by Assyria and the people exiled, but they give no intimation of the future fall of Assyria itself. Jonah even represents its capital as saved from threatened destruction by a timely repentance, and as an object of tender concern to the Lord. Amos indeed begins his prophecy with a series of seven denunciations against various heathen nations and against the other branch of the covenant people; but as appears from the whole structure of his book, as well as from express intimations, (ii. 6, etc.; iii. 2, etc.,) these portend no mercy to Israel. This prophet is peculiar in constructing thus an a fortiori argument of heavier doom. If the heathen and Judah shall be punished, much more shall Israel, whose privileges have been greater than the one, and their trespass heavier than the other.

The contents of these books may be considered under the two heads of things nearcr at hand, and those more remotely future. To the former belong the existing state of affairs, and the consequent fortunes of the two kingdoms; to the latter, the revelations respecting the Messiah. In portraying national sins and unfolding the proximate future, the prophets are led to confine themselves for the most part to that which directly related to the respective kingdoms in which their ministry was exercised. The range of prophetic vision granted to those of the one realm, was thus quite distinct from that afforded to the other, the spirit of inspiration in each case opening up just such glimpses into futurity as were appropriate to the hearers addressed, and would suggest or convey to them the lessons they required. It is a simple consequence of the fact just stated, and not of any difference in the grade of prophetic power, that the vision of the future possessed by the prophets of Judah, was so much more extensive than that of their colabourers in the sister kingdom. To the ten tribes it was revealed that the house of Jeroboam should be cut off, the kingdom itself destroyed, and the people carried into exile to Assyria. This terminated their distinct existence, and summed up God's dealings with them as his people. From this time onward, therefore, until the period of returning favour under the Messiah, all is left blank in the prophetic picture. It is only incidentally that the facts are disclosed of Judah's miraculous preservation from the power which should overwhelm Israel, Hos. i. 7, and of a subsequent burning of their cities, Hos. viii. 14, Amos ii. 5, though it is not said by whom this desolation should be effected, nor even whether it should be by the same or by another power. It is also in subordination to the main theme already stated, that the overthrow of several of the minor heathen states contiguous to Palestine is predicted, Amos i. 3-ii. 3, without, however, any distinct announcement of the agency by which it was to be accomplished.

Judah, on the other hand, was to be preserved as the people of God until the coming of the Messiah, and was to be brought successively into contact with some of the mightiest kingdoms of the earth. Accordingly her prophets are enabled to take possession of the wide field thus spread before them, and to adapt the lessons to be drawn from it to the uses of their contemporaries. They foresaw the Assyrian invasion and its miraculous defeat, the Babylonish captivity and the deliverance from it, and even sketch the heathen oppressions to be experienced between this and the coming of Christ, Micah iv. 10—v. 2. And upon the sphere of the world they beheld the overthrow of Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, Syria, and Tyre, not to speak of the fate of inferior nations.

The difference between these two classes of prophets is no less marked in regard to their Messianic predictions, and it arises from the same cause. Inasmuch as the primary design of these predictions is to suggest spiritual lessons for the contemporary generation, it follows as a natural consequence that they take their point of departure and their peculiar form from things then existing, and exhibit the period of the Messiah under such aspects as contrast most strongly with the evils of the present. The prophets of Israel are strictly confined to

this view of the subject. The evils experienced or apprehended in that kingdom were these five, viz. their apostasy from God and consequent abandonment by him, the schism from Judah and the house of David, the coming exile, the reduction of the numbers of the covenant people by their threatened excision, and the hostility of the heathen. The Messianic period is accordingly depicted under five particulars as affording the antidote to precisely these evils, their return to God and inalienable reception into favour, their union with Judah under a prince of David's line, their restoration and perpetual settlement in Canaan, Israel's vast multiplication, and the incorpora-

tion of the heathen into the kingdom of God.

The prophets of Judah were charged with the instruction of a people who were to endure to the coming of Christ, from the midst of whom he was to arise, and who needed a special preparation for this their high prerogative among the nations. Besides, therefore, presenting the blessings to be introduced by the Redeemer as a specific remedy for evils then felt or apprehended, they were led to take occasion from these to unfold more fully his person and work, and to present abundant criteria by which on his appearance he might be recognized. In addition to all that was revealed to the prophets of Israel, they speak of Messiah's divine nature, his birth of a virgin at Bethlehem, his life of suffering and sorrow, his atoning death, his priestly and prophetic offices, and the glories of his universal reign, when all mankind should flow to Zion, wars should cease, the harmlessness of paradise return even to the irrational creation, and every disease and infirmity and even death itself be banished or destroyed.

We turn now to the mutual relations of the prophets of Israel. Hosea occupies a place among them which may for prominence be likened to that of Isaiah in the corresponding period in Judah. His ministry is the longest on record, and affords a rare instance of constancy in almost hopeless circumstances, being exercised for sixty years or upwards in the midst of an apostate and deteriorating people, and continued perhaps to the very downfall of the kingdom. The book of Amos records a mission, probably a brief one, from Judah to Israel, and that of Jonah one from Israel to Nineveh. They each clothe

their instructions more or less in a figurative dress. Hosea employs allegory, chapters i. and iii, Amos emblematic visions, chapters vii.-ix, and Jonah a symbolical action. The disclosures of Hosea bear exclusive relation to Israel, those of Jonah to the heathen, those of Amos to both. Here, as in the case of all the prophets, the disclosures made respecting the heathen were designed not for their own benefit or instruction, but for that of Israel. The covenant people were the exclusive depositaries of divine revelation, and the sole theatre of prophetic ministries under the former economy. Prophecies respecting foreign nations were not in general made known to those nations. And where these ordinary limits of prophetic agency appear to be overstepped in individual instances, as in this of Jonah, this is an index to the future rather than the establishing of a new order of things in the present. No permanent mission was established at Nineveh; the extraordinary success of the prophet's preaching was followed by no subsequent labours, and we hear of no evidences or fruits of piety there afterwards. The effects upon the inhabitants of that city were without doubt quite evanescent. Everything goes to show that the divine purpose in Jonah's mission was to incorporate an idea in the progressive scheme of revelation, the time for whose full development had not yet arrived. The word of God, which Israel refused, should one day be preached to the heathen, and they would hear it. This enables us in some measure to understand how Jonah could urge the mercy of God as a reason for his having at first fled to Tarshish, iv. 2, and why he subsequently repined at the sparing of Nineveh. He could not bear to see the divine favour transferred from the children of Abraham to the heathen Ninevites; the latter penitent while the former continued obdurate; the latter spared while the former were hastening on to judgment. The conduct of the prophet is the less to be wondered at, since even in New Testament times it required repeated revelations to prepare the church for the passing away of Old Testament restrictions, and for the reception of the heathen into the church upon equal terms with the Jews. The book of Jonah is accordingly a practical prophecy of the calling of the Gentiles.

Amos, in the beginning of his prophecy, reveals God's justice

as a universal ruler in punishing heathen nations for their sins, and at the conclusion, ix. 12, intimates his mercy by expressing the same truth with Jonah, but in a different form. The theocracy shall extend its conquests over surrounding nations, and they shall be called by the name of the Lord. Of all this Hosea says nothing; his prophecy is confined to the covenant people, the justice of God in the judgments of the present, his mercy in the returning favour of the future. And yet with this evident distinction in the functions which these prophets were severally called to discharge in the unfolding to Israel of the plans of God, and while the phases of the truth which they respectively present, as viewed with Old Testament eyes, are quite distinct, the prophecies of Hosea, as contemplated from the point of their fulfilment, will be seen to involve in fact, though not in form, the same mercy to the Gentiles which it was given to Jonah and Amos unambiguously and in explicit terms to announce.

We find predicted by Hosea i. 10, 11; ii. 1, 14-23; iii. 5; xi. 11; xiv. 4-8, the first four of the five Messianic blessings already spoken of as revealed to the prophets of Israel. It is agreed by all that these met a partial fulfilment before the coming of Christ, when descendants of the ten tribes joined themselves with the exiles of Judah, returned after the Babylonish captivity, under the lead of Zerubbabel, a prince of the house of David, and with a new zeal for the worship of God, were established in the promised land. Accordingly we find the twelve tribes spoken of as still existing in repeated passages of the New Testament; and that the genealogies of all the tribes were still preserved distinct appears from the statement that the apostle Paul belonged to the tribe of Benjamin, Rom. xi. 1, and Anna the prophetess to the tribe of Asher, Luke ii. 36. But it is manifest that this event cannot be regarded as a complete accomplishment of these predictions, for it does not exhaust the terms employed in any one of the particulars. There was then no complete conversion of all Israel to God, and betrothal of them to him in faithfulness for ever. And although the schism was entirely healed, so that after the captivity there were no more rivalries or animosities between Israel and Judah, and in feeling they became one people, still the entire body of these two sections was not united under Zerubbabel, and even he was not a king. All Israel, moreover, did not come up out of exile, nor were they swelled to such countless multitudes as the sand of the sea. It becomes a question, therefore, in what events are we to look for the accomplishment of that residue of these prophecies, which was still unfulfilled at the coming of Christ? To this question in the case of these and like predictions two answers have been returned, viz. that their accomplishment is to be sought in the line of the natural descendants of Israel, or in that of their spiritual seed. According to the former view, the lineal descendants of the ten tribes shall be as numerous as the sands of the sea; shall be converted to God, and made once more his people; shall be restored from their wide dispersions to the land of Palestine; shall be united to the lineal descendants of Judah, and the old theocratic kingdom restored, with a son of David on the throne, which must then be a personal reign of the Lord Jesus, on an actual throne in Jerusalem, as king of the chosen people. For there is no scriptural warrant for believing that any other descendant of David shall ever again sit upon a throne. According to the other view, the Israel contemplated in these promises are to be counted, not in the line of natural descent, but of spiritual succession.

That this latter is the only admissible view may be argued in the first place from the fact that Israel as God's people, in the sense of the Scriptures generally, and of the promises in particular, never was exactly coextensive with Abraham's natural descendants. From the beginning some of his natural descendants were excluded, and others not descended from him were included. Ishmael and the children of Keturah were cut off, and the descent counted in the line of Isaac. Esau was cut off, and the succession limited to the line of Jacob. At the same time provision was made for giving the seal of the covenant to those born in Abraham's house, or bought with his money, though not of his seed. This is doubtless one of the items to be taken into the account in solving the problem of the immense multiplication of the people in Egypt; the retinues of the several patriarchs were mingled with their seed. Mention is also made of a mixed multitude going up with Israel out of

Egypt. The provision was inserted in the law of Moses that strangers might join themselves to the Lord's people, and by receiving the rite of circumcision, and observing the requisitions of the covenant, might be as those born in the land; and this was practised at every period of the history. On the other hand, those of the natural Israel who violated the provisions of the covenant, were to be cut off from among their people. This excision and incorporation might take place on a small or a large scale, in the case of individuals or of whole communities. Hosea threatened the ten tribes with this excision, i. 9. "Ye are not my people, and I will not be your God." They failed to take warning, and the excision was actually effected. The line of the covenant people was thenceforward continued in Judah only, 2 Kings xvii. 18. At the Babylonish exile there was another narrowing down, the corrupt mass of Judah itself was cast off, and such as returned out of the captivity to the holv land had alone a right to be entitled the people of God. When Christ came, another large excision took place. The unbelieving Jews rejecting him were rejected by him, and thenceforward formed no part of God's true people. The real Israel were they who, from among the nominally covenant people, received Christ. These were the true seed of Abraham. All others were apostate, and had no more right to be considered a part of Israel than the descendants of Ishmael or Esau. It is in the faithful few that the true line of the succession is be sought. At the same time their numbers were swelled by immense accessions from believing Gentiles, who were incorporated with them, and thus the continuity was preserved. God had not one people under the Old Testament, and a different people under the New Testament. It is one and the same people. It was Israel then, it is Israel still, not by a figure of speech, but by regular, continuous, legitimate succession. And the law of their constitution is still the same that it was at the beginning, "believers and their seed," with the provision now as then that the natural descendants failing to comply with the terms of the covenant, are to be excluded, while the stranger who takes hold of the covenant, may be incorporated amongst them. In the light of the history of the case, then, believers in Christ are the Israel of the Scriptures.

A second proof of the same position may be drawn from the abundant and explicit testimony of the New Testament. The doctrine pervades all the writings of the Apostles, that the Christian Church is not a new body recently formed, but is the legitimate continuation of the Old Testament Israel. All that they say upon this point cannot here be cited, but some of the most striking passages are the following: Gal. iii. 7, They which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham: iii. 29, If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise: iv. 22-31, Jerusalem which now is, and is in bondage with her children, answered to Hagar, who was cast out with her son; Christians correspond to Isaac, the child of the promise. Rom. ii. 28, 29, He is not a Jew who is one outwardly, but he who is one inwardly: iv. 11, 12, Abraham is the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised, and the father of them that are circumcised only in case they walk in the steps of his faith: iv. 16-18, The promise to Abraham that he should be a father of many nations, is explained to mean the father of all us Christians: ix. 6-8, They are not all Israel which are of Israel; neither because they are the seed of Abraham are they all children: chapter xi, The truth of the promises to Israel is preserved in the existence of a believing remnant after the excision of the blinded mass, the grafting in of Gentile branches upon the original olive tree, and the ultimate salvation of all the natural descendants. Eph. ii. 12-20, In their unconverted state the Ephesians were aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise; but in Christ Jesus, from being afar off they are brought nigh, made fellow-citizens with the saints and of the household of God: iii. 6, Gentiles are in Christ fellow-heirs, of the same body, and partakers of the promise. Phil. iii. 3, We are the circumcision which worship God in the spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus. Rev. ii. 9, iii. 9, Unbelieving Jews say they are Jews and are not, but are the synagogue of Satan: vii. 4, Those protected from divine judgments by the seal of God in their foreheads, i. e., God's elect people (his redeemed, xiv. 3,) are an hundred and forty-four thousand of all the tribes of the children of Israel: xi. 8, The city, where our Lord was crucified, is spiritually called Sodom

and Egypt: chapter xii, The woman, who bare the man-child, i. e., the Messiah, is Israel, the church of God in both dispensations; and verse 17, her seed are they which keep the commandments of God and have the testimony of Jesus Christ: xxi. 9-12, The Lamb's wife, i. e. the glorified church, is the holy Jerusalem, bearing on its gates the names of the twelve tribes of the children of Israel. In the judgment of the inspired authors of the New Testament, then, believers in Christ and not the natural descendants of unbelieving Jews or Hebrews, constitute the Israel of God in the sense of the promises.

In the third place, that Israel has this sense in the predictions of Hosea, which are now in question, is determined by the interpretation put upon them by two different apostles. Both Peter (1 Peter ii. 9, 10) and Paul (Rom. ix. 25, 26) cite them in proof of the calling of the Gentiles. Although it could not be fairly claimed that the sense of the original passage must be limited to the application thus made of it, it must certainly

include it within its proper scope.

Other arguments might be brought from parallel passages in the prophets, and from difficulties which beset the general scheme of interpretation here opposed. Thus the closing chapters of Ezekiel show us to what lengths those must be prepared to go, who see in the Israel of the Old Testament only the natural descendants of the patriarchs, and in its Canaan only the physical territory of Palestine. They must allow that the temple is to be rebuilt, and the ritual restored, which the New Testament declares to be among the shadows that have for ever passed away, and could be only resumed again to the prejudice of that perfect priesthood which it was temporarily instituted to prefigure. What has been already said, however, is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the Christian church, considered as the body of believers in Christ, is the legitimate heir of the promises made to Israel; and it is to that church, not to the natural descendants of the ten tribes, that these promises are to be fulfilled. This is not expecting a promise to be fulfilled to one subject, when it was really made to another. It is not taking a prophecy out of its literal and imposing upon it a spiritual interpretation. It is not that Israel was typical of the Christian church; but it is that the Christian church is Israel in the sense of the Bible, in the sense both of the Old and of the New Testaments. This is what the Holy Ghost intended in the promise. This is its proper and real meaning in its strict and literal acceptation. Israel was a church as well as a nation. It was as the people of God, that is, as a church, that they were contemplated in the promise; and that

church is now perpetuated in believers in Christ.

But how are the four promises which we are discussing to be fulfilled to the Christian church? The first declares that they who had not been God's people should become his people, and be blessed with his perpetual love and favour. The last, that true believers shall be as numberless as the sands of the sea. To the other two we must apply that principle so constantly exemplified in prophecy, that the events of the future are represented under the forms of the past and the present. The schism between Israel and Judah is the great standing type of divisions among the people of God. These shall be done away, and all that interferes with or mars their unity shall cease. The kingdom of David, under which they are to be united, no longer requires a visible throne nor an earthly capital. The royal Son of David sits upon his everlasting throne in the heavens. And as to the remaining promise, Palestine derived its significance under the old economy from its being the seat of God's worship and of his visible kingdom. There was the temple with the special presence of Jehovah in the midst of it: there only could acceptable sacrifices be offered. To be cast out of this land was to be expelled from the place where God was, to be debarred from the public exercise of his worship, to lie under his frown. To be brought back to this land was a symptom of being received again into favour, and being reinstated in the possession of all the privileges of God's house. Under the present dispensation there is no such local seat of the true religion. To worship in Jerusalem is now nothing: everything lies in the worship in spirit and in truth. Every land may now be a Canaan to the believer. To come back from exile to the Lord's land, is from a state of distance and separation to come into the possession of the true worship of God and the privileges of his kingdom. The promise assures us that this shall be accorded to all true believers.

It has sometimes been objected to this view of the subject, that the threatenings against Israel are understood in their literal sense, and applied to the natural descendants of Israel, while the promises that these threatenings should in future days be reversed, are understood in a different sense, and applied to the Christian church. If exile is threatened, it means that the natural descendants of Jacob should be carried away from Palestine: when a return from exile is promised, ought it not then to mean that these natural descendants should be brought back to Palestine? But this is no more the case here than it is in all analogous passages in the Scriptures. The visible church or people of God has always contained two dissimilar classes-those who are truly his, and those who are only such by profession and in outward appearance. Threatenings against the church are always intended primarily and mainly for the impenitent and unbelieving portion; and on the other hand the promises are for the believing portion. If the evils or blessings are of such a nature that they respect an aggregate body, it must be dealt with in the mass, according to its prevailing character. If expulsion from the Lord's land is threatened, it must naturally be executed upon transgressing portions of his visible kingdom; and as it took place during the former dispensation, it was fulfilled in a form appropriate to that dispensation, their actual removal from the land of Palestine. If a return from exile is promised, it is as naturally to a believing portion that this is to be fulfilled; and in so far as it met its fulfilment in the Old Testament times, it was in the form appropriate to that dispensation, an actual coming back from the profane land of their captivity to the Lord's land. But in so far as it is accomplished under the New Testament, it must be to those who are now what the natural seed once were but are no longer, the Lord's people, and in a form which has already been shown to be the only one adapted to the present dispensation.

Have then the natural Israel no part in these promises made to their fathers? Undoubtedly they have. They are nothing but dead branches now, and have nothing to hope for so long as they continue in their unbelieving state. But they shall be grafted again into their own olive tree, and shall then partake

of the root and fatness of the olive. They are not the children of Abraham now, and are as truly aliens from the commonwealth of Israel as any Gentiles ever were. But when they believe in Christ, they will become children of Abraham by faith in him, just as those of any other nation do, and then they will, like others and precisely as others, become heirs in full of these promises; not because they are Jews, nor any more for being Jews, but because they are believers in Christ.

But shall not these promises have a literal fulfilment in their case, which they do not have in the case of others, at least in so far that they shall be restored to the land of Palestine? In reply to this, the following considerations embrace what we consider of chief consequence. The ten tribes, of which Hosea mainly speaks, are wholly lost; all efforts to rediscover them have so far failed, and there is no reason to expect better success in the future. The providence of God by thus obliterating them from among the nations, has rendered such an event as a restoration to Palestine in their case at least, if not impossible, yet to the last degree improbable.

As to the descendants of the Jews, the New Testament predicts their conversion, and that this shall be an occasion of new life to the Gentile churches, but no where intimates that they shall be brought back to Palestine. In the absence of any authority from our Lord or his apostles to the contrary, it is quite possible to explain the prophecies of Hosea, as we have seen, and all analogous predictions of other prophets, without the necessity of assuming a literal return. It is nevertheless a most remarkable fact in providence, and one without a parallel elsewhere, that the Jewish people have been preserved distinct from all others for so many ages; and that Palestine has been kept, too, to so great an extent unoccupied, containing no such population as it is capable of supporting: and that there is no insuperable barrier to their literal return, supposing that to be the purport of these prophecies. It will be wisest and safest, as it appears to us, to reserve our decision of the question, whether it is the will of God actually to accomplish this return, until the event shall disclose it. The prophecies may all be satisfactorily fulfilled, so far as we can see, without this. And yet if this were to take place, it would be God's own comment upon the meaning of his predictions, and show that this was intended to be included. It is here as it is in regard to a multitude of other prophecies, those for example which relate to the first advent of our Lord. It would have been impossible to distinguish accurately before the event, what was intended literally from what was only to be understood figuratively. Who could have known beforehand from Zech. ix. 9, that Christ would make an actual entry into Jerusalem upon an ass, and that this was not merely a figurative representation of his general meckness and lowliness? And who could have known from Ps. xxii. 18, that the soldiers who crucified Jesus would actually cast lots upon his vesture, and that this might not have been intended merely to convey the general idea that he would be treated with extreme hostility? The event, however, has set the question at rest with regard to the meaning of these passages: and if we are content to wait patiently, it will do the same with the passages now

It appears, therefore, that while Hosea does not in form, as the other prophets of the kingdom and particularly Jonah, reveal the participation of the heathen in the blessings of the covenant, which was for those who lived under the old Testament a real diversity, still in the range of their fulfilment his prophecies do in fact cover the same ground, the distinction between Jew and Gentile being done away in Christ. It remains to define the relation of his predictions to those of Amos having respect to the covenant people. Here they are in substance precisely coincident, both revealing with equal distinctness what have already been stated to be the prophetic lessons of this period for Israel, the fall of Jeroboam's house, the overthrow of the kingdom, the exile of the people, and the several Messianic blessings. There is, however, a marked distinction in the point of view from which they respectively contemplate their theme. Hosea's leading idea is, that Israel in their sin and apostasy from God, are grossly offending against the most tender love. Hence the allegories of chapters 1 and 3, (whether they be parables, or a literal record of events in the prophet's life,) setting forth the relation of Israel to God under that of the marriage bond, and thus stamping their sin

as a flagrant and shameful violation of most sacred obligations, a repudiation of their own solemn engagements, and an outrage upon the tenderest affection. Hence Israel's immorality, idolatry, and sinful seeking of aid from heathen powers, are uniformly throughout the book represented under the same image of a wife unfaithful to her husband's love. Hence, too, the frequent upbraiding of the transgressing people, by recitals of God's acts of mercy to their fathers. Hence the unequalled tenderness of his expostulations, vi. 4-xi. 8, and the assurance of God's readiness to anticipate the first symptoms of return to him, xiv. 4. On the other hand, the main thought of Amos is, that Israel is worse than other nations. Hence the brief introductory woes against the heathen and Judah, to pave the way for the more prolonged and heavier denunciation of Israel, which is mingled with no such tenderness as that of Hosea, and relieved by no exhortations, expostulations, and promises, save the few Messianic verses at the end.

In some minute details Amos discloses facts of the proximate future not revealed to Hosea, viz. the dreadful mortality which was to prevail during the final siege of Samaria, vi. 9, 10, and the fate that awaited Amaziah, priest of Bethel, and his family, vii. 17. An intimation of greater consequence in the unfoldings of the divine scheme of revelation, which is peculiar to Amos, is that, ix. 14, of the fallen condition of the house of David at the time of Messiah's appearing; this is the earliest prophetic announcement of a fact more fully unfolded by the prophets of Judah in this and subsequent periods. As a counterpoise to this it is peculiar to Hosea to present, xiii. 14, the germ of the doctrine of the resurrection. The power of death shall be broken, and death itself destroyed by the redeeming love of God. The prophet does not expand this thought to the full extent of the New Testament doctrine upon the subject. He does not even dwell upon it long enough to show whether he fully comprehended himself all that is involved, and whether in his intention and in the connection in which it stands, it denotes the deliverance of those who have already fallen under the power of death, or the rescue of such as were threatened by it, or a deliverance of the nation from impending ruin presented under this figure. Be this as it may, the thought is expressed of a triumph over death and the grave, effected on the behalf of his people by the love and grace of God. And it is from this very point and under this same aspect that Isaiah, Ezekiel and Daniel develope the doctrine of the resurrection. The apostle Paul also in 1 Cor. xv. presents this as the last and most glorious of the Redeemer's triumphs, citing verse 55 with a burst of exultation—this very passage from Hosea as the climax of his whole discussion.

It should be observed further, in relation to this passage, that the prophets, even when predicting events that lie at the conclusion of the present dispensation, do not ordinarily forsake the bounds of Old Testament thought. They speak of the new heavens and new earth, of the convulsions that shall shake the frame of nature, of the sun and stars withdrawing their light, and straightway join with it something that belongs to the existing order of things. It does not follow from this that their predictions do not relate to the events which their words seem properly to describe, but are mere figures or symbols of things much nearer at hand. This conclusion can often only be reached by emptying their expressions of their manifest import, and converting them into the language of strained hyperbole. The fact is, that while glimpses of the magnificent events of the ultimate future were afforded them, these were mere glimpses; the time had not come when these objects were to be presented in all their relations and proportions, with the clearness and fulness with which they are unfolded now. The prophets stood on Old Testament ground, and could not anticipate more than it was in God's plan then to reveal. But we have on this account no right to rob them of their grandest disclosures, or to reduce them to mere figures of speech, because the events that are to usher in eternity are set in a framework borrowed from the things of time.

We have now arrived at our last topic, the structure of the book of Hosea, to which we must devote a brief consideration. In the opinion of some it is a collection of different discourses or portions of them, as they were orally delivered by the prophet at various periods of his ministry. Thus Maurer divides it into thirteen such discourses, which he distributes as follows, viz.

1. Chapters i.—iii, reign of Jeroboam II.

2. ix. 1—9, "

3. ix. 10—17, "" " 4. xii. 8—15, "

5. Chapter iv, succeeding interregnum.

6. Chapter viii, reign of Menahem.

7. v. 1—vi. 3, reign of Pekah.

8. vi. 4—11, "

9. Chapters xiii, xiv, succeeding interregnum.

10. Chapter vii, reign of Hoshea.

11. Chapter x, " "

12. Chapter xi, " "

13. xii. 1–7, "

Bertholdt, who makes of it fourteen discourses coinciding in the main with the division into chapters, assigns chapters iv, xii, viii, viii, x, to the first interregnum; chapters i.—iii. to the reign of Zachariah; chapters v, vi. to the reign of Pekah; chapter xiii. to the second interregnum; and chapters ix, xi, xiv. to the reign of Hoshea. Sebastian Schmidt makes ten discourses, and Dathe seventeen. Stuck finds three distinct discourses at the beginning of the book, and two at the end, with a body of disconnected fragments making up the intervening portion.

These conflicting divisions and many more of the same kind are based upon supposed allusions in the course of the book to particular events of determinate date, whereupon the passages in which they occur are erected into distinct discourses, delivered shortly after the events referred to. But these criteria are for the most part precarious and imaginary, as is shown by the endless diversity in the results to which they lead. They are commonly descriptive of a general state of things, rather than of any single events; or if this latter were the case, it is scarcely to be expected that it could be identified with facts mentioned in a history which despatches the entire term of Hosea's ministry in little more than a single chapter; or supposing the allusion made and the event identified, it still does

not necessarily follow that the passage containing it must belong to a separate discourse pronounced just after its occurrence.

Another serious objection to this view is the confusion which it assumes to exist in the book, discourses from every period of a long ministry being jumbled together in the utmost disorder. It becomes especially objectionable when pressed to the length of supposing that we have only fragmentary remains of scattered discourses, put together after the prophet's death, by some compiler as he chanced successively to light upon them. There is no reason to believe that any of the books of the prophets owe their present form to another than the prophets themselves, but on the contrary there are good reasons for the belief that they in every case wrote out and published their own predictions. Even at the hands of a sensible compiler, the confusion here supposed to exist would be inexplicable, but as proceeding from the author himself it is utterly inadmissible. This particular difficulty is escaped by those who assume a chronological order in the discourses. Thus Lightfoot places the first four chapters in the reign of Jeroboam II, the next two at the end of Pekah's reign, or in the following interregnum, and the last eight in the reign of Hoshea. And Dr. Wells, as quoted by Bishop Horseley, presents the following scheme of five discourses:

1. Chapters i.—iii, reign of Jeroboam II.

2. iv. 1-vi. 3, thence to the death of Pekahiah.

3. vi. 4—vii. 10, reign of Pekah.

4. vii. 11-xiii. 8, reign of Hoshea.

5. xiii. 9—xiv. 9, prophecies of restoration from the captivity.

Even thus, however, arbitrary assumptions must be made of allusions which are not evident, and of facts which are not recorded. Van der Hardt has quite outstripped all competition in ingenious absurdity, by distinguishing twenty-nine discourses of a single verse and upwards, the historical occasion of each of which he defines in regular order from the reign of Jeroboam II. to the fall of the kingdom. A principle which can lead to such results can scarcely be accepted by sober minds.

Another objection, and it is a fatal one to this view, however modified, is that no such partition of the book is possible as

would separate it into these distinct discourses. They are distinguished by no diversity of occasion or of theme: they are marked by nothing which has the appearance of indicating the beginning or close of separate portions.

A second class of interpreters abandoning the idea of sections composed at different times, have sought to establish a topical or logical division in the treatment of a general theme. Thus one of the old writers finds the theme propounded, chapter i., its explication, chapters ii.—xi., objections refuted, chapters xii. xiii., and the conclusion, chapter xiv. Carpzov divides all after the opening allegorical chapters into two parts thus: chapters iv.—x. legal, chapters xi.—xiv. evangelical. There is, it is true, a transition from denunciation in the beginning to mercy at the close, but these cannot be separated in the manner here proposed. Ewald divides these chapters into three parts:

- 1. iv. 1—vi. 11 a—charge of sin, first against the people generally, chapter iv., then against particular classes, v. 1—vi. 11 a.
 - 2. vi. 11 b-ix. 9, denunciation of punishment.
- 3. ix. 10—xi. 11, and xi. 12—xiv. 9, two retrospects of ancient and better days, joined with consolatory hopes for the future.

But the distinction here made is unfounded. Charges of sin are as prominent in the second part as in the first; there are denunciations of punishment in the first as well as in the second; and both extend into the third.

The simplest view of the book, and that most accordant with the phenomena which it exhibits, appears to be that which supposes the prophet in the later years of his life to have committed the substance of his previous predictions to writing, in so far as they were adapted to the permanent use of the people of God. How far he may have retained in this abstract the language and form of earlier discourses, we have no means of ascertaining; and it would be of little advantage to us if we had. The form of the prophecy in our possession is the only one with which we are concerned, and is not only equally authoritative with the prophet's oral discourses, even if they could be certainly restored, but was prepared under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, with a special view to the wants of the

church in all times to come. Such a summary of his prophetical career might easily include allusions to particular events, or to the general state of things at various periods of his ministry; so that their occurrence, where they really are found, is upon this hypothesis readily explained. The mention, x. 14, of Shalmaneser's first invasion, in the reign of Hoshea, shows that the book must have been written after that event.

The only distinction that he seems to have preserved in his ministrations is that of his earlier and his later prophecies. In i. 2, what follows is announced as "the beginning of the word of the Lord by Hosea;" and the opening chapters contain nothing inconsistent with the idea that the people are contemplated as in the enjoyment of external quiet and prosperity, as was the case in the reign of Jeroboam II. The prediction, i. 4, of the fall of the house of Jehu, likewise implies that when originally uttered, that house must still have occupied the throne. After the fourth chapter the tone changes, and the prevalence of crimes of violence, the frequent regicides, the low state to which the kingdom was reduced by foreign invasion, their alternate and unavailing reliance on Assyria and Egypt, plainly depict the state of things after Jeroboam's death, when successive usurpations and periods of anarchy followed to the close of the kingdom.

In consequence of these facts, and of the intrinsic difference of the portions themselves, the book is commonly divided into two parts respectively, embodying the substance of Hosea's earlier and his later ministrations.

1. Chapters i .- iii, predictions in allegorical form.

2. Chapters iv.—xiv, predictions in literal terms.

Ewald has proposed a division differing from this only in transferring the third chapter to the second part. Each portion of the book will then consist of an allegory, with an added expansion or enforcement of the same essential ideas in literal terms. The two allegories, chapters 1 and 3, begin with denunciation and end with promise. The intervening chapter 2 does the same. The last eleven chapters form a continuous composition, throughout the whole of which the prophet dwells upon his main theme, surveying it in every light, and directing his treatment of it not by any artificial division, but by the law of

spontaneous association, which brings prominently forward the most impressive features of his subject, and leads him to return to them again and again. The distribution is that of the poet rather than of the logician. The natural flow of his thoughts creates certain pauses and transitions, which cannot be better indicated perhaps than by following what appears to be the most obvious suggestion of the book itself. The severe denunciations of the people's crimes, and of the wrath which they had incurred, which constitute the body of the prophecy, is interrupted three several times by exhibitions of the mercy and love of God, which, though sorely wounded, still yearned over them with incomparable tenderness. We thus arrive at three sections, framed after the analogy of the previous portions of the book, each beginning with a threatening and ending with a promise. These promissory passages (vi. 1-3, xi. 8-11, xiv. 1-9) are progressive in length, and form a climax in thought. The first contains simply an exhortation and a conditional promise, declaring that the speedy return of God's favour was as certain to follow upon repentance as the sun to rise or the rain to fall in its season. In the second, God's persistent love revolts at the utter destruction to which the people were dooming themselves. The third combines the preceding while it goes beyond them both. Israel is not only exhorted to penitence, but is actually seen and heard exercising it. And God's love, no longer struggling with the stern demands of his justice, is freely restored to his repentant and obedient people, with all the blessings that flow from this reconciliation with their Maker and Redeemer. With this blissful prospect the book closes.

Our discussion has led us so far, that we shall not now undertake to characterize the Commentary on Hosea, named at the head of this article, further than to say, that it is one of ability and learning, though the author is unfortunately no believer in divine inspiration. His exposition is commonly sober and judicious, and, with the general caution already given, may be of service in the study of the prophet.

ART. V.—The Testimony of Modern Science to the Unity of Mankind; being a Summary of the Conclusions announced by the Highest Authorities, in the several departments of Physiology, Zoology, and Comparative Philology, in favour of the Specific Unity and Common Origin of all the varieties of Man. By J. L. CABELL, M. D., Professor of Comparative Anatomy and Physiology in the University of Virginia. With an Introductory Notice, By James W. Alexander, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1859, Pp. 344.

WE have seldom read a book which better answers to its title. It is precisely what it purports to be, a summary of the conclusions at which the highest scientific authorities have arrived as to the unity of mankind. This summary is drawn up with a comprehensive knowledge of the whole field, especially so far as the departments of Zoology and Physiology are concerned. It is not a mere retailing of the opinions of other men, but the intelligent exposition by a scientific man of the teachings of science, authenticated and confirmed by the testimony of the most competent witnesses. It is conducted throughout in a truly philosophic spirit, discussing scientific questions on scientific principles. There is no attempt to prove physiological facts by moral arguments, nor to refute anatomy by tradition. The unity of mankind is presented as a problem of natural history, and is discussed as such, just as the question of the specific unity of any of the varieties of the lower animals would be discussed, in which no interests but those of science were involved. In this point of view, the book must satisfy even those who deny that anything but science has a right to be heard on the subject. It is, however, higher praise to say, that Dr. Cabell, while considering the question to which his book is devoted, as a matter of science, is neither ignorant nor indifferent as to its moral and religious bearings. He does not pretend to regard it as a small matter whether all mankind are brethren of the same family, or members of races specifically distinct in nature and orgin. In other words, he is not one-sided. His mind and heart are large enough to take in the spiritual as well as the physical aspects of the subject. He can see in man a soul as well as a body, and, therefore, understands that the unity of the race involves the question of the relation in which men as spiritual and immortal beings stand to each other. We would only remark further, so far as concerns the general character of this work, that it bears everywhere the impress of the Christian and the gentleman. The author is mild and courteous, even when dealing with shallow pretence and gratuitous irreverence.

We have said that the unity of the race is here discussed as a matter of science. It is, however, a matter of deep religious interest. The departments of theology and science in many points overlap each other. Science takes cognizance of man; his origin, nature, prerogatives, and powers. So does theology. The philosopher has no right to warn the theologian off of this ground as a trespasser; and the theologian has no right to put the philosopher under an interdict. Both have their rights. The field is common to both. They differ not as to the subject to be investigated, but as to the mode of investigation. Science seeks to learn what man is, by induction and analogy; theology by revelation. Let each pursue its course independently yet harmoniously. Neither should ignore the other. It is not only unwise but unphilosophical for the man of science to conduct his investigations on the assumption that nothing more than scientific facts can legitimately be taken into view. The horse is found in a wild state all over the American continent. What would be thought of the naturalist who should insist on determining the question of its origin, and the relation of its varieties, as a mere question of zoology? What would any man of sense care for his conclusions, if in contradiction to the known historical fact of its introduction by the Spaniards? or what would be said of the man who should undertake on the zoological principles alone, to determine the origin and relation of the different tribes of Europe, ignoring all the lights of history?

Much has been said of the narrow-mindedness of theologians, and of their disposition to determine questions of science by the exclusive authority of the Bible. And there is no doubt ground for complaint on this score. But we think that theologians (or rather Christians) have much more reason to complain of men of science; who are often disposed to ignore all facts which do not fall within their own department. They often form their theories without any regard to moral and religious truths, which, to say the least, are just as certain, and infinitely more important, than the truths of science. There is not unfrequently a recklessness manifested by scientific men in this matter, which betrays great disregard to the highest interests of man, and which is not only lamentable but revolting. In many cases their conclusions are a balance of probabilities. A straw would turn the scale either way; yet too often they throw the whole weight of their influence on the side of infidelity, when the slightest appreciation of the moral and religious bearings of the question at issue would lead to an opposite conclusion.

It is perfectly conceivable that a scientific sceptic may be led in his principles by a strictly logical process to decide a scientific question one way, when a scientific Christian, by an equally logical process, would decide it another way. The reason is that the latter takes into view legitimate facts and considerations which the former ignores. Which is the higher man? Which is the truer philosopher? Can any man believe that Agassiz with his splendid intellect would have given the sanction of his illustrious name to the theory, (a mere theory,) that the different races of men are indigenous to the zones which they inhabit, each having a separate origin, if he had appreciated the immense a priori probability against that theory arising from the teachings of the Bible, and the moral and religious relations of men? Is it wise or philosophical to adopt a theory, on the mere balance of probabilities, which supposes the Bible to be false, sin and redemption to be fictions, in despite of all the evidence which sustains the authority of the Scriptures and the truth of its teachings? Is it wise or philosophical to treat of man as though he were a brute-or draw conclusions from the physical, to the exclusion of the spiritual phenomena of his nature? Is there anything in this mode of proceeding which authorizes this distinguished philosopher, or those who follow him as the dust follows a chariot, to regard

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himself as standing on a higher platform than the man who takes all the facts into view?

The church is willing to meet men of science on equal terms. She has her convictions founded on evidence which satisfies the reason and constrains the conscience. These she cannot give up, no matter how she may be puzzled or confounded by opposing arguments. No man can give up his conviction of his own liberty, however overwhelming to his understanding may be arguments for necessity. He knows there must be some mode of reconciling the apparently conflicting testimony of consciousness and speculation, and he is content to wait the solution. So the church will stand by her convictions founded on something surer than consciousness, even the power of God, (1 Cor. ii. 5,) and let science prove what facts it can; assured that God in nature can never contradict God in the Bible and in the hearts of his people. The church, however, is willing that the Bible should be interpreted under the guidance of the facts of science. Science once taught that the earth was a plain and the sun its satellite, and the church understood the Scriptures in accordance with that theory. At last it was discovered that the earth is a globe and moves round the sun. The church accepted the fact, and reads the Bible under its guidance.

It was long assumed that our globe is but a few thousand years old; men of science are now convinced that however recent the origin of the human race, the earth has existed for countless ages. Very well, let them once prove the fact, and the Bible will be found not only to agree with it, but to have anticipated it. Men of the highest rank in science now find in Genesis all that science can teach of cosmogony, and bow with wonder before the prescience of Moses. But while the church, in the consciousness of her fallibility in the interpretation of the infallible word of God, is willing to bow her judgment as to its meaning before the well-ascertained revelations of God in nature, she has a right to demand of men of science, first, that they shall be cautious in announcing facts even apparently hostile to the generally received sense of Scripture. Instead of pouncing on such facts, and parading them as if in triumph, (as in the case of the assumed fossil human skeleton of Guadaloupe,) they should be slow to admit them and withhold their

sanction until the evidence admits of no contradiction or doubt. The interests at stake demand this of every right-minded man. He should be far more reluctant to admit any such fact than to acknowledge a flaw in his title to an estate. There is in every community a large class of men eager after an excuse for unbelief. Men of science should not become panders to this depraved appetite. There is another demand on them which may reasonably be made. There is of course a vast difference between facts and theories. The former, and not the latter, are authoritative. It is the fact that the earth is a spheroid, and moves round the sun, and not the theory devised to account for that fact, which has constrained the church to alter her interpretation of the Bible. It is the fact that the magnetic needle points to the pole, and not any theory of magnetism which challenges the faith of all men. What Christians have the right to demand of men of science, nay, what sound philosophy itself demands of them is, that they should not propound theories framed in view of scientific facts alone, while they overlook the facts of religion. For example, it is a fact that there are many varieties of the human race, or many races of men, existing on the earth, and that these races differ very much in conformation, in colour, in stature, in mental endowments, &c. It is also a fact that these different races have different habitations; some dwelling in the torrid, some in the temperate, and some in the arctic zone. It is a short and easy way to account for these facts to say that the several races originated where they are now found, with conformations and constitutions adapted to their circumstances. A plausible argument may be framed in support of this theory. It may even be admitted, (what is not, however, true,) that the arguments for and against this solution of the problem, considered as a mere question in natural history, are pretty nearly balanced. Now as this theory is against the explicit declarations of the Bible, as it subverts the great doctrines of the common apostasy and redemption of the race, and is opposed to the universal faith of the church, for any man to give it the sanction of his authority shows a heartless disregard for the highest interests of men. The chances, to speak after the manner of men, are a thousand to one against the truth of the theory in

question. There are many other ways of accounting for the facts above mentioned, and however probable, considered as a mere question in zoology, the theory of separate origin may be, it is in the highest degree improbable, when considered in the light of all the facts in the case. If there were no other possible solution of this problem; if it were demonstrated to the satisfaction of all competent men, then the principle flat justitia, ruat cælum would justify its annunciation. But to put it forth as a mere plausible guess, to clothe it with the imposing robes of science, and dignify it by the sanction of an illustrious name, is one of the greatest injuries which can be committed against society. All therefore that believers in the Bible ask of men of science is, that they should reverence truth, and not be disposed on slight grounds to assume facts hostile to Christianity; and that in forming and announcing their theories they should have regard not simply to scientific or physical facts, but also to the facts of history, and to the phenomena of man's moral and religious nature, as well as to those of his external organization.

As to the question of the unity of mankind, which is so intimately connected with the whole system of revealed truth, and with the moral and social relations of men, we find the following opinions among scientific men: First, that all mankind are of one species, and have had a common origin. Second, that they are of one species, but have not had a common origin. Third, that they are different in species, as well as diverse in origin. It is obvious, therefore, that the unity of mankind involves two distinct questions, which cannot be confounded; viz. unity of species, and unity of origin. For although the latter implies the former, the former does not necessarily imply the latter. It is conceivable that mankind may all belong to the same species, have a common nature, and in that sense, constitute a common brotherhood, and yet have been created at different times, and in different places. Oaks of Europe may be specifically identical with the oaks of America, without assuming that the one were derived from the other. The fish of the rivers of England may be of the same species with those found in the rivers of France, without supposing that they were transported from the one country to the

other. So the men of New Holland may be one in nature with those of Africa and Europe, and yet be of different origin. A hundred years ago Voltaire said, if you find flies everywhere, it is a stupidity to be surprised that you everywhere find men.* Plants and animals, brutes and men, spring up wherever the circumstances are favourable, either identical or diverse in species, and when of the same species in many cases modified to suit their peculiar location. This is the old pagan theory as to the origin of man. The earth is our common mother; men are everywhere autochthones; Africans are the product of Africa, the Asiatics of Asia, the Esquimaux of the arctic zone. As this old doctrine has, in a modified form, been revived, and received the sanction of at least one illustrious name in science, it of course imposes a double task on the advocates of the unity of mankind. They must not only prove that men are of the same species, but also that they have had a common origin.

The first question then is, Are all men of one and the same species? There can be no intelligent answer to this question without a previous definition of terms. We must first know what is meant by species, and then what are its characteristics; i. e. the criteria by which we are to distinguish between species and varieties. Are the mastiff and the lap-dog of different species, or are they only varieties of the same species? How is this question to be decided? It must be by some general principle applying not to that particular case only, but to all analogous cases. Here after all is the great difficulty. Scientific men are not agreed on these points. Some use the word species in one sense, some in another; and many give it no definite sense at all. Some designate as varieties what others regard as distinct species. We cannot stir a step until this fog is cleared up. What is the use of debating whether men are of the same species, when you do not know what species is?

The general classification of animals has its foundation in nature. This is clear as to the division of all animals into four departments. 1. The Vertebrates, including all animals having a skeleton with a backbone as its axis. 2. The Articu-

^{*} Etudes des Races Humaines, par M. Hyacinthe Deschamps, p. 12.

lates, or animals whose bodies are composed of rings or joints. 3. The Mollusks, or animals with soft bodies without an internal skeleton. 4. The Radiates, or animals whose organs radiate from a centre. Each of these departments is divided into classes. Thus the Vertebrates include, 1. Mammals, or animals which nurse their young. 2. Birds. 3. Reptiles. 4. Fishes. These classes are divided into orders. Thus the Mammals include-1. Beasts of prey. 2. Those which feed on vegetables. 3. Animals of the whale kind. These orders are separated into families; families into genera; genera into species; species into varieties. All this up to a certain point is clear. There is a real foundation in nature for this classification. It proceeds on the assumption that there is a plan and design in creation; that the different classes, orders and genera of animals are constructed on a different plan, and for a different purpose, or that the peculiar form and arrangement of the organs have a relation to each other, and to a definite end. We do not find the teeth of a herbivorous animal combined with the claws of the carnivorous class. It is only when we come to the lower divisions that difficulty and obscurity occur. "The genus," says Agassiz, "is founded on some of the minor peculiarities of anatomical structure, such as the number, disposition, or proportion of the teeth, claws, fins, &c., and usually includes several kinds. Thus, the lion, tiger, leopard, cat, &c., agree in the structure of their feet, claws and teeth, and they belong to the genus Felis; while the dog, fox, jackal, wolf, &c., have another and a different peculiarity of the feet, claws, and teeth, and are arranged in the genus Canis. The species is founded on less important distinctions, such as colour, size, proportions, structure, &c. Thus we have different kinds or species of ducks, different species of squirrel, different species of monkey, &c., varying from each other in some trivial circumstance, while those of each group agree in all their general structure. The specific name is the lowest term to which we descend, if we except certain peculiarities, generally induced by some modification of native habits, such as are seen in domestic animals. These are called varieties, and seldom endure beyond the causes which occasion them."* According

^{*} Principles of Zoology, p. xiv.

to this view species are distinguished by "slight peculiarities" of colour, size and structure; and the only distinction between specific differences and the differences between varieties of the same species, is that the former are permanent, and the latter transient, i. e., such as are induced by change of habits or circumstances, and lasting only so long as these transient causes operate. The only criterion of species, therefore, is slight permanent peculiarities of colour, size and structure. On this definition we would remark, 1. That if this is all that is meant by the term, then it is, and must always remain in many cases, a matter of uncertainty to what species a particular animal is to be referred. Because varieties of the same species differ from each other by permanent peculiarities of size, colour and structure. The characteristic difference, therefore, between species and variety is obliterated. Take, for example, the case of the dog. It belongs to the genus Canis which includes the wolf, fox, jackal, &c., but all dogs belong to one and the same species, according to all naturalists of any name or authority. Within this species, however, there are an indefinite number of kinds distinguished by permanent peculiarities. Some of these kinds extend back as far as any historical record goes, being depicted on the ancient monuments The difference, therefore, has existed for thousands The peculiarities, moreover, cannot be obliterated of years. by any change of habit, external circumstances, food, &c. You may vary the surrounding of a terrier ad libitum, and to the end of time, and you can never change him into a mastiff or a greyhound. Here then are permanent peculiarities beyond the control of circumstances, distinguishing different varieties of the same species.

This proves two things, first, that the above definition or description of species amounts to nothing; and, secondly, that it is impossible for any man to pretend, on scientific principles, that the varieties of men constitute distinct species, because distinguished from each other by permanent peculiarities of colour, size, and structure, which are independent of circumstances, while all the varieties of dogs which differ by still more marked peculiarities, no less permanent and indomitable, are referred to one and the same species. It is argued that the

Negro must be a distinct species from the Caucasian, because he is depicted in the ancient monuments (not the most ancient, however,) of Egypt. But there we find the mastiff and the hound. If this antiquity in the varieties of dogs be consistent with identity of species, why may not a like antiquity in the varieties of men be consistent with their specific identity? This of course is too palpable a dilemma to escape the attention of naturalists of the modern school, in which, however, we do not include Professor Agassiz, who belongs to a different class, and who has lent his name as a jewel to be worn as on a stage and for a night. The modern school of naturalists to which we refer, are those American writers who have made themselves so prominent in endeavouring to introduce new principles into science, for the purpose of establishing the original and specific diversity of the different races of men; some, no doubt, from a sincere conviction of its truth; others apparently for the purpose of furnishing a satisfactory foundation for the perpetuity of African slaveholding; and some, as they endeavour to make conspicuous, for the sake of overthrowing the authority of the Bible. These naturalists, discovering that the same arguments which prove the identity of species of all varieties of dogs, would unavoidably prove that all the varieties of men are of the same species, have been driven to deny that dogs are all of the same species. Dr. Nott and his associate maintain that there are races of dogs specifically distinct. Dr. Morton is quoted, who thinks that our domestic dogs had a threefold origin.* But what are these among so many? Suppose we admit that there were three original sources of dogs. This does not meet the difficulty. There are more than three varieties of dogs distinguished from each other by permanent peculiarities. We must therefore either admit that new species can be originated, which is a new idea in science, or we must acknowledge that permanent peculiarities may exist within the limits of the same species. The definition remains a failure. Permanent peculiarities are not a criterion of species. Such peculiarities may be induced by the gradual operation of difference of climate, food, and modes of

^{*} Types of Mankind, by J. C. Nott and Geo. Gliddon, p. 381.

life; by accident, i. e. by the operation of causes which elude our notice: by a careful process of breeding; by the mixture of different varieties of the same species. These are facts which cannot be denied, and which are, so far as we know, universally admitted. No one pretends that all the permanent varieties of dog are distinct species. They are never found in a wild state. There are no wild mastiffs, greyhounds, or spaniels. All, or at least many of these varieties, have originated or been produced subsequent to the origin of the species. The horse is widely diffused over the earth, and differs in its varieties as to colour, size, and proportions, as much as the various races of men differ. The domestic hog is no less extensively distributed in numberless varieties, all descended from the wild boar, which differs from the domestic animal in colour, covering of the skin, and formation of the skull, as Blumenbach himself admits, as much as the negro differs from the white man.

Naturalists report a breed of cattle originating in South America, beyond the La Plata, with permanent, transmissible peculiarities, far more marked than those usually relied upon as proofs of difference of species. "Their forehead is very short and broad, with the nasal end turned up, and the upper lip drawn back; their lower jaws project forward; when they walk they carry their head low, on a short neck, and their hind legs are rather longer compared with the front ones, than is usual." Cabell, p. 24. The works of naturalists are filled with examples of this kind.

It is not our object to write a zoological treatise. We are simply testing the correctness of a definition. We wish to show that permanent peculiarities of size, colour, hair, proportion, and structure, are no proof of diversity of species. All such peculiarities occur in varieties known from history to have had a common origin. The inevitable conclusion from this fact is, that the mere existence of such differences among men is no proof of diversity of species, and no evidence against their common descent from the same parents. If all the horses in the world may have descended from the same stock; if all the varieties of swine may have descended from the wild-boar; and if all the varieties of dogs, or any considerable portion of

those varieties, may have had a common origin, then all the varieties of men may have had a common parentage.

The uncertainty of the criteria of species is a matter generally acknowledged. On this subject Dr. Carpenter says, "The uncertainty of the limits of species is daily becoming more and more evident, and every naturalist is aware that a very large number of races are usually considered as having a distinct origin, when they are nothing more than permanent varieties of a common stock."* On the following page he says, that "Mr. J. E. Gray has shown, among other instances, that what have been regarded as six distinct species of Murex, are in reality but different forms of one." In the same connection he remarks, that the naturalist is disposed to adopt "easily recognized external characters as the basis of his classification," instead of relying on peculiarities of internal structure, "which are less subject to variation." It is too obvious to need remark, that when scientific men are not agreed among themselves on the criteria of species, and find it so difficult to decide between species and varieties, it would be absurd to expect Christians to give up faith in the Bible, or to renounce important doctrines of their religion, out of deference to a principle of classification so utterly uncertain. Even among the advocates of the doctrine of the specific difference between the various races of men, there are scarcely any two who agree as to the number of species into which mankind are to be divided. Some make two, the white and black; others three, the Caucasian, the Mongolian, and the African; others make five, others eight. Dr. Pickering says there is no choice except between eleven and one. Bory de Saint Vincent makes fifteen, and Desmoulin sixteen. † What is this but a blatant confession of utter uncertainty, an acknowledgment that the criteria of species, as laid down by naturalists, do not command even their own confidence.

2. The second remark which we have to make on Professor Agassiz's definition of species, is that by obliterating the distinction between species and variety, it destroys all importance

^{*} Carpenter's General and Comparative Physiology, p. 981.

[†] Deschamps, Etudes, p. 21.

of the question as to the specific unity of mankind. If every permanent variety is a species, then it matters not whether we say there are three or twenty species of men. It is a mere dispute about words. All admit there are numerous varieties of mankind, permanent and to a great degree immutable, and if the definition of a species answers to that of a variety, you may make as many species as you please. Agassiz himself, after for years teaching that all men are of one and the same species, now says they are of as many distinct species as there are permanent varieties of the race. To cite another illustration on this point, the author of the introduction to the American edition of Colonel Hamilton Smith's book on the Natural History of the Human Species, expresses his "own opinion from a careful study of the phenomena, and from personal observation," in favour of the specific diversity of mankind. Yet on the same p. 83, we find this passage: "The most commonly used argument in this connection [i. e. for the unity of mankind,] is furnished by the varieties of the dog, which are considered as belonging to one species. To say nothing, however, of the petitio principii here, in assuming the point wished to be proved, many eminent naturalists believe that there are several species of dogs. The objection of F. Cuvier, that 'if we begin to make species, we cannot stop short at five or six, but must go on indefinitely,' is of no weight; the most it can do is to show us the exceedingly vague meaning of the word species, and that we have not yet arrived at the true distinction of species and variety. The 'permanent variety' of Dr. Prichard, from his own definition, is to all intents and purposes 'a species.'" This is certainly a very frank confession. This gentleman tells us that after a "careful study of the phenomena" he has arrived at the conclusion that men are of different species, and on the same page confesses that he does not know what a species is, and that he cannot distinguish between a species and a variety. This is a specimen of a class of birds which rub their bills against the vast cathedral of Christianity, and think they are overturning its foundations. If this gentleman does not know the difference between species and variety, we can tell him thus much at least, that species is something not only permanent but original, whereas a variety, though it may be

permanent, is not original. His saying that Dr. Prichard's permanent variety is to all intents and purposes a species, shows, as he confesses, that his ideas on the subject are exceedingly vague. The difficulty is not to tell the distinction between species and variety, but to ascertain the criteria by which we can discriminate them in the concrete, and say with confidence, these animals belong to different species, and these are varieties of the same species. We of course do not attribute to such a man as Agassiz the confusion of thought to which we have just referred. Every page of his writings is luminous with intellectual light, and glows with kind and genial feeling, so that all his readers become not only his admirers, but his friends. Our objection to his definition is, in the first place, that it does not afford the criteria necessary for practical discrimination; and, in the second place, that if adopted and carried out, it reduces species and variety to the same category of permanent peculiarity, and thus makes the dispute about the specific unity of mankind a dispute about words. This is far from being harmless, because the idea of original diversity is so indelibly impressed on the word species, that if that word be made synonymous with variety, arguments which prove only permanent diversity will be regarded as proving primordial distinction. It is of vast importance to the cause of truth that words should be preserved in their integrity. In the true meaning of the terms, permanent peculiarity (variety) is consistent with community of origin, specific difference is not.

3. A still more serious objection to the definition in question is, that it leaves out of view the immaterial element from nature. It is founded exclusively on what is material and outward. We do not mean that this element is denied, but it is ignored. This is like leaving out of view the soul in the definition of a man. This difficulty arises in part from the assumed necessity of fixing on a definition of species, which can be applied to plants as well as to animals, and even to man. In the plant the external organization is everything. In the lower animals there is besides the external organization, the $\varphi \dot{\nu} \sigma \varepsilon$ and $\dot{\psi} \nu \chi \dot{\gamma}$, and in man still further the $\pi \nu \varepsilon \ddot{\nu} \mu \alpha$. The body of the plant is the plant, but the body of a man is not the man. It is the interior higher being which determines his

nature, and decides the order of creatures to which he belongs. This is too plain and too high a truth to be denied. Professor Agassiz in his Zoology, page 9, says: "Besides the distinction to be derived from the varied structure of organs, there are others less subject to rigid analysis, but no less decisive, to be drawn from the immaterial principles, with which every animal is endowed. It is this which determines the constancy of species from generation to generation, and which is the source of all the varied exhibitions of instinct and intelligence which we see displayed, from the simple impulse to receive the food which is brought within their reach, as observed in the polyps, through the higher manifestations, in the cunning fox, the sagacious elephant, the faithful dog, and the exalted intellect of man, which is capable of indefinite expansion." Again, page 43: "The constancy of species is a phenomenon dependent on the immaterial nature." This all important truth, so clearly recognized in these and other passages of the writings of this distinguished naturalist, is overlooked in his definition, or rather in his criteria of species. When he makes species to depend on minute peculiarities of size, colour, proportion, and sculpture, everything immaterial is left out of view. Now it seems very plain, according to his own principle, if species is determined by the immaterial nature, that nothing in the organic structure can be assumed as proof of difference of species, which is not indicative of difference in the immaterial principle. That principle in every species is, according to Agassiz, the same; and in that sameness, as he teaches us, depends its identity and perpetuity. "All animals may be traced back," he says, "in the embryo, to a mere point upon the yolk of the egg, bearing no resemblance whatever to the future animal. But even here, an immaterial principle which no external influence can prevent or modify, is present, and determines its future form; so that the egg of a hen can produce nothing but a chicken, and the egg of the codfish produces only the cod. It may therefore be said with truth, that the chicken and the cod existed in the egg before their formation." To determine the species therefore, we must determine the immaterial principle. How is this to be done? Obviously in three ways. First, by the external organization.

immaterial principle of each species of animals has impressed upon it, or imparted to it a specific nature, in virtue of which it developes itself in one particular form, or moulds for itself organs adapted to its nature and destiny. We determine, therefore, the immaterial principle by the organization which it developes for itself, which cannot change any more than the principle itself can change. If the animal be destined to move through the air, through water, or on the land, this is a law of its nature which determines its organization. If it is to feed on flesh, it has the organs requisite to seize and devour its prey; if to live on herbs, its organs are adapted to that end. The important point is, that no peculiarity of the external organism which is not an adaptation to some specific end, can be taken as an indication of the nature of the immaterial principle of the animal. It is obvious, for example, that difference in the size, colour, or proportions of the horse does not indicate any difference in the interior nature of the animal. Whether he is small or large, white or black; whether his forehead is broad or narrow, whether his shoulder-blade is straight or oblique, is perfectly indifferent. The organism is the same. All that belongs to the idea of the animal, all that reveals the law of its nature, remains the same in despite of these peculiarities, and therefore the species is the same.

So also the feathers on the legs of some domestic fowls are not significant. They indicate no peculiarity in the interior nature of the animal. But a skin connecting the toes, although involving a less expenditure of material, is seen at once to be there with design. It adapts the bird for a different mode of life; and everything else in its external organization and internal nature will be found to correspond with that peculiarity. It therefore is a proper criterion of kind. There may be difficulty in carrying out this obviously correct principle in its application to lower animals. We are too little acquainted with their nature to determine what is, and what is not indicative of design. Hence a spot upon an insect's wing, a little difference in the length of its antennæ, or a slight corrugation in a shell, is held to be a sufficient proof of diversity of species. In such cases the word species loses its meaning and its importance. It becomes synonymous with difference. To

make like trivial peculiarities evidence of a distinction in species among the higher animals, would introduce endless confusion, and make all classification a matter of caprice.

There is, therefore, an important distinction to be made between those diversities which arise out of the nature of the animal, and those which depend on circumstances. While the interior life of every species of animal has its own law of development, from which it cannot depart, so that like always produces like, and so that permanency is one of the laws of its nature, yet, within the limits of its original idea, its external organism may be indefinitely modified. This susceptibility of variation differs greatly in different classes of animals, according to their destiny. If designed to live within narrow limits and under no great variety of external conditions, the capacity for variation is small. The lion and tiger confined to the torrid zone are everywhere the same; whereas the wolf intended to roam over most of the face of the earth, varies within wide limits. This is especially true of the domestic animals. The horse, the ox, the dog, swine and sheep, intended for the service of man, adapt themselves to almost all the regions of the earth. In man, to whom the whole globe is given as a possession and a dwelling, this capability of variation appears in the highest perfection. An amount of difference, therefore, between two lions, which would justify the naturalist in referring them to different species, when found to exist between two dogs or two sheep, is justly regarded as insignificant. The same remark obviously applies with still greater force to the varieties of men. We might admit that the man of the arctic zone differs more in his external peculiarities from the man of the torrid zone, than many species confined to one or the other of those regions differ from each other; and yet science would pronounce the man dwelling in a snow house, and living on oil, as of the same species with man who dwells in a burning desert. The external characteristics of animals are influenced by a thousand causes known and unknown, fortuitous and constant. They change with the season of the year, with the climate in which the animal lives. They are modified by the food it eats, by the vigour or feebleness of its constitution. The historical and

admitted fact, illustrated every day and in every part of the world, is that animals acknowledged to be of the same species, vary indefinitely in size, colour, covering of the skin, proportion and sculpture. As the crab-apple and the pippin are the same species, so the noble war-horse and the miserable hack are the same animal; the domestic hog is the same in species as the wild-boar; the athletic mountaineer is even of the same variety of the human family with the sallow, feeble white inhabitants of a malarious southern coast. These and a thousand similar modifications no one can deny. But in no one of these cases is there any departure from the original type. There is no change of structure indicating a difference in the interior principle. That remains the same, and therefore in all these cases the skeleton is the same—the number and arrangement of the bones are the same; the muscles, bloodvessels and nerves are all the same, because the functions to be performed are the same. It is the neglect of the simple principle that no peculiarity of an external kind should be taken as evidence of specific difference, which is not indicative of the nature of the immaterial principle, that has led to the undue multiplication of species of which naturalists complain, and to much of the confusion which overhangs this subject. As we have just seen in the quotation from Dr. Carpenter, a slight corrugation in a shell, which had nothing to do with the nature of its inhabitant, being assumed as a criterion, led to the multiplication of one species into six. The same writer says that an erroneous multiplication of species of birds has been occasioned by the change of plumage at different seasons. The discrimination of species must ever remain uncertain and arbitrary, so long as peculiarities which are not significant, and therefore make no revelation of the nature of the animal, are assumed as criteria.

In the second place, if it be the immaterial principle which determines the species, and secures its constancy from generation to generation, then it follows that physiology is a surer guide in the discrimination of species than peculiarities of external form. The latter are far more subject to the modifying influences of subordinate causes, than the interior nature of the animal. In other words, the $\varphi i \sigma \varepsilon \varepsilon$ is a more immediate and

reliable revelation of the immaterial principle than external peculiarities. It is more certain that the germinating spot in a hen's egg will develope itself into an animal of the same nature with the parent bird, than that the new animal will exhibit all the peculiarities of size, colour, proportion, and sculpture of its parent. These latter may be modified by accidental circumstances; the former is everywhere the same. The domestic fowl is recognized as the same animal in all its varieties, in all parts of the world, because it has the same senses; the same laws govern its respiration, its digestion, the circulation of its blood, its mode of reproduction, its periods of incubation, of progress, and decline. It has the same cravings, and the same food. In short it has the same nature, therefore the species is the same. In like manner the wolf widely diffused over the earth, varying in size, colour, and proportion, has everywhere the same nature. What physiology reveals of the laws of the interior life of the wolf of America, it teaches of the wolves of Europe and Asia. So of the horse, the dog, the lion, the tiger. Identity of nature is proof of identity of species. If the guous be the same, the immaterial principle is the same; and if the immaterial principle be the same, Agassiz being judge, the species is the same.

In the third place, the immaterial principle, or species, is manifested through the doyd. Every animal has its psychology, as well as its physiology. The same species has everywhere the same habits, propensities, and instincts. The bee everywhere builds a hexagonal cell; the beaver everywhere builds a dam; the rabbit everywhere burrows in the earth; birds build their nests after the same fashion, each according to its kind. These instincts remain unchanged from age to age. The elephant has the docility and sagacity, the dog the fidelity to man, the fox the cunning, they had thousands of years ago. These instincts, although thus permanent in their essential character, may be modified by training and change of circumstances, within certain limits. As one man has an eye for painting, another an ear for music, another a genius for mechanics or mathematics, so some dogs have a peculiar keenness of scent; some have a mild, and others a ferocious temper. But all these modifications leave the original physical basis un-

changed. They are not greater than are found among men confessedly belonging to the same division of the human race, and even between the children of the same parents. Besides the infinite diversity of individual character, there are family and national peculiarities distinctly marked, and transmissible from one generation to another. It is impossible to give a Frenchman the character of an Irishman, or an Irishman that of a Frenchman. Yet everything that pertains to human nature belongs as much to the one as to the other. Psychology is not one thing in France, and another thing in Ireland-nor one thing in Europe, and another thing in Asia. The wolf is a wolf, and a lion a lion, and a man is a man, the world over, in every thing which relates to the characteristic propensities of their nature. Here again the argument is, if the $\psi \nu \gamma \dot{\gamma}$ be the same, the immaterial principle is the same; and if the immaterial principle be the same, the species is the same.

Under Agassiz's guidance we have thus arrived at the conclusion that the criteria of species, as consisting in peculiarities of size, colour, proportion and sculpture, even when these peculiarities are permanent, or extend beyond the limits of actual observation, are altogether inadequate. He has taught us that the species is determined by what lies back of the material development, and determines its character; that this immaterial principle is to be identified and its species decided by those varieties of external form which indicate design; by the physiological and psychological characteristics of the animal whose nature it constitutes.

Most of the popular definitions of species are more or less open to similar objections. Cuvier says: "We are under the necessity of admitting the existence of certain forms which have perpetuated themselves from the beginning of the world, without exceeding the limits first prescribed; all the individuals belonging to one of these forms constitute what is termed a species." De Candolle says: "We write under the designation of species all those individuals who mutually bear to each other so close a resemblance as admits of our supposing that they may have arisen from a single pair."* The objections to

^{*} Introduction to the English edition of Pickering's Races of Men, p. xxxii.

these definitions are, 1. That they do not tell us what species is, but what groups are to be referred to one species and what to another. 2. That they refer to similarity of form as the only criterion; and 3. That they give us no means of distinguishing between species and permanent varieties.

Instead of relying on constancy of peculiarities, others make community of descent the criterion of species. Thus Dr. Prichard says, that under the term species are included all those animals which are supposed to have arisen in the first instance from a single pair. And Dr. Carpenter says: "When it can be shown that two races have had a separate origin, they are regarded as of different species; and, in the absence of proof, this is inferred, when we see some peculiarity of organization characteristic of each, so constantly transmitted from parent to offspring, that the one cannot be supposed to have lost, or the other to have acquired it, through any known operation of physical causes." The two obvious objections to this are, 1. That community of origin in the vast majority of cases cannot be proved; or it is the very thing to be proved, and therefore cannot be assumed. 2. That diversity of origin is no proof of diversity of species. If God had created one pair of lions in Asia, and another in Africa, they would still be identical in species; for identity of species is only sameness of kind.

Agassiz in his later writings has adopted Dr. Morton's definition, which makes different species to be different "primordial forms." But this is the same thing over again. How are we to tell what forms are primordial? We have seen twenty times over that a peculiarity of form having existed at the earliest period of observation is not regarded by naturalists as proof that it has existed from the beginning. Besides, in the sense in which the word is here used, species is not form. It is not external configuration. This is only one, and as we have seen, beyond certain limits, the most unreliable of its manifestations. To say, therefore, that species are primordial forms, leaves us exactly where we were. If dogs with their acquired peculiarities of form can remain of the same species, had they been created with those peculiarities they would still have been of the same species. If one horse were created a Shetland pony

and another a barb, both would be as much identical in nature as they are now. In another sense of the word form, it is synonymous with species. This any dictionary teaches us: "Genus et species, quam eandem formam Cicero vocat," Quinctil. Inst. 5, 10, 62. It of course does not amount to much to define a word by its synonyme. In the scholastic or philosophical meaning of the term, the form of a thing is its esse, that which makes it what it is. It is the essence with its determination. But this sense is foreign from common usage, and would not suggest itself to any reader; neither is it the one intended by the author or advocates of the definition in question. If they would allow us to take the word in that sense we should be satisfied, so far as the meaning is concerned, but should still object to the definition as certain to be constantly misunderstood, and therefore to be a prolific source of error.

Professor Dana of Yale College, so far as our reading extends, is the only naturalist who has presented this subject in its true light. "Species," he says, "are the units of nature."* His formal definition is, "A species is a specific amount or condition of concentrated force, defined in the act or laws of creation," p. 860. We do like this language. We do not approve of the disposition among naturalists to merge substances into forces. Matter, however incapable of definition or conception in itself considered, is not mere force. Force is the revelation of being, and that being is other than the being or essence of God. The same is true of immaterial beings. Thought is not a definition of mind, nor is vital power a definition of a living substance. It is not the form of expression, therefore, that commends itself to our mind, but the idea intended to be conveyed. What Agassiz defines as the immaterial principle or "nature," (φύσις or οὐσία,) on which the permanence of species depends, are, as we understand Professor Dana, the units of nature. "The units of the inorganic world," he says, "are the weighed elements and their definite compounds or their molecules. The units of the organic are species, which exhibit themselves in their simplest condition in

^{*} See his instructive paper in the Bibliotheca Sacra for October, 1857.

the germ-cell state. The kingdoms of life in all their magnificent proportions are made from these units," p. 863. ()n a previous page he says, "When individuals multiply from generation to generation, it is but the repetition of the primordial type-idea; and the true notion of species is not in the resulting group, but in the idea or potential element which is at the basis of every individual of the group."* We therefore understand Professor Dana to agree with Professor Agassiz in regarding the immaterial principle as that which determines the species, so that where that is the same, the species is the same. The question, therefore, whether any two or more animals belong to the same or to different species, is a question whether the immaterial principle belonging to them be the same or different. We have already seen that, apart from revelation and history, the only possible way of determining this point is, the external organization, the physiology, and the psychology of the animals in question. If these are the same in everything which is indicative and revealing, then by all the laws of logic the species is the same.

It follows from all that has been said, that the great characteristics of species are originality, universality, and immutability. 1. By originality is meant that species are underived, owing their existence and character to the immediate creating power of God. As to this point all naturalists, or at least naturalists of all classes, are agreed. This is taught by Cuvier, who says we are forced to admit that species have perpetuated themselves from the beginning of the world. This also is the doctrine of Agassiz, of Dr. Morton, and of all who define species to be primordial forms. This, too, is the view of those who are so desirous to prove that varieties of the human race are different species. They mean by this, that they have differed from the beginning, each having its own origin. It is included in the originality of species that no new species can be produced by external causes, or by the intermixture of dif-

^{*} Professor Dana says, p. 862, that "Dr. Morton presented nearly the same idea when he described a species as a primordial organic form." If this be so, then the word form must be taken in its scholastic sense. In its ordinary meaning, form is not "force," or "law," or "idea," or "potential element," all which terms Professor Dana uses to express his notion of species.

ferent races. Diversity of species supposes diversity of origin. This fact, although naturalists often forget it, is their own almost universally admitted doctrine. "It is a law of nature," says Agassiz, "that animals as well as plants are preceded only by individuals of the same species; and vice versa, that none of them can produce a species different from themselves." Each, therefore, must have had its own distinct origin. 2. Universality. By this is meant, that everything essential and characteristic belonging to any individual of a given species, belongs to every other individual included in it. What constitutes the species lies at the basis of every individual embraced in the whole group. This of course is not disputed. It is only another way of saying that things which are equal to the same are equal to one another. Whatever belongs to the nature of a lion is common to all lions.

3. Immutability or permanence. By this is meant, that the only way that a species can be destroyed is by destroying all the individuals which belong to it. It is by the law of God permanent. Like begets like; and one species does not mingle with another so as to produce a third; nor is one ever merged into another so as to be thereby lost or confounded. This is a general principle which until of late has been universally admitted. In proof of this point, we may refer, in the first place, to the great outstanding fact, that the different species of animals which inhabit our earth, have existed distinct as far back as our knowledge extends. The horse, the dog, the lion, the tiger, the wolf, the elephant, the camel, the sheep, are now what they were in the days of Abraham. Cuvier says that Aristotle describes the elephant better than Buffon does. There has been no confusion from the intermixture of distinct species. The fact that animals of nearly allied species, as the horse and ass, may produce a hybrid, (as a mule, for example,) does not conflict with this statement. Because the product of such discordant unions either remain unprolific, or they die out in a few generations, or by union with individuals of the pure blood the foreign element is eliminated, and the original type is restored.

The two greatest authorities on the subject of hybridity are the Rev. Dr. Bachman of this country, and M. Flourens of Europe. Both have paid special attention to the subject, and instituted numerous and long-continued experiments to determine the question. The latter, from his official position at the Jardin des Plantes, has had the fullest opportunities for the investigation. Both have arrived at the settled conviction that species are immutable; that hybrids are sterile, or die out in a few generations. M. Flourens thus states the conclusion to which his long-continued experiments have led him: "Either hybrids, born of the union of two distinct species, unite and soon become sterile, or they unite with one of the parent stocks, and soon return to this type—they in no case give what may be called a new species, that is to say, an intermediate durable species." "Les espèces ne s'altèrent point, ne changent point, ne passent point de l'une à l'autre; les espèces sont Fixes."* This fact stares us constantly in the face. The oaks and pines of our day are the oaks and pines of our fathers, and of our fathers' fathers, from the very beginning. No one denies this. No one expects the different races or species of plants and animals to change, any more than they expect other laws of nature to change.

It seems strange that naturalists in search of truth, should apparently for the sake of establishing a foregone conclusion, appeal to isolated cases of coerced connection of individuals of different species; gathering their examples from the ends of the earth, and from reports of questionable authority. How can such examples invalidate a law? Where are these mongrel races? Where are the hybrid descendants of the lion and tiger, of the wolf and fox, of the ass and zebra, of the leopard and panther? Has not the experiment been tried long enough during thousands of years? Has not the whole earth been a theatre wide enough on which to make the trial? The experience of ages and the observation of nations have established it as a law, that "beings of a distinct species, or descendants from stocks originally different, cannot produce a mixed race which shall possess the capability of perpetuating itself." †

^{*} De la Longevité Humaine, &c., par P. Flourens, Paris, 1855. We quote from Dr. Nott's Appendix to the translation of Count de Gobineau's work on the Moral and Intellectual Diversity of Races, p. 495.

[†] Dr. Carpenter, p. 984.

In the second place, permanence is involved in the very idea of species. Indeed this among naturalists is its great criterion. "The ground upon which," says Agassiz, "animals are considered as distinct species, is simply the fact, that, since they have been known to man, they have always preserved the same characteristics."* Dr. Nott, seeing the insufficiency of any other means of proving the varieties of man to be distinct species, renounces all other criteria, and argues, that as living species of animals are distinguished as different species, "simply upon their permanency of type, as derived from history," therefore, "the races of men depicted on the monuments of Egypt, five thousand years ago, and which have maintained their types through all time and all climates since, are distinct species.'+ He adduces Professor Leidy's authority, who says, "A species of plant or animal may be defined to be an immutable organic form, whose characteristic distinctions may always be recognized by a study of its history," p. 479. The favourite definition of species among naturalists, as we have seen, is, "primordial organic forms." Agassiz's whole theory is founded on the belief of the immutability of species. He maintains that the different varieties of men are not to be referred to the influence of secondary cause, or to intermixture, but that they were created as they are and where they are. How is all this to be reconciled with the doctrine of hybridity? If the idea of species is that of an original and permanent organic form, how can distinct species mingle and produce other and mongrel races ad libitum? If species are original, they cannot be produced; and if they cannot be produced, they cannot intermix; for the result of such intermixture, according to the doctrine of hybridity, is the production of new species, i. e. of new, permanent organic forms. It is therefore at the expense of all consistency, of all uniformity in the use of terms, and of all certainty in science, to teach that distinct species can be united so as to give rise to new self-perpetuating races.

It is a palpable contradiction to say that species are original and permanent, and yet that they can be produced and obliterated; and to say that hybrids can be permanently prolific,

^{*} Types of Mankind, p. LXXIV.

[†] Appendix to Gobineau, p. 478.

is to say that specific differences are neither original nor permanent. If, therefore, species are what these naturalists pronounce them to be, the fact that two races or varieties of animals produce permanently prolific offspring is proof positive that they belong to the same species, naturalists must either alter their definition, and overthrow the very foundations of their science, or they must admit that permanently prolific hybrids are impossible. If they choose to confound the words species and variety, and make every permanent diversity of form proof of diversity of species, very good. It is a mere question of words. But they cannot teach that species are original and permanent—that the varieties of men must have had different origins because their distinctive characteristics have existed for ages—and at the same time maintain that hybrids may be permanently prolific. If this conclusion flows ex necessitate, even from the idea of species which makes the external organism everything, much more does it flow from the juster and more profound view of the nature of species which Professor Dana has presented, and which, as we have seen, Agassiz himself frequently propounds. If species are the units of nature, if it is the immaterial principle, as Agassiz says, that gives them character and permanence, then they are raised above the sphere of mutation. They are, so to speak, the thoughts of God; the ideas which from the beginning he determined to express by means of these organic forms and the internal nature therewith connected. If these can be mixed and confounded, then the book of nature becomes unintelligible. You might as well take the letters of a printed page and throw them together pell-mell, and expect them still to spell words significant of thoughts of truth and beauty.

In the third place, this doctrine of the mingling of distinct species is not only contrary to the experience of ages on the wide theatre of the earth's surface, and to the fundamental idea of species as given even by the advocates of the doctrine—it would not only, if true, lead to utter confusion in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, but it is in entire contradiction to

the whole analogy of nature.

The permanence of the laws of nature, and the certainty of their operation, are the basis of all science, and the indispensable condition even of the existence of living creatures. If the law of gravitation could cease to be what it is; if heat could cease to be heat, and light to be light, what would become of the world and its inhabitants. If caloric could combine with magnetism, and become a hybrid, something neither the one nor the other-if the elementary principles of nature could be thus confounded, it is obvious that chaos would prevail. "The units of the inorganic world," says Professor Dana, in a passage already quoted in part, "are the weighed elements and their definite compounds, or their molecules. The units of the organic are species, which exhibit themselves in their simplest condition in their germ-cell state. The kingdoms of life in all their magnificent proportions are made up of these units. Were these units capable of blending with one another indefinitely, they would be no longer units, and species could not be recognized. The system of life would be a maze of complexities; and whatever its grandeur to a being that could comprehend the infinite, it would be unintelligible chaos to man. It would be to man the temple of nature fused over its whole surface, and through its structure, without a line the mind could measure or comprehend."* As therefore the universe in all its parts is constructed on a definite plan, as the laws of nature are uniform, as the constituent elements of the material world are permanent, it would be in strange contradiction with this universal analogy, if in the very highest department of nature, in the organic and living world, everything should be unstable. that species could mingle with species, and confusion take the place of order and uniformity. So far as our limited reading extends, this doctrine of hybridity is maintained only by those who deny the specific unity of mankind. As the different races of men freely unite and produce offspring permanently prolific, it becomes absolutely necessary for this class of naturalists to maintain that distinct species may give rise to permanent races. They therefore hunt the world over for examples of such prolific unions, and what does it all amount to? No such thing exists on the face of the earth as a race of animals known to have sprung from parents belonging to different species. This fact is itself enough.

^{*} Bibliotheca Sacra, October 1857, p. 863.

If we have succeeded in convincing our readers that species in animals depends on the immaterial principle, which manifests itself in the external organization, in the coors and the ψυγή, then the question whether mankind are of one or of different species can, in their minds, admit of no debate. No one denies that the external organization of all men, amid all their diversity of size, colour, proportion, and sculpture, is the same in everything which indicates design, or which serves to reveal the interior being. The skeleton is the same as to the number and arrangement of the bones; the limbs are the same; the muscles, the blood vessels, and their distribution are the same in all. The physiology and psychology of all men are precisely the same. This no one denies. But this is all that is meant by identity of species. It is the sameness of nature. Let it not be supposed that we have Agassiz against us on this point. Agassiz is a genius, but he is no logician. He does not discriminate in the use of words. He says and unsays the same thing, sometimes on the same page. He tells us the species is determined by the immaterial nature, and he further tells us that all men have the same immaterial nature, and yet they are of different species. This contradiction arises from using the same word in different senses. Taken in its true, legitimate, and established sense, as expressing identity of nature, mankind are of one species; taken in the sense of a primordial organic form, Agassiz says, they are of different species; that is, they have had different origins, and have differed from the beginning. This is not now the point before us. We are anxious to show the unity of mankind, the doctrine that they are identical in nature, as truly as the varieties of the horse, or of any other widely diffused terrestial animal. This we think we have fairly done on the principle laid down by Agassiz himself. No definition of species can be authenticated and established on a scientific basis, which will not include in it all the varieties of the human. Even admitting they had different origins, yet if their interior nature is the same, their external organization, their physiology and psychology, then are they the same in every sense in which the inhabitants of France or England are the same. In addition to the identity of the σωμα, φύσις and ψυχή, which are the

constituent elements of irrational animals, there is a higher bond of union among men in the identity of the πνεῦμα. The rational and immortal soul belongs to all, and is the same in This puts them in a class by themselves, and identifies them as a class. The rational soul of the Caucasian, of the Mongolian, and of the African, do not differ the one from the other, more than the soul of one Englishman differs from that of another. There may of course be a great difference in the mental endowments of different races of men, as there are among the different members of the same family. But this does not affect the question of identity. The essential faculties are the same in all. All have the powers of understanding, will, and conscience. These are the elements of our higher nature. Where these are in any inhabitant of our earth, there a man is. Where these are not, there human nature is not. No man whose whole life has not been devoted to material pursuits, whose mind is not so trained to the observation and examination of physical laws, and the phenomena of matter, as to be incapable of appreciating the immaterial and spiritual, could ever doubt the unity of mankind. Unfortunately with many naturalists, the only infallible rule of faith and practice is the scalpel and the microscope. There are, however, truths which neither scalpel nor microscope can reveal. and which, therefore, such naturalists cannot be expected to believe. With them the body is everything. If that be the same, the animal is the same; if it differs, the animals differ. With others, happily, the case is reversed. If the immaterial principle be the same, the animal is the same, and if different, different. Put the ψυγή of a fly into the body of a bee, and it would cease to be a bee. An angel clothed in a human body would be angel, and not a man. The devil when he took upon him the form of a serpent was the devil still. We adhere to Agassiz's saving doctrine, that the immaterial principle determines the species, in spite of unimportant external differences. And as, beyond all controversy, the immaterial, the rational and immortal principle in the Caucasian, the Mongolian, and the African, is the same, so beyond all righteous contradiction they are the same in species. As the immaterial principle cannot be produced by secondary causes, any man

who has ever looked an intelligent, moral, pious African in the face, has had a divine attestation to the unity of mankind, and to the universal brotherhood of man. In this view of the subject, how small a business it is for one naturalist to be measuring the facial angle, another the base of the skull, another to subject a hair to the microscope, in order thus to prove that men are of different species! How can the nature of a human being be determined by such a process? Naturalists may say what they please, a man is man in virtue of his interior nature, their technicalities of classification to the

contrary notwithstanding.

It is of course a strong confirmation of the specific identity of all the varieties of the human family, that they are capable of intermixture. The Caucasian and African, the Mongolian and Australian, may intermarry, and their offspring perpetuate their race. In South America they have sixteen distinct names for the various combinations of the European, the Negro, and the Indian. There are over four hundred thousand mulattoes in the United States; and they are just as able to perpetuate their race as either the whites or blacks. That in many instances they are less robust, and more liable to disease than the pure races, may be easily accounted for from their peculiar circumstances, or on the same general principle that the children of near relations are apt to degenerate. The physical peculiarities of the two races may not suit each other, just as it often occurs among families belonging to the same nation, or even village. The great fact, however, of the capability of the different races of men to produce by intermarriage a permanently prolific offspring, is not affected by such considerations. The significancy of that fact has already been noticed. If species are "the units of nature;" if the analogy of the whole animal kingdom, and the analogy of universal nature, is not violated in the single instance of man, the above fact is proof positive that all men are of one and the same species. And this, as Dr. Cabell has abundantly shown, is the conviction of the first men in all departments of science.

We have left ourselves little space for remark on the question of the common origin of our race. As before admitted, this is not a necessary conclusion from identity of species. It

is conceivable that plants and animals of the same kind may have been created at different times and places. In reference to the origin of men, we find the following opinions: 1. The scriptural view of the subject, that all mankind are descended from one man and one woman. 2. That each of the distinct varieties of our race, whether few or many, had a distinct origin, each from a single pair. 3. That men were created in nations, adapted to their several locations. The second and third of these views do not essentially differ. Those who hold the second are willing enough to accept the third. The only important question is, whether men have had a common parentage, or are derived from sources originally distinct.

Until recently there was no dispute on this subject among those naturalists who acknowledge either the specific or generic unity of man. Unity of species, at least, was universally considered as involving unity of origin. All the great authorities in science, from Cuvier down, as well as those of the earlier schools, included in their definition of species the idea of community of origin. This is still the doctrine of the highest class of scientific men. Dr. Cabell quotes from the contributions of Professor Forbes to the "Memoirs of the Geological Survey of Great Britain," in which the author adduces the strongest arguments to prove that even among plants, identity of species is evidence of a common origin, (p. 184.) Agassiz himself seems to admit this in his later writings. For, whereas he formerly strenuously maintained the specific unity of men, while asserting the diversity of their origin, he now, seeing that these two things cannot hang together, admits that since they have had different origins, they must be different species. We have a right therefore to claim even his authority for saying that if men are all of the same species, they are all descended from the same parents. We shall see directly, that this admission works utter confusion and ruin to Agassiz's whole theory. But that is not now the point. All we wish at present is to show that we have the highest scientific authority for saying that all the arguments which prove the specific unity of men prove also their common parentage. This goes a great way towards settling the question. Until recently, Agassiz himself admitted the proof that men are "everywhere one identical

species' to be perfectly conclusive; and he only avoids this conclusion now by altering his definition of the term. He still admits that men are of the same "nature," while he denies that they are of the same species. This, in our view, and according to Agassiz's own higher doctrine, is admitting and

denying the same thing.

But conceding that plants and animals of the same species may have been in fact created at different times and places, this much must be on all hands admitted, viz. that if men are of the same species they may have had a common origin. In other words, no diversities of race consistent with unity of species can be inconsistent with the unity of origin. If, therefore, the Caucasian, the Mongolian, and the African do not differ more from each other more than is consistent with identity of species, there is no reason to be founded upon these differences in favour of their being of distinct origins. We have already referred to the inconsistency of naturalists on this subject. They admit all the aborigines of this continent to be the same race, and yet the finest and most degraded specimens of humanity are to be found among them. No two varieties of man can well be more widely separated than some of our northern Indians and the miserable inhabitants of Terra del Fuego. It is, however, unwise to judge by extremes. If you place the mastiff and lapdog side by side, you might doubt the possibility of a common descent; but when all the intermediate steps are taken into view, the case is altered. So if a beautiful Caucasian be contrasted directly with a Hottentot, the disparity may appear to forbid a common parentage, however remote. But when all the numerous intervening gradations in colour, countenance and structure are contemplated, all improbability of a common origin disappears. Besides, it would not be difficult to select from the palaces and hovels of any great city contrasts scarcely less striking. Nay, what contrast can be greater than that between a blooming girl of sixteen, and the same person at eighty, worn down, it may be, by vice, exposure and starvation. Any one who can identify such a girl with such a woman, need stagger at nothing in the varieties of men. All, however, we are concerned about at present is to show that mankind being admitted (as by Agassiz until

recently,) or proved to be of the same species, they are thereby admitted to be capable of a common descent, notwithstanding their distinguishing peculiarities.

The great argument against the common parentage of men is the permanence of the varieties existing among them. As Agassiz, as we have seen, says that the only reason for regarding lions and tigers as distinct species, and as having had different origins, is that as long as known they have been distinguished by their present characteristics. The same principle, he urges, should lead us to assign different origins to the different races of men. Dr. Nott, speaking of Dr. Prichard says, that "he perceived in the distance a glimmer of light from the time-worn monuments of old Egypt destined eventually to dispel the obfuscations with which he had enshrouded the history of Man; and to destroy that darling unitary fabric on which his energies had been expended."* Had he lived, he adds, until the mighty discoveries of Lepsius had been given to the world, he would have found he had wasted his life. The idea is that the Egyptian monuments prove the existence of the present diversities of men thousands of years before Christ, and thereby prove that they must have had different origins. It would have been candid in Dr. Nott to inform his readers that Lepsius is a firm believer in the unity of mankind, which his splendid discoveries are said to disprove. The fact however that negroes are depicted in the Egyptian monuments is no evidence against the common parentage of mankind, 1. Because the most learned Egyptologists are by no means agreed or certain as to the dates of those monuments. 2. Because varieties of other animals are there depicted which naturalists admit to have had a common origin. 3. Because a thousand years is acknowledged to have intervened between the earliest representations of the negro face and the date of those monuments on which only Caucasian features are represented. Birch and Lepsius assign the most ancient monuments to 3890 B. C. Dr. Nott claims for the earliest negro delineation the 24th century B. C. Dr. Cabell, p. 61. 4. Because changes of types are known to have occurred within comparative short periods.

^{*} Types of Mankind, p. 56.

Reference has already been made to the rise of a marked variety of cattle in South America, within the memory of man. Two hundred years of exposure, ignorance, and hunger, have sufficed to transform a people, in the mountains of Iceland, "once well-grown, able-bodied, and comely," into a race distinguished by projecting mouths, prominent teeth, exposed gums, pot-bellied, bow-legged, and abortively featured," Cabell, p. 98. Within the limits of modern history, the Magyars of Hungary, while preserving the purity of their blood, have laid aside their Mongolian features and structure, and acquired the characteristics of the Caucasian race. "Thus," says Dr. Carpenter, "we have the Lapps, Finns, and Magyars, three nations or tribes, of whose descent from a common stock no reasonable doubt can be entertained, and which yet exhibit the most marked differences in cranial characters, and also in general conformation; the Magyars being tall and well-made, as the Lapps are short and uncouth. The inky Hindu, black for centuries, and the fair Saxon, as their language proves, have had a common origin. It is vain, in view of such facts as these, and hundreds of others of like import, to assert that the existence of diversities of race from even the earliest records of profane history, necessitates the assumption of diversity of origin.

There is still less force in the argument against the common parentage of men derived from the fact of the distribution of the race over the whole earth. Man is able to adapt himself to all climates. Europe, Asia, and Africa form one continuous continent. America approaches Asia so nearly to the northwest, that Dr. Pickering says, it is hard to tell where America ends and Asia begins;* and the islands of the Pacific, and of the Indian ocean, are placed as stepping stones for the progress of the race. Trade winds and currents carry the canoes of savage tribes over large tracts of water, so that the diffusion of men over the earth is not a matter of difficult explanation.

Agassiz's great argument is founded on the geographical distribution of animals, which he regards as affording decisive evidence that they originated in their respective districts; affording also a strong proof that the several varieties of

^{*} Races of Men, (London edition) p. 296.

men originated where they now live. Certain animals are found exclusively in certain zones; others are common to two or more zones, and others again are more or less distributed universally, as the bat and the rat, which are found everywhere, except within the arctic regions. Those animals which are peculiar to a particular region are generally so organized, that they cannot live elsewhere than within their own prescribed limits. The white bear would perish in the torrid zone, and the monkey could not live within the arctic circle. These animals also are fitted to live on the productions of the district for which they were intended, and could find their appropriate food no where else. In his Zoology, p. 177, Agassiz says, "neither the distribution of animals, therefore, any more than their organization, can be the effect of external influences. We must, on the contrary, see in it a realization of a plan wisely designed, the work of a Supreme Intelligence, who created at the beginning, each species of animal at the place, and for the place, which it inhabits." 'In the Christian Examiner, p. 190, he says, "Evidence could be accumulated to show, we will not say the improbability only, but even the impossibility, of supposing that animals and plants were created in single pairs, and assumed afterwards their present distribution. . . . We have been gradually led to the conclusion that most animals and plants must have originated primitively over the whole extent of their natural distribution. We mean to say that, for instance, lions, which occur over almost the whole of Africa, over extensive parts of Southern Asia, and were formerly found even over Asia Minor and Greece, must have originated over the whole range of these limits of their distribution. We are led to these conclusions by the very fact that the lions of the East Indies differ somewhat from those of Northern Africa; these again from those of Senegal. It seems more natural to suppose that they were thus distributed over such wide districts, and endowed with particular characteristics in each, than to assume that they constituted as many species; or to believe that, created anywhere in this circle of distribution, they have gradually been modified to their present differences in consequence of their migration." His contribution to the "Types of Mankind" is designed "to show

that the boundaries, within which the natural combinations of animals are known to be circumscribed upon the surface of our earth, coincide with the natural range of distinct types of man." He divides the earth into eight realms, each of which is subdivided, some into three, some into eight provinces, distinguished by their characteristic faunæ. "The conclusion at which he arrives is, "that the diversity among animals is a fact determined by the will of the Creator, and their geographical distribution part of the general plan which unites all organized being into one great organic conception: whence it follows, that what are called human races, down to their specialization as nations, are distinct primordial forms of the type of man." p. lxxvi. The extent to which he is disposed to carry out his theory may be inferred from a passage on p. lxviii. "We have the Semitic nations covering the north African and south-west Asiatic faunæ, while the south European peninsulas, including Asia Minor, are inhabited by Græco-Roman nations, and the cold, temperate zone, by Celto-Germanic nations; the eastern range of Europe being peopled by Sclaves. This coincidence may justify the inference of an independent origin for these different tribes, as soon as it can be admitted that the races of men were primitively created in nations; the more so, since all of them claim to have been autochthones of the countries which they inhabit."

From these extracts it appears that Agassiz denies, 1. That the varieties of animals even when of the same species, (as the lion,) had the same origin; 2. That even those which belong to the same province and are in all respects alike, are descendants of one pair. His theory is that plants and animals arise all over the territory in which they live, or to which they naturally belong. The same he says is true of mankind. The different varieties of men have not only had different origins, but the several varieties instead of being descended each from a single pair, were created in nations. It is important to eliminate from this theory those elements which may be true, or which as concerns religion are unimportant, so as to leave the question of the origin of mankind to stand by itself and on its own merits. First, it may be admitted that animals peculiar to any zone and so constituted that they cannot live outside of its

present limits, were created where they are found. There is nothing in the Bible contrary to this assumption. We have no desire to maintain that the white bear was created in the temperate zone and wandered into the Arctic regions to find a congenial home; nor that monkeys were called into existence in the high table-land of Asia, and then migrated to South America and Africa. 2. It may also be admitted, if naturalists so desire, that many animals were produced in shoals, or flocks, or herds. There is no scriptural reason for teaching that all bees, contrary to their nature, come from a pair of bees, or that all the flies, or all the herrings in the world are the descendants of two parent flies or herrings. The general doctrine among naturalists no doubt is, and in all probability the general truth is, that plants and animals of the same species have had a common origin; but this is not a point in which we are specially interested. When God said, "Let the earth bring forth grass, and the herb yielding seed," &c., there is nothing to intimate that only one plant of each kind was produced. And when he said, "Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creatures," &c., or, "Let the earth bring forth the living creatures after his kind," we are not told that only two of each kind were created. Let naturalists adopt what theory they please as to the origin and distribution of plants and inferior animals, so long as they do not apply their theory to man. As however, Agassiz maintains that men are subject to the same law which regulates the distribution of other animals, it is well to know that his whole theory on this subject is regarded by competent authorities as a flight of the imagination. "The learned and talented naturalist, Professor Forbes," says Dr. Cabell, "has conclusively shown that the analogy of inferior animals and plants is altogether adverse to the hypothesis of a plural origin of identical species." p. 192. "The divisions of the earth's surface into eight great zoological realms, each subdivided into a number of subordinate faunæ, as set forth in the 'Sketch,' is purely arbitrary, so far at least as the precise limits of most of the realms are concerned." This is illustrated by his including the whole of the American continent, south of the isothermal line of 32° Fahrenheit, in one province. Why should this be done? The plants and animals of North and South America differ as much as those of districts which he assigns to different realms. Why is this? It is because the American Indians are regarded as belonging to one type, and therefore the continent they inhabit must be regarded as one zoological realm. Thus, as Dr. Cabell argues, in order to prove that the boundaries which circumscribe natural combinations of animals, coincide with the natural range of distinct types of men, he arranges his realms to suit those types. Again, Dr. Bachman, the first American zoologist in his peculiar department, shows that Agassiz's doctrine that the types of men were created where they are found, involves, in some cases, an impossibility, and therefore it breaks down entirely as a theory. "Life," he says, "can only be maintained in an Esquimaux winter by stores provided in summer." If therefore the Arctic man had been created where he is now found, he could not have survived a single winter, or even a single month. Dr. Pickering also says that plants and animals indigenous to a district exposed to extremes of heat and cold, moisture and aridity, are by nature furnished with the means of protection. He therefore concludes that "man does not belong to cold and variable climates; his original birthplace has been in a region of perpetual summer, where the unprotected skin bears without suffering the slight fluctuations of temperature. He is, in fact, especially a production of the tropics, and there has been a time when the human family had not strayed beyond these geographical limits."* The doctrine therefore that the races of men originated where they are found, is not likely to meet with favour even with naturalists, who look on the subject as a mere question of zoology. This is an aspect of the matter we must leave to them to discuss. Until they are agreed among themselves, Christians, as such, need not be much disquieted.

There are however facts, not connected with zoology, which show that Agassiz's theory cannot possibly be correct. It contradicts history; it contradicts the known affinities of different races, as determined by their language; and it contradicts some of the best authenticated moral and religious truths, which are

facts of the highest order. There are two preliminary remarks which it may be well to make before going further. The first is, that the theory, even in the mind of its author, is founded on mere probabilities. It is an inference from a narrow range of facts, all of the same class. He says it is "more natural" to suppose that animals originated over the whole region of their distribution, than that they are descended from a single pair, or were derived from a single centre. It is, in his own view, therefore, of two possible assumptions only the more natural. This is a slight foundation on which to overthrow some of the best authenticated facts in the history and nature of man. And suppose it were the more natural hypothesis in regard to animals adapted to only one region, does that prove anything with regard to man, a cosmopolite, designed to live everywhere, and with a nature capable of adapting itself to all diversities of climate and modes of life? The European can live in the arctic or in the torrid zone; so can the Asiatic or the African. The analogy, therefore, even conceding the facts on which it is founded, is of the feeblest kind. The other remark is this: Agassiz, when he formed his theory of the origin and distribution of animals, held a certain view of the nature of species; since then he has adopted a definition of that term which is inconsistent with his theory. He formerly held that the immaterial principle determined the nature and constancy of species; and consequently where that principle is the same, the species is the same. From this it follows that diversity of origin does not of necessity imply diversity of species. The varieties of the lion, of the horse, or of man, may have been created at different times and places, and yet constitute "one identical species;" because the immaterial principle or nature remains the same in each class of these several varieties. Recently, however, he has adopted the idea that species, "are primordial organic forms." Hence it follows that every variety of the lion becomes a distinct species. So of all other animals. So of man. These varieties, although differing as little as the lion of North Africa from the lion of Senegal, are assumed to be original. They therefore fall under the category of "primordial organic forms." This will necessitate a sweeping change in the classifications of naturalists. Animals univer-

sally regarded as of the same species, must now be considered as distinct. Mankind, instead of consisting of one, three, five, or eight species of the genus homo, must consist of hundreds, if not of thousands of primordial organic forms, "even down to their specialization as nations." The Semitic race is one species; the Græco-Roman another; the Celto-German another; the Sclaves another. Our American Indians must add some thirty or fifty to the list; for many tribes differ from each other far more than the Celts and Germans, or than the lion of Asia from the lion of Africa. This surely is running the whole thing into the ground. It is a reductio ad absurdum. This theory not only overthrows the basis of all zoological classification, by multiplying species without limit, but it utterly confounds and destroys the very idea. A distinction of species is not an arbitrary affair. It is a distinction of nature. To say that two animals are of different species, is to say they are of different natures. This is universally admitted. This is Agassiz's own formally professed and laboriously inculcated doctrine. But what is the difference of nature between the lion of North Africa and the lion of Senegal? or between the Celt and the Sclave? When Kossuth was in this country, who ever thought that he was an animal of a different species from the rest of us? Besides, Agassiz and all other naturalists teach us that species are permanent. They do not die out unless they are extirpated, or unless from change in the condition of the earth it is no longer suited for their support. Accordingly, the horse, the ass, the dog, the lion, are now as they were when the pyramids were built. But where are the ancient Egyptians, the old Romans, or the Aztecs, and other strongly marked races of men? They were not extirpated, nor has the earth changed since their day, yet they have disappeared. If they were distinct species, and if species are permanent, why do they not continue, and keep themselves as distinct as the lion and the tiger? It is plain that Agassiz must give up either his theory or his definition. The one is death to the other. It need hardly be added that according to this new doctrine all the recognized criteria of species disappear. Although the Germans and Sclaves have their peculiarities, yet they do not differ more than Jews and

Arabs, Irish and Scotch, nor half as much as a Mandan Indian differs from a Californian. Why should the former be regarded as distinct primordial forms, and not the latter? Besides, you may select a hundred Germans and as many Sclavonians whom no mortal can distinguish. They will have the same facial angle, the same base of the skull, the same colour, the same hair. How can you tell to which species they severally belong? Only by consulting their baptismal registers. We can easily and in every case tell a horse from an ass, a cat from a tiger, but in thousands of cases no man can tell a German from a Sclavonian. Why is all consistency thus given to the winds, and such illogical confusion introduced into books of science? Is it for the sake of establishing what the illustrious Humboldt calls, "la distinction désolante de races supérieures et de races inférieures"? Is it to break the bond of brotherhood among men, and to excommunicate a portion of our race from the church universal of humanity? We gladly acquit Agassiz of any such object. As he sacrifices his logic to his imagination, he is willing enough to sacrifice it to his moral sentiments. He still says that he holds to the unity of nature among men. This, if it means anything, means unity of species. For, according to his own showing, it is the immaterial nature which determines the species. The lion and the tiger, although both belong to the cat tribe, are not of the same nature. The immaterial principle in the one is not what it is in the other. Else, why are they so different? and why do they remain distinct without intermixture, through all generations?

We have endeavoured to show that Agassiz's theory is in conflict with his recent definition of species, and that by enlarging the meaning of the term so as to make the Germans and Sclaves, Romans and Celts distinct species of men, he must introduce the utmost inconsistency and confusion into every department of zoology. Our readers we hope will not accuse us of the presumption of even sitting at the feet of Agassiz as a naturalist. It is only with the logic and metaphysics of his speculations we venture to intermeddle.

We must bring this long article as rapidly as possible to a close. What is historically false cannot be zoologically true. Agassiz says, "it is more natural" to suppose that the lions of

North Africa and those of Senegal were created where we find them, rather than they were modified by circumstances. So it would be more natural to suppose that the horse of Canada and those of South America were created within the limits which they occupy, did we not happen to know that they are not indigenous. It is in vain to set up conjectures against facts. The theory of Agassiz contradicts all history. It makes nations known to have had a common origin to be of distinct species. The scriptural ethnography which divides the human family into three great families, the Semitic, Japhetan, and Hamite, is confirmed from so many sources, from tradition, from monuments, from names of tribes and places, from affinities of language, from profane history, that its correctness, apart from all reference to the Divine authority of the Bible, cannot, at least as to its leading features, be reasonably questioned. Agassiz, however, ignoring everything pertaining to history and language, proceeds as a mere zoologist to pronounce affiliated nations to be of entirely distinct origins. The Japhetan race he breaks up into an indefinite number of specifically different nations. The historical connection of all the inhabitants of Europe and Asia, from Ceylon to Iceland, has hardly been doubted, and yet, according to the new theory, they constitute a dozen or twenty "distinct primordial forms of the type of man." This is a sheer impossibility, without even a semblance of probability, if anything beyond zoological facts be taken into view.

Still more flagrant is the opposition of this theory to the facts connected with the affinities of language. If language consisted only of natural sounds, if it depended for its peculiarities on some modification of the vocal organs, or of the instincts of particular races of men, then there might be some propriety in comparing it to the cries and songs of lower animals. But between articulate speech and the natural cries and calls of brutes, there is an impassable gulf. The latter are the product of instinct, and remain the same from age to age. The other is the product of reason, and is in perpetual change. Language is conventional. The selection of certain sounds to express certain things or thoughts is arbitrary. That two nations unconnected and independent should select even eight

words of the same sound for the same things would be improbable, mathematicians say, in the proportion of a hundred thousand to one. Besides this, there are all the complexities of affixes and suffixes, of conjugation and declension, of syntax and construction, so that if two or more languages exhibit a common character, not only in their vocabularies, but in their grammar and internal structure, the evidence that they had a common origin amounts to demonstration. Comparative philology, therefore, is regarded as a surer guide in tracing the relationship of nations even than history, and is far more trustworthy than external peculiarities of form or colour. The way in which Agassiz deals with this subject, is a surprising illustration of the effect of devotion to one pursuit, to incapacitate the mind to apprehend and appreciate subjects foreign to their vocation. "The evidence adduced," he says, "from the affinities of the languages of different nations in favour of a community of origin is of no value, when we know, that, among vociferous animals, every species has its peculiar intonations, and that the different species of the same family produce sounds as closely allied, and forming as natural combinations, as the so called Indo-Germanic languages compared with one another. Nobody, for instance, would suppose that because the notes of the different species of thrushes, inhabiting different parts of the world, bear the closest affinity to one another, those birds must all have a common origin; and yet, with reference to man, philologists still look upon the affinities of languages as affording direct evidence of such a community of origin, among the races, even though they have already discovered the most essential differences in the very structure of these languages."* Again, in the Christian Examiner for 1850, he says, "as for languages, their common structure, and even the analogy in the sounds of different languages, far from indicating a derivation of one from another, seem rather the necessary result of that similarity in the organs of speech, which causes them naturally to produce the same sound." Then why did the Hebrews say sus, the Greeks hippos, the Latins equus, the French cheval, the Germans pferd, the English horse, when they all mean the same thing? "Who

^{*} Types of Men, p. lxxii.

would now deny," he adds, "that it is as natural for men to speak as it is for dogs to bark, for an ass to bray, for a lion to roar, for a wolf to howl, when we see that no nations are so barbarous, so deprived of all human character, as to be unable to express in language their desires, their fears, their hopes? The cry of birds of prey is alike unpleasant and rough in all; the song of all the thrushes is equally sweet and harmonious, and modulated upon similar rythms, and combined in similar melodies; the chit of all titmice is loquacious and hard; the quack of the duck is alike nasal in all. But who ever thought that the robin learned his melody from the mocking-bird, or the mocking-bird from any other species of thrush? It were giving up all induction, all power of arguing from sound premises, if the force of such evidence were denied." Hear that, ye Humboldts and Grimms, ye Bopps and Bunsens! To the first naturalist in the world, saying Quack, and speaking Greek are, at bottom, the same thing! The one is as natural as the other. Then all young Greeks without instruction, even if brought up in China, should speak Greek, as all ducks wherever hatched emit the same nasal quack. There cannot be a clearer proof that exclusive devotion to the contemplation of material forms incapacitates the mind to understand mental operations, than that furnished by the above extract. How different is the judgment of competent scholars on this subject! Alexander von Humboldt says, "The comparative study of languages shows us that races now separated by vast tracts of land, are allied together, and have migrated from one common primitive seat. The largest field for such investigations into the ancient condition of languages, and consequently into the period when the whole family of mankind was, in the strict sense of the word, to be regarded as one living whole, presents itself in the long chain of Indo-Germanic languages, extending from the Ganges to the Iberian extremity of Europe, and from Sicily to the North Cape." D. Max Muller says, "The evidence of language is irrefragable, and it is the only evidence worth listening to, with regard to ante-historical periods. There is not an English jury now a days which, after examining the hoary documents of language, would reject the claim of a common descent, and a legitimate relationship between Hindu,

Greek, and Teuton." The Chevalier Bunsen says, "The Egyptian language attests an unity of blood with the great Aramaic tribes of Asia, whose languages have been comprised under the general expression of Semitic, or the languages of the family of Shem. It is equally connected by identity of origin with those still more numerous and illustrious tribes which occupy the greater part of Europe, and may, perhaps, alone or with other families, have a right to be called the family of Japhet." This family, he says, includes the German nations, the Greeks and Romans, the Indians and Persians. Two-thirds of the human race are thus identified by these two classes of languages, which have had a common origin. By the same infallible test Bunsen shows that the Asiatic origin of all the North American Indians "is as fully proved as the unity of family among themselves."* Every day is adding some new language to this affiliated list, and furnishing additional evidence of the unity of mankind. Had we time and space we could exhibit the nature of the evidence derived from this source, and show that it has the force of ocular demonstration, to which the counter evidence of variation in the facial angle and colour of the skin appears as mere trifling. Suffice it to say, that if the affinity between English and Saxon, between French and Latin, prove the blood relationship between the English and Saxon people, and between the French and Romans, then the common origin of the vast body of languages above referred to, proves the common origin of the nations who speak them.

The grand objection after all to any theory of diversity of species or of origin among men, is that all such theories are opposed to the authority of the Bible, and to the facts of our mental, moral, and spiritual nature. The church, as we have said, bows to the facts of nature, because they are the voice of God. Theories are the stammering utterances of men before which she holds her head erect. The Bible says that all men are children of a common Father. Accordingly, wherever we meet a man, no matter of what name or nation, we find he has the same nature with ourselves. He has the same organs, the

^{*} See Dr. Cabell, pp. 213-239.

same senses, the same instincts, the same faculties, the same understanding, will and conscience, the same capacity for religious culture. He may be ignorant and degraded; he may be little above the idiot brother who sits with us at our father's table, but we cannot but recognize him as a fellow-man. The Bible tells us that all men fell in Adam's first transgression. Accordingly, we search the earth around, and we find the evidences of an apostate nature wherever we find the human form. Our adorable Redeemer says that he died for all men, and bids us preach his gospel to every creature under heaven. We go, and nowhere, from Greenland to Caffraria, do we find any class of men to whom the gospel is not the grace of life; none who do not need it, or who are not capable of being partakers of the salvation which it offers. Would that men of science could but enlarge their views. Would that they could lift their eyes above the dissecting table, and believe that there is more in man than the knife can reveal. Then would they feel that the spiritual relationship of men, their common apostasy, and their common interest in the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, demonstrate their common nature and their common origin beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt.

SHORT NOTICES.

The Limits of Religious Thought. Examined in Eight Lectures, preached before the University of Oxford, in the year MDCCCLVIII, on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M. A., Canon of Salisbury. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College; Tutor and late Fellow of St. John's College. Oxford and London, MDCCCLVIII.

In our notice, in this Journal for October, 1855, of Sir William Hamilton and his Philosophy, we made special mention of the relation which that philosophy bore to Christianity. When speaking of its great metaphysical canon relative to our knowledge of the unconditioned, we said:—"There is no philosophy which in its spirit, its scope, and its doctrines, both positive and negative, so conciliates and upholds revealed religion

as that which is based on this great canon of Metaphysics. The conditions on which revelation, with its complement of doctrines, is offered to our belief, are precisely those which this canon enounces." Mr. Mansel, in the Lectures before us, has proved, to the very letter, all that we then said. In the Preface, he explicitly avows, that the inquiries pursued in the Lectures have been suggested to him, by the great principle of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, that "the unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable;" and that Sir William's practical conclusion, that our knowledge is not necessarily co-extensive with our faith, "is identical with that which is constantly enforced throughout these Lectures." We, who put before the public our estimate of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy in so elaborate a manner, because we knew its mighty power for good, feel no little gratification at seeing it working out that good, in the most sacred of provinces, through these lectures of Mr. Mansel. As a philosophical defence of Christianity, there is no work, in the English language, which can at all compare with it, except Butler's Analogy. And when we compare the great work of Butler with that of Mr. Mansel, and see how much better, in the latter, the true theory of the limits of human thought is exhibited and applied to theological criticism, we at once learn the immense stride which the philosophy of the human mind has taken in the last hundred years, and what powerful aid it can now furnish in theological polemics.

We may, perhaps, hereafter give our own independent reflections on the great theme of Mr. Mansel's Lectures; the more especially, as while too much praise cannot be given for the general ability, learning and literary elegance of the lectures, it seems to us, that in the fourth lecture, Mr. Mansel has not very accurately distinguished and correlated the intellectual and the moral natures of man, as related sources of the knowledge we have of the existence and attributes of God. He seems to us, to lean too much towards the Kantean doctrine of the superlative weight of our moral reason, in the evidences of the existence of God; and is not altogether free from a seeming confusion in his doctrines. It is important, that this special point in the basis of all theology should be accurately explicated; for philosophy is still entangled in the grand paradox

of Kant in regard to our moral consciousness.

We have occasion to know that these Lectures are producing a sensation in Great Britain; and we earnestly recommend them to all who wish to see theoretically, how profoundly Christianity is laid in the depths of human nature. Inspiration not Guidance nor Intuition: or, the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. Second Series. By Eleazar Lord. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1858.

The orthodox doctrine of inspiration is perfectly clear and simple. It is precisely that which the great mass of Christian people have no difficulty in apprehending and believing, nay, cannot help apprehending and believing: viz. that the Sacred Scriptures, in all their parts, as to matter and style, thoughts and words, are the Word of God, written by his direction, uttering his mind, and clothed with his authority. This is the

doctrine, so called, of Plenary Inspiration.

Those whose principles or feelings revolt at the plain averments of the Bible, of course, seek to divest them of Divine This begets rationalism, which, according to its authority. intensity and virulence, either denies that the Scriptures are inspired at all, or if not this, that they are altogether inspired. Some turn them into myths. Some admit their substantial historical verity, their unrivalled exaltation and purity of sentiment, their fertility in unfolding blessed truths before unknown, their high ethical value, who still maintain that they are the productions of uninspired, though unequalled men. Others say that parts of the Bible are inspired, and parts uninspired, varying the relative proportions of each, according to their several tastes. A much more wide-spread and insidious doctrine is, that the substance of the sacred writings is inspired, but not the form, the thoughts but not the words in which they are presented. These, it is contended, were left to the discretion of the writers, without any decisive Divine guidance. Still another specious form of assault upon the plenary inspiration and Divine authority of the Bible, is the intuitional scheme of Morell and others, who deny the possibility of any objective revelation of what has not already been attained by our own inward experience and intuition. They confound inspiration with spiritual illumination, in this respect not differing from the mystics.

Mr. Lord, in this volume, which is in the nature of a supplement to a former one published by him on the same subject, of course, makes vigorous warfare against these various impugners of the plenary inspiration and Divine infallibility of the Scriptures. In his argument against the intuitional and anti-verbal theories of inspiration, he displays considerable logical and metaphysical acumen, together with a close observation of the operations of the human mind, so far as these are implicated in the discussion. His modes of statement on these subjects, however, often fail of that clearness, simplicity and aptness,

without which they are not easily intelligible, and which can only be acquired by long familiarity and thorough culture in

these departments.

The main object of this book, nevertheless, is not directly to combat rationalists or intuitionalists. It is rather to combat a certain position taken by most of the defenders of plenary inspiration, which he appears to regard as a perilous concession to their adversaries. It consists chiefly of strictures on an article on inspiration in the *Bibliotheca Saera*, for January, 1858; on an article in this Journal for October, 1857, on the same subject; and on the volume by Mr. Lee in regard to it,

to which those articles have special reference.

The issue joined is simply as follows: The matter of the Bible is of two kinds. First, is that of which the inspired writers knew nothing except as it was made known to them by special revelation, such as prophecies, and the doctrinal teachings peculiar to Christianity given by the several writers. Secondly, there is the narration of facts, of which the writers had previous personal knowledge. In regard to the first, the distinction between revelation and inspiration is brought prominently into view. Revelation is the communication of truth; inspiration is the guidance of the Holy Spirit, by which its subject is rendered infallible in the communication of the truth. In regard to matters of which the sacred writers had previous knowledge, as in the case of the evangelists, of the acts and teachings of Christ, the Spirit brought all things to their remembrance, and guided each writer so as to render him infallible in his narration. In neither case, however, is there anything mechanical in this theory of inspiration. Each writer, whether communicating truths immediately revealed, as in the instance of St. Paul, or narrating facts of which, as Luke says of himself, he had a perfect understanding from the beginning, was free, in the sense of being spontaneous, in all his mental exercise, and therefore impressed his own character of thought and style on his discourses or narrative. What Mr. Lord means by the sacred writers, according to this theory, being left "free to use such language, and to narrate such circumstances as suited their own taste or purposes," we do not know. language quoted is not ours, and is not such as we would use. He objects that making inspiration (as distinguished from revelation) "guidance," rests the infallibility of Scripture not on the fact that it consists of the words of God recorded, but on the fact, real or supposed, that the writers were rendered infallible in selecting and recording the words. And what higher infallibility or ground of infallibility can he desire or conceive? He adds, that, on this theory, "it was at their option as men, to narrate such circumstances as suited their taste or purposes,' and more to the same effect. This, however, is expressly denied in the passage which he is criticising, except so far as is consistent with their being "guided to the use of words which expressed the mind of the Spirit." Are not the words, according to this view, determined by the Holy Ghost? Is any exercise of the faculties of the writers permitted, which does not ensure this? Did not these holy men speak, on this hypothesis, as they were moved by the Holy Ghost? And are they any the less the words which the Holy Ghost teacheth, than they would be, if they were so given as to exclude all intelligent activity in the writer's mind, in shaping the language? Really, is there a lurking peril in such a doctrine of inspiration, whereby it extends to every word of the Bible, which calls for a sturdy volume to refute it?

We honour our author's zeal for the entire and intact doctrine of plenary inspiration, and his godly jealousy of the least semblance of any deviation from it. We submit, however, that he has not, on this issue, made out the semblance of such a deviation from it. He has been beating the air, and spending his strength for nought. If it is bad not to see pitfalls into which we are groping, it is quite as bad to be imagining pit-

falls beneath us, when we are treading solid ground.

Nature and the Supernatural: as together constituting the One System of God. By Horace Bushnell. New York: Charles Scribner, 1858.

The arrangements for our present number were so far completed before this volume came to hand, that we are precluded from giving it that thorough review at this time, to which, on various accounts, it is entitled. It is quite the most able and valuable of Dr. Bushnell's works on Theology. It, of course, bears the imprint of the author's genius, in its fresh and brilliant diction, its affluent originality and bewitching felicity of illustration, its episodic passages of marvellous beauty and eloquence.

It gives us pleasure, moreover, to add, that the doctrinal tone of this book is greatly in advance of his former books, (God in Christ, and Christ in Theology,) which were so widely and justly offensive to the Christian world. Not that there is any explicit and formal recantation; not that we do not trace occasional intimations or implications of some of the antievangelical views protruded with a bold and defiant nakedness in those volumes: but they are not here avowed with emphasis; they are kept in the back-ground behind the more prominent

and significant assertion of views in contradiction to them, and in harmony with the faith of the church. They would not generally arrest the attention of those unversed in this sort of polemics. Every one who compares this volume with those which preceded it, must be struck with the fact that as Dr. Bushnell has increased his knowledge of the standard theology of the church, he has increased his respect for it. He sees more and more of truth, power and vitality in it, since he has ceased to confound it with two or three systems of provincial theologico-metaphysics, which, in his God in Christ, he evidently mistook for it. In this he was not singular. It was a common mistake of large numbers, resulting from the training they received, and the atmosphere they breathed. It is also clear that he has less respect for the negations and cavils of Socinians, than when he knew less of the issues between them and their adversaries. Indeed, the principal power of the book lies in the vigour of its attacks on Unitarian scepticism, and the blanker pantheistic infidelity of Parker. The latter is the prominent adversary assailed. Especially in the thousand unconscious and indefinable revelations of sympathy, which are often more significant than formal propositions, no one can fail to see that Dr. Bushnell in his feelings, at least, has drifted from his former position and bearings. The attitude in which he is placed by the kind of work in which he is engaged, accounts in part for this. In the former case the nature of his undertaking required him to search out and lay bare the infirmities of orthodoxy. The present work is apologetic. It aims to defend the supernaturalism of Christianity against infidels and sceptics. The consequent difference of attitude, of predisposition to sympathy and appreciation with regard to the different parties, and still further as to the points to be made prominent and obtrusive in the discussion, is obvious.

As a sample of the improved tone to which we refer, we cite a single passage. It is familiar to many of our readers, that in his God in Christ, Dr. Bushnell professed to have discovered a "chemistry of thought," whereby he saw no difficulty in "accepting as many creeds as were offered him." He sublimely disavowed responsibility for his opinions, as much as for the

growth of his body. What now does he say?

"Charity holds fast the minutest atoms of truth, as being precious and divine, offended by even so much as a thought of laxity. Liberality loosens the terms of truth, permitting easily and with careless magnanimity variations from it; consenting, as it were, in its own sovereignty to overlook or allow them; and subsiding thus, ere long, into a licentious indifference to

all truth, and a general defect of responsibility in regard to it. Charity extends allowance to men; liberality to falsities themselves. Charity takes the truth to be sacred and immovable; liberality allows it to be marred and maimed at pleasure. How different the manner of Jesus in this respect from that irreverent feeble laxity that lets errors be as good as truths, and takes it for a sign of intellectual eminence, that one can be floated comfortably in the abvsses of liberalism." Pp. 312—13.

This book, as a whole, however, is a new evidence to us that Dr. Bushnell is more a poet than a philosopher or theologian. Its power lies in its separate parts, its pithy and glowing sentences, its graphic representations and eloquent appeals, in the felicity and force with which single topics are presented. Of this sort is the argument from the character of Christ for his Divinity. This, though not new in its general conception and outlines, is presented with that new strength and vividness which genius imparts to familiar ideas. With this strength in some of the parts, as a concatenated whole it is feeble and incoherent. If some of the links are of adamant, others are of clay. As a statement and defence of supernaturalism, it is loose and erratic in definition and proof, inconsistent and selfcontradictory in its positions. It lacks logical accuracy, unity and cohesion. We can at this time barely refer to one or two of the more glaring features of the work on which this judgment is founded. He so defines "Nature and the Supernatural" as to bring the human will within the province of the latter. "Man, as a being of free-will, is no part of nature at all, no arc in the circle of nature," p. 340. "The very idea of our personality is that of a being not under the law of cause and effect, a being supernatural. This one point clearly apprehended, all the difficulties of our subject are at once relieved, if not absolutely and completely removed," p. 43. We think as much. There is no difficulty in proving that there is a God if men are gods, that there are angels if men are angels, that the Bible is inspired if all great writers are inspired, or that the supernatural exists if we ourselves are supernatural. But the supernatural, in the only sense known or important in the controversy between believers and unbelievers, denotes precisely that which is above, not only physical, but human nature, above man's powers unassisted by superhuman aid.

This conception of the supernatural deranges and vitiates the whole discussion, of which it is the cardinal feature. Such a supernaturalism is easily maintained. With this generous extension of the term, it is hardly surprising that he maintains the continued existence of miraculous gifts and works in the

church, substantially according to the views of the Irving school, and even places in this category some wholesome suggestions made to him by an ignorant but profoundly pious

negro. Pp. 487-8.

His view of the human will as supernatural, involves, of course, the assertion of the extreme Pelagian view of its absolute and independent antinomy. But he maintains, no less strenuously, that the fall of this supernatural agent into sin is, essentially, an inevitable necessity in the due development of a moral agent-very much in accordance with the latest and most approved theory of fatalistic and pantheistic optimism. A very different and precious doctrine, which has a firmer support than this pestilent theory, he also propounds-we mean the inability of the sinner to regenerate himself, and his absolute dependence on the Holy Spirit therefor, to the full length of Old-school Calvinism. In this we rejoice. How now do these doctrines consist with his doctrine of the will? But we stop. Our object now is to notice, not to review the book. But in doing this, we could not withhold our general judgment of its character, or, in giving this, avoid all reference to some of the more obvious grounds of that judgment.

Blind Bartimeus; or, the Story of the Sightless Sinner and his Great Physician. By the Rev. William J. Hoge, Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, Prince Edward, Virginia. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman & Co. 1859.

When Dr. Bellamy was once preaching, a thunder-storm arose in the midst of his discourse. The peals of thunder grew loud and terrific as he reached its impassioned parts, and deepened the solemnity of the audience-a circumstance he did not fail to make good use of, in his further appeals to his hearers. The sermon produced an extraordinary impression, and excited a vehement and general demand for its publication. Accordingly a committee waited on him next day to request a copy for the press. His answer was, "if you can print the thunder and lightning too, you may have it." It is rare that the force and fire of the most eloquent discourses can be transferred to the printed volume. However powerful and penetrating may be the matter and style, yet so much is added by the circumstances and surroundings, by warmth and earnestness of manner, by the living voice, effective elocution, attitude and gesture, by the sympathy between speaker and hearer-a dying man speaking to dying men-which helps what he says to penetrate and kindle the heart of his auditory, that the eloquence of the most eloquent discourses is seldom set in type. It evaporates in the very attempt to condense and embalm it. Who has not

read the sermons of Whitefield, nearly if not quite the most effective pulpit orator of modern times, with a feeling of disappointment, wondering what they contain to entrance assemblies of ten and twenty thousand, and melt the sturdiest scoffers?

We confess we took up this beautifully printed volume, with some misgiving, lest those who might look for a reproduction on its pages, of the high power which they have discerned and felt in Dr. Hoge's discourses, as spoken from the pulpit, should be disappointed. On the contrary, we were ourselves disappointed, most happily. The volume consists of a series of discourses, preached during the author's pastorate in Baltimore, thoroughly revised, and set in a series of appropriate chapters. It is greatly above the average run of this species of religious literature. It contrives, from the various suggestive aspects presented by the story of Bartimeus, to educe the entire gospel, and apply it with extraordinary skill to the various phases of character and condition exhibited by saints and sinners. Rich in scriptural quotation and allusion, thoroughly sound and evangelical, full of unction, probing the heart, revealing its distempers, and applying scriptural remedies with peculiar skill, instructive, convictive, searching, startling, or consolatory, as exigencies require, this volume offers these characteristics to its readers in classic and nervous English, with great affluence of imagery and illustration, with fervent and impassioned earnestness; in "thoughts that breathe, and words that burn." Few books of this class are better fitted to enchain and benefit the reader-to rouse the careless, guide the inquirer, or stimulate, strengthen, and comfort the Christian.

The Noon Prayer-Meeting of the North Dutch Church, Fulton Street, New York; its Origin, Character, and Progress, with some of its Results. By Talbot W. Chambers, one of the Pastors of the Reformed Protestant Dutch (Collegiate) Church, New York. Board of Publication of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church. 1858.

As the daily meetings for prayer, which have had such an obvious and remarkable connection with the great awakening of the past year, largely owe their origin and their peculiarities to that which forms the subject of this book, the Christian public will prize the full account which Mr. Chambers has here published, in regard to "its origin, character, progress, and results." Those results are blessed. We rejoice that this meeting is still sustained with lively interest, and that the tokens are abundant, that the prayers there offered are not unheard or unanswered. We gratefully acknowledge the obligation of the church to our brethren of the Dutch Church, for the part they have taken in opening and sustaining this meeting, and for the disposition as well as ability which they show to keep alive the worship of God in the monetary heart of our metropolis, whence nearly all other Christian temples have been banished, to make room for the temples of Mammon.

The Higher Christian Life. By the Rev. W. E. Boardman. Boston: Henry Hoyt. Chicago: William Timlinson. 1858.

There are undoubtedly grades in the Christian life. is a weak faith and a strong faith; a dawning twilight of hope, and the full assurance of hope. The true Christian goes from grace to grace, from strength to strength, from glory to glory. It is also true that many professing Christians remain content with the lower stages of Christian experience, of faith, love, hope, joy, consecration. And hence, so many are not only feeble, thriftless and joyless in their own spiritual estate, but they are inefficient in promoting the great cause; barren and unfruitful in the work of the Lord. The object of this book is to rouse these faint and sluggish Christians from their inert and drooping state, and incite them to aspire to that higher stage of the Christian life in which they are filled with all the fulness of God, and rejoice in the hope of his glory. The author presses his point with much earnestness and power. His reasonings and exhortations are enlivened and enforced by a number of sketches of the religious experience of eminently pious persons.

This higher Christian life he appears to ascribe to a "second conversion," to which he exhorts us to aspire. We have no doubt that it requires what may be called a second conversion in the case of the fallen, the backslidden, the slothful-which is the case with multitudes. We do not, however, recognize the necessity of any such marked crisis after the first conversion, in order to lift the believer up to the summits of assured hope, in cases where there are no formidable distempers of this sort. We may not limit the Holy One of Israel, who giveth to each one severally as he will; lifting some like David and Peter, by sudden and startling methods out of their fallen state, while the course of others is, from the first, quietly and steadily progressive. "The path of the just is as the shining light, shining more and more unto the perfect day." There is a sense, indeed, in which conversion is repeated in all Christians, not once only, but all their days. The Christian life is a constant turning to the Lord. This, however, is not the special

second conversion in question.

The Living Epistle: or, the Moral Power of a Religious Life. By Cornelius Tyree, of Powhatan county, Virginia. With an Introduction by Rev. R. Fuller, D. D. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman & Co. 1859.

The "Higher Christian Life," treated of in the volume last noticed, is here set forth and urged with especial reference to its influence upon the world. The author contends, very justly and forcibly, that a more perfect exemplification of the power and beauty of religion in the lives of its professors would do more to commend and propagate it, than any mere verbal argument or expostulation can accomplish without it. It cannot be too often or earnestly impressed upon the church, that her most effective argument against unbelief is the "logic of the life."

Materials for Thought, designed for Young Men. By the Rev. Griffith Owen. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1859.

This volume, like several we have just noticed, appears to be among the products of the remarkable attention to religion which has crowned the past year. It "does not aim at originality; it is simply a compilation. The selections are made from choice and rare publications, not easily accessible to most readers." Its object is to "aid young men and others in becoming labourers in the conversion of the world." So far as we have been able to examine, the selections are judicious and well adapted to kindle holy impulses and high resolves in the bosoms of young men.

Seven Miles around Jerusalem. From original Surveys and Observations, projected and drawn by the Rev. H. S. Osborn. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son.

This is the second of a series of three Maps, the first being a map of Jerusalem, the third, of Jerusalem and its environs, published in a neat and elegant style; projected from original surveys, and referring to such authorities as Robinson, Hackett, Thompson, and Samson, as vouchers for their accuracy.

Titcomb's Letters to Young Reople, Single and Married. Timothy Titcomb, Esquire. Tenth Edition. New York: Charles Scribner, No. 124 Grand Street. 1858. Pp. 251.

The Preface of this little volume is dated July 1, 1858. The "tenth edition" so soon, shows that it is enjoying a remarkable popularity. We can give it no higher commendation than by saying, we think it deserves the favour with which it has been received. We cannot subscribe to every opinion of the author, but his book contains much wholesome advice to the classes to which it is addressed, and is calculated to be useful, especially among those who would be repelled from a strictly religious volume.

Biographical Sketch of Amariah Brigham, M. D., late Superintendent of the New York State Lunatic Asylum, Utica, New York. Utica: W. O. McClure. 1858.

Dr. Brigham was a self-made man. Without the advantages of academic training, he rose to the highest professional distinction. With the boldness and self-reliance common to such men, he sometimes advanced crude views which shocked the religious community. In his disgust at some extravagances which were current in the era of New Measures, he published strictures in regard to some of them, and incidentally in regard to religion as implicated with them, which bore a sceptical taint, and begat a distrust of him in the Christian community. We are glad to see in this calm and candid volume, that, as he advanced in life, he became a sincere believer in the gospel, and put his entire trust in Christ for salvation.

A Quarter Century Discourse; Delivered in the Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, on Sunday, November 7th, 1858. By Henry A. Boardman, D. D. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1858.

A pastorate over the same church of twenty-five years' duration has been rare during the last quarter of a century. The few instances of it, therefore, deserve attention for the purpose of looking into the causes which promote that permanency which is so desirable in this relation. In this case the simple explanation is, the ability, tact, and fidelity of the pastor, together with a grateful appreciation of his services, a considerate attention to his wishes and wants, and warm personal attachment to him, on the part of the people. Christian love so welds together faithful ministers and faithful congregations, that their separation becomes an act of violence and sacrifice to

both parties.

We are glad to have pastors avail themselves of opportunities to rehearse the dealings of God with them and their flocks, not only because it is fitted to awaken gratitude for the past, and courage for the future; to stir tender memories and solemn reflections; to instruct others, and provoke them to love and good works: but because this is the only way in which ample and sure materials can be provided for future church history. When Dr. Boardman entered the ministry it was the sanguine belief of many, who were not slow to proclaim it, that young ministers who espoused Old Calvinism were doomed to an impotent and barren pastoral career. The history of his pastorate is only one of a thousand which might be adduced to silence such pretensions. On these subjects Dr. Boardman has uttered no uncertain sound, and it is not the least important testimony given in this discourse, that the experience of a quarter of a century has only served to confirm his faith.

The New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Translated out of the Original Greek, and with former Translations diligently Compared and Revised. New York: Collins & Brother. 12mo. pp. 548.

This is a beautiful and (so far as we have observed) correct edition of the authorized version, but divided into paragraphs, the old division into chapters and versions being scarcely indicated in the margin. To those who are offended or disturbed by the frequent pauses of the usual arrangement, nothing could be more acceptable than this neat volume. We observe an error in the prefatory statement to the reader, where the common division into chapters, as well as into verses, is ascribed to Robert Stephens, whereas the former was the work of Hugo de Sancto Caro, a learned Dominican and Cardinal, who died about six hundred years ago.

Text-book of Church History. By Dr. J. C. L. Gieseler. Vol. V. (From 1814 to the present time.) Edited from the author's manuscripts by Dr. E. R. Redepenning. Leipzig. 1855. 8vo. pp. 408.

This, with a supplementary volume on the History of Doctrines, completes the great work begun more than thirty years ago, and nearly at the same time with Neander's. Both works have been sufficiently described in former numbers of this journal, and our only object in this notice is to lay before our readers the following picture of religion in America as drawn by one of the great church-historians of the age. "Trade and gain is that which especially engrosses the American. smooth politeness and cold selfishness, with an extravagant appreciation of his national institutions and contempt for all that is European, are chief traits of his character. In trade, deceit and overreaching is so habitual to him, that he is in this respect notorious throughout the commercial world. The inhabitants of the north-east provinces, (!) New York and Pennsylvania, precisely those who are most distinguished for external piety, are also most notorious for skill in cheating. Their religion shows itself by no means in its good effects upon their morals, and cannot therefore be so inward and sincere as it appears without. The truth in reference to this religiosity may thus be stated. America received her first stock of European colonists from England, and these brought a religious spirit with them from their fatherland. But the peculiar development of this religiosity in America must be explained from the one-sided inclination of the people to trade and gain. This effort occupies the greatest part of their time; the end of all their thoughts and plans is lucky speculation and great gain. The more entirely their whole estate, and therefore their whole happiness are at stake, and the greater the avidity

for gain, the greater is their need and their desire of the divine blessing on their efforts. On the other hand, so many frauds and cheats are practised, that their conscience forces them to seek for some atonement. Hence they feel constrained, after they have spent the largest portion of their time exclusively in business, to devote certain days and hours no less exclusively to the work of reconciliation with God, and making him welldisposed to them. It is not genuine religion which animates them, for this fills men at all times and pervades all their acts and thoughts, but a false and superstitious religiosity, which thinks by outward devotion and money-spending to conciliate and appease God. Of course such men are far from all reflection on religious subjects; they take the religion which the church provides, and reckon it indeed as meritorious to believe without change all that is prescribed to them. This is precisely one of their good works which they imagine they present to God." Pp. 372-3. This must be what the Germans call "Philosophy of History." We learn from it how justly we are sometimes treated, as a nation, in the lecture-rooms of Germany, and by her greatest men, though few of them have editors so brave and wise as to print posthumously what the author never meant to publish. Besides the general correctness of this portrait by the hand of a great master, it is worthy of remark how nicely it discriminates between the "north-east provinces" and others, thus showing that the author's sweeping declarations as to a whole people, without any loop-hole for exception or gradation, save the one just mentioned, were not made in haste but with deliberation. We need not say how much the knowledge and benevolence here shown in dealing with contemporary history must strengthen every reader's confidence in Gieseler's exhibition of antiquity, or suggest that some among us who can hardly believe that two and two make four, unless they have a German's word for it, may now be enabled for the first time to obey the oracular precept, Know THYSELF.

History of the Christian Church. By Philip Schaff, D.D., Author of the History of the Apostolic Church. From the Birth of Christ to the reign of Constantine, A.D. 1—311. New York. 1859. 8vo. pp. 535.

This may be regarded either as the first instalment of a general Church History, or as a complete work on the first three centuries. A little more than one fourth of the volume is occupied with a condensation or abridgment of the author's larger work on the Apostolical Church, which we reviewed at great length just five years ago. The remaining space is filled

with a continuation of the history until the time of Constantine, and seems to us, upon a cursory inspection, to have all the merits of the author's previous publications, which are too well known to need description here, and which have placed him in the first rank of contemporary writers on Church History, not only in this country but in Germany and England. The only faults, of form or substance, which have struck us on a slight examination, are such as may be charged upon the whole modern school of historiography which Dr. Schaff so creditably represents. An example, of the more substantial kind, is the concession which the German writers, by a sort of fashion, and as if without renewed examination, now habitually make as to the ancient mode of baptism, a concession not at all required or warranted, in our opinion, by the extant evidence. The same thing is equally, though less emphatically, true of some things that are said in reference to the origin of infant-baptism, episcopal church government, and liturgical worship. All these gratuitous concessions may be readily abused as premises, from which to draw conclusions not intended, and indeed repudiated, both by Dr. Schaff and the most eminent contemporary German writers. As to form, we see a great improvement on the favourite German method of Church History, with its endless subdivisions and its stereotyped rubrics, and would gladly have observed a still more marked approximation to the luminous and simple plan of Grote and Gibbon. We have some objection to the archeological rather than historical account of the religious states and usages of three whole centuries, as if they had been fixed and uniform, instead of indicating the specific changes, with the greatest chronological precision now attainable, and constantly distinguishing between the earlier and later portions of the same great period. What can be more dissimilar, for instance, than the penitential discipline, the form of worship, and the number of church-officers, at the beginning of the second and fourth centuries? And yet the general reader might be sometimes pardoned for supposing that the same description was intended to apply to both, although we doubt not that a diligent inquiry would discover, in the history itself, the data needed to correct this error, the defect here pointed out being one of form, not of substance.

It seems that Dr. Schaff began to write the work in English, which would probably have given it more freshness and vivacity, with less of that comparative prolixity and tameness incident to all translation, but with less too of that neatness and correctness which it now owes to the practised and accomplished pen of Mr. Yeomans; a correctness seldom marred, so

far as we have seen, by foreign idioms, or needless innovations, or an inadvertent substitution of the German for the English mode of writing proper names. The typography is elegant, with one exception, much more common in American than English publications, the incongruous mixture of inferior Greek type with the finest Roman. We conclude with an expression of regret that, even when completed on the present scale, the work will scarcely be adapted, as to size and cost, for academical instruction; but we trust that this deficiency or failure will be made good by its usefulness, not only as a standard work of reference for scholars and professional inquirers, but also as attractive and instructive reading for a wider public.

The History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century, called Methodism, considered in its different denominational forms, and its relations to British and American Protestantism. By Abel Stevens, LL. D. Vol. I. From the Origin of Methodism to the Death of Whitefield. New York: Carlton and Porter, 200 Mulberry street. London: Alexander Heylin, 28 Pater Noster Row. Pp. 480.

This descriptive title gives a good idea of the plan and purport of the volume before us. It is the commencement of a great work, as the author contemplates another volume to complete the history of Methodism proper, to be followed by two additional volumes, to give the history of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Few events in the history of the church, since the Reformation, can be compared in importance with the rise and progress of Methodism. It is a subject worthy of the ablest pen in the service of the church. It has often been treated in detail, or in detached portions. We have lives of Wesley, of Whitefield, and of Fuller, but there has no one yet risen to take a large, catholic, and at the same time, philosophical view of this great movement. Dr. Stevens has evidently appreciated the true compass of his task, and has produced a work of high interest and value. So much depends on the stand-point of an author, that however able and candid he may be, he cannot fail to present things as they appear from his point of view, and of course rather differently from that in which they present themselves to those occupying a different position. We can conceive of one history of Methodism written by an Arminian. another written by a Calvinist, another written by a man neither the one nor the other, all equally able, learned, catholic, and honest, and yet differing as much as so many pictures of the same landscape, painted by different artists, and from different positions. Dr. Stevens, while he does not attempt to conceal his own theological opinions, has endeavoured to do equal justice to the Arminian and Calvinistic elements of Methodism. This is a high and proper aim. It seems, however, to be beyond the reach of ordinary mortals. One of the first qualifications for a historian of any great religious movement is cordial sympathy with it. (How would it be possible for a Romanist to write a fair history of the Reformation?) But cordial sympathy with Arminianism is repugnance to Calvinism, and so vice versa. We must be content to have the views taken at different angles, and then pray for the stereoscope of charity, by which we may see them as one.

The Martyrel Missionaries. A Memorial of the Futtehgurh Mission, with some Remarks on the Matiny in India. By the Rev. J. Johnston Walsh, sole surviving member of the Futtehgurh Mission of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street. 1858. Pp. 338.

The clerical members of the Futtehgurh mission were the Messrs. Freeman, Campbell, Johnston, and McMullin; of each of these a brief memoir is given, and also of their wives. These missionaries being all Americans, educated among us, in the prime or morning of life, known, therefore, to thousands of Christians still living, endeared to multitudes by personal intercourse and associations, and embalmed in their own blood, shed in the service of the Lord Jesus, whatever relates to them is sure to awaken a deep and wide-spread interest. One will turn to this volume to see the face of one long familiar, others will look for another. Princetonians will turn with special interest to the portrait and memorial of Robert McMullin. He was so recently among us, his features are so familiar, the impression left of his character is so pure and mild, that few dry eyes will look on the reflection of his well-remembered countenance. The fiery trial, even unto blood, through which the church has passed in India, will, we trust, awaken new interest in the work of missions in that part of the field, and help to keep in perpetual remembrance those who have perished in the cause. To both these ends the work before us is well adapted to minister.

The Giant Judge; or, the Story of Samson, the Hebrew Hercules. Rev. W. A. Scott, D. D., of San Francisco. San Francisco: Whitton & Co. 1858. Pp. 324.

The eminent services which Dr. Scott has rendered the church as a pastor in New Orleans, and latterly in San Francisco, and the demands made on his time and strength by his arduous official duties, have not prevented him from distinguishing himself as a scholar and an author. His book on

Daniel, his Wedge of Gold, and now his Giant Judge, furnish abundant evidence of varied attainments and research. The last mentioned volume, of which mere accident prevented an earlier notice, is not designed simply to derive practical lessons from the history of Samson, but to furnish a vehicle for important doctrinal instruction. Thus we find in one chapter a learned dissertation on the office of the Judges under the old dispensation, and in another an instructive discourse on the theophanies recorded in the earlier books of Scripture, and proof that the manifested Jehovah of the Old Testament was the Logos afterwards manifested in the flesh. The style in which these works are written is clear and forcible; the doctrines which they contain are the doctrines of our standards, and their whole tendency is to promote knowledge and practical religion.

The Life and Labours of the Rev. Daniel Baker, D. D., Pastor and Evangelist. Prepared by his Son, the Rev. William M. Baker, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Austin, Texas. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut Street. 1858. Pp. 572.

To few of our readers can the name or character of Dr. Baker be unknown. He was not only so successful, but so extensive in his labours; he ministered in the gospel in so many parts of the country, that he was more widely personally known than almost any other minister of our church. The Memoir of his life and labours has been prepared under unusual advantages. It is the work of an affectionate and admiring son, who had long cherished the purpose to erect this monument to his father's memory. He therefore made preparation for the work through a course of years, and induced his parent himself to furnish, in the form of an Autobiography, the materials which form the basis of the present volume. This, with the numerous letters which had been preserved, enabled the biographer to present the full and satisfactory account of Dr. Baker's extraordinary course of usefulness which we find here recorded. There is much in the volume not only to interest the wide circle of personal friends of the deceased, but also to instruct both ministers and private Christians.

Day-Dawn in Africa; or, Progress of the Protestant Episcopal Mission at Cape Palmas, West Africa. By Mrs. Anna M. Scott. New York: Protestant Episcopal Society for the Promotion of Evangelical Knowledge. 11 Bible House, Astor Place. 1858. Pp. 314.

This history commences with the year 1851. The mission was established in 1836; for an account of its earlier years the reader is referred to the work of Mrs. E. F. Hening, a member of the mission. This volume is adorned with numer-

ous illustrations, which add materially to its value. Every accession to our knowledge of the progress of the gospel in heathen lands is of importance to the whole church. It tends to strengthen the faith and encourage the hope of all the people of God, and to give new vigour to their efforts for the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom. To no part of the world are the eyes of Christians turned with more interest than to Africa; and in no part of the missionary field do they find more to encourage and excite.

The Revelation of John the Divine: or. A New Theory of the Apocalypse, corroborated by Daniel and other Prophets. By Samuel S. Ralston. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., 40 North Sixth street. William S. Young, 1023 Race street. 1858. Pp. 208.

"Fully convinced," says Mr. Ralston, "that the true key to this complicated system is yet to be discovered, the writer has laboured intensely for the attainment of this great desideratum; in the hope that the boon may be given by Him who said "Let there be light." Such devotion to a laudable object is worthy of all respect, even when success does not reward the student's zeal. We cannot pretend, in the compass of a notice, to give our readers an idea of the author's theory, much less to enter on a discussion of its merits. We can only recommend it as the fruit of long continued and laborious study.

A Critical Dictionary of English Literature and British and American Authors, living and deceased, from the earliest accounts to the middle of the Nineteenth Century. Containing thirty thousand Biographies and Literary Notices, with forty Indexes of subjects. By S. Austin Allibone. Vol. I. Philadelphia: Childs & Peterson, 602 Arch street. 1858. Pp. 1005.

The labour involved in the preparation of such a work as this, no one but the author, or some one engaged in a like herculean task, can in any way understand. Nor can its value be duly estimated except after long use. It is necessary that the student should, time after time, find his own labours abridged, the sources of desired information pointed out, and facts determined on the spot which could not otherwise be ascertained without extended research, before the full worth of such a work as this can be comprehended. What a lexicon is to the student of a new language, this work is to the student of English and American literature. The plan of the writer leads him to give a brief biographical notice of the several authors, a list of their works, and either an independent judgment on their merits, or citations from the critical judgments of others. Literary questions of interest are also discussed, and the literature relating to them is pointed out. For example, seven columns and a half

of closely printed matter are devoted to the vexed question of the authorship of the Letters of Junius. We cannot do more than express in the strongest terms our respect for the diligence, ability, and fairness which Mr. Allibone has exhibited in the preparation of this important work.

Annals of the American Pulpit, or Commemorative Notices of distinguished American Clergymen of various Denominations, from the early settlement of the Country to the close of the year 1855. With Historical Introductions. By William B. Sprague, D.D. Vol. V. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 815.

Having given reviews of the former volumes of Dr. Sprague's great work, we have only to repeat our judgment, that it is a storehouse of valuable historical information not elsewhere to be found. The estimate of the importance of the work rises with the appearance of each succeeding volume. Those relating to Presbyterians had an interest of one kind, which the others had not; and on the other hand, this, which treats of Episcopalians, including the memoirs of distinguished men with whose lives and labours Presbyterians were less likely to be familiar, has on that account its peculiar claims.

The Last Days of Jesus; or, the Appearances of our Lord during the Forty days between the Resurrection and Ascension. By T. V. Moore, D. D., Richmond, Virginia. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 300.

The combination of learning, ability, and piety, evinced in this and other publications of Dr. Moore, have secured for him ready access to the ear of the church. The peculiarly interesting and solemn nature of the occurrences which are here illustrated and unfolded, give to this his latest work a special attraction for Christians.

The Land and the Book; or, Biblical Illustrations drawn from the Manners and Customs, the Scenes and Scenery of the Holy Land. By W. M. Thompson, D.D., Twenty-five years a Missionary of the A. B. C. F. M. in Syria and Palestine. Maps, Engravings, &c. In two volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1859. Pp. 557 and 611.

Probably no one now living is so well qualified for the task here undertaken as the author of these volumes. The fact that he has been twenty-five years a missionary in the lands which he essays to describe, and from which his illustrations of Scripture are drawn, is itself enough to secure confidence in his representations. But to this must be added not only his superior personal accomplishments, but also the consideration that his duties led him to extensive travel, and to protracted sojourn in various parts of Syria and the Holy Land. His opportunities of observation, therefore, have been as varied as pro-

longed. We are satisfied that the reader will find a peculiar charm in these volumes, and be surprised at the number, felicity, and importance of the illustrations of scriptural expressions and allusions with which they abound. The work has just come to hand, but we found it hard to lay it aside after once commencing its perusal. We congratulate our friend the author on the accomplishment of a truly valuable work.

The Happy Home. By Kirwan, author of Letters to Bishop Hughes, Romanism at Home, Men and Things in Europe, etc., etc. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1858. Pp. 206.

The versatile and skilful pen of "Kirwan" has found a new field. It is no longer the humour and quiet vein of sarcasm which rendered his letters to Bishop Hughes so effective and so successful, but the serious, didactic tone of the experienced pastor. He says in his Preface, that having devoted special attention during his long ministry "to the instruction of his people as to the family institution, and as to the duties arising out of the relations which the members of the family bear to one another," and having witnessed the beneficial effects of such instruction, he was led to commit the views which he had inculcated from the pulpit to the press, in hopes of a more extended benefit. He treats in order, first of the moral, then of the mental, then of the religious training of children; enlivening wise counsel with interesting anecdotes and historical incidents. We commend the book both to parents and children.

Obedience, the Life of Missions. By Thomas Smyth, D. D. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 170.

This is a sequel to the two preceding works of the same author, "How is the World to be Converted?" and "Faith the Principle of Missions." They were all prepared by Dr. Smyth as Chairman of the Committee of the Synod of South Carolina on Foreign Missions, and ordered by the Synod for publication. They come, therefore, before the churches with the sanction of a high authority.

Palestine, Past and Present. By the Rev. Henry S. Osborn, A. M., Professor of Natural Science, Roanoke College, Va. Member of the American Scientific Association, and Honorary Member of the Malta Scientific Institute. Philadelphia: James Challen & Sons. 1859.

"This work is the result of recent researches in Palestine and a portion of Syria. It embraces the Natural, Scientific, Classical and Historical features of this, the most interesting of all lands, and identifies and illustrates many scriptural passages hitherto unnoticed." The engravings are from new and original designs taken by the author, and the map is from his own actual surveys. This work is designed to be not only instructive, but itself ornamental as a work of art. The illustrations prepared for the volume are chromographs, tinted lithographs, and the finest wood engravings. This is a fitter subject on which to lavish the resources of the press, and the graver, than ideal likenesses of celebrated beauties.

The Children of the Church and Seuling Ordinances. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 110.

A republication of an article from the *Princeton Review*; attributed to the pen of the Rev. Dr. Atwater. We are glad that our Board of Publication has at last seen their way clear to give their imprimatur to an article which could never have been the subject of misgiving, had it not been from strange misunderstanding. It would be a serious matter of regret if views expressed almost in the words of the symbols and leading theological writers of the Reformed Churches, should fail to meet the approval of Old-school Presbyterians, who boast of their adherence to the faith of their fathers.

A Sermon, delivered on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Author's Ministry in the Third Congregational Church, New Haven, July 25th, 1858. By Elisha Lord Cleaveland. New Haven: Thomas H. Pease.

Misrepresentations Corrected. Review of Dr. Cleaveland's Anniversary Sermon. From the New Englander for November, 1858.

Dr. Cleaveland's Statement in reply to Dr. Dutton's Review of his late Anniversary Sermon. New Haven: Thomas H. Pease. 1858.

Those who know the history of Dr. Cleaveland's church, know that its position and career have been determined by the author's rejection of Taylorism. No truthful or even intelligible account of its fortunes and vicissitudes, for a quarter of a century, could be given, without referring to this fact. Any historical review of this church for this period, which ignored this fact, would be like playing Hamlet with the part of Hamlet left out. Dr. Cleaveland, therefore, specifies the self-love theory of Dr. Taylor as having first awakened his repugnance. Dr. Dutton complains of this as a "gross misrepresentation of Dr. Taylor." How any one familiar with Dr. Taylor's teachings can consider this a misrepresentation, we do not see; much less how Dr. Dutton can so consider it. For, in his eulogy of Dr. Taylor, he says that his "self-love theory, or desire of happiness theory, as it has been called; viz. that all motives that come to the mind find their ultimate ground of appeal in the desire of personal happiness; and that the idea of right in its last analysis is resolved into a desire of personal happiness,"

will not "bear the test of time and light."

Dr. Cleaveland next declared his disbelief of "that native freedom from sin, that undiminished power of will, that limitation of the Spirit's office-work, and that enthronement of reason as the judge of Scripture, so confidently maintained by the friends of the new theology." Dr. Dutton pronounces this "a palpable and injurious misrepresentation"! What next? Who will tell us, after this, what were Dr. Taylor's discoveries and improvements in theology? How does Dr. Dutton prove this grave charge? Does he deny that Dr. Taylor held to "native freedom from sin"? Not at all. He says Dr. Taylor and his friends "did not teach, as this paragraph virtually declares, that men are not by nature sinners." Who said that they did? Not Dr. Cleaveland. Dr. Dutton does not venture to deny what Dr. Cleaveland said. He attributes to him what he did not say, and then complains of it as a "gross and palpable misrepresentation." All we can say is, that if it be a misrepresentation, Dr. Dutton, not Dr. Cleaveland, is its author. Dr. Dutton proceeds: "they did not teach that the human will is unaffected by sin, or by the apostasy." Who said that they did? A will "unaffected by sin" is one thing. "Undiminished power of will," to which Dr. Cleaveland objected, is another. Nor does Dr. Dutton venture to deny that this was taught. And is it to be questioned that the office-work of the Spirit was limited by the theory of a power in the will to sin "despite all opposing power"? Or can any man fairly deny that human reason and common sense were raised by this school to an oracular authority in reference to the obvious teachings of Scripture, which was quite novel in orthodox communions?

Dr. Cleaveland adverted to the recent disintegration of old parties and the formation of new ones in the communion to which he belongs, stating that, while some were growing more orthodox, others were pushing their speculations closer to the heart of Christianity, to the Trinity, atonement, &c., and some were even "exchanging signals of sympathy with Unitarians." This last seems most seriously to have disturbed Dr. Dutton. It appears that, a few years ago, he admitted Professor Huntington of Harvard College to his pulpit. He assumed that Dr. Cleaveland had a chief reference to this fact, in the foregoing paragraph, and that it was so understood by his auditors. This was a wholly gratuitous inference. We venture to say that not one in twenty of the hearers or readers of Dr. Cleaveland's discourse so much as thought of the circumstance. For there was too much of a far graver character in other quarters,

of which we, and we presume others, thought, on reading the discourse. Dr. Cleaveland declares that he did not so much as think of it in penning the paragraph so loudly complained of.

We see no "misrepresentations," therefore, for Dr. Dutton

to correct in this case, except his own.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

H. Hupfeld, The Psalms translated and explained. Vol. II.

8vo. pp. 424. This volume extends through Psalm 50. L. Reinke, The Messianic Psalms. Introduction, original text, and translation; with a philological, critical and historical Commentary. Vol. II. Part 2d. 8vo. pp. 316.

L. Reinke, Deviations of the Septuagint and Vulgate versions of the Psalms, from the Hebrew text, compared with the Latin translation of Jerome and the Hebrew text, with critical explanations. 8vo. pp. 314.

W. Neumann, Jeremiah of Anathoth, an Exposition of his Prophecies and Lamentations. Vol. 2. (which completes the work.) 8vo. pp. 536.

M. Baumgarten, Acts of the Apostles, or the Development of the Church from Jerusalem to Rome. Second Edition. Vol. I. from Jerusalem to Corinth. 8vo. pp. 630.

A. Trana, Pauli ad Galatas Epistola. 8vo. pp. 80.

C. J. Bunsen, Complete Biblical Apparatus (Bibel-werk) for the Community. Vol. I. Containing preliminary essays and a new translation of the Pentateuch. 8vo. pp. 394 and 348.

H. Hupfeld, On the Hebrew feasts and festivals. Part 3. On the Sabbatical year and the year of Jubilee. 4to. pp. 22. (Latin.)

J. Bachmann, The Laws respecting Feasts in the Pentateuch. 8vo. pp. 152.

C. F. Kahnis, On the Angel of the Lord. 4to. pp. 20. (Latin.)

C. J. Trip, The Theophanies in the Historical Books of the Old Testament. 8vo. pp. 219.

J. H. Kurtz, The Sons of God in Gen. vi. 1-4, and the Angels that sinned in 2 Pet. ii. 4, 5 and Jude verses 6, 7. 8vo. pp. 95. This is a defence of the author's previous publication, The Marriage of the Sons of God with the Daughters of Men, against some strictures from the pen of Hengstenberg.

Gregorii Bar-Hebræi Scholia in librum Jobi. Edited from the MSS, with an explanation of the more difficult passages,

and critical notes, by G. H. Bernstein. 4to. pp. 16.

H. G. Hoelemann, The Position of St. Paul relative to the question of the time of the Second Advent. 8vo. pp. 32.

C. G. Wilke, Greek and Latin Lexicon of the New Testa-

ment. 8vo. pp. 860.

The Book of Wisdom in Greek and Latin. Edited by F. H.

Reusch. 8vo. pp. 62.

Lieutenant van de Velde, Plan of the town and environs of Jerusalem. Constructed from the English ordnance survey and measurements of Dr. T. Tobler, with memoir by Dr. Titus Tobler. 4to. pp. 24, with 3 lithographs in 4to and folio. Scale 1 to 4843.

Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation, by an American citizen, translated from English into Hebrew at the request of his brethren, the divinity students in the United Presbyterian Semi-

nary, Edinburgh, by Isaac Salkinson. 8vo. pp. 184.

H. Ewald, History of Israel. 2d edition. Vol. 6. History of the Apostolic age to the destruction of Jerusalem. 8vo. pp. 754.

J. M. Jost, History of Judaism and its Sects. 2d Part.

8vo. pp. 463.

H. Graetz, The Legislation of the Western Goths regarding the Jews. 4to. pp. 36.

J. H. Kurtz, Outlines of Church History. 4th Edition.

8vo. pp. 206.

J. H. Kurtz, Handbook of Universal Church History. 2d Edition. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 558 and 206.

D. Schenkel, Christian Dogmatics in 2 volumes. Vol. I.

8vo. pp. 512.

F. H. Frank, Theology of the formula of Concord historically and dogmatically developed. Part I. Original Sin and Free Will. 8vo. pp. 240.

H. Laemmer, The ante-Tridentine Catholic Theology of the period of the Reformation, from the original sources. 8vo.

pp. 353.

H. Heppe, History of German Protestantism from 1555 to 1581. Vol. IV. from 1577 to 1581, a continuation of the history of the Lutheran formula of Concord. 8vo. pp. 399.

C. Wile, Beginnings of the renovation of the Church in the 11th century from the sources. Part I. 8vo. pp. 140.

J. E. Jörg, History of Protestantism in its latest develop-

ment. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 1158.

Codex diplomaticus et epistolaris Moraviæ. Collection of original documents relating to the history of Moravia. Vol. VII. Part 1. 4to. pp. 440.

L. Preller, Roman Mythology. 8vo. pp. 822.

T. Mommsen, Roman Chronology to the time of Cæsar.

8vo. pp. 283.

A. Fabretti, Glossarium Italicum, Explanatory of the words found upon the Umbrian, Sabine, Oscan, Volscian, Etruscan and other monuments. In 10 numbers. No. 1. 4to. pp. 160. Turin.

J. G. Stickel, The Etruscan shown by an Explanation of inscriptions and names to have been a Semitic language. 8vo.

pp. 296.

Facciolati, Forcellini et Furnaletti Lexicon totius Latinitatis, enlarged from the works of Klotz, Freund, Döderlein and others, by F. Corradini. In 4 vols. of 10 numbers. No. 1. 4to. pp. 80. Venice.

F. Mone, Greek History. Vol. I. No. 1. 8vo. pp. 80. J. P. Fallmerayer, The Albanese Element in Greece. Part 1, on the origin and antiquity of the Albanese. 4to. pp. 71.

H. Brugsch, Geographical Inscriptions of Egyptian Monuments. Vol. II. Geography of neighbouring lands from Egyptian monuments, with 22 plates.

tian monuments, with 23 plates. 4to. pp. 96.

A. Gladisch, Empedocles and the Egyptians, with elucidations from the Egyptian monuments, by H. Brugsch and J. Passalacqua. 8vo. pp. 156.

R. Lepsius, King's-book of the ancient Egyptians. 4to. pp.

188, with 73 lithograph plates.

M. Uhlemann, Handbook of universal Egyptian Archeology. Part 4th, The Literature of the ancient Egyptians explained

and illustrated by examples. 8vo. pp. 316.

Bibliotheca Ægyptiaca, Repertory of the various writings, treatises, and essays, in scientific and other journals, which had appeared up to 1857 in relation to Egypt, its geography, natural history, monuments, language, etc., etc., by H. Jolowicz, with an alphabetical register. 8vo. pp. 244.

F. Müller, The Expression of the Verb in the Arian and

Semitic cycle of languages. 8vo. pp. 39.

Mutanabbii Carmina cum Commentario Wâhidii. Ex MSS. ed. F. Dieterici. No. 1. 4to. pp. 176.

Ibn Hishâm, Life of Mohammed, from the MSS. By

F. Wüstenfeld. Part 2d. 8vo. pp. 296.

Ibn Abd-el-Hakemis history of the Conquest of Spain, now edited for the first time, translated (into English) from the Arabic, with critical and exegetical notes, and a Historical Introduction, by J. H. Jones. 8vo. pp. 114.

Mohammedan Sources for the History of the Countries on the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea, published, translated and explained, by B. Dorn. Parts 2 and 3. 8vo. pp. 528

and 323. St. Petersburgh.

History of Georgia from antiquity to the 19th century, translated (into French) from Georgian, by Brosset. Part 2d. Modern History, No. 2. 4to. pp. 576. St. Petersburgh.

C. Lassen, Antiquities of India. Vol. 3. History of trade, and of the Greek and Roman knowledge of India, and the history of Northern India, from A. D. 319, to the Mohamme-

dans. 8vo. pp. 1199.

J. Muir, Original Sanscrit texts on the origin and progress of the religion and institutions of India, collected, translated into English, and illustrated by notes. Part 1. The Mythical and Legendary account of Caste. 8vo. pp. 204. London.

F. Miklosich, The formation of Nouns in Old Slovenic. 4to.

pp. 100.

F. G. Bergmann, The Scythians, ancestors of the Germanic and Slavic peoples. 8vo. pp. 76. (French.)

Library of Anglo Saxon Poetry, with a Glossary, by C. W.

Grein. Vol. 2d. 8vo. pp. 416.

Calendowide, i. e. Menologium Ecclesiæ Anglo-Saxonicæ

poeticum, ed. Bouterwek. 8vo. pp. 40.

Ulfilas, or the monuments preserved to us of the Gothic language, Text, Grammar, and Dictionary, by F. L. Stamm. 8vo. pp. 472.

A. Castren, Koibalic and Karagassic Grammar, with lists of words from the Tartar dialects of the Minussin Cycle. 8vo.

pp. 210.

J. C. Buschmann, The Tribes and Languages of New Mexico, and the Western side of British America. 4to. pp. 206.

G. M. Thomas, Newly Discovered Poems of Petrarch. 4to.

pp. 16.

C. Tischendorf is about making an addition of three more volumes to his Monumenta Sacra Inedita, Nova Collectio. He has already published accurate copies of twenty-five of the most ancient manuscripts, or portions of manuscripts, of the Greek and Latin Scriptures, thus making these invaluable sources of textual criticism more generally accessible, and placing their

preservation beyond the risks to which the documents themselves, with all the care that can be bestowed upon them, are liable. The first two volumes of this collection, which appeared in 1855 and 1857, contained nine of these ancient documents. A third and fourth volume are promised the present year, and a fifth with an appendix in 1860. The third volume is to contain a reprint of the Leyden manuscript, older probably than the fifth century, and remarkable as containing fragments of Origen's Octapla, marked with the critical signs which he employed; the Wolfenbüttel palimpsest of about the same age. containing fragments of Luke and John, which was imperfectly examined a hundred years since by Knittel; and some smaller fragments of Mark and Luke from a palimpsest at St. Gall. The fourth volume will contain a Greek Psalter of the seventh century, which is written in letters of gold and silver upon purple, and belongs to the public library of Zurich. The fifth, fragments of Genesis from the Vienna purple and illuminated manuscripts; fragment of the Gospels recovered from the Wolfenbüttel palimpsest of the sixth century; fragments of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, found in Paris, from the same manuscript of Origen's Octapla as those in Leyden; all the citations from either Testament in a Wolfenbüttel manuscript of Chrysostom of the sixth century; the complete text of the books of Judges and Ruth, from a manuscript found by the editor in the East, and now in the British Museum; and a fragment of the book of Genesis, which is perhaps without its like in having the uncial character upon one page, and the oldest form of the Greek small letter upon another. In an appendix will be published a new edition of Bishop Laud's Oxford manuscript of the Acts of the Apostles, in Greek and Latin, which was printed, though with many inaccuracies, one hundred and fifty years ago. These volumes will be issued in a style correspondent with their predecessors, which were honoured with the prize medal at Paris, and will be accompanied with fac-similes and prolegomena. Two hundred copies only will be issued. The price is sixteen Prussian thalers, or sixty-four francs per volume.

PRINCETON REVIEW.

APRIL, 1859.

No. II.

ART. I .- The Doctrine of Perception, as held by Doctor Arnauld, Doctor Reid, and Sir William Hamilton.

It is our purpose in this article to offer a monograph upon one of the most limited questions in psychology. But inasmuch as the interest of the discussion must turn very much upon a particular controversy, and even on the opinions of an individual, we think it advisable to place at the beginning all that we have to say of a historical nature, in order that no details of fact may be left to embarrass us in recording the series of philosophical determinations. Working in a somewhat unfrequented field, we hope to be able to show, that in regard to the true doctrine of Immediate Perception, the great Jansenist was not only a successful co-worker, but that he approached singularly near a solution of the problem.

It is not quite ten years since we asked the attention of our readers to a special article on the Family of Arnauld.* Our purpose at that time was not so much philosophical as theological and religious. But the good and ascetic recluses of Port-Royal des Champs also entertained themselves in spare moments with questions of metaphysic; and one of these now

concerns us.

Let memory be refreshed by the statement, that Descartes was born in 1596, and died in 1650; that Arnauld was born in

^{*} Princeton Review, 1849, pp. 467-502.

1612, and died in 1694; and that Malebranche was born in 1638, and died in 1715. ANTONY ARNAULD, Doctor of the Sorbonne, was the scourge of Jesuitism. He was condemned by the Faculty of Theology in 1656. About the same time appeared the Provincial Letters, in several of which he assisted Pascal. The Jesuits denounced him as a Calvinist and a Huguenot. We have in another place recorded the eulogies uttered concerning him by both Racine and Boileau. The more masculine style of French writing had not yet passed away. It was no mean era, when, if we may use the words of M. Cousin, "Descartes shared the esteem of the public with Corneille and Condé; when Madame de Grignan studied his works with passionate vivacity; when Bossuet and Arnauld, Fénelon and Malebranche boldly declared themselves his disciples."* Two schools divide the seventeenth century, in regard to French literature; that of Louis XIII. and the Regency, represented by Corneille and Pascal, and that which was created by Louis XIV., and exemplified by Racine and Fénelon. One has a negligent greatness, the other a bewitching art. It is to the former of these that Arnauld belongs.

The earliest philosophical writing of Arnauld is a mere thesis, prepared in 1641, for one of his pupils at the College of Mans. His next attempt was a series of bold strictures upon the system of Descartes. These raised his reputation, even among the Cartesians; but he was soon drawn off into the hotter conflicts of theology. Before the persecutions which drove him from his native land in 1679, he lived at Port-Royal des Champs, in constant intercourse with Nicole, Sacy, and the Duke de Luynes, who translated the Meditations of Descartes. It was then that, in connection with Nicole, he produced the Port-Royal Logic, or Art de Penser, which still lives, and of which Crousaz says, that it contributed more than either the Organon of Bacon, or the Methode of Descartes, to improve the established modes of academical education on the Continent.† But our principal concern is with his attack upon the universally received doctrine of Ideas, as set forth by

Malebranche.

^{*} Mad. de Longueville, Paris, 1855, p. ix. † Preface to Crousaz's Logic, Gen. 1724.

It is well known that Malebranche maintained the doctrine that we see all things in God, and subordinately to this, that the immediate object of our perception can be nothing but those representative entities which are called ideas. Arnauld, who was preëminently a theologian, came to this debate by a theological route. Malebranche had written a treatise on 'Nature and Grace'; the principles of which seemed to the Jansenist to impugn the grand foundations of the Augustinian system. It was while preparing to combat these errors, that, ten years after its first appearance, Arnauld set himself to examine the famous Recherche de la Vérité; and, being arrested by the portentous dogma of our seeing all things in God, he instituted labours which resulted in the work on True and False Ideas, which appeared in 1683.* Arnauld wrote on his conv of Malebranche these words: Pulchra, nova, falsa. He is said to have been stirred up to the controversy by Bossuet, who for some years threatened to engage in it personally; on hearing this, Malebranche said he would be proud of such an adversary. In this discussion every thing turns upon the question whether ideas have any separate existence. After settling this to his own satisfaction in the negative, he proceeds to the particular system of Malebranche, which he denominates "the most ill-contrived and unintelligible of all hypotheses." He shows that his opponent leaves altogether undetermined the important inquiry, what it is precisely that we see in God. At first, he seems to say, it is all things. A little further on, he excepts our notion of the mind itself acquired by a direct internal consciousness, and the knowledge of other minds which we derive from analogy. Presently he represents the divine ideas as representing to us only space, number, and the essences of things; afterwards all the works of God. Equally vague is Malebranche when he undertakes to explain the nature and mode of this imaginary vision. He seems at first to have believed that each individual object has its individual idea in the Divine Mind. But he afterwards adopted the opinion, that the different objects of the universe are represented all together in an intelligible and infinite space which God comprises,

^{*} Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, etc. Cologne, Nicolas Schouten, 1683. 12mo. pp. 338.

and in which the mind beholds them.* How little the matter is helped by this, will be apparent from a lively apologue of Arnauld, in which he reminds us of the greatest writers of his

age.

"An excellent painter," says he, "who had been well educated, and who was also skilled in sculpture, had so great a love for St. Augustine, that in a conversation with one of his friends he avowed to him that one of his most ardent wishes was to know how this great saint looked: 'For you know,' said he, 'that we painters have a passionate desire to have to the life the countenances of those whom we love.' The friend thought this a laudable curiosity, and promised to seek for some way of gratifying it. And so, either for diversion or with some other design, he had a great block of marble carried the next day into the studio of the painter, together with a large mass of the best wax, and a piece of canvas; for as to pencils and a palette of colours, he expected to find them there of course. The painter, very much surprised, asked what could be the intention of bringing all these things to his house. 'It is,' replied he, 'that I may satisfy your wish to know the personal appearance of St. Augustine; in this way I put you in the way of knowing it.' 'And how so?' asked the painter. 'Why thus,' answered the friend; 'the exact countenance of the holy father is certainly in this block of marble, and also in this piece of wax. All that you have to do is to take away from around it what is superfluous; what remains will give you a head of St. Augustine to the very life, and you can easily transfer it to your canvas.' 'You are jesting with me,' said the painter; 'I admit that the exact image of St. Augustine is in this block of marble and this mass of wax, but so are the images of a thousand others. In cutting this marble then, or moulding this wax, how do you mean that the face which I shall hit upon shall be that of this saint, any more than of a thousand others, equally contained in the marble and the wax? And, even granting that by chance I should light on it—which indeed is morally impossible—I should be no nearer the mark: for not knowing how St. Augustine looked, I should never be able to tell whether I had found him or not. It is just so, also,

^{*} Introduction of Jourdain, p. xxii.

with the face you would have me put upon this canvas. The means that you give me therefore, for knowing precisely how St. Augustine looked, is amusing indeed; because it presup-

poses that I know it already.'

"The friend seems to have had nothing to reply to this. But as our painter was a very inquisitive man, he asked if he owned Malebranche's Inquiry after Truth. He happened to have it, went to look for it, and put it into his friend's hands, who opening at page 547 resumed his discourse in the following terms: 'You seem astonished at the method which I give you for getting St. Augustine's face true to the life. I have done only what the author of this book does, in order to give us knowledge of material things, which he alleges we cannot know in themselves, but only in God; and the manner in which he says we know them in God, is by means of an infinite intelligible extension which God comprises. Now, I do not see that the method which he gives me of seeing in this extension a figure which I may only have heard named, but never known, differs at all from that which I have suggested to you in regard to St. Augustine. He says that as my mind can perceive one part of this intelligible extension which God comprises, it can perceive in God all figures, since every finite intelligible extension necessarily has an intelligible figure. And this is just what I have been telling you, that there is no face of man which may not be found in this block of marble, if only you cut it aright. But is it less necessary to know this figure (which I have supposed I could not know) in order to take a portion of intelligible extension, and circumscribe it by my mind as I must, in order that this figure should be its term, than as you most justly believe it is necessary to know the true face of St. Augustine, in order to the perception of it in this marble or this wax, where it is not less hidden than every figure in this intelligible extension?"*

But it is not our intention to analyze the work. It was the rudest brush which the subtle and elegant Malebranche had encountered; and he replied with mingled loftiness and chagrin.† He urged that Arnauld's coming out in reply to a

^{*} V. et F. Idées, p. 132—134.

^{† &#}x27;Réponse au livre Des vraies et des fausses Idées.'

book which had been before the public ten years could be accounted for only by his spite against the more recent work on Nature and Grace; and he charges on him the odium theologicum and a spirit of party; alleging that he had purposely singled out one of the most difficult and abstruse of scholastic questions, in order to bring his adversary into discredit with the vulgar: When he complained that the Jansenist doctor did not understand him, Boileau said, "Whom then, my father, do you expect to understand you?"* Malebranche passes slightly over Arnauld's heaviest arguments, and closes haughtily with these words: "If I have not given particular . answers to all his reasonings, it is not because I have no reply, but because they deserved none." Such however was not the method of Doctor Arnauld, who in due time appeared against Malebranche in an answer of six hundred pages. The tone in this work, of which we have seen only a part, is said to be much more indignant than in the original strictures. Malebranche deemed it necessary to set himself right, in regard to intelligible extension, by which term he protested that he always understood knowledge of extension, without supposing in God any material element; but as to other points he declared that he was unwilling to spend his life in useless disputations.† The controversy broke out afresh, in a small way, some years later, on the occasion of Malebranche's striking at Arnauld in reviewing another writer. Arnauld, "nothing loath," appeared in four letters; Malebranche rejoined in two several publications; when the death of his great adversary seemed to close the warfare. It is painful however to be obliged to add, that five years after this event, Malebranche issued a pamphlet, on Prejudice, in which he attempts to prove that Arnauld could not have been really the author of the works which go under his name, if he possessed the ordinary qualities of uprightness for which his friends give him credit.t

^{*} Oeuvres de Malebranche, ed. Simon. Introd.

^{† &#}x27;Trois lettres du P. Malebranche touchant la Défense de M. Arnauld.'

[‡] Introduction of M. Jourdain. The titles of these publications are, 'Quatre lettres de M. Arnauld au P. Malebranche sur deux de ses plus insoutenables opinions,' 1694.—'Lettres du P. Malebranche à M. Arnauld,' 1694.—'Réponse, par le P. Malebranche, à la troisième lettre de M. Arnauld,' 1699.—'Ecrit contre la Prévention,' 1699.

The casual relations of great men to each other are sometimes striking; as an instance, take the only interview which ever occurred between Malebranche and Berkeley. "The conversation turned on the non-existence of matter. Malebranche, who had an inflammation in his lungs, and whom Berkeley found preparing a medicine in his cell, and cooking it in a small pipkin, exerted his voice so violently in the heat of their dispute, that he increased his disorder, which carried him off in a few days after."*

Having thus despatched the historical part of our task, we proceed to consider the teachings of Arnauld in regard to the cardinal point of Perception, with or without ideas. And in this inquiry we shall derive our information chiefly from his own writings, and particularly from his treatise on *True and False Ideas*, mentioned above.

The ingenious account given by Arnauld of the manner in which philosophers came to admit the necessity of ideas as objects of perception is alluded to by Reid. Accustomed from childhood to believe that the presence of the object of sense is necessary in order to perception, and finding that they had knowledge of things not visible or tangible, they readily came to think that the mind sees such objects, not in themselves, but by means of certain images. The representative entities are called ideas; and it is to disprove the existence of these, which he denominates chimeras, that Arnauld lays out his strength in this controversy. It is our purpose to consider only those parts of it which bear upon the question of immediate perception.

The great Sorbonnist, a man of war from his youth, as indeed his opponent urges in more than one deprecatory passage, goes to work in all the forms, opening with certain definitions, which are altogether too important to be omitted, when our inquiry is into his precise standing as to this cardinal question.

The definitions of Arnauld are these:

- "1. I call soul or mind the substance which thinks.
- "2. To think, to know, to perceive, are one and the same thing.

* Biographia Britann. Art. Berkeley.

- "3. I also take in the same sense the *idea* of an object and the *perception* of an object. I waive the question, whether there are other things which may be called ideas. But it is certain that there are ideas, taken in this sense, and that these ideas are either attributes or modifications of our mind.
- "4. I say that an object is present to our mind when our mind perceives and knows it. I do not consider the question, whether there is any other presence of the object, previous to knowledge, and which is necessary that it may be in a state to be known. But it is certain that the manner in which I say that an object is present to the mind, when the mind knows it, is incontestable; being that which causes us to say of a person whom we love that he is often present to our minds, because we often think of him.
- "5. I say that a thing is objectively present, in my mind when I conceive it. When I have conception of the sun, a square, a sound; the sun, the square and the sound are objectively in my mind, and this whether they are or are not external to my mind.
- "6. I have said that I took for the same thing perception and idea. It must nevertheless be remarked, that this, though one, has a twofold relation: one to the mind which it modifies, the other to the thing perceived, so far as this is objectively in the mind; and further that the word perception more directly denotes the former relation, and the word idea the latter. Thus the perception of a square denotes more directly my mind as perceiving a square, and the idea of a square denotes more directly the square. So far forth as it is objectively in my mind. This remark is very important for the solving of many difficulties, arising solely from neglecting to consider that there are not two entities, but an identical modification of our mind, which involves essentially these two relations; since I cannot have a perception which is not at one and the same time the perception of my spirit as perceiving, and the perception of something as perceived; and since nothing can be objectively in my mind, (what I call idea) which my mind does not perceive.
- "7. By representative existences, so far as I oppose them as superfluous, I design such only as are imagined to be really

distinct from ideas taken as perceptions; for I do not care to oppose every sort of representative existences or modalities; inasmuch as I maintain it to be clear to every one who reflects on what passes in his own mind, that all our perceptions are modalities essentially representative.

"8. When I say that our ideas and our perceptions (by which I mean the same thing) represent to us the things which we conceive, and are their images, it is in a sense quite different from that in which we say that pictures represent their originals, and are their images, or that words pronounced or written are images of our thoughts; for in regard to ideas the meaning is that the things which we conceive are objectively in our mind and thought. Now this manner of being objectively in the mind is so peculiar to mind and thought, as constituting their very nature, that the search would be vain for any thing similar in whatsoever is not mind and thought. And, as I have already remarked, it is this which has so much involved this matter of ideas, because the attempt has been made, by means of comparisons from corporeal things, to explain the manner in which objects are represented by our ideas, although in this respect there can be no true relation between bodies and minds.

"9. When I say that an idea is the same as a perception; I understand by perception every thing that my mind conceives, whether it be by the primary apprehension which it has of things, or by the judgments which it forms of them, or by what it discovers of them from reasoning. Thus, though there is an infinity of figures of which I know the nature by long reasonings, I nevertheless, having made these reasonings, have as veritable an idea of these figures as of a circle or a triangle, which I can conceive at once. And though perhaps it is only by reasoning that I am entirely assured that there truly exists an external earth, sun or stars, the idea which represents the earth, sun and stars as truly existing outside of my mind, deserves the name of idea no less than if I had acquired it without the aid of reasoning.

"10. There is still an ambiguity to be removed; namely, that we must not confound the idea of an object, with this same object conceived, unless we add, so far as it is objectively in the

mind; for to be conceived, in regard to the sun which is in the heavens is only an extrinsical denomination, which is nothing more than a relation to the perception which I have of it. Now this is not what we ought to understand when it is said that 'the idea of the sun is the sun itself so far as it is objectively in my mind'; and what we call being objectively in the mind is not merely being the object on which my thought terminates, but also being in my mind intelligibly, as it is customary for objects to be there; and the idea of the sun is 'the sun so far as he is in my mind,' not formally as he is in the heavens, but objectively, that is to say, after the manner in which objects are in our thoughts; a manner of being, which is far less perfect than that whereby the sun is really existing, but which nevertheless we cannot assert to be nothing or to have no need of a cause.

"11. If I should say that the mind does this or that, and that it has the faculty of doing this or that, I understand by the word does the perception which it has of objects, which is one of its modifications; nor do I give myself any trouble about the efficient cause of this modification, that is to say, whether God gives it to the mind, or the mind gives it to itself; for this does not concern the nature of ideas, but only their origin, which is a very different question.

"12. By faculty I mean the power which I certainly know that any thing spiritual or corporeal possesses, either of acting or suffering, or of existing in such or such a manner, in other words, of having such or such a modification.

"13. And since such faculty is certainly a property of the nature of the thing supposed, I then say, that it holds this of the Author of its nature, who can be no other than God."*

The axioms and postulates which follow have a mathematical formality usual in the scholastic encounters of that day. Arnauld then goes on to examine the locutions everywhere prevalent in the schools, that we do not see things immediately; that what we see is the ideas of the things; and that it is in the idea of any thing that we see its properties. It is in treat-

^{*} Oeuvres philosophiques de Antoine Arnauld. Ed. Simon. Paris, 1843. pp. 51—54.

ing of this ex professo in his sixth chapter that he lays himself open to the strictures of Reid and Hamilton, by seeming to admit no less than his opponents, certain representative manières d'être distinguishable from both the real existence and the percipient act, with this peculiarity that these are not separate, intermediate entities, but modifications of the mind. We shall see that every thing turns upon the acceptation of this phrase, 'modification of the mind.'

Without rejecting, as perhaps he ought to have done, these consecrated expressions, he goes on to protest against their being taken to imply any thing like 'representative entities as distinguished from perceptions.' He then recalls the law, often neglected then and since, that 'our thought or perception,' a pregnant exegetical phrase, 'is essentially reflective upon itself,' or as the Latin has it more felicitously est sui conscia. "For," adds he, "I never think, without at the same time knowing that I think; I never have knowledge of a square, without knowing that I have such knowledge; I never see the sun (or to cut off all debate, I never imagine that I see the sun) without being certain that I so imagine. I may not be able, some time after, to remember that I had such or such a conception; but during the time of my conceiving it, I know that I conceive it."* This reflection he calls virtual, as distinguished from that turning of the mind to its own acts which he denominates express. The passage in which his language most vacillates, and where he seems too ready to use the terms of the other side, is this:

Now adding to this what we have said in the third, sixth, and seventh definitions, it follows that every perception is essentially representative of something, and being hence named idea, it cannot essentially be reflective on itself, without having for its immediate object this idea, that is to say, the objective reality of what my mind is said to perceive; so that if I think of the sun, the objective reality of the sun, present to my mind, is the immediate object of this perception; and the possible or existing sun, which is exterior to my mind, is, so to speak, its

^{*} The acute observation of Hamilton is worthy of comparison here, not to the discredit of the great Frenchman.

mediate object. And thus, it will be perceived, that without having recourse to any representative entities, distinguished from perceptions, it is quite true in this sense, as well generally of all things as of those in particular which are material, that it is our ideas which we see immediately, and which are the immediate object of our thought; which however does not prevent its being likewise true that by means of these ideas we see the object which formally contains what is only objectively in the idea; for example, it is still true, that I conceive the formal essence of a square, which is objectively in the idea or perception which I have of the square."* In all this he clings to the phraseology of Descartes, whose words are: "Per realitatem objectivam ideæ intelligo entitatem rei repræsentatæ per ideam quatenus est in idea, eodemque modo dici potest perfectio objectiva, artificium objectivum, etc. Nam, quacunque percipimus tanquam in idearum objectis, ea sunt in ipsis ideis objective." But in all these places, it is indispensable to remark the deflection of meaning which has since the scholastic age befallen the terms, 'subject,' 'object,' 'subjective,' 'objective;' so that in the writings of German philosophers the relation of the two is almost inverted; and we have come to take subject and object, respectively, as equivalent to the Ich and the Nicht-ich.

But the true acceptation of this definition is apparent from what Arnauld subjoins, namely, that what Descartes calls an idea "is not really distinguished from our thought or perception, but is our thought itself, so far as it contains objectively that which is in the object formally."

As our purpose is simply to report this great philosopher upon the one point of immediate perception, we shall, except so far as necessary to this end, omit any account of his ingenious and masterly demonstrations. These are five in number. The proposition which he first sets out to prove is this: Our mind has no need, in order to know material things, of certain representative beings, distinguished from perceptions, such as it is pretended are necessary to supply the absence of all that which cannot of itself be intimately united to our mind." In the second demonstration there is some pleasant raillery, quite

in the manner of his friend and fellow-sufferer Pascal, upon Malebranche's arguing for ideal entities, from this, that the mind could not leave the body, and go travelling into the heavenly spaces in order to see the sun: "It is all in vain for men to say that they see the sun; we have proved to them that they only dream, and that it is impossible they should see it. The argument would be conclusive; our mind can see only those objects which are present to it; this is indubitable. Now the sun is separated from our mind by more than thirty millions of leagues, according to M. Cassini; in order therefore to be visible, the mind must go to him, or he must go to the mind. Now you have no belief that your mind leaves your body in order to find the sun, nor that the sun leaves the heavens in order to unite himself intimately with your mind; you dote then when you say that you see the sun. But be not uneasy; we are going to extricate you from this embarrassment, and give you a means of seeing. Instead of the sun, who would not be likely to leave his place so often, which would be very troublesome, we have very ingeniously found out a certain être représentatif, which takes his place, and which shall make up for his absence by joining himself closely to our minds. And it is to this being representative of the sun (whatsoever it be, and whencesoever it came, for we are not agreed about this) that we have given the name of idea or species."*

Upon this extract, we beg leave to submit to the attentive and candid reader, whether the whole argument of Arnauld, thus veiled in fine irony, does not imply a seeing of the sun, as distinguished from seeing an idea of the sun. Great injustice would be done to this most acute writer, if we should transfer to the phenomenon of primary perception, those things which he predicates of our subsequent recalling of such perception; or, if we should forget his declaration, that our cognizance of the perception is necessary and simultaneous, and, as he calls it, virtual. The assertion of Malebranche and all the schools is that what I see, in a primary perception, is not the real, but the ideal, or intelligible sun; the assertion of Arnauld is, that what I see, in a primary perception, is the real sun, though by means of a mental change, or modification. "For," says he,

^{*} Op. cit. pp. 71, 72.

"though I see immediately this intelligible sun by the virtual reflection which I make of my own perception, I do not stop at this, but this very perception, in which I see this intelligible sun, makes me see at the same time the material sun which God has created."* We regard this as a key to the whole

hypothesis of perception, held by Arnauld.

In Dr. Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers, where he gives a historical statement concerning the theories of perception, there is an account of Arnauld's speculations. We shall abridge some of Reid's passages, though without otherwise altering his perspicuous language. "The most formidable antagonist Malebranche met with was in his own country,-Antony Arnauld, doctor of the Sorbonne, one of the acutest writers the Jansenists have to boast of, though that sect has produced many. Those who choose to see this system attacked on the one hand, and defended on the other, with subtilty of argument and elegance of expression, and on the part of Arnauld with much wit and humour, may find satisfaction by reading Malebranche's Inquiry after Truth, Arnauld's book of True and False Ideas, Malebranche's Defence, and some subsequent replies and defences." These are just remarks, and they are followed by an account of Arnauld's scheme, then little known in Great Britain. It might have been expected that the Scotch philosopher should have bestowed high applause, and exulted in the utterance, a hundred years before his day, of a doctrine concerning perception which so closely approached his own, and which has given direction to all following systems in England and America. And he certainly says all that a very observant reader needs in order to make this inference; yet in such a way as to draw undue attention to some of Arnauld's nomenclature, which savoured of a former system. "Arnauld," says he, "has employed the whole of his sixth chapter to show that those ways of speaking, common among philosophers, to wit, 'that we perceive not things immediately; that it is their ideas that are the immediate objects of our thoughts; that it is in the idea of every thing that we perceive its properties'; are not to be rejected, but are true when rightly understood. He labours to reconcile these expressions

to his own definition of ideas, by observing, that every perception and every thought is necessarily conscious of itself and reflects upon itself; and that by this consciousness and reflection, it is its own immediate object. Whence he infers, that the idea—that is, the perception—is the immediate object of perception."* We shall not interrupt our recital any further than to say, what the definitions above will substantiate, that this is a very insufficient and unguarded representation of Arnauld's theory. Sir William Hamilton, in his annotations, to a certain extent confirms the censure of Reid. "Arnauld," says he, "did not allow that perceptions and ideas are really or numerically distinguished, -i. e. as one thing from another thing; not even that they are modally distinguished, i. e. as a thing from its mode. He maintained that they are really identical, and only rationally discriminated as viewed in different relations; the indivisible mental modification being called a perception, by reference to the mind or thinking subject,—an idea, by reference to the mediate object or thing thought." We have given enough from Arnauld himself to show that it is only the latter half of this statement, which adequately represents him. He everywhere declares perception, thinking, cognizance and idea, to indicate one and the same function of the subject. Other judgments of Sir William are the following: "Arnauld's was indeed the opinion which latterly prevailed in the Cartesian schools. Leibnitz, like Arnauld, regarded ideas, notions, representations, as mere modifications of the mind, (what by his disciples were called material ideas, like the cerebral ideas of Descartes, are out of the question,) and no cruder opinion than this has ever subsequently found a footing in any of the German systems." And elsewhere: "Reid's discontent with Arnauld's opinion—an opinion which is stated with great perspicuity by its author-may be used as an argument to show that his own doctrine is, however ambiguous, that of intuitive or immediate perception. Arnauld's theory is identical with the finer form of representative or mediate perception, and the difficulties of that doctrine were not overlooked by his great antagonist." Stewart, with a more liberal construction of his author, says: "Anthony Arnauld farther held,

^{*} Reid's Essays, chap. v. & 5.

that 'Material things are perceived immediately by the mind, without the intervention of ideas.' In this respect his doctrine coincided exactly with that of Reid."*

The strictures of Reid and Hamilton have not escaped the notice of French metaphysicians, who have stood up for the honour of their countrymen. Among these we may cite M. Jourdain: "Notwithstanding the inexhaustible resources," says he, "of an argumentation always subtile and sometimes eloquent, Malebranche did not succeed in proving that between objects and the mind there are interposed any distinct images of our perceptions, and the contrary thesis was established by his antagonist with conclusive evidence; so that about a century before the publication of Thomas Reid's Inquiry, Arnauld had not only suspected, but developed, sustained and invincibly demonstrated the very theory which has caused the success and glory of the Scottish school. For what is it that the Scotch say, from Reid to Hamilton? That we take cognizance of bodies immediately and in themselves. And what ground do they take in support of this opinion? That in the fact of external perception, we have no consciousness, in addition to the very notion of material reality, of any intermediate notion which could have representative species for its object. Now both conclusion and argument belong to the Traité des Idées. Others have reproduced the analyses of the French philosopher, but without surpassing them, and his doctrine, perhaps clothed in less severe forms, has been on the whole quite faithfully exhibited. It is for this reason that we have never been able to comprehend how the leader of the Scottish school, with Arnauld's book under his eyes, could ever have written the following lines: 'Malebranche and Arnauld both professed the universally received doctrine, that we do not perceive material things immediately; that only the ideas of these are the immediate objects of our thoughts, and that it is in the idea of a thing that we perceive its properties.' And again: 'It would be wrong to conclude from the preceding remarks, that Arnauld denied without restriction the existence of ideas, and unreservedly adopted the opinion of the vulgar, which recognizes no object of perception but the external object. He

^{*} Encyclopædia Britannica, vol. i. p. 80.

does not leave the beaten road at this point, and what he tears down with one hand, he builds up with the other. In these two passages," continues M. Jourdain, "Reid takes the reverse of truth. We do not question his good faith; but does not his own countryman Thomas Brown find reason to censure his grave errors in history, and his disposition to raise phantoms that he may have the pleasure of contending with them?" "It is just to say that M. Hamilton has relieved Reid from a part of the reproaches which Brown bestows on him in this regard."*

But something was needed more exact and searching than these assertions on one side and denials on the other; this is supposed to be afforded by Sir William Hamilton in that memorable article of the Edinburgh Review in which he gave the coup de grace to Brown. But there have prevailed such ignorance in some, and such indifference in others, in regard to Arnauld's opinions, that this abstruse passage in one of the. subtlest writers of our day has perhaps awakened less attention in its original position than it will do in an extract. It will be remembered that he is there engaged upon the philosophy of perception, in treating of which he ascribes to Reid an error of omission in not discriminating intuitive from representative knowledge. In justifying this judgment, he begins by generalizing the possible forms, under which the hypothesis of a representative perception can be realized, and reduces these to three: "1. The representative object not a modification of mind. 2. The representative object a modification of mind, dependent for its apprehension, but not for its existence, on the act of consciousness. 3. The representative object a modification of mind, non-existent out of consciousness;-the idea and its perception only different relations of an act (state) really identical." The third of these will arrest attention, as that which applies to Arnauld. The passage which relates particularly to this point is too curious and instructive to be omitted here. "In regard to ARNAULD," says Sir William, "the question is not, as in relation to the others, whether Reid conceives him to maintain a form of the ideal theory, which he

^{*} Logique de Port Royal, Ed. Jourdain, Paris, 1846, pp. xxx. sqq. VOL. XXXI.—No. II. 25

rejects, but whether Reid admits Arnauld's opinion on perception and his own to be identical. 'To these authors,' says Dr. Brown, 'whose opinions on the subject of perception Dr. Reid has misconceived, I may add one, whom even he himself allows to have shaken off the ideal system, and to have considered the idea and the perception as not distinct but the same, a modification of the mind and nothing more. I allude to the celebrated Jansenist writer, Arnauld, who maintains this doctrine as expressly as Dr. Reid himself, and makes it the foundation of his argument in his controversy with Malebranche.' (Lecture xxvii. p. 173.) If this statement be not untrue, then is Dr. Brown's interpretation of Reid himself correct. A representative perception, under its third and simplest modification, is held by Arnauld as by Brown; and his exposition is so clear and articulate, that all essential misconception of his doctrine is precluded. In these circumstances, if Reid avows the identity of Arnauld's opinion and his own, this avowal is tantamount to a declaration that his peculiar doctrine of perception is a scheme of representation; whereas, on the contrary, if he signalize the contrast of their two opinions, he clearly evinces the radical antithesis-and his sense of the radical antithesis-of the doctrine of intuition, to every, even the simplest form of the hypothesis of representation. And this last he does.

"It cannot be maintained, that Reid admits a philosopher to hold an opinion convertible with his, whom he states:—'To profess the doctrine, universally received, that we perceive not material things immediately—that it is their ideas which are the immediate objects of our thoughts—and that it is in the idea of every thing that we perceive its properties.' This fundamental contrast being established, we may safely allow, that the radical misconception, which caused Reid to overlook the difference of our presentative and representative faculties, caused him likewise to believe, that Arnauld had attempted to unite two contradictory theories of perception. Not aware, that it was possible to maintain a doctrine of perception, in which the idea was not really distinguished from its cognition, and yet to hold that the mind had no immediate knowledge of external things: Reid supposes, in the first place, that Arnauld.

in rejecting the hypothesis of ideas as representative entities really distinct from the contemplative act of perception, coincided with himself in viewing the material reality as the immediate object of that act; and, in the second, that Arnauld again deserted that opinion, when, with the philosophers, he maintained that the idea or act of the mind representing the external reality, and not the external reality itself, was the immediate object of perception. But Arnauld's theory is one and indivisible; and, as such, no part of it is identical with Reid's. Reid's confusion, here and elsewhere, is explained by the circumstance, that he had never speculatively conceived the possibility of the simplest modification of the representative hypothesis. He saw no medium between rejecting ideas as something different from thought, and the doctrine of an immediate knowledge of the material object. Neither does Arnauld, as Reid supposes, ever assert against Malebranche, 'that we perceive external things immediately,' that is, in themselves. Maintaining that all our perceptions are modifications essentially representative, Arnauld every where avows, that he denies ideas, only as existences distinct from the act itself of perception."

"Reid was therefore wrong, and did Arnauld less than justice, in viewing his theory 'as a weak attempt to reconcile two inconsistent doctrines;' and he was wrong, and did Arnauld more than justice, in supposing that one of these doctrines is not incompatible with his own. The detection, however, of this error only tends to manifest more clearly, how just, even when under its influence, was Reid's appreciation of the contrast subsisting between his own and Arnauld's opinion, considered as a whole; and exposes more glaringly Brown's general misconception of Reid's philosophy, and his present gross misrepresentation, in affirming that the doctrines of the two philosophers were identical, and by Reid admitted to be the same."*

We have been induced to give this long extract, not only from our reverence for Hamilton, and our admiration of the characteristic acumen evinced by this particular criticism, but

^{*} Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1830. The italics are the author's.

because it affords us a fit occasion to hazard a few explanatory remarks upon the nomenclature of Descartes and his immediate successors. It is observed by Hamilton himself that Descartes, Malebranche, Arnauld, Locke, and philosophers in general before Reid, employ the term Perception as co-extensive with Consciousness. It hence appears the more readily how any thing before the mind, or in its consciousness, came to be denominated a modification of the mind. This must be carefully regarded, lest we judge Arnauld too harshly. A statement in the history of philosophy which, though negative, is equally important, is that the writers of that day rarely predicated activity of the mind's contemplative perceptions; so that we do not find certain phrases which meet us on every page of modern works, such as 'the active powers,' 'the operations of the mind,' or its 'acts' or 'activities.' The question was thus left open, whether the subject or the object be active, or whether the action be reciprocal. And hence the class of phrases came to be, often harshly, substituted, which have given occasion to most of this controversy. Among these none is more common than 'modification of the mind.' If any one is tempted to ask, 'Why did not Arnauld cut off all debate, by declaring outright, that between the percipient act and the real object, there is nothing interposed?' we can only reply that such was not the way of speaking in that day, and that this would have presupposed the exactness, not merely of Reid, but of Hamilton. The writer last named has well said, in his notes to Reid, that "modes or modifications of mind, in the Cartesian school, mean merely what some recent philosophers express by states of mind, and include both the active and passive phenomena of the conscious subject." This is deserving of special note. Where we should speak of an act, an exercise, an operation of the mind, they, in the spirit of their vaunted philosophical skepticism spoke of the mode, modality or modification of the mind, often expressed by the mind's manière d'être; and this included perception, thought, feeling and volition.* To take a single instance out of many, from Arnauld's rejoinder: "When a thing or a substance, remaining substantially the same, is sometimes after

^{*} See Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité; I. iij. p. ii. chap. 1.

one manner and sometimes after another, we call that which determines it to be after one manner, rather than another, manière d'être, modality, or modification; for these three terms signify one and the same thing. This will be better comprehended by an example. I have a bit of wax in my hand, which I make sometimes round, sometimes square, or of any other shape: now though this bit of wax remains still the same bit of wax, I call its being round, being square, or being of any other shape, a manière d'être, a modality, or a modification of this bit of wax. Now my mind remaining the same thinks sometimes of a number; at other times of a square, or of its own body, or of God. It follows, that this thinking of a number, a square, one's own body, or God, are so many modes of being, modalities, or modifications of the mind. To think of a number or a square, to take notice of a number or a square, to have perception of a number or a square, are all one and the same thing, differently expressed. Since then to think of a number or a square is a modification of our mind, it clearly follows that perception of a number or a square is also a modification of our mind; and consequently, no one can doubt of my first position, namely, that all our perceptions, as is the perception of a number or a square, are modifications of our mind." And he adds: "When I think of a square, my mind is modified by this thought, and the square is the object of that modification of my mind which is the thought of a square."*

This is certainly a nearer approach to the doctrine of Reid, Hamilton and Mansell, than can be found in any writer of the seventeenth century; an approach which, in spite of unsteady language, will appear still more striking, when we examine certain other modes of expression occurring in these works. We have seen how much importance the incomparable Scottish critic attributes to the distinction between presentative and representative perception, and how he connects with the latter his most serious charge against Arnauld. Is there not a possibility that we may urge too far inferences from the term representation, and thus fix upon the word as used in French a signification more distinct than it ought to bear. Representa-

^{*} Defense, pp. 412, 413.

tive, as applied to perceptions, is ambiguous. It may mean first, that it puts the object before the mind, or secondly that it is vicarious of the object; in other words, a perception may be declared to objectify external nature in reference to the thinking subject, or it may further and more questionably be declared to be a modality which stands in the room of the external object before the mind. It is a question whether by representative modality Arnauld means more than what the Germans denote by Vorstellung; a term the most general of all those which indicate the presence of any thing in consciousness; and which is put as well for the Act des Vorstellens, as for das Vorgestellte selbst. Let us observe Arnauld's use of the term. Malebranche denied that "the perceptions which our minds have of objects are essentially representative of those objects."* In his view perception had no objectifying virtue, and required an intermediate entity or idea. He further charged, that according to Arnauld, we do not see bodies, but only ourselves. "Can any one imagine me to teach," replies Arnauld, "that we do not see bodies, and that we see ourselves only, or that we see only the modalities of the mind, when I actually teach that these modalities of our mind, that is the perceptions which we have of bodies, are essentially representative of bodies; [which he now expounds thus] that it is these whereby our mind perceives bodies; that they are the formal cause which makes our mind perceive bodies, knowing at the same time that it perceives them, because it is the property of the intelligent being to be conscia suce operationis." † This representation, however awkward the term may be, agrees with the definition of the schoolmen: Conceptus sunt signa formalia rerum. And this presentation is distinguished from proper representation, in the following passage from a writer whom he does not name: "Siquidem idez rerum formaliter sunt earum perceptiones, nec per intuitum ab idea diversum res ut in hac expressa videtur, sed per imaginem, seu ideam, formaliter res ipsa percipitur: quamvis idea reflexè cognosci, et ita perceptionis perceptio dari possit."†

Immediate perception of the external object is not asserted

^{*} Defense, p. 409.

by Arnauld, in that unembarrassed and unequivocal manner which satisfies Hamilton; but neither is it so asserted by Reid; for Hamilton speaks of "the vacillating doctrine of perception held by Reid himself." Let us however give the great Sorbonnist all the credit of an approximation, which remained unique, until the days of Reid.* Let the following remarkable passage be considered, which relates to the dictum that when I look at the sun, it is the intelligible, and not the real sun, which I perceive: "As we may say that whatsoever is in our mind objectively is there intelligibly, we may in the same sense say that what I see immediately, when I turn my eyes towards the sun, is the sol intelligibilis, provided we intend by this no more than my idea of the sun, which is not at all distinguished from my perception, and if we are careful not to add, that I see nothing but the intelligible sun; for though I see immediately this intelligible sun by the virtual reflection which I have of my perception, I do not stop at this; but this same perception, in which I see the intelligible sun, makes me at the same time see the material sun which God created."†

The incidental statement, in one of these extracts, that consciousness accompanies mental acts, brings to our remembrance Sir William Hamilton's arch remark, that the Greeks were happy in not having the term; and also his discontent with Reid, for "discriminating consciousness as a special faculty." Arnauld, as a quasi Cartesian, could not deviate on that side. As we have quoted before, "It is the property of the intelligent being, to be conscia suce operationis." And more fully: "There is reason to believe that in creating the human soul God gave it the idea of itself, and that it is perhaps this thought of itself which constitutes its essence; for, as I have said elsewhere, nothing seems more essential to mind than that consciousness, or internal sentiment of itself, which the Latins more felicitously call esse sui consciam." Amidst all the infelicities of nomenclature which Arnauld borrowed from the reigning school, he sometimes expresses himself in such a way as to fix in us the belief, that when he speaks of the modifica-

^{*} Buffier. † Vraies et Fausses Idées, p. 92; partly quoted antea. † V. et F. Idées, p. 246.

tion of mind called Perception as in any sense itself the object of thought, he means little more than that we are conscious of the perceiving act. This opinion, which we express with hesitation, derives colour from the following passage: "—Whatsoever it be that I know—I know that I know, by a certain virtual reflection which accompanies all my thoughts—I therefore know myself in knowing all other things. And in fact, it is herein principally, as it seems to me, that we have to distinguish intelligent beings from those which are not such, that the former sunt conscia sui et sux operationis, and the latter are not."*

After this tedious investigation, we beg leave to sum up the result in a series of particulars. We seem to have discovered, then,

- 1. That, according to Arnauld, there are no representative entities, distinct from the external thing, such as are called ideas.
- 2. That he held the only ideas of external objects to be our perceptions of them.
- 3. That then, as against the prevalent tenet of the schools, Arnauld is an assertor of the great truth now universally believed.
- 4. That in Arnauld's opinion the mind takes cognizance of every perception, at the instant of its occurrence; and this by the very constitution of its nature.
- 5. That Arnauld considers the mind's perception to have for its direct object the external reality; but that this perception is itself at the same time the object of cognition, by what we should now call Consciousness, but what he calls Virtual Reflection.
- 6. That the language of Arnauld, if strictly interpreted, often does injustice to his opinion, causing him to appear more remote from the truth than he really is; and that this is especially true in regard to his constantly calling Perception a modification, and not an act, of the mind.
- 7. That, omitting lesser points in which they differ, there is remarkable consent between the three great masters, Arnauld, Reid and Hamilton.

8. That if to Hamilton belongs the honour of having given philosophical precision and completeness to the true doctrine of Perception, the praise is no less due to Arnauld of having first given it enunciation.

Having thus put it within the power of the reader to judge from Arnauld's own statements what was his doctrine as to sensible perception, and how far he deserves to be named among the precursors of Reid and Hamilton, we desire to spend a short time in examining the subsequent progress of analysis in this direction, and the bearing of certain fundamental discoveries upon the progress of philosophy in general.

The unpopularity of the religious party to which Arnauld belonged forbade his being frequently named in high circles as an authority, even when his reasonings were producing their effect upon certain leading minds. He was a Jansenist, indeed he was their theological champion; and hence Buffier, while borrowing his opinions, allows jesuitical prejudice to betray him into condemnation "with faint praise." To Buffier is ascribed by Stewart* the earliest exact enunciation of a distinction which he then quotes in the very words of Arnauld.† "It affords," says Stewart himself, "a remarkable illustration of the force of prejudice, that Buffier, a learned and most able Jesuit, should have been so far influenced by the hatred of his order to the Jansenists, as to distinguish the Port-Royal Logic with the cold approbation of being 'a judicious compilation from former works on the same subject." Doctor Reid was therefore warranted in citing Arnauld, to the neglect of the other, though it is matter of record that Buffier was translated for the very purpose of annoying Reid, and was thus brought into undue prominence before the British public. His work on First Truths is of high value, as a real contribution to the great question of our age. Voltaire was not wrong in declaring him to be the only Jesuit who ever put a reasonable philosophy into his works. How indistinct have been the views of French writers generally upon the connection of the several great masters, may be seen in the remark of Professor Bouillier of

^{*} Elements, Note to Part I. chap. iv. § 2.

[†] See Hamilton's Notes to Reid, chap. v.

[‡] First Preliminary Dissertation, p. 81.

Lyons, upon the passage indicated above as borrowed from Arnauld: "Most scholastic philosophers, and even the Cartesians, had considered ideas as something intermediate between the mind which knows and the object known. Locke fell into the same error. Reid claims it as his principal merit, to have refuted this theory, and shown that ideas are nothing distinguishable from the knowing mind. Father Buffier had already acquired this merit, by defining ideas to be simple modifications of the mind. How is it then that Reid does not cite him along with Arnauld among philosophers who before himself attacked the legitimacy of what is called the ideal theory?"* This

question has been already answered.

The services of Reid, in applying the principles of Bacon to the phenomena of thought, are only beginning to be esteemed at their due value. Omitting intermediate names, we would mark the great points of advancement by those of ARNAULD, REID and HAMILTON. The moments of Reid's discovery have not been noted in a more masterly manner by any than by Samuel Tyler, LL.D., in his Discourse on the Baconian Philosophy; in which he shows that his merit resides in his having made it clear, that, from his very constitution, man cannot but believe in the reality of whatever is clearly attested by the senses; as well as whatever is distinctly remembered; -that, further, he cannot but believe that like causes will produce like effects, and that the future will be as the past. + And in another treatise the same acute and perspicuous philosopher, in regard to our topic of Perception, has expressed the relation of Hamilton to Reid in terms equally comprehensive and exact. "In the act of sensible perception," says Dr. Tyler, "we are, equally and at the same time, and in the same indivisible act of consciousness, cognizant of ourselves as a perceiving subject and of an external reality as the object perceived, which are apprehended as a synthesis inseparable in the cognition, but contrasted to each other in the concept as two distinct existences. All this is incontestably the deliverance of consciousness in the act of sensible perception. This all

^{*} Oeuvres de Buffier, ed. 1843, p. 187.

[†] Discourse of the Baconian Philosophy. By Samuel Tyler, LL.D., pp. 261, ff.

philosophers without exception admit as a fact. But then all, until Reid, deny the truth of the deliverance. They maintain that we only perceive representations within ourselves, and by a perpetual illusion we mistake these representations for the external realities. And Reid did not fully extricate himself from the trammels of this opinion. For while he repudiated the notion, that we perceive representations distinct from the mind though within the mind, he fell into the error, that we are only conscious of certain changes in ourselves which suggest the external reality. But Sir William Hamilton has, by the most masterly subtlety of analysis, incontestably shown, that we are directly conscious of the external objects themselves, according to the belief universal in the common sense of mankind." With our ample citations before him, the reader will judge whether Arnauld is very far behind Reid, in their

common inferiority to Hamilton.

Although at the present time no great constructive genius is making himself felt in shaping the opinions of the philosophical world, there are tendencies propagated by past investigations, which awaken hope of something more healthful. Instead of the leaning towards skeptical idealism, we observe everywhere an increasing disposition to settle upon those conclusions of which mankind, even in its unlettered portions, has had a catholic faith. Such is the manifest bearing of all inquiries like those of Reid and Hamilton. Such is the significancy likewise of all those studies which have to do with truths of intuition. There is thus opened a prospect into a wide field of inquiry as to those cognitions which are universal, immediate and necessary; a description which will include not merely our knowledge of the external world, but all such knowledge as is primary and underived from ratiocination, or any other intermediate process. The degree of limitation given to this field of immediate knowledge will always go far towards defining the ground of any philosopher or school. While the adventurous skepticism of the seventeenth century narrowed first-truths to the very smallest number, the equally adventurous rationalism of the nineteenth has led the German schools, even when disagreeing on other points, to enlarge the scope of Reason, in its higher designation. Philological causes, themselves consequent

on original peculiarities of notion, sometimes in turn react powerfully upon psychology. To this we have often been disposed to ascribe the tenacity with which all sects of thinking in Germany cling to the radical distinction between Understanding and Reason. These terms do not bring up to the English mind the same associations which a German has with Verstand and Vernunft. For example, the latter of these words has no kindred with trains of ratiocination, as has the English verb to reason. Reason, in the recent philosophy, imports the highest, deepest, widest intuition. Just at this point of certainty, immediateness, and necessity, this connects itself with all other kinds of knowledge which are founded on neither experience nor reasoning. There can be little question, we think, that Coloridge, in the Biographia, the 'Friend,' and the 'Aids to Reflection,' first drew the English and American mind to consider this distinction; the acceptance or rejection of which, as the grand basis of philosophy, serves to mark the line between the two conflicting hosts. Well do we remember the zeal and enthusiasm with which, many years ago, we heard Mr. Marsh, afterwards President Marsh, of Vermont, expound and vindicate these views, then so novel. Coleridge, following Jacobi and Hernsterhuis, defined Reason as "an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena."* This falls in well with our collation of Perception, with Intuition, whether narrowly or widely taken.

The relation of truth to mind is sublime, and is indicated by the scriptural figure of Light. In the last resort, all our knowledge must be immediate; for any truth clearly presented to an intelligent mind is self-evident; no foreign evidence is required. Suppose the given truth is not clearly before the mind; it may be so presented by ratiocination, that is, by the suggestion of intermediate propositions; but when once so presented it shines by its own light. At this point, therefore, our cognizance of the truth is immediate, and herein differs nothing from intuition or from sensible perception. In other words, (as we were taught by the wisest of our masters in youth,) the evidence

^{*} Aids to Reflection, ed. Marsh, p. 308.

of all truth, when clearly presented to the judgment, is in itself, and the use of proof or foreign evidence is to bring it fairly before the mind. To a mind capable of comprehending a truth in all its relations, that truth must be self-evident; and therefore to the Supreme Reason all truths are self-evident. are certain principles however which neither require nor brook the allegation of proof. These fall within the range of immediate vision. The wholesome tendency of these simple doctrines is to encourage our constitutional confidence in our own faculties. We may conceive of a being so constituted that his faculties should uniformly deceive him; but, by the very hypothesis, such a being could never detect the flaw in his own constitution; and nothing can be conceived more unreasonable than the existence of such a being. Before we erect into a new faculty that energy of the mind which accepts truth instantaneously and necessarily, we must consider well whether its actings in view of truth are not identical with those which terminate our trains of ratiocination. What is reasoning, but a distinct noticing of the relations which subsist between certain truths? Of certain truths our knowledge is immediate; we believe them as soon as they are presented to the mind. But there are other truths, which seem not clearly such, until viewed in connection with truths already known; but which, thus viewed, shine by their own light no less than the others. The only difference between the intuitive and the ratiocinative judgment is, that in the one we perceive a truth at once, and in the other we do not perceive it till other truths are presented; when this is done, the determination is as direct and necessary as the other.

The same may be made apparent in the logical process. In any valid syllogism, the major and minor being admitted, the conclusion follows, and that instanter. Nothing can be interposed, or conceived to be interposed. Only let the terms be comprehended, and the formula be just as to mood and figure, and the conclusion is immediate and inevitable. There is no distinction appreciable at this point between ratiocinative judgment and intuition. Suppose, after having gone thus far, you should be challenged to make the case plainer, and to show why you so concluded; it would be impossible for you to reply

in any but one of these two ways, either to make the terms more intelligible, or to justify the logical process. But this last is not different from a bare re-assertion of this apodeictic judgment of the understanding-may we not say, the Reason? Hence my assent to the conclusion of a syllogism is as immediate, nay, when thus insulated, as unreasoning, as my acquiescence in the external reality of a material world. We are not quite sure that this was in the mind of Kant, when he wrote thus, in his section on 'Pure Reason as the Seat of the Transcendental Illusory Appearance: "In every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by means of the understanding. In the next place I subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule (and this is the minor) by means of the judgment. And finally, I determine my cognition by means of the predicate of the rule (this is conclusio), consequently I determine it a priori by means of the reason."* The point to be observed is, how remarkably an extended inquiry into the law of cognition, reduces the varieties of knowing and strengthens the confidence which we repose in our own faculties. Inasmuch as all trains of ratiocination may be arrayed and verified in the shape of syllogisms, it follows that all the conclusive determinations of reasoning are equally immediate and necessary as the assertions of consciousness. Neither Intuitive nor Ratiocinative Reason (sit venia verbo) can vaunt, one against the other. The immediateness and absolute necessity of successive determinations in reasoning go to reduce them to the same condition with pure intuitions. That is to say, in the ultimate tribunal, when the judgment, as by a flash, gives forth decree, the probative force of argumentation results from a clear, instant, unavoidable, assertory conclusion: the premises being so and sothe conclusion is so and so-immediately and irresistibly. And we crave to know, why (as Kant seems to admit) this is not a determination of Reason; in which case, one of the chief grounds of distinction between the Understanding and the Reason is taken away.

^{*} Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; Meiklejohn's transl., p. 215.

ART. II.—A Treatise on the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics. By George Cornwall Lewis,* Esq. 2 vols. London: John W. Parker & Son. 1852.

Political Progress not necessarily Democratic; or, Relative Equality the true Foundation of Liberty. By James Lorimer, Esq., Advocate. Pp. 303. London: Williams & Norgate. 1857.

How politics have come, in a Christian land, to be considered as beyond the pale of Christian restraints, and politicians to deem themselves entitled to impunity of the revealed law, is a very curious question, and one of no little practical import. In all other occupations, our citizens recognize it as the duty of him who ministers in holy things, to apply the doctrines of Scripture to their conduct, for reproof, for admonition, or comfort; and whether he does so or not, the more respectable hold themselves amenable thereto, as the law of their moral existence. Among politicians, however, it is becoming the fashion to reject the application of Scripture. Their acts are assumed to lie out of its range; not because immaculately rightcous, it is clear, for they speak of them habitually in the opposite light; but because it is taken for granted that whatever touches the government of the nation or the movements of party, is entitled to special indulgence, or to be judged by the principles of a different code. To say of any topic that it is a political one, is deemed equivalent to saying that the pulpit must let it alone. Very convenient for the purposes of the sinner, to have an occupation into which the law of God is not to follow him; or, at least, which furnishes a plea for resisting, and telling the messengers of the Gospel that this is not in their line. But is statesmanship one of that kind? If we have rightly perused the page of history, no other branch of worldly business has been so largely indebted to the wisest and best of men, or to the word of revelation. Or have politicians, in the midst of their many exposures and temptations, and admitted sins, some recuperative powers, rendering them independent of

^{*} Now Sir George C. Lewis.

that wisdom which cometh down from above—some peculiar resources from below, whereby, though they may fall, they will certainly rise again, with renewed rectitude, from the bosom of the democracy, as Antæus of old, from contact with the earth? Singular as it is, some such notion—vague, undoubtedly; it could not exist otherwise—seems to pervade the public mind, the principal symptom of which is a morbid sensitiveness to the application of gospel truth to the conduct of public men and public affairs.

Progressively, for many years, has this error been insinuating itself into the spirit of our politics, until it has seriously impaired both the moral and intellectual stature of political men. There was a time when citizens went to the polls under as true a sense of duty as they went to church, and when the wisdom and dignity of American councils filled the hearts of all advocates of human rights in every land with triumph. Well is it that many pious people do so still; but their number has certainly diminished, while that of a giddy and ignorant multitude has increased-a multitude disposed to jostle the more orderly aside, and with whom it is disagreeable for them to mingle. The effect is apparent in every branch of government. That sound principle, which separates the church and state, has, by the inactivity of Christians, and overbearing of the worldly, been forced into most unnatural distortion. An agency there is pervading all human affairs, which is skilful at engrafting evil upon every popular good; and an indispensable condition of orthodoxy in politics, as well as in theology, is sleepless watchfulness over interpretation of good doctrine, and over honesty of meaning in forms of sound words.

We fully appreciate the objection to political harangues from the pulpit, and regard with as much horror the act of turning the house of God into a place for advocating the merits of office-seekers, as we should that of making it a place of merchandize, or a rhetorical bazaar, in which to trade in the talents of a gifted minister; and hold it to be equally to the interests of religion and of the state that the church should not embroil itself as a party in the secular government; but a just abhorrence of such profanation has been carried by our people to an unwarrantable length. Though we would have the service of God's house defended from all such contact, we cannot fail to see that pious people are under the most solemn obligations to avail themselves of the proper vehicles of political opinion, to make the gospel bear upon the policy of the country. It has been too much left out of view that the profession of politics, like every other occupation of man, has its moral and religious aspects, in which it stands, as truly as any other, in need of the correctives of the divine word. An act of violence perpetrated by a politician, in carrying forward his measures, is just as truly violence as if it occurred in any other hands; dishonesty in a politician, though generally covered by some plausible name, is nothing but dishonesty; drunkenness does not cease to be a vice, because the privilege of indulging in it is defended by a party; and yet it cannot be denied that the sentiment is prevalent, which holds every thing taken up by politics as thereby defended from the reproofs of the gospel. It behaves us to reflect and see whether we are prepared for it, before we admit the doctrine and carry it out, that, no matter what a man's character and conduct, as soon as he takes up the profession of politics, the minister of God is bound to refrain from disapproval of his vices, and to acquiesce in all he may say and do, and sustain all his measures, no matter how flagitious, by a docile silence; and that even against crime, if committed for political purposes, he must hold it indecorous to remonstrate. Such is positively the meaning of the political public. Are Christians prepared to accept it? In short, it is neither more nor less than the old intolerance of 'monarchical sovereigns, which we, in the capacity of sovereigns ourselves, are attempting to enforce, on our own behalf. King Majority, like King Ferdinand, must not have his measures questioned, nor his servants interfered with by either expostulation or criticism. Such also was the opinion of Ahab in olden time, but Elijah thought otherwise, and has had some credit for resisting him. It is the duty of the church to follow the operations of the civil government with a vision enlightened by the word of God, and without becoming a party in the conflict of its business and passions, its sectional or personal issues, to labour faithfully, by the use of scriptural means, to imbue the public mind with a due sense of religious obligation in poli-27

tical conduct, and to refrain from the condemnation of no vice, because it has been adopted by government, or become a public or party measure.

The works named at the head of this article, though very different in their purpose, present kindred topics of grave importance in this connection; the former unfolding and establishing reliable methods of political reasoning, whereby the scientific position, and the moral purity and grandeur of the profession are brought to view, extricated from the wilderness of questionable and erroneous notions, with which they have been confounded; and the latter pursuing an inquiry into the vital principle of liberal government, whereby and to what extent power comes safely into the hands of the people, in the course of which, considerations of political education, and the legitimate influence of the church in the formation of political opinions, arise as essential elements.

The work of Sir George C. Lewis is a political organum, which, howsoever it may subserve the purposes designed, is addressed to a widely pervading want of the age. The impotency of reasoning, and consequent fluctuation of opinion, in which the world is actually involved by the vastness, and multitude, and manysidedness of political questions, make urgent demand for some help of this kind. Such is the diversity, not to say the perversity of reasoning, on such matters, that hardly a conceivable system of government is without its advocate among us. "Writers of the most dissimilar schools of philosophy, historians, and practical men, as well as the general public, seem to concur in thinking that the principles of political science are ill-ascertained, and that the maxims of political art are insufficiently established; while we see, from the daily experience of civilized nations, that there is no generally recognized standard of opinion with respect to the practical application of political theories and rules of conduct. So unfavourable, indeed, is the popular judgment with respect to political philosophy, that it is often inclined to proscribe the whole for the defects of a part; to disturb much that is sound on account of the rest that is unsound; and to involve the good with the bad, in one sweeping and indiscriminate condemnation."

Consequently the aim and limitations of the "Methods of

reasoning on Politics" are thus stated by the author. "The most effectual mode of removing this uncertainty, and of reducing the discordant chaos of political theories and doctrines to a uniform and harmonious system, would be to produce a complete body of political philosophy, which should, by the accuracy and completeness of its facts, the fitness of its arrangement, and the force of its reasoning, command the general approbation of competent judges, and, through their assent, gradually work its way to popular reception. Such a task, however, is more easily described than executed; and there may, in the present state of political investigation, be obstacles to the attempt, which, when we consider the failure which has attended the efforts of many eminent speculators, might fairly be deemed insurmountable.

"Whether, however, an attempt at a definitive treatment of the whole compass of political philosophy be, or be not, premature at the present moment, it will at least be conceded, that the success of such an attempt at some future period, may be facilitated by preliminary labours, intended to clear the way for other and more capable investigators. One of the most important of these labours consists in the determination of the subject-matter of politics, and of the methods by which it is to be investigated. When we have settled what political theory and practice are, and how we ought to reason respecting them, we may hope to have made some progress towards the attainment of that end, which all men, whatever their opinions may be, must concur in thinking desirable, provided it be attainable.

"In the present treatise, therefore, an attempt will be made to survey this foreground of political philosophy, with the view of furnishing a guide to the political student, who seeks to reason for himself, and to form an independent judgment upon any department of politics. On the one hand it does not aim at establishing any political theory, or inculcating any system of political doctrine; on the other hand, it does not pretend to be a logical treatise, but it avails itself of logical rules, established by professed writers on logic, and is merely concerned with their application to politics. It makes no claim to novelty or invention; but it seeks only to extend to politics those methods of observation and reasoning which experience has

proved to be most effectual, and which are employed with success in other departments of knowledge. Without proposing to determine truth, it proposes to be instrumental in promoting the determination of truth by others."

In pursuance of this purpose, the author proceeds to define the province of politics, which he afterwards subdivides into four departments. Of these the first pertains to the registration of political facts, including history and statistics, and all the methods adopted for preserving, in an authentic and permanent form, the memory of political facts. as they occur. The second is that of positive, or descriptive politics; or the treatment of what is necessarily involved in the idea of a political government. It undertakes to define the elements necessary to constitute a government, and to show how these are modified in its various forms. The third is that of speculative politics, which, upon the foundation laid by positive politics, seeks to determine how certain forms of government, and certain laws and institutions operate, and from observed facts, and from known principles of human nature, to determine their character and tendency; and attempts to frame propositions respecting their probable consequences, either universally or in some hypothetical state of circumstances. And the fourth department treats of maxims of political practice. "The second and third of these departments correspond with the science of politics; the fourth corresponds with the art."

Under these heads the author conducts an exhaustive treatment of the subject of political methodology, or the principles and apparatus of reasoning upon public affairs. It would be too much to hope for a work of this kind any direct popular effect, but certainly no man, accustomed to consecutive thinking, can read it without great practical benefit, assisting as it does towards the discrimination of facts, the detecting of fallacies, determining what kind of conclusions are ascertainable in a given case, and clearing them, as far as possible, of all grounds of doubt. The author's prolixity, which on some heads is excessive, is that of materials, not of words. Led away by the profusion and diversity of his knowledge, though he never turns aside from the subject, he illustrates by similitude, by contrast, example, and so forth, to an extent far

beyond what can be necessary for any reader of such a work as his. In both a moral and scientific point of view the book is one of inestimable value. Politics pursued in the spirit of its method must become a noble branch of the service of God.

The aim of Mr. Lorimer's little volume is to determine the principle of safety in political progress, with a more special view to its conditions under the present government of England. A limited monarchy is considered as having, in its liberal elements, a native tendency towards radical democracy, and democracy, as it is liable to fall into the hands of a demagogue, and thereby to lead to the restoration of despotism, is represented as a dangerous proclivity. To secure all the advantages of liberty without approaching that precarious brink, to foster progress up to a point where it may safely be stayed, and where the government, equally balanced on every side, may thereafter librate with equal freedom and security, is the consummation, on which all the argumentations of the treatise bear. The means proposed to that end is a distribution of political privileges graduated to the presumptive competence and good will of the people. And the author's strength is laid out in demonstrating that "political influence ought, as nearly as possible, to correspond to social weight and importance."

Mr. Lorimer elaborates his convictions in a cautious and scholarlike manner. His style is refined, compact, and subdued, presenting in small compass the fruits of much thinking. It is too late in the world's history to assume that any one form of government is, in all cases, the best; that is bad, of whatsoever form, which is unfitted to the conditions of the nation; but if a democracy, in its right working, is a good form, it does not seem to be a sufficient reason for rejecting it, to say that it is liable to be corrupted. For that is true of most good things among men. Good institutions run the greatest risk from innovation, for the very reason that they are good. The inferior may be improved thereby, but that is certainly not a valid reason for preferring the inferior.

The considerations whereby the author would have his general proposition interpreted and applied, must, he says, "in each particular state, depend upon the peculiar circumstances

of that state." At the same time, he declares himself in favour of limitations formed upon property, rank, virtue and intelligence. Of these, the former two are no longer practical questions under our government, and we can foresee no benefit to us from their discussion. And as to intelligence and virtue, they can be maintained only by systematic effort to that end: which as it must be national, to answer the purposes of a popular government, should fairly extend to all the nation. It would be a mockery of the principle to admit its operation only in the case of professional men. The danger to be dreaded in any popular government is that the people, through vice or passion, or ignorance, may suffer their affairs to be mismanaged by the incompetent or designing. But that may be done by one million of voters as likely as by five millions. The evil is not to be met by diminishing the number, but by proper preparation of each individual for his political duties. A national system of education is indispensable, whether the number be one million or more. Mr. Lorimer remarks briefly, but well to the point, on the head of popular instruction, but why the agencies he recommends should not be addressed towards enabling all the people to take part in their public affairs, as well as only a large number of them, we cannot understand. His judgment is readily accounted for by the fact that, in his hands, this qualification is burdened by those of property and rank.

In the earnest inquiries awakened by agitation of further parliamentary reform in England, it was to be anticipated that every available example, and especially the Constitution of the United States, should undergo a thorough scrutiny; and the objections thereto presented, generally with the most respectful moderation of tone, but evidently under constraint of real apprehension, have received, of late, plausible support from certain occurrences among ourselves. We are by no means disposed to make light of the considerations of danger from vice and ignorance. On the contrary, we regard them as the most formidable that a liberal government has to encounter. How to meet and resolve them successfully, is the grand problem for us to solve. Their preponderance in our system of government would be the sure forerunner of dissolution. If

there is no way, consistent with justice to better citizens, whereby voters of the Paudeen and Bill Poole class can be excluded, it becomes absolutely indispensable to the safety of the commonwealth that their influence be countervailed.

The error to which our remarks apply is twofold. In the first place, it consists in leaving politics entirely to the occasional and heated excitement of party conflict, while no adequate provision is made for giving the subject that calm and systematic place in common education, which it ought to occupy in a free country; and secondly, in the fact that so many of those who are both morally and intellectually best qualified stand back from the post of citizen duty, thereby resigning the weight of power into the hands of such as are competent only to its abuse. By means of its commonness, franchise has come to be undervalued by that class, to whom a higher standard of qualification would have confined it. By no other civilized people is the subject of politics treated with such disrespect as it is by the religious public of the United States. Especially is this true of the cities; where it is notorious that political majorities are controlled by a class of persons, who themselves need the most stringent control of law; while the orderly and industrious are too much occupied with their private affairs to take any active hand in the matter, at least until moved by some glaring iniquity: and, even then, too often content themselves with an outburst of indignant language. And many pious people actually conceive that in thus neglecting their political duties, and, so far nullifying their own influence, they are commendable for eminent piety.

We are reaping the fruits of our error. It is certainly not other than might have been anticipated, if election movements are left in the hands of the idle, the ignorant, and the vicious, that office holders should in some degree correspond in character to their constituents, or that constituents should elect those congenial to their own likings. If the country has had to blush for disorder and profligacy in its high places, if even senators, with a view to outmanœuvre each other in party tactics, have perpetrated such undignified harangues as would have turned ridicule upon a country debating-society, the better class of citizens have had themselves to blame. The guilt lies

heavily upon the shoulders of American Christians, who in slighting their duty to their country, have thrown its interests into such hands. Were the fear of a well informed Christian constituency in all cases before the eyes of the national representative, we should be spared much of that Buncombe which it burns the cheek to read: and the manners of our legislative halls would receive some improvement in dignity, were the accounts always to be rendered to an orderly, right-thinking

majority, instead of one mustered by pothouse bullies.

As a whole, doubtless, the people of the United States are superior to all other nations in political knowledge, and on emergency, do not fail to use it; but mere superiority to those, who are not called upon to exercise any such rights, or discharge any such duties, is too low a standard. Our measure is not what other nations are, but what we have to do, and spasmodic effort in time of danger will not always atone for the careless security, which gave occasion to it; and it will make little matter what is the wisdom existing in the country, if the Christian and well disposed classes suffer the political lead to be taken out of their hands by the enemies of social order. No other government in the world presupposes, and depends upon such an amount of political knowledge in the people. Christians did well under imperial Rome, and while they were comparatively few, to refrain from intermeddling with a government, which they could not affect otherwise than indirectly, by living quiet and peaceful lives; it is otherwise when they have a government of their own choice, shaped after their own views, and founded upon principles of the Holy Word. No Christian citizen can withhold his coöperation towards its right working. without dereliction of a most solemn duty. And that cooperation consists in both a prudent use of the right of suffrage. and execution of what falls to his own hand to execute, and in promoting such instruction as shall enable and dispose the succeeding generation to do likewise.

No form of government can be rationally condemned because its violation produces evil. If it is found impossible to prepare by education a majority of the people for the proper discharge of their citizen duties, we shall admit that our system is wrong; or if the work of government is itself such an evil that pious people cannot put their hands to it without pollution, then there is nothing for us, under any constitution, but to submit to the domination of iniquity, and rest content if fortunate enough to be ruled by rogues of talent, who will spare us at least the humiliation of official imbecility. But these are hypotheses, which though largely acted upon, are too absurd for serious consideration.

Assuming what we have large ground for believing true, that Christians are more generally beginning to take just views of their duty in this respect, we shall address our remaining remarks to that branch of a republican education, which goes to prepare a citizen for the proper discharge of his duties as such.

Suffrage is not an innate and inalienable right. A man is not entitled by the laws of good sense to a voice in the government of his country just because he has been born. Intelligent preparation for the position of a freeman and constituent of legislators is implied in every liberal constitution, otherwise it would be preposterous. A liberal government is called upon by the very dictates of self-preservation, to be indefatigable in the use of systematic means for propagating and maintaining virtue and political intelligence among its citizens. The right working of a pure democracy is a state proper to the very highest civilization, and cannot be maintained without a suitable education, as general as the suffrage. Its most deadly ingredient is an ignorant or vicious class of citizens, led blindly by selfish and unprincipled demagogues. The vicious never governed themselves but to their own destruction, and the only step possible to ignorance is to obey. When the majority of any people sink to that condition, they are no longer democratic, and the sooner they find a master the better for them. Servile in spirit, despite their refractoriness, the only choice left them is whom they shall serve, anarchy or monarchy. For anarchy consists not in every man thinking for himself, but in a mass who do not think for themselves, having too many masters. Nor can we rely for security against this danger upon the recuperative power, the inevitable coming right of human nature. Examples are too abundant, in both past and present time, of the inevitable going wrong of human

nature, unless directed and followed up by the correctives of a moral, scientific, and religious training.

Rightly, and, we are happy to say, with most praiseworthy practical effect, have we been directed to popular education as the safeguard of liberty; but it still remains to discriminate in the well stocked arsenal of education what weapons are the best to be selected. One man cannot know all arts, nor possess himself of every accomplishment; and the labourer and artisan have only limited time for any thing beyond their daily task. Education should guide them as directly as possible to what they need. It is not every kind of education that will answer the purpose. All learning is not equally good for the same thing. What is suited to a lawyer would be no preparation for a surgeon. You may have a common school course which shall prepare its pupils to be submissive subjects, and to recognize a propriety in implicit obedience to a priest or a king, as readily as one that will prepare them to be freemen; and if you leave out of the school all reference to virtue and religion, you will certainly subserve the purposes of vice and infidelity. Not that any branch of truth depends upon education; but a human mind, as it cannot comprehend all knowledge, must be characterized by that portion which it knows, and cannot possibly take the bent of that which it does not know.

It becomes, therefore, a matter of the first importance to make a suitable selection of studies. Of course, there are certain indispensable elements lying at the foundation of all instruction, indispensable, because only instruments whereby the substantial work is to be done. A higher step, and the all important one is towards the use to be made of them. It is true that this latter pertains to a man's whole life, and education cannot follow him all his life; but it may give such an impulse and bearing to his life as to determine the whole of it for right or wrong. And this is just what it should most eminently aim at. His education should be such as to start a man right in the course of duties belonging to him. And what are the duties belonging to us? Those touching our private affairs. and those which we owe to the public. In regard to the former, it is not doubted that even learning may greatly err if not of a kind that is to the purpose, while in the latter it is deemed secure, no matter of what kind it may be. Almost universal is the notion among us that if a man is educated he must be a republican—that if the people be only instructed in reading and writing English, and the use of numbers, they must, by a certain natural consequence, think correctly on all their public duties. A strange hallucination! As if multitudes of the educated in different countries were not both the subjects and advocates of monarchy. True liberty is the colleague of intelligence; but intelligence of certain things may exist without liberty. Knowledge is power. But knowledge of what? Why, knowledge of what you have to do, and how to do it. That is the only knowledge which is power. There is a branch of education which seeks to liberalize a man's thinking, and cultivate him in relation to himself; but the full work of instruction is not done until the man is prepared for his proper duties.

Popular education is always implied in a popular government, as truly as, in a monarchy, it is understood that whoever is born to the throne shall receive the instruction proper for a king. But as the education of a king must be royal, that of a citizen should be republican. No doubt a large amount of political information, though of a very unreliable kind, is scattered abroad among the people by conversation and the newspapers; and school study of the Constitution and History of the United States is very well, as far as it goes; but all that is far short of what is needed by a population, upon whom rest the awful responsibilities of sovereignty. Are they to be abandoned to the consequences of such meagre and defective rudiments, and the random discussions of the smithy and bar-room? Good, as well as evil is effected through the newspapers; but the newspapers do not teach politics, though generally occupied, more or less, with pleadings of party interests. What we stand in need of is a well devised course of political instruction, which shall go directly and systematically to prepare, at least, a majority of citizens for an intelligent and conscientious discharge of their citizen duties. Such an end cannot be effected by the simple adoption of any European system, however excellent in itself, and for its own purposes. The body of the Prussian system, for example, we may safely borrow as it stands, but

there is an element of its spirit which we must leave out, and another element which we must introduce, or we shall train up subjects and not citizens-shall shape the young mind to views inconsistent with the practice around it, and the duties to be exacted of it. Under a monarchy, it is wise to give such a bearing to all studies as to impress youth with the proper feelings of subjects, inasmuch as all the duties to be exacted of them spring out of the spirit of submission. A monastic training may be suitable for one whose life is to be spent within the walls of a monastery, or in obedience to the regulations which are there observed; but for those who are to tread the busy walks of life in a free country, it is not only preposterous, but disabling, like the bandages which imprison the feet of a Chinese lady. A youth brought up under any such method would feel himself growing into discordance with the spirit of his country, and must become, as far as his education takes effect, not merely unqualified, but positively disqualified for the position of a citizen.

Nor is it enough to attempt to leave the mind of the pupil neutral—simply inculcating a disrespect for authorities, and inordinate esteem for himself, with the wild notion, that because we have no king in this country, we have no sovereignty; and because we are free, we are subject to no restraints. In the training of a subject, it may suffice to avoid every thing that has a liberal tendency, and so to order the "incidentals of education," that the pressure of royal authority shall be felt throughout, and obedience inculcated insensibly, like the sentiment of religion; but the citizen requires more than a negation of loyalty-more than a mere sentiment of the opposite. He needs positive instruction for positive and ever recurring duties. It is not enough to leave out the subject-training of monarchical countries, and give up its place to insubordination; to put into our books president instead of king, and patriotism for loyalty-we must substitute the citizen-training and instruction, which is to put a man into the proper moral attitude towards his country, and give him a just apprehension of its government, and of his own responsibilities under it. To be a citizen is something more than to toss one's cap in the air, and fire off powder and rhetoric on the Fourth of July-it is to

partake in the powers and responsibilities of sovereignty—most solemn responsibilities, not to be undertaken without careful preparation.

The first element of citizen character is reverence—reverence towards God and properly constituted human authority; connected, at as early a date as possible, with right instruction as to what it is to be rightly constituted. A feeling this, which, in itself one of the most valuable and beautiful of human nature, is more important to the success of a free government than of any other. Fear may subserve the purposes of order under a despotism, and a strong army may suffice for its moral power; but in a government dependent upon the will of the people, nothing can take the place of due reverence for the authorities of their own appointment.

Freedom differs, on the one hand, from vulgar license, in that it possesses reverence, and on the other hand, from servility, in that it entertains reverence only for what is good and noble. And how shall that emotion be most certainly directed to the noblest and the best? If common sense should answer, it would be by pointing us to God. But a higher authority than common sense has provided us with both an answer and a guide, in one. The word of God is the only complete text book on this subject. And the schools of a free country cannot be safe without it. Reverence to a priest must not be suffered to take the place of reverence to God. To pay to man what is due to God is the very essence of servility. The noblest independence is direct dependence upon God. And, if we deem our government to be according to the will of God, we shall reverence also the authorities which constitute it, and teach with diligence the revelation which inspired it. The most valuable element in the schools of a free country is the Bible. For he alone is the true "freeman, whom the truth makes free."

After the church, no other class of human affairs are more solemn than those of the state. Sovereignty may be abused; but cannot be degraded. If treated with irreverence by one occupant, it will only transfer the crown to another, and will neither die with us, nor at our hands. To exercise it with indignity is not merely to lose possession of it, but also to sink

beneath its vengeance in another form. For, though its shape may be submitted to human choice, and even that within narrower limits than is commonly believed, its essential authority is of God-springs out of the same volition that created the human spirit. To rightly and deeply apprehend the solemn nature of political office, would go far in guiding to the proper choice of incumbents for its duties. Every thing that represents the authority should harmoniously conspire to its divinely appointed end.

With such a spirit of intelligent reverence, the citizen needs also to be imbued with a true and delicate discrimination of the rights of others, as well as of himself, and of the claims which, in the ordinary business and intercourse of life, his fellow-men have upon him. Constitutional freedom is not designed to protect a selfish man, in gratifying himself at the expense of others, while it positively does leave much more of the private intercourse of men to their own discretion. It becomes necessary, therefore, to include the proper culture of that individual discretion in the educational training of the future citizen, as well as to inculcate a right understanding of and due respect for those relations in which men stand to men by nature and through the same governmental system.

In political science every man among us claims to hold opinions; and it seems no more than reasonable that some care should be taken to have those opinions formed in consistency with truth. If the subject were one of an esoteric philosophy, on which it is possible to withhold discussion from the people, we might content ourselves with saying that it is above their capacity, they can do very well without it, why trouble them with such abstruse matters, away from their proper business? But as it is just about topics of political science that our people talk most frequently, it is no longer a question whether the subject is to be discussed before them, or whether they are to have the means of entertaining opinions about it. Opinions they will adopt, on that subject, instruction or no instruction. and act upon them too, in a way very deeply affecting every one of us. The sole question is whether they shall be helped to form their opinions correctly or not.

This subject is immediately practical also in another sense.

Whether considered as touching domestic or foreign affairs, the people, with us, are the ultimate resort, and their opinions, right or wrong, will find expression in the national policy. For men, who may be called upon to give their vote upon a question of government, it must be of importance to have some just ideas of what a government is, in itself, and as respects those for whom it exists. Here it is, on the very threshold of political science, that many a flattering promise of national independence has stumbled and fallen. A government is not an industrial institution, set up to find the people employment, nor an almshouse, to make provision for those who are unable or unwilling to provide for themselves; only Frenchmen accept the idea that it is both, and, consequently, fall into the hands of him who succeeds in providing for them best; and his servants they must be, while their views of government remain the same. But such an error, as well as others more or less dangerous, there can be no difficulty in exposing to a people, fond of political discussion, in such a light as to make its practical bearing perfectly clear. Much metaphysical speculation may be employed upon theories of government, but all that pertains to the necessary instruction of the people, for the proper discharge of their citizen duties, requires no such elaboration. The same may be said of that branch of the science which treats of public wealth. Because it has been handled philosophically, not the less is political economy a matter of solid, practical, every day business. All political measures, in greater or less degree, affect the material resources of the State; and few elements of government are more conducive to public comfort and independence, or more indicative of a wise and temperate management than an unembarrassed treasury. with nations, as with individuals, the art of being economicala very different thing from niggardliness-is one that calls for no little judgment and cautious forethought, drawn from the very heart of statesmanship. And when debt has to be incurred, those who stand at the sources of authority ought to have some ideas as to where, with least national danger, the liability may be created. On the other hand, it is not desirable that a government, as such, should be wealthy. National riches ought to lie in the hands of the people, not of their government. But an ignorant populace, whether dazzled by, or jealous of official state and splendour, and military array, are continually prone to rush blindly into measures which involve both evils. In heat of party action, and from false notions of economy, they will adopt a policy which cuts off revenue, and involves deficit and debt; and from admiration of a favourite hero, indulge him in privileges and emoluments which put it in his power and tempt him to oppress them. Great erudition is not required, nor is it necessary that every man be an Adam Smith, or a Bentham; a few principles, in connection with knowledge of the particular case, are sufficient for citizen duty; but these cannot be mastered without set purpose to that end.

No small amount of government business in every country, but most of all in a commercial country, is concerned with its foreign relations. And these often involve the very national life, its dignity, its independence, its wealth or poverty, its peace, or the necessities of war-subjects that touch the interests of every individual. As there is no congress to determine what shall be the laws of international intercourse, but every great nation acts without recognition of an earthly superior, the people of a democratic government cannot help having to do with international law, and thereby, to some extent, affecting the policy of the civilized world. The subject is one inseparable from sovereignty. The sovereign may, indeed, be ignorant, and utterly incompetent to his place; but he is one in the community of sovereigns, and his conduct towards his peers, no matter how rude, or how stupid, must enter as an element into the character which marks the intercourse of the whole. But, as among gentlemen, there is an unwritten law, which gentlemen do not violate without detriment to their standing as gentlemen; so among nations there are principles of right and comity, which no one can disregard without impairing that respect of its peers, to which much of its power is due; and possibly, also, not without incurring the penalty of a deadly conflict. Those with whom are the powers of sovereignty, if they cannot always foresee who of their servants will act in accordance with the national interest and honour, should be well enough informed to make the weight of their reproof fall correctly upon the head of him who violates them.

It need scarcely be added, that to such a course of instruction, the outlines of general history, and especially the constitutional history of England and of the United States, belong as essential ingredients. For these are the fruits of national experience, and sources of national wisdom. Civilized society implies provision for continually succeeding changes. Experienced prudence is required to adapt the constitution thereto. Blind adherence to old routine will not suffice. What was wisdom in one conjuncture, may be folly in another. The most conservative government in the world, to be well conducted, needs the aid of nice adjustment, continually renewed.

In its mutability lies the distinction of human nature, and its glory. Brute existence is one and the same from beginning to end. The mountains and the ocean may be now as they were on the day of their creation. There is sublimity in their everduring sameness; but grander far is the sublimity of that progressive change, every step of which, if taken in accordance with fundamental law, is a growth towards divine perfection. We have no knowledge of moral or intellectual progress, except in man. It is the peculiar condition of our kind. Aspects there are, in which this mutability is really painful to contemplate; but intrinsically it is the path of greatness for the life of man, and the only one. Man can attain to neither power nor happiness otherwise. At any stage of progress, to become stationary is to deny our human nature, and sink towards that of the irrational creation. No matter where a people ceases to advance, it there terminates its prosperity and its contribution to civilization. However wisely our fathers have done for us, there is still something we have to do for ourselves. We need continual study of present emergencies, in the light of past experience, and of sound political principle.

Such a course of instruction might be varied in extent and thoroughness to any degree. It is not necessary for every citizen to be a great jurist, any more than for every Christian to be a great theologian; but if any one denies that a knowledge of the proper bearing and fundamental principles of political science can be of use, except as followed up to great

legal learning, he controverts the whole doctrine of popular instruction. He might as plausibly say that the common principles of arithmetic are of no use, because every man cannot become a Newton; or that the practical elements of the gospel are of no use to any, who cannot hope to be theologians like Calvin or Edwards; or that there is no use in attempting to distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, unless a man is to be a great moral philosopher. If he says that political principles cannot be communicated to the people, he assails the very foundation of all liberal government, on a hypothesis, which we hold to be untenable. For we can see no reason why this range of subjects should not be comprehended in popular education, as well as the elements of chemistry or astronomy, which are much more out of the range of common thinking, and require more recondite reasoning to understand. We would not undervalue any department of art or science; but as a selection has to be made for popular instruction, why not take those subjects most apt to citizen wants? Chemistry and the higher mathematics are very valuable, and richly repay all who have time to devote to them, but they are not every man's business. Every man is not called upon to analyze earths and acids—it is not every man's business to circumnavigate the earth, and weigh the stars in a balance; a man may be a good citizen although he knows no language save his vernacular, and cannot parse a sentence of Aristotle to save his neck; scarcely one of us in a hundred has occasion to read or to speak a foreign tongue, although it is sometimes very convenient to be able to do so; but every man needs a practical acquaintance with the duties belonging to him as a citizen, as truly as he needs instruction in his profession or handicraft.

Political philosophy is, by its very nature, the most easily accessible kind of knowledge. It requires no previous mathematics, no previous linguistics, no previous chemistry. Its logic is comprehended within itself, and it presupposes only a basis of good common sense and intellectual honesty. Nor would such a course of citizen education be either tedious or difficult; inasmuch as its design could not be to confer at once, all the information that the pupil should ever need, but

simply to start trains of thinking and habits of observation in the proper direction. People do not need to be taught to reason, but only how to avoid errors in reasoning. The humblest among us attempt to reason on politics, and do reason after their own fashion. On this very account it is that they stand in need of instruction, as well for the guidance of their own thinking, as for the detection of false argumentation when addressed to them. It is not true that the uneducated do not generalize. This they do only too rapidly, and to a degree that defeats itself. A man who has jumped at several contradictory inferences with equal facility, and seen them to be contradictory, is ready to lean upon any person who can give him confidence. To reach a conclusion in reasoning is so gratifying to the human mind that, without instruction touching necessary cautions, a man will hurry to an apparent conclusion by a very inadequate process. And, for the same reason, he is prone to fall in with the judgments of others even when scantily sustained. Perfectly charming to ill-regulated minds are wide and sweeping assertions, which seem to reach broad principles from a few facts easily apprehended. A cautious survey of a subject in all its aspects, leading to a fair estimate of it, tires and disgusts them. Greedy of excitement, impatient of proof, prone to infer rapidly, and confused by an opposite inference, whoever would fix their attention and carry their convictions must present only one side of a subject, adroitly adapted to their propensities. The demagogue is their only man. An audience of this kind can have no intelligent understanding of their political affairs. Their vote is only the expression of a passion, of a prejudice or haphazard. Calmness in thinking, patient hearing of adverse opinions, and suspension of judgment, until all accessible arguments have been weighed, are the work of education either given or taken.

The influences, under which an American citizen lives, impress him with the spirit of freedom; but as far as intellectual furniture goes, he is provided by his education with very little help towards the right formation of opinions. It is not unlikely that a consciousness of that lack accounts, in the case of many good men, for the utter neglect of their political duties, and

with a greater number, creates the necessity under which they are of following the leadership of a party. Such is not the manly part of a true republican; such is no addition to the national wisdom. The blind follower of a demagogue is only a make-weight to his leader. To him, as far as the party question is concerned, that leader is a king. It is really time that some elementary political instruction should be given to those upon whom such solemn political responsibilities are to rest. Why is it not given? Perhaps for no other reason than that it has not been given. We have copied our methods and subjects of education, from countries where such an element was not needed, or rather carefully shunned, and have not yet made all the amendments necessary. It is to be hoped, as well for the safety of our rights as for the style of our statesmanship, that the step will not be much longer delayed.

Elementary principles of political science, and of the methods of reasoning on politics might be introduced into the school, in connection with history and moral philosophy, to the extent of laying before the pupil clearly the nature and obligation of his citizen duties, and the sources of proper equipment for them. And lyceum lecture courses, which, in their present condition, without aim or plan, are good for nothing, might be wrought into a system, and turned to the valuable account of following up the discipline of youth with well graduated political instruction for maturer years. Thus a citizen, at some of the leisure hours which he now wastes, might enjoy the means of continuing the increase of political knowledge upon the basis of early education, throughout life.

It will certainly not be forgotten that we are advocating, not the education of statesmen—although in a country where so many are needed to fill places in township, county, state, and general government, and where, in the rapidity of rotation, almost any citizen may be chosen to almost any office, the education proper for a statesman ought not to be rare—but of the people, to the end that they may recognize a statesman in his work, and properly judge of the place in which to put him. It is much to have men competent to the work of government—a matter in which this land was, at one time, highly favoured. A true statesman is of no common growth—not to be picked

up at random on the highway. Few men have either the necessary breadth and force of character, truth and humanity, or the industry in acquisition. When found, his price is above rubies, and all the wealth of mines not to be compared with him. But what matters it how many such invaluable men a country may possess, if the power in whose hands is the gift of office, is equally incapable of understanding their value and the demands of the places that need them ?-if the people, who appoint to such places, go to work so blindly, or so recklessly, as to pass by men equipped with every proper qualification, and set up those who have none? Of what use is it to be favoured by God with great statesmen, if they are to be trodden down, or hustled aside to make way for any militia captain, or empty demagogue who succeeds for the moment in getting up a shout? What is the use of jewels to those who trample them in the mire and crown themselves with straw? When great statesmen, whose equal the world has seldom seen, after long and invaluable service, and in the prime of their wisdom, have been turned over to neglect, to make way for second rate soldiers of a few months' notoriety-when party watch-words, slang epithets and nicknames go further towards securing elections than any consideration of solid merit, we can make little question that more is needed than great men to choose from. Successful sovereignty, whether wielded by a king or a people, must depend upon the discriminating disposal of right men in right places.

Length of days, and experience in political campaigns, and intercourse with political men, will give even the uneducated some adroitness in the duties of citizenship. But such a method is very imperfect, not to say corrupting. For a man must become accustomed to all that is bad in that course of things before he is able to discriminate for himself what is good. And familiarity with the bad blunts the perception of

its iniquity.

But granting that such a method well attained its end, it is too slow. The greater number of citizens do not live long enough to profit by it, and the most favoured only when old. We want well equipped men in the prime of their days, with all the vigour and elasticity of youth, to carry forward the operations of our liberal institutions, and to fill the numerous offices under them, to which any citizen may be called.

Without entangling the present question in discussion as to what party in the state is under special obligation to execute this work, we insist upon it as a duty of Christians, and of vital importance to the whole. All parties who wish the wellbeing of their country are interested in it. Self-defence imposes upon the state, at least, a sedulous encouragement of such instruction. The church may deem itself, or may be deemed, improperly employed, as a body, in conducting anything, even education, with a view to political good. It is not to the present point to dispute that position; none will deny that it belongs to Christians to use every influence of the gospel to make a government, which is their own, tell to the glory of God in the highest well being of the nation; nor that having the power so to do, they are recreant to a most holy obligation, if by neglect they throw sovereign power, with all the influence it wields, into the hands of vice. Politics of a Christian country, if Christians are faithful to their citizen duties, should not be unsuitable for pious people, or ministers of the gospel to put a hand to, or make their voices heard in. That the contrary belief extensively prevails is a reproach to the Christian character of the nation—a humiliating proof of our dereliction of

Moreover, the church, in the discharge of its own proper office, is possessed of a power, which merits better than to be strangled by its own hand. Does any other power in the country so nullify itself, and is there any other so solemnly bound to give itself the widest possible effect? Whatever may be done by state or individual for political instruction, there will always be much that can be effected only through the church; to it must we look for that practical virtue, without which freedom would be only an evil, and there will always be many, whom no instructions save those of the church can reach.

This notion that it is inconsistent with Christian life to take any part in politics, has not arisen within the church. No man ever learned such a doctrine from intelligent study of his Bible, or of church history. It is due to a cry got up by unscrupulous men, who wish to be rid of the troublesome presence of

sensitive consciences-men who know that their ends and measures must conflict with those of pious men, and who naturally wish to have the whole field to themselves. Under cover of an excellent principle—the separation of church and state-they have boldly claimed politics for the ungodly; and Christians have tamely succumbed, and joined in the outcry against themselves. Well may the trickster laugh in his sleeve. Weakness is too mild a term for this submission on the part of a Christian community in a Christian land, under a government dictated by Christian principle, and for the establishment of which their Christian forefathers fought and bled, and toiled and suffered so much and so long. It is high time that the error were corrected, and that Christians took such a part in the affairs of their government that those affairs should bear their impress, and reflect to all the world the influence of a Christian public sentiment.

Public opinion consists largely in an echo of the opinions of a few. We have most fully and distinctly learned that the voice of the people is not the voice of God, and that there is no more confidence to be put in the infallibility of a public than in that of a pope. A few active minds are always the generators of popular sentiment. The masses of mankind, educated and uneducated, do not form, but adopt the doctrines which they hold. Consequently, it is no good defence of letting alone, to say that it permits every one, without bias, to form his own opinion; for, in that case, very few will have any political opinion, or it will be one inherited, or taken up at random or in a passion. The majority of people, in order to think rightly,

must be taught rightly.

And yet, notwithstanding the proclivity of the human mind to err, and the disposition to rely upon authorities, the doctrines which everywhere are esteemed most respectable for opinions, are those which have the appearance, at least, of being in accordance with the divine law; and the active and consistent conduct of a good man will always exert a superior influence. A wise and consistent Christian, taking his legitimate place in public affairs, is not a mere isolated drop in the shower; he is rather to be compared to a wind on the surface of the waters. Each of those ten thousand waves seems to run

at its own free will; and yet they are all impelled by a touch unseen, which lights upon them as softly as the breath of persuasion. A formative influence some must and will exert to the creation of public sentiment, and direction of public action. None possess a means so powerful or benign to that end as the Christian. It certainly is no light matter to hide such a talent in the earth, and sin against the well-being of a nation.

ART. III.—The Pilgrim's Progress. By John Bunyan. Edited for the Hanserd Knollys Society by George Offor. 1847.

The Works of John Bunyan, with an Introduction to each Treatise, Notes, &c. Edited by George Offor, Esq. Edinburgh, 1856.

PERHAPS no book, with the exception of the Bible, has been so universally read and admired as Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress; and especially has it been the treasure of the humbler classes, for, as Baron Macaulay remarks, "it had been during near a century the delight of pious cottagers and artisans, before it was publicly commended by any man of high literary eminence. At length critics condescended to inquire where the secret of so wide and so durable a popularity lay. They were compelled to own that the ignorant multitude had judged more correctly than the learned, and that the despised little book was really a master-piece. Bunyan is indeed the first of allegorists, as Demosthenes is the first of orators, or Shakspeare the first of dramatists. Others have shown great ingenuity, but no other allegorist has ever been able to touch the heart, and to make abstractions objects of terror, of pity, and of love."

Mr. Offor, a great authority on editions of the English Bible, is also a great authority on the various editions of Bunyan. In this reprint of the Pilgrim's Progress, which he edited for the Hanserd Knollys Society, he has given us an exact reprint of the first edition; and not the least valuable part of this

work is the Introduction, in which he shows where the Pilgrim's Progress was written; the school in which the author was trained to compose his immortal allegory; an account of the various editions that have appeared; analyses of the many allegories which have preceded this in all the European languages; the various versions and commentaries upon it, and the opinions of the learned upon its merits, and the causes of its popularity.

In the third volume of the "Works of Bunyan," edited by Mr. Offor, and published nine years later, he has given us the substance of this Introduction, and some additions.

Mr. Offor has accomplished his work well, and the public and the Hanserd Knollys Society are under obligations to him. We suppose that it is because the Hanserd Knollys Society is a Baptist Society that Mr. Offor, in a single sentence, speaks disrespectfully of those who are not Baptists. We might contrast his sneers about "baby-baptism" with Bunyan's account of the reception of Christian at the House Beautiful. If Mr. Offer had been the author of the Pilgrim's Progress, he might have made Christian take a bath before he permitted him to sit down to supper; or he would have made the Porter and Christian take the bath together. Scott says, in his note on the passage, "Mr. Bunyan was an anti-pædobaptist, or one who deemed adult professors of repentance and faith the only proper subjects of baptism, and immersion the only proper mode of administering that ordinance; yet he has expressed himself so candidly and cautiously, that his representations may suit the admission of members into the society of professed Christians in every communion where a serious regard to spiritual religion is in this respect maintained."

There are very few of our readers who are not familiar with the life of John Bunyan, and therefore we do not propose in this article to speak of the school of affliction and persecution in which he was trained to write "the progress of a Christian from this world to that which is to come;" but in Mr. Offor's Introduction we shall find many facts connected with the Pilgrim's Progress and its publication both new and curious, and a statement of these facts will fully occupy the space allotted to us in this article.

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On the 12th of November, 1660, the year of Charles the Second's return to England, John Bunyan, who had been preaching about five years, was seized and thrust into Bedford jail, where he remained for six years, until 1666, the year of the great fire in London, when he was released; but returning immediately to his old employment, of preaching the gospel, he was again thrown into prison, where he lay for six years more. After his second release returning to preaching again, he was for the third time imprisoned, but this proved but a short confinement of six months. During this imprisonment of twelve years and a half he wrote many of his works, and among these his Pilgrim's Progress. The fact that this wonderful allegory was written in Bedford jail, is proved by certain statements in the work itself, the date of its publication, the evidence of one of his personal friends, and the tradition handed down in the family of one of his fellow-prisoners.

As to his own testimony, he says: "As I walked through the wilderness of this world, I lighted on a certain place where was a Den; and laid me down in that place to sleep; and as I slept I dreamed a Dream." In the margin of the fourth edition he tells us that the word "Den" means the "Gaol"; thus indicating the place where the First Part of the Pilgrim's Progress was conceived. Had this work been printed when it was first written, the author, as in other of his books, would have dated his introduction from the jail, in which case there would have been no need of any note to connect the words "Den" and "Gaol." Nor did we feel the necessity of such a reference until after the second edition, when he inserted a plain indication that he wrote it while he was a prisoner, as may be seen in some verses added to the third edition.

Another proof that he wrote this book in prison is in the first edition of the book itself. This bears strong internal evidence of its having been written long before it was published. It must be remembered that the second edition issued from the same press, by the same publisher, also in the same year; and there will be found, in comparing the two editions, a very striking difference in the spelling of many words; such as "drowned," corrected to "drowned"; "slow" to "slough"; "chaulk" to "chalk"; "travailer" to "traveller"; "brast" to

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"burst," &c. &c. This may readily be accounted for by the author's having kept the manuscript for some years before it was printed, and having taken the advice of many friends who had read the manuscript, upon the propriety of publishing it, he either had no inclination or leisure to revise it when he had decided upon sending it forth to the public. There is an apparent difference of twenty years between the spelling used in these two volumes which were published in the same year, and issued from the same press; besides which there were very considerable additions of new characters, and also to the text, in this second edition.

A third evidence of his having written it in prison, is the testimony of a pious gentleman, who was one of Bunyan's personal and "true friends," and who enjoyed the happiness of a long acquaintance with him. It is in the continuation to the "Grace Abounding," published in 1692, from which time it was very extensively circulated along with that deeply interesting narrative. This author says, that, "during Bunyan's confinement in prison he wrote the following books, namely, Of Prayer by the Spirit; The Holy Citie; Resurrection; Grace Abounding; Pilgrim's Progress, First Part." Nothing can be more conclusive than such evidence by an eye witness, one of Bunyan's intimate friends; for one hundred and fifty years it was never doubted, nor ought it ever to have been doubted.

Another proof that this book was written in prison is derived from the tradition handed down in the family of his fellow-prisoner, Mr. Marsom, an estimable and pious preacher, who with Bunyan was confined in Bedford jail for conscience sake. Thomas Marsom was an ironmonger, and pastor of a Baptist church at Luton; he died in January, 1726, at a very advanced age. This Thomas Marsom was in the habit of relating to his family many interesting facts connected with his imprisonment. One of these is, that Bunyan read the manuscript of the Pilgrim's Progress to his fellow prisoners, requesting their opinion upon it. The descriptions naturally excited a little pleasantry, and Marsom, who was of a sedate turn, gave his opinion against the publication; but on reflection requested permission to take the manuscript to his own cell, that he might read it alone. Having done so, he returned it with an earnest recommenda-

tion that it should be published. The reason why it was not published for several years after the author's release, appears to have arisen from the difference of opinion expressed by his friends as to the propriety of printing a book which so familiarly treated the most solemn subjects; and in addition to this opposition of friends, his own personal affairs after so long an imprisonment, added to his parochial duties, demanded all his time and attention. Indeed so great was his popularity at this time, that an eye witness testified, that when he preached in London, twelve hundred assembled on a week day in winter, at seven o'clock in the morning, to hear his lecture. At length he made up his mind:

--- "Since you are thus divided, I print it will; and so the case decided."

How far Bunyan was assisted in the composition of his allegory has been a question much debated. He answers himself in some lines appended to the "Holy War;" and in the preface to "Solomon's Temple Spiritualized," he says: "I dare not presume to say, that I know I have hit right in every thing: but this I can say, I have endeavoured so to do. True, I have not for these things fished in other men's waters; my Bible and my Concordance are my only library in my writings."

The great store of ancient allegories and poems has been ransacked to find the original of Bunyan's Pilgrim without success. Dr. Dibdin in his "Typographical Antiquities," describing Caxton's "Pilgrimage of the Soul," says: "This extraordinary production, rather than Bernard's 'Isle of Man,' laid the foundation of Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress." Dr. Adam Clarke in a postscript to a life of Bunyan observes, that "his whole plan being so very similar to 'Bernard's Isle of Man, or Proceedings in Manshire;' and also to that most beautiful allegorical poem, by Mr. Edmund Spenser, oddly called the 'Faery Queen,' there is much reason to believe, that one or the other, if not both, gave birth to the Pilgrim's Progress."

Mr. Montgomery, a devoted admirer of Bunyan's genius, considers that the print and the verses in "Whitney's Emblems," published in 1585, might perhaps have inspired the

first idea of this extraordinary work. Southey, who investigated this subject with great ability, came to a very pointed conclusion: "It would indeed be as impossible for me to believe that Bunyan did not write the Pilgrim's Progress, as that Porson did write a certain copy of verses, entitled the 'The Devil's Thoughts.'" Now as these verses were doubtless written by Southey himself, he had arrived at a conviction that Bunyan was entitled to all the honour of conceiving and writing his great allegory. Still he says, "the same allegory has often been treated before him. Some of these may have fallen in Bunyan's way, and modified his own conceptions, when he was not aware of any such influence."

But there is a strong argument against this from the fact that Bunyan was an unlearned man, and indeed knew no language but his own. When he used five common Latin words in Dr. Skill's prescription, "Ex carne et sanguine Christi," he tells the readers in a marginal note, "The Latine I borrow." And we cannot conceive that learned men read to him old monkish manuscripts, or the allegories of a previous age; for his design was unknown, he had formed no plan, nor had he any intention to write such a book until it came upon him

suddenly while composing one of his other works.

Mr. Offor, who is high authority in this matter, says that he has investigated every assertion and suggestion of this kind which has come to his knowledge, and analyzed all the works referred to; and beyond this, every allegorical work that could be found previous to the eighteenth century has been examined in all the European languages; and the result is a perfect demonstration of the complete originality of Bunyan. "It came from his own heart." The plot, the characters, the faithful dealings are all his own. And what is more, there has not been found a single phrase or sentence borrowed from any other book, except the quotations from the Bible, and the use of common proverbs. To arrive at this conclusion, Mr. Offor has occupied much time and labour, at intervals, during fifty years; he is competent therefore to give, as he has done, a sketch of more than fifty of these works, beginning with the monkish manuscripts, and continuing through the printed books published prior to the Reformation; and from that time to 1678, when the first part of the Pilgrim's Progress appeared.

It may be interesting to the reader if we notice a few of the most prominent of these, and the reasons of Mr. Offor why they could not have been used by Bunyan. The first we shall notice is a little volume entitled "The Abbey of the Holy Ghost," written by John Alcocke, the founder of Jesus College, Cambridge, a learned and abstemious bishop in the reign of Henry VII. From this curious and very rare little volume, Mr. Offor conceives that Mr. Bunyan could not have gained any idea; but in it are some translations of passages of Scripture made fifty years before any version of the Bible was published in English, which prove the great liberties the Church took with the Scriptures, and the extent to which they misled the people when the holy oracles were locked up in a foreign tongue. Matt. iii. 2: "Shrive ye and do penance, and be ye of good belief; the kingdom of heaven nigheth fast." John viii. 6: "He stooped down and wrote on the ground with his finger all their sins, so that each of them might se how sinfull other was." Matt. xxvi. 38: "I have, he said, full much dread against that I shall die. Sit ye down, he said, and wake ye, and bid your beads till I come again to you."

Allusion has already been made to the "Pylgremage of the Sowle," printed by William Caxton, 1483. Mr. Offor gives an analysis of this book drawn from a careful perusal of the original edition, compared with the manuscript written in 1413, and the result is to establish conclusively Bunyan's originality, notwithstanding the laborious effort of Dr. Clarke to prove that this book was the original of the Pilgrim's Progress. There is in the British Museum a very fine and curious MS. copy of this book, illustrated with rude illuminated drawings. It closes with "Here endith the dreem of the pilgrimage of the soule, translated owt of the Frensch into Englysche, the yere of our Lord MCCCCXIII." The translator craves indulgence, if "in som places ther it be ouer fantastyk nought grounded nor foundable in Holy Scripture, ne in doctoers wordes, for I myght not go fro myn auctor." The original work was written by Guillonville, prior of Chaalis, about 1330. This old poem was beautifully reprinted in London in 1858, 4to, by

Basil Montegu Pickering, with notes by Nathaniel Hill, comparing it with the Pilgrim's Progress.

It is a matter of great regret, says Mr. Offor, that those who write and publish for the millions, too frequently circulate opinions and supposed facts, without personal investigation. Mr. Chambers, the popular publisher at Edinburgh, whose works find readers as far as the English language is known, has joined those who detract from Bunyan, by charging him with plagiarism. In his Encyclopædia of Literature, speaking of Gawin Douglas, the bishop of Dunkeld, a celebrated Scottish poet, he observes: "The principal original composition of Douglas is a long poem, entitled 'The Palace of Honour.' * * * The well known Pilgrim's Progress bears so strong a resemblance to this poem, that Bunyan could scarcely have been ignorant of it." Mr. Offor, with some trouble, found a copy of this rare tract of Douglas, written in the ancient Scottish dialect, and with the aid of a good modern glossary, was enabled to read it through, but was surprised to find that it had not, either in the plot or detail, the slightest similarity whatever to the Pilgrim's Progress; and that it is written in terms that a poor unlettered minister could not have understood.

Passing by many works of this time, we come to a poem, entitled "The Vision of Pierce Plowman." "I am inclined to think," says Mr. D'Israeli, in his Amenities of Literature, "that we owe to Pierce Plowman an allegorical work of the same wild invention from that other creative mind, the author of Pilgrim's Progress. How can we think of the one without being reminded of the other? Some distant relationship seems to exist between the Plowman's Dowell and Dobet, and Dobest, Friar Flatterer, Grace, the Portress of the magnificent Tower of Truth, viewed at a distance, and by its side the dungeon of Care, Natural Understanding, and his lean and stern wife Study, and all the rest of this numerous company, and the shadowy pilgrimage of the 'Immortal Dreamer' to the 'Celestial City.'" Such a notice by so popular a writer, led Mr. Offor to examine closely this severe satire, and he found it written in a language that to Bunyan would have been almost as impenetrable as Hebrew or Greek. It is a very curious poem, composed about the time of Wicliff, by one of the Lollards, said to

be by Robert Langland. The printer (R. Crowley, 1550) states that it was written in the time of Edward III., "when it pleased God to open the eyes of many to see his truth, giving them boldness of heart to open their mouths, and cry out against the works of darkness." There is nothing in this very interesting book that could in the slightest degree have aided Bunyan, if he had been able to read it.

Another curious book in this series is "The Plaine Man's Pathway to Heaven," by Arth. Dent, 1601. This little volume made a considerable part of the worldly goods which Bunyan's first wife brought as her portion; and it became one of the means by which he was awakened from the dreary sleep of sin, and therefore an invaluable portion. It is singular, says Mr. Offor, that no one has charged him with taking any hints from this book, which is one of the very few which he is known to have read prior to his public profession of faith. The author in his epistle calls it "A Controversie with Satan and Sinne." It is a dialogue between a Divine, an Honest Man, an Ignorant Man, and a Caviller. This book must have been exactly suited to the warm imagination of Bunyan. It had proved invaluable to him as a means of conversion; but after a careful and diligent perusal by Mr. Offor, he could find no trace of any phrase or sentence having been introduced into the Pilgrim's Progress. The copy in Mr. Offor's possession is the nineteenth impression, 1625, and has the name of "Mr. Bunyoun" written on the bottom of the title; probably the very volume which his wife brought him as her dowry.

The book that has been most noticed as likely to have been seen by Bunyan, is Bolswert's "Pilgrimage of Duyfkens and Willeynkens. Antwerp, 1627." A copy of this rare edition is in the possession of James Lenox, Esq., of New York; it contains twenty-seven engravings, and was printed by Hieronymus Verdussen. This book was translated into French, and became somewhat popular. Mr. Offor relates that this volume was noticed by two gentlemen from Yorkshire, who had called to see his extensive collection of early English Bibles and books. Among other books they noticed a very fine copy of this rare volume of Bolswert's, the prints in which reminded

them of Bunyan's Pilgrim, and on their return to the north, a paragraph was inserted in a provincial paper stating that our Pilgrim's Progress was a translation. The falsehood of such a statement has been fully proved by Mr. Southey, to whom the identical volume was lent for the purpose of fully entering into the question, and there appears not to be the slightest similarity in the two stories. The cuts which attracted the attention of the visitors of Mr. Offor were-A man sleeping, and a pilgrim leaning over the bed; through the open door two pilgrims are seen walking; they stoop on the bank of a river, at the head of which, in the distance, the sun is setting. Another cut represents the pilgrims with foolscaps on their heads, driven by a mob, and one of them before a man sitting with his secretary at a table; a third shows the alarmed pilgrims in a circle of lighted candles, while a necromancer produces goblins, and sprites from an overhanging hill; a fourth shows the pilgrims going up a steep mountain, when one of them falls over the brink. Southey, after giving an analysis of the book, says, "and this is the book from which Bunyan is said to have stolen the Pilgrim's Progress! If ever there was a work which carried with it the stamp of originality in all its parts, it is that of John Bunyan's."

Bernard's "Isle of Man; or the Legal Proceedings in Manshire against Sin," is another book often referred to as having been used by Bunyan in the preparation of the Pilgrim's Pro-This little volume was very popular in its day. The author was a Puritan member of the Church of England, and profiting by the personal respect felt for him by his bishop, escaped punishment, and was permitted to enjoy his living at Balcomb. Dr. Adam Clarke considered that there was much reason to believe that the "Isle of Man," or Spencer's "Faery Queen," gave birth to the Pilgrim's Progress and Holy War. Dr. Southey imagines that Bunyan had seen this book, because his verses introductory to the Second Part have some similarity to Bernard's "Apology for his Allegory," which closes this volume. Mr. Offor, on account of the high authority of those holding this opinion, made a careful reperusal of the book, and was convinced that there is not the slightest similarity between it and the Pilgrim's Progress; and the only resemblance it has

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to the Holy War, is making the senses the means of communication with the heart or soul—an idea usual and universal in every age, the use of which cannot subject the writer to the

charge of plagiarism.

The last book we shall notice is Bishop Patrick's "Parable of the Pilgrim." This was written about the same time that Bunyan was writing his Pilgrim's Progress; and in comparing the two books, we think that all will agree with Mr. Offor when he says, "Whoever has patience to wade through the pages of Bishop Patrick's 'Parable,' must be fully convinced that his lordship's limping and unwieldy Pilgrim will never be able, with all his hobbling, to overtake or even get within sight of John Bunyan by many a thousand miles; a striking proof that exquisite natural ability casts a brighter and more captivating lustre than the deepest acquired parts."

We are compelled to pass by many works which Mr. Offor has examined, which are exceedingly interesting and curious, giving only the titles of a few of them. "The Pilgrimage of Perfection," supposed to be written by William Bond; printed by Pynson, 1526. "The Pype or Tonne of the lyfe of Perfection," 1532, an allegorical work for the instruction of nuns. "Le Voyage du Chevalier Errant," Par F. J. Cartheny, written about the year 1311; printed at Anvers, 1557. Translated into English about 1611. "Whitney's Emblems," Leyden, 1586. "The Pilgrim of Loretto Performing his Vow made to the

Glorious Virgin Mary, Mother of God," Paris, 1630.

The editions of the First Part of the Pilgrim's Progress have been very numerous. Eleven editions were published during the author's lifetime, and four, perhaps five, editions of the Second Part. There were fourteen editions of the First Part, and seven of the Second Part, printed before the end of the seventeenth century; and there were at least thirty-six editions of the First Part, and twenty-one of the Second Part printed before 1800, and several others without any indication of the number of the edition.*

The first edition was published in a small 12mo. in 1678. Printed for Nath. Ponder. This volume is of extraordinary

^{*} A brief notice of those published while Bunyan was alive is all that we can give.

rarity; only two copies being known to exist. One of them in the most beautiful preservation, in the original binding, clean and perfect, was discovered in a nobleman's library, and judging from its appearance it has never been read. It is now in the cabinet of H. S. Holford, Esq., of Weston Birt House, Tetbury, Gloucestershire. It was this copy which Mr. Offor used in preparing his edition for the Hanserd Knollys Society. It contains 233 pages, which does not include the title page and the apology, comprising five leaves; this would make the whole number 243 pages. The title is in a blackletter headline. It has no portrait or cuts. The edition of the Hanserd Knollys Society, of which only fifty copies were printed, is a most accurate reprint, not merely verbal, but literal, including the punctuation, and use of capitals and italics.

The only other copy of this edition known to exist is in the possession of Mr. Lenox. This copy has the title-page, the first two leaves of the apology, and the last page containing the conclusion, in fac-simile. The second edition was published also in the year 1678, for Nath. Ponder. The title is nearly similar to the first, with the words, "The second edition, with additions." A fine copy of this edition is in the library of Mr. Lenox. The text of this copy fills 276 pages, and the conclusion another page at the end, besides the title and four and a half leaves in the apology. It contains no portrait nor cuts. It has many more typographical errors than the first edition, but the spelling is greatly modernized and improved, an explanation of which has already been given.

The third edition appeared in the following year, 1679, by the same publisher. It contains 287 pages, with a portrait of the author, but no other cut or illustration. Mr. Offor, and a clergyman in Somersetshire have copies, but these do not agree. There must have been two third editions, or errors were corrected as the sheets passed through the press.* From this time every edition presents some little additions of side notes or references.

The fourth edition is by the same publisher in 1680; it contains 288 pages, and has a portrait. The copy in the library

^{*} In this a considerable addition was made, and this completed the allegory.

of Mr. Lenox has upon the back of the portrait an "Advertisement from the Bookseller." It is worthy of notice:

"The Pilgrim's Progress, having sold several Impressions, and with good Acceptation among the People (there are some malicious men, of our profession, of lewd principles, hating honesty, and Coveting other men's rights, and which we call Land Pirates, one of this society is Thomas Bradyll a printer, who I found Actually printing my book for himself, and five more of his Confederates) but in truth he hath so abominably and basely falcified the true Copie, and changed the Notes, that they have abused the Author in the sence, and the propriator of his right (and if it doth steal abroad, they put a cheat upon the people.) You may distinguish thus, the Notes are Printed in Long Primer, a base old letter, almost worn out, hardly to be read, and such is the Book itself. Whereas the true Copie is Printed in a Leigable fair Character and Brevier Notes as it alwaies has been, this Fourth Edition hath, as the third had, the Author's Picture before the Title, and hath more than 22 passages of Additions, pertinently placed quite thorow the Book, which the counterfeit hath not."

N. PONDER.

"This is Brevier and the true copy."

"This is Long Primer Letter."

The additions alluded to above are quotations from Scripture and side notes. No copy of this pirated edition of Bradyll is known to exist. Mr. Offor has a copy of the fourth edition, containing the portrait and the above advertisement upon the back, and on the back of the title an advertisement of "Owen on the Hebrews." The text contains 287 pages, the apology four leaves, and the conclusion one page.

The fifth edition is also by Ponder, and was published in 1680. The copy in the library of Mr. Lenox has the portrait, title, and apology, on six leaves; the text from 1 to 220; the conclusion on an additional page, and five pages of books published by Ponder; and on the back of the portrait this advertisement: "The Pilgrim's Progress having found good Acceptation among the People, to the carrying off the Fourth Impression, which had many additions, more than any preceding; and the Publisher observing, that many persons

desired to have it illustrated with Pictures, hath endeavoured to Gratifie them therein: and besides those that are ordinarily printed to this Fifth Impression, hath provided Thirteen Copper Cutts curiously engraven for such as desire them." These copper cuts were advertised to be sold separately, and they afford the only proof of the authorship of the verses found under each of them. These verses took their place in the text after Bunvan's death. Mr. Offor has three different fifth editions: one, corresponding with the copy in Mr. Lenox's collection; a second, with portrait and the "thirteen copper cutts," as announced in the advertisement, with a cut of the Martyrdom of Faithful printed in the text on page 128; but though the date is 1680, every page shows that the whole book has been re-composed: a third copy, but without the title-page. It is supposed to be the fifth edition, and has the copper cuts; but they are rather copies than fac-similes of the originals, and there are proofs throughout the work of a different printer's composition. A very fine impression of the above mentioned plates is found in a German version published in London, 1766, with the English verses below. If these are not Sturt's plates, they are certainly copied from them. A copy of this version is in the possession of Mr. Lenox.

The sixth edition has not been found. The seventh, in very beautiful preservation, is in the library of R. B. Sherring, Esq., Bristol, England. It was printed by Ponder, 1681, containing 286 pages, handsomely printed, with the portrait, and the cut of the Martyrdom of Faithful, on a separate leaf, between the pages 164 and 165. It was a copy of this edition which Bunyan used in writing his Second Part, all the references in which

to the First Part, are correctly made to this edition.

There were two eighth editions in 1682; they have 211 pages, and two leaves of a list of "Books" published for Ponder. On the back of the frontispiece is an advertisement similar to that in the fifth edition, with the change of one word. In the copy of Mr. Lenox there are three cuts; on page 121, the Martyrdom of Faithful; on page 145, misprinted 135, Doubting Castle; and on page 204, Christian and Hopeful received by angels into the clouds. The portrait, title, and apology, occupy six leaves; the text from 1 to 211, the con-

clusion on an additional page, and four pages of books printed for Ponder. The pages run from 1 to 144, then 135 to 211; the signatures are correct. It is on this second page 135, that

the print of Doubting Castle is found.

The other issue, which is probably the first of the two, has the same error in the paging, but there is no cut of Doubting Castle. Mr. Offor thinks that the printer, wishing to insert this cut in the second issue, reprinted one whole sheet, using a sharper type on a thin body, and by thus adding a line to each page, managed to pack the 24 pages into 23, thus making room for the cut. The following signature seems also to have been

re-composed.

There are two ninth editions, both bearing the imprint of N. Ponder: the first of these is dated 1683, comprised in 212 pages. It has a different portrait, but the same woodcuts as the eighth, with the addition of Doubting Castle on page 145, numbered 135. Another distinct edition is called the ninth, also by N. Ponder, with the same woodcuts as the last, but with a different type. This bears the date of 1684. On the back of the frontispiece is the advertisement of the thirteen copper-plates, in addition to those ordinarily printed to the eighth edition. Both of these editions are in the collection of Mr. Lenox; that of 1683 has the portrait with the advertisement, a copy of that in the fifth edition, with a few changes. It has the portrait, slightly varying from the previous one, and three cuts, on pages 121, 135, misprint for 145, and 204. The portrait, title, and apology, fill six leaves; the text pages from 1 to 211, and the conclusion on an additional page, and four leaves of books printed for Ponder: pages 135 to 144 are double, and 159 to 168 are omitted in the paging.

The tenth edition appeared in 1685, on two hundred pages. In the title the name of the author is spelt *Bunian*, but he signs the apology as usual Bunyan. This has the frontispiece and two woodcuts only, that of Doubting Castle being omitted. The copy in Mr. Lenox's library wants the portrait; there is an advertisement of the Second Part, by "John Bunian," price one shilling. The head line from page 73 to the end is in

much smaller type than from page 1 to 72.

The eleventh edition appeared in 1688, the year in which

Bunyan died. Mr. Lenox has in his collection a copy of the twelfth edition, printed by Robert Ponder, in 1689. The portrait is in some respects altered, although it has the name of Nath. Ponder at the bottom. The advertisement on the back refers to the "carrying off of the 11th edition and this 12th Impression." There are twenty-four wood cuts with the verses below, printed in the text. The portrait, title page, and apology occupy six leaves; the text pages 1 to 204 including the conclusion; pages 196 to the end in much smaller type than the rest of the volume.

We refer while passing to a superb copy of the first edition of the Holy War, which is in the possession of Mr. Lenox. It is a 12mo., printed in London, 1682. From its clean and perfect condition it appears never to have been read. It has the portrait engraved by R. White, which is considered the most correct of all the representations of Bunyan; and the folding plate of the siege of the "Towne of Mansoul," with a full length likeness of Bunyan in the centre, and at the end of the volume the verses beginning,

"Some say the Pilgrim's Progress is not mine."

We are not surprised to learn that one hundred thousand copies of the Pilgrim's Progress in English were circulated during the life-time of the author. There were then also translations into French, Flemish, Dutch, Welsh, Gælic and Irish; and since then it has been translated into Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Danish and German, into the various languages of Asia and into Hebrew; indeed it has appeared in nearly all the languages of the world. There is a Latin copy entitled Peregrinantis Progressus. And what is not generally known, there was an early American edition, "published in Boston by Samuel Green, upon assignment of Samuel Small, and are to be sold by John Vysor, of Boston, 1681," 12mo. But one copy of this edition is known, and that is imperfect. Bunyan probably refers to this edition, in the first edition of Part Second, 1684, in speaking of the circulation of Part First.

"'Tis in New England under such advance,
Receives there so much loving countenance,
As to be trimmed, new cloth'd, and decked with gems,
That it may show its features and its limbs."

He may perhaps speak of a later edition not now known, for this is a very plain and common production, and does not at all correspond with the third line quoted. There was an edition of Part First published at New York, in 1794, by Benjamin Gomez, a Jewish bookseller, probably a converted Jew, for he

printed a New Testament in 1801.

The French translation, published in Amsterdam, 1685, is entitled Voyage d'un Chrestien vers l'Eternité, par Monsieur Bunjan, F. M., en Bedtford. No doubt Bunyan's colloquial English was a difficult task for the translator. The Slough of Despond is called, Le Bourbier Mésfiance; Worldly Wiseman, Sage Mondain; Faithful, Loyal; Talkative, Grand Jaseur; Pickthank, Flatteur; My Old Lord Letchery, Mon vieux Seigneur Assez Bon; No Good, Vautrien; Live-loose, Vivant Mort; Hate-light, Grand Haineux; Bye-ends, Autrefin. Instead of translating the poetry, it is supplied from French psalms or hymns. The only copy of this edition known to exist is in the collection of Mr. Lenox, and is in very fine condition. There is in the British Museum a copy somewhat modernized, printed in Rotterdam, 1722: another in 1757; another in Basle, 1728. These are French Protestant versions; besides which there have been many editions of a Roman Catholic translation into French, greatly abridged, and of course Giant Pope is omitted, and so is the remark about Peter being afraid of a sorry girl.

Bunyan gives a hint in the verses with which the First Part is concluded, of his intention to continue his allegory; but this was not done until 1684. But in the meantime a forgery appeared with this title—"The Second Part of the Pilgrim's Progress, from this present World of Wickedness and Misery to an eternity of Holiness and Felicity exactly described under the similitude of a Dream, &c. Printed in London, 1683, for Thomas Malthus, at the Sun in the Poultry." Mr. Lenox has a copy of this forged edition. It has a frontispiece representing two men (one sleeping) in clerical garb; and one plate of persons dancing round the edge of a pit. This is the only counterfeit that has been discovered, although Bunyan thus warns the public in the verses prefixed to the Second Part:

"'Tis true some have of late to counterfeit My Pilgrim, to their own, my Title set;

Yea, others, half my name and Title too, Have stitched to their Books to make them do; And yet they by their features do declare Themselves, not mine to be, whose ere they are."

It is probable that this book never reached a second edition, being eclipsed by the real Second Part, which appeared in 1684. There is in the library of Mr. Lenox a small 12mo. volume, which must be distinguished from the above, entitled "The Progress of the Christian Pilgrim from this world to the world to come. In two parts'—with the motto, "Joel xi. 23: Your old men shall dream dreams. The second edition: London and Westminster. Printed for the author, and sold by the booksellers. 1702."

Mr. Offor has a later edition, printed in 1705. This appears to be an imitation rather than a forgery, as it does not profess to be by Bunyan. Mr. Offor supposes it to be a Roman Catholic production, as Giant Pope is omitted, and Faithful, called *Fidelius*, is hanged, drawn, and quartered; that being the punishment inflicted on the Roman Catholics by Elizabeth and James I.

The real Second Part is a similar volume to the First Part, and appeared in 1684. A fine copy of this rare volume is in the possession of Mr. Lenox. In this, seven pages are in larger type than the rest, from page 100 to 106 inclusive. Page 106 is numbered 120. It was printed by Nathaniel Ponder, and has a frontispiece engraved by Sturt, representing Bunyan asleep below, and Christiana and her family above, setting out on their journey, with verses below. It has two plates, one representing Great Heart leading on the Pilgrims; the other the dance round the head of Giant Despair. On the back of the title is the following notice: "I appoint Mr. Nathaniel Ponder, But no other to Print this book, Jan. 1, 1684. John Bunyan." The text fills 224 pages, 106 to 109 being omitted in the paging; the title and verses, six leaves, are not counted in the paging.

The next edition known has a similar title to the first, but has no indication of what edition it is (perhaps the third or fourth,) but bears the date of 1687. A copy of this edition is

in the collection of Mr. Lenox. There is an advertisement of books upon the back of the title, but not the notice quoted above. It has an engraved frontispiece and two plates, as in the first edition. The paging is correct, but there are variations throughout from the first edition. The sixth edition appeared in 1693, "Printed for Robert Ponder, and sold by Nicholas Boddington, in Dutch Lane." On the back of the title, after an advertisement of books, is the following notice: "The Third Part of Pilgrim's Progress that's now abroad, was not done by John Bunyan, as is suggested. But the true Copy left by him, will be published by Nath. Ponder." This notice refers to "Grace Abounding," which is advertised by Ponder on the back of the title of Part First, 13th edition, 1692, as "John Bunyan's life, writ by his own hand in a book entitled Grace Abounding, &c.; to which is added, The remainder of his life to his death by the hand of a friend, and reprinted this year." Below is a caution against the Third Part, "printed by an impostor," &c. The engraved frontispiece in this sixth edition is very much worn, and two wood-cuts printed in the text. The title and verses occupy six pages; the text pages 1 to 180, of which 167 to 180 are in smaller type than the rest. There is a copy of this edition in the library of Mr. Lenox.

The seventh edition appeared in 1696. The eighth in 1702. In the copy of Mr. Lenox, it is called on the title "the eighth edition, with addition of four cuts. Note—the 3d Part, suggested to be J. Bunyan's is an Impostor—and printed for W. P., and to be sold by Nicholas Boddington, 1702." The two additional cuts refer to Christian, and are copied from Part First.

The copy of the ninth edition in Mr. Lenox's collection, bears the imprint of N. and M. Boddington, 1712. Mr. Offor has a ninth edition dated 1708. It would be endless to continue this examination.

In 1692 a Third Part made its appearance, and although the title does not directly say that it was written by Bunyan, it was at first received as his. It is this Third Part of which notice is taken on the back of the title of the sixth edition of of the Second Part, and denounced as an "Impostor" on the back of the title of the eighth edition.*

A copy of the first edition of this counterfeit is in the library of Mr. Lenox. The date on the title page is 1693, the life which is appended has the date 1692. The second edition appeared in 1694. In the first and second editions an indelicate paragraph was inserted respecting the "Revels of the Ranters." It is not known whether this was continued in the third, but in the fourth edition of 1700, the life is rewritten, and the objectionable paragraph omitted. The life thus altered was continued in almost all the editions, but the paragraph was reproduced in editions published in Glasgow as late as 1792. We find it in a Glasgow edition called the second, 1717, and in another of 1773.

John Newton asserts of this forgery, that "a common hedge-stake deserves as much to be compared with Aaron's rod, which yielded blossoms and almonds, as this poor performance to be obtruded upon the world as the production of Bunyan." Dr. Ryland observes, that "when the anonymous scribbler of the 'Third Part' of the Pilgrim's Progress, tried to obtrude his stuff on the world as the production of Mr. Bunyan, the cheat was soon discovered; every Christian of taste could see the difference as easily as we can discern the superior excellence of a Raphael or a Titian from the productions of a common dauber; and we can as easily distinguish Bunyan from all other writers, as we can discern the difference between the finest cambric and a piece of hop-sacking." The author of this forgery is as yet unknown.

A much more respectable attempt has since been made towards a Third Part, under the title of the "Pilgrims of the Nineteenth Century; a continuation of the Pilgrim's Progress, upon the plan projected by Mr. Bunyan, containing a history

^{*} The same denunciation appears on the title pages of two editions of the Holy War, in the library of Mr. Lenox, printed in 1738, and 1759. Thus, "By John Bunyan, Author of the Pilgrim's Progress, 1st and 2d Parts. Note. The Third Part suggested to be his is an Imposter (1738) Impostor (1759): and on the back of the woodcut frontispiece the verses beginning

^{&#}x27;Some say the Pilgrim's Progress is not mine.'"

of a visit to the town of Toleration; with an account of its charter, and a description of the principles and customs of its inhabitants, under the similitude of a Dream. By Joseph Ivimey, 1827." The object of this volume is to show the advantages which resulted from the Act of Toleration, by the adventures of Christian children; but it is hard to conceive what this had to do with the nineteenth century.

For many years the Pilgrim's Progress was printed on very poor paper; the wood-cuts, when worn out, were replaced by an inferior set; each Part was published separately in a cheap form. The first edition which made any pretension to elegance was published in 1728, "adorned and embellished with curious sculptures by J. Sturt." In comparison with its predecessors, this was a truly beautiful edition. The engravings were from old designs, and well executed. For many years this was considered the standard edition, and was reprinted many times. It is not known who was the editor; it was superseded by an edition with Mason's notes. This was considered good, but it abounds in errors. There is a very curious omission in this edition brought down from the eighth edition of the Second Part, where it first occurs.* In the catechizing of James by Prudence, she asks him, "How doth God the Son save thee?" The answer and the next question are left out, and it appears thus: "By his illumination, by his renovation, and by his preservation." The lines that are omitted are: "James. By his righteousness, death, and blood, and life. Prudence. And how doth God the Holy Ghost save thee?" Mr. Mason, in one of his notes, calls attention to the error, and seems to think that Bunyan was at fault in his theology; but in the next edition, having discovered his error, very properly inserted the missing lines, but as improperly continued his note reflecting

^{*} We find this error in the following 12mo. editions in the possession of Mr. Lenox. In the 9th, 12th, 13th, and so on to the 28th inclusive; also in the following London 8vo. editions—22d, 23d, 28th, 50th, (two of that number, but different), and 32d. In the edition with Mason's notes, 1778, and an edition in 8vo. with notes by Bradford, 1792. It occurs also in an edition called the 17th, printed in Boston in 1744. It is corrected in the 31st ed. 12mo. London, 1770—8vo. edition, London, 1763, called the 54th; and Edinburgh 12mo. called the 56 ed. 1777; London 58 ed. 12mo. 1782; Cook's edition, London, 1792; T. Wilkins, Boston, 1806, 8vo.

upon Bunyan; and it was continued in every successive edition in which the text was printed correctly.

There is another extraordinary error which is found in many editions, and among others those of Southey and the London Art Union. It is in the conversation between Christian and Hopeful about the robbery of Little Faith. Bunyan refers to four characters in Scripture, who were notable champions, but who were very roughly handled by Faint-heart, Mistrust, and Guilt. "They made David (Psal. xxxviii.) groan, mourn, and roar. Heman and Hezekiah too, though champions in their day, had their coats soundly brushed by them. Peter would go try what he could do-they made him at last afraid of a sorry girl." Some editor, not acquainted with Heman (Psal. lxxxviii), and not troubling himself to find who he was, changed the name to one much more common and familiar, and called him Haman. More recent editions, including Southey and the Art Union, conceiving that Haman, however exalted he was as a sinner, was not one of the Lord's champions in his day, changed his name to that of Mordecai!

So great was the popularity of the Pilgrim's Progress, that it led some to attempt its improvement by turning it into verse. The first attempt of this kind was by Francis Hoffman, printed by R. Tookey, 1706. There were two issues of Hoffman's version, both in the possession of Mr. Lenox; they differ only in the title-page; the one has, the other has not, the name of the versifier. Both have a portrait and four cuts. We give a specimen from page 60: Apollyon says—

"'Tis with professors now in fashion grown
T' espouse his cause awhile to serve their own;
Come, with me go occasionally back
Rather than a preferment lose or lack."

Many attempts were made afterwards to versify the Pilgrim's Progress; the most respectable of which was by J. S. Dodd, M. D., Dublin, 1795: it is in blank verse, with good engravings. George Burder, the author of "Village Sermons," published, in 1804, "Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, Part First, versified," which passed through several large editions, and was much used in Sunday-schools. A very handsome edition of this, with the Second Part, has lately been published in Eng-

land, by the author of "Scripture Truth in Verse." T. Dibdin also published "Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress metrically condensed, in six cantos." This embraces only the First Part. The author claims to have kept the simplicity of the original, and a rigid observance of every doctrine enforcing the certainty of the one only road to safety and salvation. Dr. Adam Clarke considered that our Pilgrim might be more read by a certain class, if published as an epic poem. He observes: "The whole body of the dialogue and description might be preserved perfect and entire; and the task would not be difficult, as the work has the complete form of an epic poem, the versification alone excepted. But a poet, and a poet only, can do this work; and such a poet, too, as is experimentally acquainted with the work of God in his own soul. I subscribe to the opinion of Mr. Addison, that, had J. Bunyan lived in the time of the primitive fathers, he would have been as great a father as any of them."

A lady who uses the initials C. C. V. G., has recently made the attempt, and she does not appear to be aware that Dr. Dodd has gone over the same ground. It is, says Mr. Offor, a highly respectable production, divided into six cantos, but includes only the First Part. Mr. Offor remarks, that "little interest has been excited by these endeavours to versify the Pilgrim. All the attempts to improve Bunyan are miserable failures; it is like holding up a rushlight to increase the beauty of the moon when in its full radiance. His fine old colloquial English may be modernized and spoiled, but cannot be improved. The expression used to denote how hard the last lock in Doubting Castle 'went,' may grate upon a polite ear, but it has a deep meaning, that should warn us of entering by-path meadows."

It would be a culpable omission, in mentioning editions of Bunyan's Pilgrim, if we should not speak of one by the Rev. J. M. Neale, M. A., Warden of Sackville College, "for the use of children of the English Church;" (Oxford, J. H. Parker, 1853.) This is an alteration, at once arrogant and treacherous; being a jesuitical endeavour to make the glorious old Nonconformist utter the cant, not merely of the Anglican, but of the Puseyite. It is just in harmony with later proceedings of this ridiculous

priestling, in the well known case of a perverted lady, whose burial was profaned by the pertinacious interruptions of this Neale. The preface expounds the sapient plan of mutilation and forgery; but the counterfeiter's tools are so clumsy as to result only in the ludicrous. The poor Editor finds neither Baptism nor Confirmation mentioned by Bunyan, and is of course scandalized by "the whole story of Worldly Wiseman and Legality, the adventure with Faithful, with Adam the First, and Moses; much of the conversation with Talkative, and more of that with Ignorance." Accordingly, after the Slough of Despond, Christian has a threefold dipping into a baptismal spring, furnished by Mr. Neale. He receives a roll by which "we are to understand a state of grace." Although "his original sin was at once and for ever put away by Baptism," there is yet another burden on his back when he reaches the Interpreter's House. Our grim old enemies, "Pope and Pagan," are exchanged for "Mahometan and Pagan," (pages 14, 16, 54, 60.) The trick was too barefaced, even for Tractarianism, and we believe the edition has attained condign contempt.

We learn that a Poetical Pamphlet of Minor Poems, written by Bunyan, and published by him while in prison, has lately been discovered. An edition was to have been published in the beginning of this year. Mr. Offor, who superintends its publication, says in a private note, that there can be no doubt of its genuineness. It is supposed to have been written by Bunyan for the purpose of gaining a pittance with which to support his family during his confinement. It contains an

autograph of John Bunyan.

It is an interesting fact, that during the revolution in Italy, in 1849, Italian versions of the New Testament and the Pilgrim's Progress, were circulated freely in sheets throughout

Italy.

We close this article by enumerating the translations of the Pilgrim's Progress in the library of Mr. Lenox, which probably comprises the most complete collection of the editions of the English Bible and of the Pilgrim's Progress, in the world. Dutch-Amsterdam, 1682, probably the 1st ed. Do. 1684, 4to. Do. 1687, 5th ed. Utrecht, 1699. Amsterdam, 1718.

Groningen, 1718, with annotations. Part First, New York, American Tract Society, no date, probably 1851. French-Amsterdam, 1685, 12mo., 1st ed. Part First, Rotterdam, 1764, 12mo., 6th ed. Part First, Paris, 2 copies, 1831 and 1834, 12mo., Protestant versions. Paris, 1821, 16mo., Roman Catholic version. Part First, London Tract Society, 1850, 12mo. Part First, Paris and Lyons, no date, Roman Catholic version-very much abridged. The figures in the plates are all dressed in modern costume. Part First, New York, American Tract Society, no date but about 1853, 12mo. Part First, Valence, 1845, small 12mo. Part Second, Paris, 1855, 12mo. Part First, Brussells, Paris and Geneva, 1855, 12mo. Part First, Toulouse, 1852, 12mo. German-London, 1766, small 8vo., with portrait, and 15 plates noticed above in the text. Part First, Hamburg, 1837, 16mo. Parts First and Second, Hamburg, 1842, 12mo. Parts First and Second, New York American Tract Society, no date, about 1850. Part First, Hamburg, 1853, 12mo. Bengali and English-Calcutta, Baptist Mission Press, 1835, 12mo. Bengali-Lodiana, American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1835, 12mo. Orissa Language-Part First, Calcutta, Baptist Mission Press, 1838, 12mo. Modern Greek-Part First, Malta, 1824, small 8vo. Welsh-Parts First, Second, and Third, London, 1836-7, printed in parts, 8vo. Parts First and Second, New York, no plates nor date, but American Tract Society, about 1845. Parts First, Second, and Third, Caernarvon, 1848, 32mo. Hebrew-Parts First and Second, London, 1851, 1852, small 8vo. Danish-Parts First and Second, New York, American Tract Society, no date but about 1851. Spanish-Part First, New York, American Tract Society, no date, about 1851. Part First, London, no date but about 1849, 12mo. Honolulu-Sandwich Islands, Parts First and Second, for American Tract Society. 1842, 12mo. Swedish-Part First, New York, American Tract Society, no date but about 1854, 12mo. Italian-Part First, Firenze, 1853, 12mo., printed surreptitiously without any title page, place, or date. The verses are translated into prose. Genova, (Genoa) 1855, Parts First and Second: a second edition of Part First, the poetry rendered in verse, 12mo. Parts First and Second, New York, American Tract

Society, no date, but 1858, 12mo. These three Italian editions are the same. The translation was made at Florence, by an Italian priest, under the superintendence of the Rev. Robert Maxwell Hanna, of the Scotch Free Church. The first edition was small and is rare; the second was larger, and printed at Genoa, and has been stereotyped by the American Tract Society. Almost all the volumes enumerated have plates or wood cuts.

ART. IV.—On the authorized Version of the New Testament in connection with some recent proposals for its revision. By RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, D. D., Dean of Westminster, Author of "Synonymes of the New Testament"— "the Study of Words"—"the English Language, Past and Present"—"the Lessons in Proverbs"—"Sermons"— "Poems"—"Calderon," etc. London: 1858. pp. 146. 8vo.

In closing our review of Mr. Sawyer's new "New Testament," we quoted him as claiming to have forestalled nearly all the new suggestions of Dean Trench, and undertook to show, at some convenient season, the extraordinary difference between their methods of improving on the common version. Who and what Trench is, and how entitled to be heard as an authority in this case, if it were not known already to the great mass of our readers, might be gathered from the title of the book before us. His position at the head of the chapter of Westminster Abbey implies not only the esteem in which he was held by the appointing power, but a reputation previously acquired and established in the Church of England, and still further back, a finished academical training in one of the great universities. The fruits of this training, and the causes of this reputation, are unambiguously indicated by the subjects of his previous works, including those upon the Parables and Miracles, though not here specified, except by an etcetera. The very titles of these publications will sufficiently define the field of his successful labours, as including scriptural interpretation, general religious teaching,

poetry, the history and structure of the English language, and the nice distinctions of New Testament Greek usage. It would certainly be difficult to trace a course of study and of authorship more perfectly adapted to prepare a man for aiding, both by counsel and by act, in the responsible and delicate attempt to solve the problem now so generally interesting, as to the proper mode of dealing with our venerable English version. What is here required is not a high degree of any one qualification, but a rare concurrence or coincidence of many, corresponding to the multiform and complex difficulties of the question to be settled. No amount of Greek or Hebrew learning, or of mere sense, whether common or uncommon, or of personal religion and the best intentions, can supply the place, in this emergency, of that refinement and almost instinctive sensibility of taste, which is the joint product of a happy mental constitution and the rarest opportunities of culture, not scholastic merely, but professional and social. There are no doubt men who think themselves sufficient for the work in question, without any such diversified and complex preparation; but its usefulness, if not its absolute necessity, will be conceded by all who have themselves enjoyed the humblest measure of such varied culture. A strong proof, because a natural effect, of its possession in the case of Dr. Trench, is his remarkable modesty, and freedom from all arrogance, even in discussing matters, as to which he would require no apology for speaking with authority. Another mark of many-sided culture, as distinguished from pedantic, pedagogical excess in one direction and proportionate deficiency in others, is the absence of all overweening fondness for the antique, which is no less evident, though more surprising, because rarer in the class of scholars represented by him, than the absence of that swaggering contempt for what is old, and that exclusive deference for what is just now in fashion or in bloom, which savours more of ignorance than even of partial or distorted cultivation. Closely connected with this general attribute of Dr. Trench's mind and writings is a special moderation and exemption from extreme views in relation to the English Bible. While he treats its very errors with a filial reverence and tenderness, in striking contrast with the slashing and dogmatical depreciation of its very excellencies elsewhere, he is so far

from denying the necessity and lawfulness of doing something to improve the common version, that the volume now before us is expressly meant to show, or rather to inquire, how it may be most efficiently and safely done.

The tone of the Preface must conciliate every cultivated reader by its mingled modesty and candour, as well as by its curious felicity of phrase, as when it speaks of some things as already escaping the confusion of manuscript and assuming the painful clearness of print, an expression which must come home to the business and bosom of every one who ever read a proofsheet. We think, however, that most readers will dissent from Dr. Trench's condemnation of his own arrangement, even as compared with that of Dr. Scholefield's "Hints for an Improved Translation of the New Testament," and feel that what he had to say could scarcely have been better put together.

The first chapter is preliminary and intended to guard against the errors which too frequently accompany and mar all propositions to improve the common version. Such are, on the one hand, too exclusive a regard for settled habits and associations, as the ultimate criterion or test, which must of course condemn all innovation, whether good or bad, gratuitous or necessary; and, on the other hand, a coarse indifference to all the claims of long prescription and antique peculiarity; both which extremes the author, with a creditable though unnecessary caution,

most explicitly repudiates.

The subject of the second chapter is "the English of our version," which is characterized under the two-fold aspect of lexicography and grammar. In reference to the first of these, the author praises the delectus verborum, the equal freedom from vulgarity and pedantry, undue familiarity and strangeness, and the happy mixture of Latin and Anglo-Saxon vocables. When he speaks of the Rhemish translators as having "put off their loyalty to the English language with their loyalty to the English crown," because they use such forms as "odible," "impudicity," "longanimity," "coinquinations," "commessations," "contristate," "agnition," "suasible," "domesticals," "repropritiate," or prefer such as "incredulity," "precursor," "dominator," "cogitation," and "fraternity," to "unbelief," "forerunner," "lord," "thought," and "brotherhood," he did

not know that this proceeding is now sanctioned, and more fully carried out, by "the greatest work of this" or any other age! The opposite extreme he exemplifies by quoting, from Sir John Cheke's version of Matthew, such Anglo-Saxonisms as "hundreder" (centurion,) "gainbirth" (regeneration,) and "freshman" (proselyte.)

Another merit of the English Bible recognized by Dr. Trench, is its careful retention of the most felicitous expressions found in older versions, and especially in Tyndale's, for example, "turned to flight the armies of the aliens," "author and finisher of our faith," while they introduced others of their own, such as "the prince of life," "the captain of our salvation," the "sin that doth so easily beset us," all which he regards as having now become, on account of their beauty and fitness, "household words," and fixed utterances of the religious life of the English people, but all which he will no doubt grieve to find materially changed in the American New Testament. We may add that we should have been glad to see connected with the author's just praise of the common version, as to this point, a distinct admission of the fact that it has copied Tyndale when it ought to have amended him sometimes.

Dr. Trench defends the common version from some charges of inaccuracy in the use of words, by showing that the usage of the language has since changed; for instance, that to "take thought" means to be solicitous or anxious, not only in Matt. vi. 25, but in Bacon and Shakspeare; that to "cumber" means to vex, annoy, and injure, not only in Luke xiii. 7, but in Shakspeare and Spenser; that "devotions" is a concrete term, not only in Acts xvii. 23, but in Sir Philip Sidney's Arcadia; that "church" is applied to heathen temples, not only in Acts xix. 37, but in Holland's Pliny, and to that of Jerusalem in Sir. John Cheke's version of Matt. xxvii. 51; that in old English, "carriages" means "baggage;" "endeavour" the most earnest energetic effort; "nephews" lineal descendants, as he proves from Hooker and from Holland, who expressly says, "their nephews, to wit, the children of their sons and daughters." This last fact had escaped even so accurate a scholar as the late Professor Blunt, who, in his "Church of the First Three Centuries," says (with reference to 1 Tim. v. 4,) "not children

only, but even nephews, were expected to support their aged relations."

In favour of revision, at least so far as to exclude words which have wholly changed their meaning, Dr. Trench shows that the authors of our version did the same, as when they substituted "separate" for "depart" (Rom. viii. 39,) though the same word was not changed to "do part" in the marriage service ("till death us depart") before the year 1661. On the same principle they substituted "robbery" for "bribery" (Matt. xxiii. 25,) and "hurtful" for "noisome" (1 Tim. vi. 9,) which were formerly synonymous; and Trench complains that the latter substitution was not carried out in other places, on the ground that "noisome" now suggests the idea of something offensive or disgusting, which may possibly arise from some confusion of a similar word ("nauseous") with the true synonyme ("noxious.") He notes the same inconsistency or incompleteness in the retention of the equivocal phrase "by-and-by," in four places, while they have exchanged it in all others for the unambiguous "immediately" or "straightway." Other examples of the same thing are "Easter," retained in one place (Acts xii. 4,) "grudging," in the old sense of murmuring, complaining (1 Peter iv. 9,) and "Jewry" for "Judea" in two cases (Luke xxiii. 5, John vii. 1.)

Dr. Trench's rule in reference to old words is, that only such should be expunged as now convey a false idea to the vast majority of readers, or none at all. Such are "taches," "ouches," "bolted," "ear" (in the sense of plough, arare,) "daysman" (in that of mediator.) Such words are described by our author as dark even to scholars, where their scholarship is rather in Latin and Greek than in early English; but he adds that they are almost entirely confined to the Old Testament. Their omission, in case of actual revision, would probably be regretted only by those to whom omne ignotum pro magnifico est, or those whose love of mystery takes pleasure even in the unintelligible, like one of Edward Irving's prophets whom we heard interrupting his majestic reading of the thirty-ninth of Exodus, by crying out, "O, ye people, ye people, ye people of the Lord! Ye have not the ouches, ye have not the ouches! Ye must have them, ye must have them!" With this kind of archaism it is clear that Dean Trench feels no sympathy whatever, and that if the way were opened for a cautious and temperate revision, such as he afterwards proposes, he would not be much impeded by the cry from any quarter that we "must have the ouches."

On the other hand, our author utterly repudiates the favourite rule and practice of revisionists and versionists, according to which a word must be expunged if not now in common use, though perfectly intelligible to the plainest reader, and maintains that this antique phraseology is not an evil but a good, "shedding round the sacred volume the reverence of age; removing it from the ignoble associations which will often cleave to the language of the day" "just as there is a sense of fitness which dictates that the architecture of a church should be different from that of a house," (p. 36.) For our own part, we can scarcely believe that those who take the other course have ever asked themselves distinctly upon what ground old words, still universally intelligible, are to be rejected. To condemn them for the simple reason that they are old, is as cruel and uncivilized, in point of taste, as the practice of those savages, who put their aged relatives to death, is in social life and morals. It is no new thing, however, as we learn from Dean Trench, that Symonds thought "clean escaped," (2 Pet. ii. 18,) a very low expression; that Wemyss expunged as obsolete such words as "straightway," "haply," "twain," "athirst," "wax," "lack," "ensample," "jeopardy," "garner," "passion;" and that Purver (in 1764) denounced as "clownish, barbarous, base, hard, technical, misapplied, or new coined," many hundreds of words, among which are "beguile," "boisterous," "lineage," "perseverance," "potentate," "remit," "seducers," "shorn," "swerved," "vigilant," "unloose," "unction," "vocation."

Besides the reverence due to still intelligible archaisms, and the endless diversity of taste and judgment among those who would reform them, the least refined being commonly the most fastidious, our author deprecates the modernizing process on another ground, to wit, "that our translation would be no longer of a piece, not any more one web and woof, but in part English of the seventeenth century, and in part English of the

nineteenth." We hardly know indeed the value of this homogeneousness, until we see it marred by such darning and patching as distinguish almost every modern "improved version." The examples which the author cites (such as "impending vengeance" for "wrath to come," "unchaste and immodest gratifications" for "chambering and wantonness," Campbell's Scotch paraphrase of Mark vi. 19, 20, and even the American Baptist monstrosity, "that in the name of Jesus every knee should bend, of heavenlies and of earthlies and of infernals,") are almost tame and timid in comparison with some which have been since propounded.

The "grammar" of the English Bible our author thinks less perfect than its "dictionary," but defends it against some objections, such as the use of "his" and "her" for things as well as persons, arising from the fact that the possessive "its" was not in use at that time, in connection with which he brings to light the curious circumstance, that in the early editions of the authorized version, and in the Geneva Bible, Lev. xxv. 5, reads "of it own accord," a transition to the present usage also found in other books at the beginning of the seventeenth century. He likewise vindicates the syntax of Rev. xviii. 17 (riches is) on the ground that riches is a singular, formed from the French richesse, the s being radical and not a plural termination, any more than in alms and eaves, though now becoming plural through forgetfulness or ignorance of their origin.* In Wiclif's English the plural of riches is richessis, and in perfect agreement with our Bible, Shakspeare writes, "the riches of the ship is come ashore." The author objects likewise to the use of the subjunctive were instead of was, when no contingency is meant to be implied; but this confusion of the moods is almost as universal in the English writers of the present day as the reverse, or the exclusive use of the indicative, is among ourselves. Another inaccuracy, very common in our version, is the arbitrary and unmeaning junction of both moods in one construction (John ix. 31, If any man be a worshipper of God and doeth his will).

^{*} Is there not an analogy to this in suburbs, which is not only treated as a plural, but provided with a corresponding singular form, suburb, in the latest usage?

The next of the Dean's criticisms, although just as against the common version, betrays, by a gratuitous addition, what might well have been suspected, that his scholarship, though varied and extensive, is not boundless. After correctly stating that cherubim being already plural, it is excess of expression to add another, an English plural, as our translators have done once in the New Testament (Heb. ix. 5) and constantly in the Old by writing cherubins; he unfortunately adds that "Cherubins of glory, as it is in the Geneva and Rheims versions, is intelligible and quite unobjectionable," because, "the Hebrew singular is there dealt with as a naturalized English word, forming an English plural." Non omnia possumus omnes; but any American "churchman" or "dissenter," though without a tithe of the learned Dean's advantages, would be severely handled for forgetting that Cherubin is not the "Hebrew singular," but the Chaldee plural of the same word (Cherub.) He might as well have represented the provincial plural, housen, used in some parts of America and England, as the singular of houses.

Another point, in which we think our author less felicitous than usual, is his lamentation over the frequent use of adjectives in "ly" as adverbs, ("behave itself unseemly," "soberly, righteously, and godly,") which appears to us to be only one example of a very common phenomenon in language, the contraction of two like forms into one, or the use of one for two distinct purposes, as in the English genitive or possessive plural, where the final s denotes both case and number, the apostrophe now added being a mere orthographical expedient to point out the omission of a letter. The Dean's analogical argument, which substitutes "improper" for "unseemly," is entirely fallacious, as there is in that case no adverbial form at all, whereas in the other it coincides with the termination of the adjective itself, the one being just as readily suggested as the other. That is to say, "godly" and "unseemly" are both adjectives and adverbs, both in sense and form; and though a morbid love of uniformity is tending to proscribe all adverbs except such as end in "ly," we cannot think that Dr. Trench would tolerate such phrases as to "smell sweetly," or to "look beautifully," which, besides their finical preciseness, really convey a different idea from the one intended. But if "sweet" and "beautiful" may be employed as adverbs, without any distinctive termination, how much more may "godly" and "unseemly," which may be regarded as euphonic contractions of the uncouth full forms, "godlily," "unseemlily," of which an unabbreviated instance ("holily") is found in 1 Thess. ii. 10.

We concur in both parts of our author's last suggestion as to the grammar of the common version, namely, that the old English preterites, "spake," "brake," &c., ought to stand, as being perfectly well understood, and all the better for their antique form; but that "which" should be replaced by "who," when persons are referred to, and "his" or "her" by "its," when the reference is to things, not persons. We venture to add, as a grammatical suggestion, that such anomalous and unmeaning combinations as but and, and such gratuitous expletives as the which, should be carefully expunged, if not in the printing, in the reading of the Scriptures, as alike foreign from the form of the original and English usage, and yet necessarily suggestive of a false emphasis or spurious distinction, as appears from the extreme care with which some readers dwell upon these slight interpolations, and repeat them themselves, in order to supply them when they have been inadvertently omitted.

The third chapter presents, in a very interesting and instructive manner, some of the difficulties with which all translators of the Bible must contend, and over which our own have not invariably triumphed. After pointing out, with great solemnity and force, the fearful risks of mistranslation into new tongues, and the opposite embarrassments arising from deficiency and multiplicity of terms, the author shows how much the whole development of Latin theology has been affected by the use of the neuter verbum to translate the masculine $\lambda \dot{\phi} \gamma \sigma \zeta$, and of pænitentia to represent $\mu \varepsilon \tau \dot{\phi} \nu \sigma a$, though he thinks both words, upon the whole, to have been properly preferred to sermo and resipiscentia. Another interesting statement has respect to the four modes of rendering technical expressions, such as measures and official titles, all of which have been promiscuously used in our translation, sometimes substituting English

equivalents (as in "Mars' Hill," "pavement;") sometimes putting the genus for the species (as in "measure," "piece of silver," "piece of money," "deputy," "magistrate," "wise men;") sometimes using a specific kindred term, approximating to the strict sense of the Greek one (as in "farthing," "penny," "firkin," "easter," town-clerk," to which Trench adds, "Mercurius" and "Diana," as mere Roman substitutes for "Hermes" and "Artemis;") sometimes retaining the original expression, with or without a slight modification (as in "paradise," "Messias," "tetrarch," "proselyte," "pentecost.") He shows the disadvantages attending all these methods and the impossibility of using any one exclusively. He supposes our translators to have commonly preferred the second, even where one of the others appears manifestly preferable, as when they translate ἀνθύπατος by "deputy," whereas "proconsul" was the proper Latin term, already introduced by Wiclif. We shall not repeat our author's just remarks upon the ill effects which have arisen from the various forms of the same proper names in the English version of the Old and New Testament, as this is now very commonly admitted, and some of the latest versions actually make them uniform. Nor need we dwell upon the less important want of uniformity in Greek and Latin terminations ("Sylvanus" and "Mercurius," but not "Paulus" or "Urbanus," while in other names both forms occur, as "Mark" and "Marcus," "Timothy" and "Timotheus," to which may be added "Jona" and "Jonas," "Cretes" and "Cretians.") Still slighter inconsistencies are those exemplified by "Ephesus," "Miletus," as compared with "Assos," Pergamos," or "beryl" and "jacinth," as compared with "sardius" and "chrysoprasus." In reference to one word of this last class ("chrysolite,") our author makes too sweeping an assertion when he says, that it is "mis-spelt 'chrysolyte,' and the etymology obscured, in all our modern editions:" whereas two of Bagster's, which we happen to have near us, give the true form, to say nothing of American impressions, with which of course we cannot expect the Dean of Westminster to be familiar. Another slight inaccuracy is the statement. that in Acts xxviii. 15, the sacred historian has merely written the name Tres Tabernæ in Greek letters, and not turned into

equivalent Greek words, whereas both in this name and in Appli Forum, he gives all four words a Greek termination.

The last grammatical point noted by the author, is the frequent resolution of a genitive into an adjective construction, (as "forgetful hearer" for "hearer of forgetfulness," "natural face" for "face of nature," "unjust steward" for "steward of injustice,") which he thinks is often well done, but at other times without necessity, and occasionally with manifest loss, (as in "beloved son" for "son of his love," "our vile body" for "the body of our vileness," "his glorious body" for "the body of his glory," "glorious liberty" for "liberty of glory," "uncertain riches" for "uncertainty of riches.") Upon this we have only to remark, that in some such cases the accompanying pronoun qualifies the whole phrase, so that "body of his glory" would be more exactly rendered "his body of glory," which is

really the same thing with "his glorious body."

The fourth chapter treats of "some unnecessary distinctions introduced" into the common version, and opens with a cautionary notice, that its authors were really revisers rather than translators, being required not to make something altogether new, nor even to bring good out of evil, but to frame a better or a best translation out of several previous good ones; an advantage not without its accompanying drawbacks, and especially the danger of retaining inadvertently the errors of preceding versions, for which they thus become themselves responsible. This, though true in general, is particularly applicable to the false distinctions now in question, which arise in part, however, from the deficiencies of language itself, or rather from the want of perfect correspondence and exact equivalents in any two dialects whatever. There is no more prevalent mistake, among those who are conversant with one tongue only, than the notion that "words in one language cover exactly the same spaces of meaning which other words do in another; that they have exactly the same many-sidedness, the same elasticity, the same power of being applied, it may be, now in a good sense, now in a bad;" whereas "words are enclosures from the great outfield of meaning; but different languages have enclosed on different schemes, and words which are precisely co-extensive are much rarer than we incuriously assume."

As illustrations of this general statement Trench refers to ἄγγελος, μάγος, παράκλητος, κύριε, as having no exact equivalents in English, and correctly rendered therefore by different words in different connections ("angel" and "messenger," "wise man" and "sorcerer," "comforter" and "advocate," "lord" and "sir.") At the same time he regards the variations in our version as too numerous, and frequently gratuitous, and that not merely from neglect or inadvertence, but in application of a mistaken principle, or false taste on the part of the translators, as expressed in the preface to King James' Bible, namely, that the version should be varied, even where the sense remains the same, to please fastidious readers, and employ a greater number of good English words. This deprives the English reader of the help to be derived from a comparison of all the places where a word occurs, as there is nothing to suggest, for instance, that "atonement," (Rom. v. 11,) "reconciling," (Rom. xi. 15,) and "reconciliation," (2 Cor. v. 18,) all represent the same Greek word (καταλλαγή.) A still more striking instance is, that one Greek verb (λογίζομαι) occurs eleven times in a single chapter (Rom. iv,) and is twice rendered "count,' three times "reckon," and six times "impute," while in Gal. iii. 6, it is "account." Of less doctrinal importance, though injurious to the point and beauty of the passage, is the use of wholly different expressions to represent similar or kindred forms, as "seats" and "thrones," in Rev. ii. 13, iv. 4, xvi. 10, "preach" and "setter forth," in Acts xvii. 18, 23, (where the Vulgate has "annuntio" "annuntiator," and the Rhemish version "preach" and "preacher;") "unknown" and "ignorantly," Acts xvii. 18; "defile" and "destroy," 1 Cor. iii. 17; "wicked" and "miserably" (κακούς κακῶς) Matt. xxi. 41; "concluded" and "shut up," Gal. iii. 22, (where the Vulgate has "conclusit" and "conclusi;") "lust" and "covet," Rom. vii. 7; "work" and "do," Phil. ii. 13; "withhold" and "let," 2 Thess. ii. 6; "want" and "lack," James i. 4, 5; "comfort" and "consolation," Rom. xv. 4, 5; "witness" and "testimony," John iii. 11, 32; "hurt and damage," and "harm and loss," Acts xxvii. 10, 21; "householder" and "goodman of the house," Matt. xx. 1, 11; "governor" and "ruler," John ii. 8, 9; "goodly apparel" and "gay clothing," James ii. 2, 3.

The same objection lies against the use of different words to represent the same Greek ones in parallel passages, a case of frequent occurrence in the gospels, which are thus made to appear less alike in English than they are in the original. (For example, compare Matt. xxvi. 41 with Mark xiv. 38, and the threefold form in which Gen. xv. 6 is quoted in Rom. iv. 3; Gal. iii. 6; James ii. 23, to which our author adds, that the same familiar phrase from the Old Testament is once translated "a sweet-smelling savour," and once "an odour of a sweet smell.") In the same way similarities of language in writings of the same date are obliterated to the English reader, such as "working" (Eph. i. 19,) and "operation," (Col. ii. 2;) "lowliness" (Eph. iv. 2,) and "humbleness of mind," (Col. iii. 12;) "compacted" (Eph. iv. 16,) and "knit together," (Col. ii. 19;) with much more of the same kind, brought out by the late Professor Blunt, (in his "Duties of the Parish Priest,") as one chief reason why the clergy ought to study the original Scriptures. This chapter closes with a select list of instances in which this kind of variation, although often unavoidable, is carried to a needless excess. Of these the most remarkable is that of the verb καταργέω, which occurs but twenty-seven times in the New Testament, and is represented by no less than seventeen distinct English words and phrases.

The fifth chapter points out and illustrates the opposite error of employing one word to translate several not entirely synonymous. This arises partly from the absence of equivalents in English, which has only one word for man, life, temple, true, love, and new, every one of which in Greek has two or more equivalents. The most inconvenient instance of the kind, our author thinks, is the employment of the word "hell," both for hades and geenna, a confusion only to be remedied by limiting that version to the latter, and naturalizing the former as an English word. But besides these unavoidable deficiencies, arising from the poverty of language, there are others of the same kind which might easily have been avoided, such as the use of "beast" in the apocalypse, to represent both $\vartheta \dot{\eta} \rho \iota \omega \nu$ and ζῶον, an error which the Vulgate has escaped, but which is found in all the English versions, notwithstanding the analogy afforded by the use of "living creature" in the first chapter of Ezekiel. Other cases of the same sort are the uniform use of "wise," "forgiveness," "basket," where the Greek term varies. In this last case, Dr. Trench commends the Vulgate for employing distinct terms (cophinus and sporta,) which is very different from Mr. Sawyer's method of avoiding the same error.* Again, our translators, for the most part, obliterate the distinction between $\pi \alpha \tilde{a} \zeta$ and $v \tilde{c} \delta \zeta$ $\vartheta \varepsilon o \tilde{v}$, by rendering both "son," and thus obscuring the allusion to the "servant of God," so often mentioned in the prophecies. Without dissenting from the justice of this criticism, we think it right to add, that Trench himself has not sufficiently brought out the important fact that $\pi \alpha \tilde{a} \zeta$, in the New Testament, is really a middle term between "son" and "servant," the prominent idea being now the one and now the other, but the word in every case suggesting the complex idea of a filial service, or (if we may so say) a servile sonship.

As concluding examples of the error now in question, he notes the fact, that "thought" is used to render six Greek nouns, and "think" twelve Greek verbs, while an equal number is translated by the verb "to trouble," though the language furnishes a number of equivalents, such as "vex," "disturb," "distress," "afflict," harass," &c.

The sixth chapter brings together the few instances, in which our author thinks an older version has been changed for the worse or banished to the margin; such as Matt. xxviii. 14, where the Geneva Bible had correctly rendered, "if this come before the governor;"† Mark xi., 17, where Tyndale rightly reads not "of" but "unto all nations;" Eph. iv. 18, where the marginal version ("hardness of their heart") is that of the Geneva Bible; 1 Thess. v. 22, where the same version more correctly reads, "from every kind of evil;" Heb. xi. 13, where "received" is less expressive than Wiclif's "greeted" and Tyndale's "saluted;" 1 Pet. i. 17, where the Geneva version is, "ye call him Father."

Over against these retrocessions, as he thinks them, from the best translation, Dr. Trench arrays examples of the much more frequent movement in an opposite direction, or of manifest improvement on the older versions; as in Heb. iv. 1, where they all have "forsaking the promise" instead of "a promise

^{*} Vide supra, p. 66.

being left us;" and in Acts xii. 19, where they read "commanded to depart," instead of "put to death," which is itself too strong, however, being not so much a version as a gloss. though a correct one, the exact translation being that expressed by Trench himself in praising the common version, namely, "he commanded them to be led away" (i. e. to execution.) A more important and more manifest improvement is the use of "Him" in John i. 3, 4, where the older English versions have the impersonal or neuter "it." Sometimes the expression is improved although the sense remains the same; as in the substitution of "earnest expectation" for "fervent desire" (Rom. viii. 19;) or that of "tattlers" for "triflers" (1 Tim. v. 13;) or that of "whited" for "painted" (Matt. xxiii. 27;) or that of "distraction" for "separation" (1 Cor. vii. 35;) or "Crete" for "Candy" (Acts xxvii. 7;) or "profane" for "unclean" (Heb. xii. 16.)

As instances of better renderings placed in the margin, which our author looks upon as very much the same thing as omitting them, he cites John iii. 3, "born again" (marg. "from above;") Matt. v. 21, "said by them" (marg. "to them;") Matt. x. 16, "harmless as doves," (marg. "simple;") Mark vi. 20, "observed him" (marg. "kept or saved him;") Mark vii. 4, "tables" (marg. "beds;") Luke xvii. 21, "within you" (marg. "among you;") Col. ii. 18, "beguile you" (marg. "judge against you;") 1 Thess. iv. 6, "in any matter" (marg. "in the matter;") Heb. v. 2, "have compassion on" (marg. "reasonably bear with;") 2 Pet. iii. 12, "hasting unto the coming" (marg. "hasting the coming;") 1 Tim. vi. 5, "gain is godliness" (Coverdale, "godliness is lucre," i. e. a means of gain;) Heb. ix. 23, "patterns" (Tyndale, "similitudes;" Trench, "copies.")

The seventh chapter treats of the Greek grammar of our version, as its English grammar had been previously handled. The first deficiency here indicated and exemplified, is the omission and insertion of the article without necessity, and sometimes so as to obscure the sense, or at least enfeeble the expression; as in Rev. xvii. 14, where the strict translation is "THE great tribulation," with distinct allusion to the prophecies of Daniel (xii. 1,) and of Christ himself, (Matt. xxiv. 22. 29;)

Heb. xi. 10, "THE city which hath foundations;" John iii. 10, "THE teacher of Israel;" Rom. v. 15. 17, "THE one . . . THE many." These are given as examples of unauthorized omission, while the converse error of gratuitous insertion is exemplified in Rom. ii. 14, where the form of the original is simply "gentiles," not "the gentiles;" 1 Tim. vi. 10, "a root," not "the root;" Acts xxvi. 2, "Jews," not "the Jews;" Phil. iii. 5, "a Hebrew of Hebrews," not "of the Hebrews."

Another violation of Greek grammar, not infrequent in the common version, is the loose and inexact translation of the prepositions, as in John iv. 6, "on the well" for "by (or at) the well," as the same Greek word is rendered elsewhere, (e. g. Mark xiii. 29, John v. 2;) Heb. vi. 7, "by whom," where the margin renders more correctly "for whom;" Luke xxiii. 42, "into thy kingdom," more correctly, "in thy kingdom;" as in Matt. xiv. 28; Gal. i. 6, "into the grace" for "in the grace;" 2 Cor. xi. 3, "in Christ" for "to (or toward) Christ;" 2 Pet. i. 5. 7, "to your faith to knowledge, &c.," for "in your faith in knowledge, &c.," as in the older versions.

A third offence against the canons of Greek Grammar is the habit of confounding verbal tenses, or neglecting the precise shade of meaning indicated by the present, perfect, aorist, &c., as in Luke xviii. 12, where "I possess," is the meaning of the perfect, and the present should be rendered "I acquire (or gain;" Luke xxi. 19, where "possess ye your souls" should be "acquire them," i. e. get the mastery of them; Luke xiv. 7. where "chose" does not convey the full force of the imperfect. "they were choosing;" Acts iii. 1, "went up" for "were going up;" Luke i. 59, "called" for "were calling, (or about to call;)" Luke v. 6, "brake," more exactly or at least more expressively, "was breaking." (Trench, "was in the act of breaking," or "was at the point to break;) Luke i. 19, "I am sent," which Trench amends, "I was sent," but which seems to us to require the proper perfect form in English, "I have been sent;" Mark xvi. 2, "at the rising of the sun;" Trench. "when the sun was risen," but retaining the original construction, "the sun rising," or "the sun having risen;" as in Luke

xiii. 2, and Col. i. 16, where Trench himself would read "have suffered," and "have been created."

Another grammatical inaccuracy, which he points out, is the needless substitution of pluperfects for the simple preterite, as in John v. 16, "had done" for "did;" ib. v. 13, "had conveyed (for conveyed) himself away." So too the voices are sometimes confounded, as in Phil. ii. 15, where all the English versions follow the Vulgate in giving to the middle voice (appear) the sense of the active (shine,) although the distinction is uniformly made in Greek, (compare John i. 5; 2 Pet. i. 19; Rev. i. 16, with Matt. xxiii. 27; 1 Pet. iv. 18; James v. 14,) and although it was made even here by the old Italic version, as quoted by Augustine. The converse error is exemplified in 2 Cor. v. 10, where "appear" is a passive form in Greek, and means "must be made manifest," a distinction clearly pointed out by Chrysostom, whose exposition is supposed to have exerted no small influence on our translation. To these examples we add Acts ii. 40, where the passive (be saved) is needlessly, if not erroneously, translated as the middle (save yourselves.) The phrase "all manner," where the Greek has simply "all," (Acts x. 12,) is not so much a mistranslation, as a gloss, intended to preclude too strict an explanation, and suggest what was supposed to be the writer's meaning; a departure from their proper work which few translators have entirely avoided. Of more importance, because very frequent in occurrence, and by no means without positive effect upon the point, if not the sense, of many passages, is the habitual confounding of the two verbs of existence (είμι and γίνομαι,) one of which corresponds to be, and the other to become, (or to begin to be.) Hundreds of cases, still more striking, might be added to the two which Trench adduces, viz. Heb. v. 11, where "ye are" should rather be "ye have become;" and Matt. xxiv. 32, where it is not the being tender, but the becoming tender, of the figtree, that announces the approach of summer. It might have been added, that the sense is here reversed, not merely by confounding the two verbs, but by arbitrarily substituting "yet" for "already."

The last grammatical inaccuracy noticed by our author, is vol. XXXI.—No. II. 35

the failure to express in English the precise force of the Greek interrogation with a negative, a point in which the idioms of the two languages are altogether different, so that "is not this the Christ?" (John iv. 29,) although in form an exact copy of the Greek, corresponds in meaning to our phrase, "is this the Christ?" as our translators have expressed it in Matt. xii. 23, though all the editions, since the middle of the seventeenth century, appear to have introduced the "not," either carelessly

or as a supposed correction.

The eighth chapter under the title of "questionable renderings of words," suggests some new and some familiar changes of unequal plausibility; such as that of "stature" to "age" (Matt. vi. 27,) for which the usual arguments are stated; that of "about my father's business" to "in my father's house" (Luke ii. 49,) which is now the favourite interpretation; that of "bare" to "bare away" or "carried off" (John xii. 6,) which, it seems, is as old as Augustine (ministerio portabat, furto exportabat; that of "men" and "women" to "males" and "females" (Rom. i. 26, 27;) that of "causeth us to triumph" (2 Cor. ii. 14,) to "triumphs over us," as rendered by Jerome (triumphat de nobis;) that of "spoil you" (Col. ii. 8) to "make spoil (or prey) of you," as proposed by Bengel (non solum de vobis sed vos ipsos spolium faciat;) that of "show" (Col. ii. 23) to "reputation," which is rather modernizing than improving; that of "raiment" (1 Tim. vi. 8) to the more generic "covering," as in the Vulgate (quibus tegamur;) that of "matter" (James iii. 5) to the marginal translation, "wood" or Trench's "forest," as in better keeping with "the spirit and temper of this grand imaginitive passage," and recommended by the use of the same image both in Homer and Pindar. All these are modestly suggested, not as positive improvements, but as possible amendments, as to which there may be wide diversity of judgment. We should be most disposed to question two which we have not yet quoted, namely, 2 Cor. ii. 17, where Bentley's version ("corrupters of the word of God for filthy lucre") is not a mere translation but a gloss; and Rev. iii. 2, where the proposition to translate τὰ λοιπά as if it were τοὺς λοιπούς, though it may convey substantially the true sense, is as much a departure

from the form of the original as that which Trench himself condemns in the authorized version of Acts x. 12.*

The ninth chapter follows up these "questionable renderings" with a more positive specification of "words wholly or partially mistranslated;" such as "nests" (Matt. viii. 20) for "shelters" or "habitations;" "Canaanite" (Matt. x. 4) for "zealot" (Luke vi. 15;) "before instructed" (Matt. xiv. 8) for "urged on," or, as we should think still better, "prompted" (or "instigated,") without any implication of resistance; "on foot" (Matt. xiv. 13) for "by land," where the strict sense seems to us sufficiently inclusive or suggestive of the other; "a place where two ways met" (Mark xi. 4) for "a way round" (a crooked lane;) "men of like passions" (Acts xiv. 13) for "men who suffer like things;" "too superstitious" (Acts xvii. 22) for "very religious;" "able" (Acts xxv. 5) for "in authority;" "commit sacrilege" (Rom. ii. 22) for "rob temples:" "slumber" (Rom. xi. 8) for "torpor" or "stupor;" to "see Peter" (Gal. i. 18) for "to acquaint myself with Peter;" "seditions (Gal. v. 20) for "dissensions;" "first-born of every creature" (Col. i. 15) for "born (or begotten) before the whole creation;" "drowned" (Heb. xi. 29) for "engulfed" (or swallowed up;) "trees whose fruit withereth" (Jude 12) for "autumnal trees;" "use of edifying" (Eph. iv. 29) for "edifying of need" (or necessary edification.) In some other cases cited in this chapter, the proposed improvement seems to us to be not so much a corrected version as an exegetical addition, e.g. "think himself religious" for "seem to be religious" (James i. 26,) where the latter is the true translation, though the former may be a correct gloss. So too in Mark xii. 26, "in the bush" is the nearest approach that could be made to an exact translation, and the question whether it describes the place of the transaction or the place where it has been recorded is entirely exegetical, as Trench himself admits by saying, "how, indeed, to tell this story in the English version is not easy to determine, without forsaking the translator's sphere and entering on that of the commentator." This is a fair concession; but instead of being thrust in parenthetically near the close of this enumeration of "words wholly or partially mistranslated," it should

^{*} Vide supra, p. 273.

rather have excluded from the list all instances in which the version only fails in making clear what is obscure in the

original.

In the ninth chapter, the author vindicates the translators from the charge of doctrinal bias, either as Protestants or Calvinists, the passages alleged by Papists being Heb. xiii. 4; 1 Cor. xi. 27, ("and" for "or;") Gal. v. 6, (active for passive;) by Arminians Acts ii. 47, and Heb. x. 38. To show how groundless the first charge is, Trench directs attention to the fact that King James's Bible uniformly substitutes "idol" and "idolatry" for "image" and "image-worship," where the latter forms had been employed by the earlier versions, perhaps in their controversial zeal against the church of Rome. The famous equivoque in Matt. xxiii. 24, which though without any doctrinal importance, has perhaps occasioned as much misapprehension as any other passage in our version, it being "no doubt the supposition of most English readers, that to 'strain at' means to 'swallow with difficulty.'" Trench regards it as a mere typographical error, as the older versions have "strain out," and as misprints have been certainly detected in the first editions of King James's Bible, e. g. 1 Cor. xii. 28, "helps in governments" for "helps, governments,") and 1 Cor. iv. 19, ("approved" for "appointed.") In this last case, however, may not "approved" have been intended in some legal or forensic sense, a trace of which is still found in the technical usage of the term "approver?"

The eleventh and last chapter gives the author's views as to "the best means of carrying out a revision," in stating which he first enumerates the "difficulties and dangers," arising from the uncertain state of the Greek text; from the risk of shaking the popular faith in the English Bible as the very word of God, "supposing, as might only too easily happen, very much else to be disturbed with it;" from the risk of severing the only bond of union now existing between Churchmen and Dissenters, "the Roman Catholics and the Unitarians being the only bodies who have counted it necessary to make versions of their own;" from the less serious chance of wider separation between the Church of England and her daughter in America; and lastly, from the impossibility of stopping the emendatory pro-

cess when begun by one revision; the Edinburgh Review having seriously proposed a permanent commission to be always embodying the latest allowed results of biblical investigation, and another writer no less gravely urging a revision once in fifty years.

Far from extenuating these objections, Dr. Trench considers them sufficient to discourage all attempts at revision, if it were avoidable; but this, he is persuaded, is impossible. "However we may be disposed to let the question alone, it will not let us alone." The inconveniences of staying where we are, will, he thinks, soon be manifestly greater than the inconveniences of action; and although there will be danger in both courses, it is only in accordance with the dictum of the Latin moralist, "nunquam periclum sine periclo vincitur." The real question, as he understands it, is not whether change can be avoided, but how we should prepare ourselves to meet or make it, and how it may be rendered least dangerous and hurtful. His proposition is, in substance, to appoint a mixed commission, by ecclesiastical or royal authority or both, representing the Church of England and all the orthodox dissenters, except "the so-called Baptists, who demand not a translation of Scripture but an interpretation;" and to let this body draw out a list of certain and necessary changes, "avoiding all luxury of emendation and using the same moderation here which Jerome used in his revision of the Latin." These emendations should be left "to ripen in the public mind," until their actual insertion in the text is generally called for, and the public become weaned from the existing form, as churchmen were of old from the Bishops' Bible, and Puritans from the Geneva. The inconveniences, he thinks, would be but transient, and the very unsettlement of old associations salutary.

After the author's own concessions and provisos, it is needless to enumerate the difficulties which would necessarily attend the execution of this project; first, in selecting the revisers, organizing them, and giving them authority; then, in securing a sufficiently extensive recognition of their labours to avoid the evils of distinct and independent versions; then, in giving general circulation to the proposed changes, without inserting them in the text of the authorized version; and lastly, in con-

trolling the insensible and dilatory process, by which the Dean of Westminster expects that insertion to be ultimately brought about.

To many well-disposed and interested readers we are much afraid that this new proposition will be only an additional reason for despairing of all legal and authoritative emendation of the English Bible, and for seeking some alternative, some practical method of attaining the same end, by means better suited to the actual state of things than those employed two hundred years ago, when the crown and Church of England held a very different relation to the Protestant world, and to the English-speaking races. For the benefit of such, we may conclude this paper with a few suggestions growing out of Dr. Trench's book or founded on it, although not exactly coinciding with his practical expedients. The first point, as to which we are disposed to dissent from his conclusions, is the absolute and unavoidable necessity of some change in the text of the authorized version, which the author rather takes for granted than attempts to argue. If the necessity assumed be simply of a moral nature, and the author merely means to say, that if we could, we ought to make the version better, this is merely saying what is universally admitted, namely, that a perfect version is to be preferred to an imperfect one, and should be substituted for it, if the change is feasible, without the risk of doing more harm than good. But if the meaning be, that such a change, whether safe or unsafe, must take place by some external necessity, entirely independent of all questions as to its expediency, we must confess that we are so far from perceiving this necessity or certainty of its occurrence, that we think the very question to be solved is, how it may be rendered possible. Particular editions may exhibit what are thought to be improvements, and such editions may obtain more or less of currency and influence; but why "King James's Bible," or the "Authorized Version," must be changed in spite of those who still agree to use it, we are utterly unable to perceive or guess. To us there is at least a want of clearness in the Dean of Westminster's position as to this point, which we regret the more because it is the very point on which he speaks with most decision, and with least appearance of a previous balancing of reason upon both sides of the question.

We may go still further and express our own conviction, that the authorized version not only may be left in statu quo by simply letting it alone, but also that its preservation intact is upon the whole the safest and the wisest course to be pursued, both on the negative ground, that change is difficult and dangerous, and on the positive ground, that Providence has given it a historical position which entitles it to permanence, as a sort of quasi-original to all the English-speaking races, and requires or recommends some other method of correcting the evils which may flow from its deficiencies or errors. For ourselves we have no hesitation in affirming that the evils arising from the loss of the agreement now existing among Protestant Christians in the use of the English Bible, would be vastly greater than the evils now arising from its imperfections. Even admitting all the charges made against it to be well-founded, they are scarcely sufficient to detract perceptibly from its effect, or to modify its intellectual and spiritual influence upon its readers. There seems to be a strong disposition in some quarters to confound the desirableness of absolute perfection in the version, as an object to be aimed at and desired, with its absolute necessity to give the Scriptures due authority and efficacy as a revelation and a vehicle of saving truth. The error is analogous to that of the old Montanists and Donatists in reference to the church, who, not content with seeking its entire purity from hypocritical and unworthy members, made this absolute purity essential to its very being, and, of course, to the validity of all its acts and ordinances, and moreover undertook to secure the purity required by mere coercive discipline, an error against which our Lord himself has warned us in the parable of the tares. The same spirit is exhibited in both the ways just mentioned, by the loudest clamorers against the English Bible, as if any amount of emendation would secure an absolute perfection, or as if the want of this perfection must destroy or even sensibly impair its intellectual and moral influence. How much nearer to the standard of ideal faultlessness does the English Bible come than the Septuagint version, which is nevertheless quoted and applied in the New Testament, wherever it is right

as to essentials, notwithstanding its deficiencies or errors as to minor points! This does not prove that an inexact translation is as good as an exact one; but it does prove that when Providence has suffered an imperfect version to acquire the authority and influence of a quasi-original, the advantages arising from this circumstance are not to be rashly sacrificed to the chimera of an absolute perfection, which may be forbidden by the very laws of language, or at least be unattainable by the means proposed, or if attainable accompanied by incidental evils far more serious than those necessarily arising from the minor imperfections, even of the Septuagint, but still more of the English Bible.

But while we thus believe that the best and safest mode of dealing with the text of the English Bible is the simplest and the easiest, to wit, that of letting it alone, except so far as interference may be necessary to extirpate changes which have been already made without authority or need; we think it absolutely necessary to the vindication of this "masterly inactivity" in textual innovation, that it should be accompanied by corresponding and proportionate exertion to prevent the evils which may possibly arise from this conservative position.

In the first place we consider it incumbent upon all who take this stand, to repudiate themselves, and to discountenance in others, the habit of regarding the authorized or any other version as precisely equal in authority to the ipsissima verba of the sacred oracles, and still more the illiterate and indolent treatment of its very inaccuracies and deficiencies as part and parcel of the Christian revelation. Instead of making the retention of the version as it is a pretext for reposing in it as the only form of the Divine Word to be recognized or used, in humble imitation of the Tridentine recognition of the Latin Vulgate as "authentic," it becomes those who assume the ground which we have taken, to maintain in theory, and promote in practice, the continual comparison of this exclusive version and acknowledged standard with the immediately inspired originals, not only as a subject of scholastic or professional study, but in the actual instruction of the people, from the pulpit, through the press, and in private intercourse. The difficulties which attend this question call for more expository

preaching, and for printed expositions more directly tending and adapted to correct and perfect the translation, so that hearers and readers may, as far as possible, be put upon the same footing with the student of the Greek and Hebrew text. The feeble efforts which have been already made in this direction should be followed up and carried out by abler hands. This we cannot but regard as more important and particularly called for at the present time than merely homiletical or hortatory comment, which any minister or teacher can supply, if once acquainted with the true sense of the language, more especially in those parts where the meaning is inadequately given in our Bible, and where there is a risk of the translator's errors being taken for the word of God. All this. however, though connected closely with the question of revision, is connected with it only as an auxiliary or preliminary measure, leaving still unsolved the interesting problem. how the version itself may be improved, or its deficiencies supplied, without an alteration of its text. This may seem to be a contradiction, and it is so if there can be no change in our customary modes of editing and studying the Scriptures. Even Dr. Trench appears to take for granted, that because the Bible is now usually printed without the marginal additions of the translators themselves, this practice must continue, and all plans involving a departure from it are to be rejected as impracticable. But in a case where the only choice is one of difficulties, this foregone conclusion is equivalent to giving up the whole thing in despair. To remedy existing evils without making any change in our established or familiar modes and habits, is not only in itself an unreasonable proposition, but at variance with the Dean's own project of revision, which would still more rudely violate old habits and associations. If the cumbrous machinery of a new commission, and a general revision, and a gradual amendment of the text, is not impracticable, why should it be thought impossible to have the English Bible printed in its original integrity, i. e., with the alternative translations in the margin, which are really a part of the authorized version, and ought never to have been excluded from it, a mutilation which might well excite our wonder, if we did not know that editorial audacity or ignorance has sometimes gone so far as to omit the titles or inscriptions of the

Psalms, as forming no part of the text.

Our next suggestion, therefore, is to restore the marginal translations of the first edition of King James's Bible to their proper place as an integral part of it, intended to afford the reader a choice, if not of senses, of expressions, and in many cases better than those given in the text. How this may be accomplished, is a question of detail and secondary interest. However difficult, it cannot well be more so than the imposition of a new text on the English-speaking races, by the virtual if not the formal act of Queen Victoria and the Church of England. To the obvious objection, that editions in the mutilated form would still be published, or that men would still refuse to read the margin, it may at least be answered as an argument ad hominem, that this result is far more likely in the case of Dr. Trench's revised version, and the provisional or tentative editions by which he proposes gradually to effect it. If the indisposition to read marginal matter is as great and invincible as Dr. Trench supposes, why not insert it in the text, where it really belongs, with brackets to prevent confusion? This would be a first step towards the restoration of King James's Bible to its integrity and pristine form. The next would be to rectify its errors and deficiencies by simply adding to the margin, not explanatory comments, but alternative translations, so as to allow the reader greater latitude of choice, or to make the meaning clearer by expressing it in different forms. This is the more desirable as no two languages can furnish absolute equivalents, so that paraphrase is often indispensable to a precise and full expression of the meaning.

But how or by whom are these marginal additions and corrections to be made? We answer, by the hands of individual and irresponsible correctors. But what is to give them authority and currency? We answer, their own merit, as determined by the public judgment. This, we know, is a precarious and dubious reliance; but we have no better, and we see no reason why a gradual adoption of the best amendments might not take place upon this plan as well as upon Trench's, with the great advantage of leaving the text itself untouched. For ourselves, we should expect far more from individual exertion than from

the joint action of any commission that could now be constituted by authority. But what is to become of the Bible Societies, with their numberless editions "without note or comment?" We will not alarm our readers by suggesting as a possible contingency, that these institutions may confine themselves hereafter to the collection of the necessary funds, and leave the printing of the Scriptures to the trade, and its distribution to be regulated by the churches. We make no such practical proposal, and express no wish upon the subject. But if the improvement of the authorized version should be found incompatible with actual arrangements, and the clamor for the former should grow louder, it may some day overbear the latter. But if this should not be so, we are prepared to see the authorized version circulated as it is, believing that with all its imperfections, it will do as little harm in future as it has in time past, and that while any tampering with its text would be like the letting out of water, fraught with error and confusion, truth contained in the existing version will to countless generations be found able (or sufficient) to make wise unto salvation.

ART. V.—Morality and the State. By SIMEON NASH. Columbus, Ohio: Follett, Foster & Co. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1859.

Morality and the State! How noble the theme in itself, and how urgently requiring treatment at the hands of a master, with special reference to our own time and our own country! Amid the shameless venality and profligacy which scarcely try to veil themselves under the mask of a decent hypocrisy in our American politics, and which taint our national, state, and municipal legislation, the voice of a judge and civilian expounding and enforcing the obligations of morality in the state, seems like a living spring bubbling up in a stagnant pool.

The purpose of this book, therefore, commands our warmest sympathy. And we are happy to add, that the execution of

that portion of it which bears directly upon the subject indicated by the title, is, in many respects, successful. This portion is exclusively the latter half of the volume, beginning with chapter eighteen, on "Social Morality." Here the ethics of sociology, as applied to the family, to society, and the state, are discussed with vigour. The moral standard set up is lofty, and, at times, even severe. In defining details of duty, the author sometimes runs into extravagance and ultraism. Thus he strenuously insists that every "individual has a right to a portion of the earth; to a portion sufficient by the application of his labour to provide for his physical wants." If this means any thing more than that those who have no land, may take to themselves a portion of the earth's surface not yet appropriated by man, we see not how it can stop short of agrarianism. Besides, it is inconsistent with what he says of the right of property, as that which "cannot be limited in time; a right of disposition whether by sale or gift, whether to be delivered in his (the owner's) lifetime, or after his decease." No way can be devised by which property, and the right to dispose of it at pleasure, can consist with its universal distribution. The right to dispose of property is a right on the part of the improvident and unfortunate to transfer it to the prosperous and prudent; and it is the right of the latter class to keep for themselves and their heirs what they honestly acquire.

Again he says, "a thing is worth what it cost to make it, on the principle of paying labour a fair day's wages for a fair day's work, and capital a fair return. It is a sin to sell or buy at a less price." Such unqualified language as this refutes itself. A thousand cases may be supposed, and are of constant occurrence, in which it is a duty to buy and sell at less than

cost.

"The same view strips slavery of all legality, of all justification, even of all apology. Slavery is inconsistent with the right of education, of moral culture, of free thought. Man is bound to all these; but slavery deprives him of these rights, forbids him to perform these duties," p. 298. Slavery is involuntary servitude, in which the law gives the master the title to the services of the slave, without his consent. But it is clear that all this may be without interfering with his right of suit-

able education, moral culture, or free thought. The law may guaranty all these rights to him while it makes him a slave. Or if the law comes short in this respect, the master may not. The above language of the book is in direct conflict with the Bible. It pronounces that a sin, in all circumstances, which the word of God treats as no sin in some circumstances. A super-scriptural morality is an infidel morality. It can do no good. It works evil and evil only in church and state. Abolitionism only binds the burdens and fetters it seeks to loose. It has yielded nothing as yet but the apples of Sodom and the clusters of Gomorrha. Its most significant achievements thus far, are open infidelity in its foremost leaders, and a school of extremists in opposition, who advocate slavery as the ideal form of society, and the slave-trade as a means of invigorating

and perpetuating it.

While a certain radicalism of the kind we have indicated detracts from the value of the political part of the treatise, we are happy to say that it is largely compensated by a sound conservatism in other respects, and by a high moral tone, whereby it brings politics, in every aspect, attitude and relation, under the most stringent applications of Christian ethics. Judge Nash repudiates the popular infidel theories as to the origin of government, and the ground of its obligation. He rejects the social compact theory in all its forms. He denies that superior numbers, power, or the consent of the governed constitute the ground of the obligation to obey government. He takes the Christian ground, that it is the ordinance of God, and therefore, within its proper sphere, its ordinances bind the conscience by a divine authority. And so long as it duly fulfils its functions, the obligation to obey it holds, whatever be its form-monarchic, aristocratic, democratic, or mixed. The obligation to obey any government ceases, when it transcends its sphere, and commands us to disobey God. To obey it then is to abet a creature in his rebellion against the Creator. There is no room for doubt, when the only question is "whether we ought to obey God rather than man." Yet, if one is consciencebound to disobey human laws, in fealty to God, our author teaches, that he must quietly bear the penalty, committing his cause to him that judgeth righteously; unless when government

has become oppressive, to that degree that renders revolution both justifiable and feasible. All mere insurrections and rebellions are condemned, while the right of revolution is asserted, in cases where the people have outgrown their form of government, or are hopelessly oppressed by the reigning dynasty, and have the spirit and probable power to apply an adequate remedy by overturning it. According to our author, the state and its authority are one thing; the particular organization or persons by whom its authority may be exercised for good or evil, are another. The former always live without intermission. The latter may be changed for cause, either under the forms of law as in free governments, or in conformity to the behests of eternal justice, and the only end for which government of any sort ought to exist-as in the case of our own Revolution. We do not, however, endorse the opinion, more than once advanced by the author, that there can be no revolution, rebellion or other general uprising of the people, which is not stimulated by oppressions or grievances, such as either absolutely justify it, or would justify it, if it could succeed. We think history furnishes abundant examples of popular outbreaks stimulated by artful and aspiring leaders, where the oppression is slight or imaginary.

The carnestness and force with which Judge Nash insists that the state should subordinate all material interests to the moral and spiritual well-being of the people, in providing education, protecting and encouraging Christian institutions, in suppressing licentious and demoralizing publications, is well fitted to enlist that attention to these high themes, which they deserve and now urgently need. His vehement denunciation of that popular Political Economy which ignores man's spiritual and immortal nature, and treats of him as a being of exclusively material wants, is both deserved and needed. In all his utterances he is perfectly outspoken and uncompromising. While he insists on the duty of voting for the most upright and able men for all public offices and trusts, and on goodness as the most indispensable requisite in public officers, he urges upon good men the duty of accepting and discharging public office. The demagogue, the partisan, the mere politician as distinguished from the statesman, are held up to reprobation, with indignant and excoriating eloquence; while he forcibly shows that the chief peril of democracy lies in ignorance and vice among the masses, combined with able, adroit and unprincipled leaders, who use them without scruple for their own aggrandizement. Of the partisan he says:

"He never has any opinions of policy but those which are considered popular; hence he never originates, but servilely follows. With him the question is not, what is right, what is best for national dignity and true progress; but what course will secure votes at the next election; what policy will keep him in office? . . . His speeches are not made to elucidate truth, to establish right, to enlighten the public mind, and advance great national interests; they look lower; their object is to secure a personal and party triumph at all hazards; hence the staple of them is crimination of all political opponents, and a studied effort to make the worse appear the better reason, to dash and perplex maturest counsels. His haunts are crowds and bar-rooms, and party-caucuses, and secret party meetings; he is more familiar with the cunning devices and tricks by which an election may be carried, than with the science of politics, or the nature of governments, or the manifold applications of political and moral truth." . . .

"Out of such men is constituted that party organization which seeks personal aims, not national good. They are envious of the really great and good; and hence combine to put them down by slanders, which may render them unpopular with the ignorant and the bad, unsuccessful at the polls. Party machinery is worked to prevent such men from occupying public positions, lest once there they cannot be displaced. . . . Against such minds, smaller and narrower minds ever conspire and plot, well knowing that their own success depends upon keeping all intellectual and moral suns below the horizon, so that mere political moons may become the light of humanity. They are right in their schemes; but their schemes are schemes of deceit, and fraud, and wickedness, tending to dwarf, instead of elevating the head and heart of a great people." pp. 395-7.

We are sorry that this is no fancy-sketch, but a true portrait of a large proportion of those who make politics their

vocation in this country, and worming their way into various offices of state, are contributing to debase the people, and degrade the government. In taking leave of the portion of the book which deals with the topic indicated by the title, while we regret the exaggerations and ultraisms which occasionally deform it, we appreciate its elevated and even intense ethical tone, and the sledge-hammer blows which it visits, with crushing effect, upon various noisome social and political corruptions.

The first half of the book is another matter. It does not treat, except incidentally, of "Morality and the State." It consists of a series of essays on Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Theology. It seems to us mostly out of place. Not that these topics are not implicated with political morality. They interlock with it in various points. So, in their way, do Physiology, Medicine, Logic, Physical Geography, whatever sheds light upon Anthropology, Sociology, or Theology, in any of their departments. It is impossible, however, in treating any one subject, to give formal treatises on all topics that mingle with it, or conduce to its illustration. Plain and unquestionable truths in other related sciences must be assumed and taken for granted. Debatable points must be ventilated as they arise in prosecuting the discussion of the principal theme, otherwise the disquisitions on related subjects overshadow the principal topic. They obstruct the way to it, tire the reader in his search for it, divert attention to irrelevant issues, and, at best, serve as an incumbrance to the main work. We think this is the effect of the author's method in this volume. We have no doubt that, so far as "Morality and the State" are concerned, the portion of the book which treats of it, would be far more widely read and influential, if it were published by itself, and eased of its preliminary burden of discussions philosophical and theological. We suspect, however, that, in the author's view, this would have been giving us the house without its frame or foundation, the appetizing condiment without the substantial nutriment, the chief thing to which the other is accessory. In other words, we fancy that he had the propagation of his philosophy and theology quite as much at heart, as his political and social ethics. We judge so from the position

and emphasis, and apparent elaboration, given these topics. Were this all, we should drop the matter here. But the philosophy and theology are of a peculiar stamp. They belong to a mode of thinking unknown in this country until a recent period. They are somewhat crude, but bold and vigorous specimens of a type of theologizing and philosophizing that has worked its way from Germany, mostly via France and England, to this country, and is now actively obtruding itself on the public mind from various quarters. We will proceed forthwith to show more definitely what we mean.

The following from the Preface will indicate the sources of the author's inspiration. "The two modern writers who have exerted and are still exerting upon the thinking minds of England and America more influence than all other writers, are Coleridge and Carlyle. Now, this patent fact could not exist unless these men, with all their errors, had got hold of some vital truths hitherto overlooked; some new views of humanity, not hitherto developed; views approved by consciousness, and hence the ground of their power."

The following also from the Preface, reveals, in some measure, the conscious animus or drift of the author in this work. "I have written this work with no feelings of hostility to evangelical Christianity; my object has rather been to reconcile its teachings with those of human consciousness. If, therefore, any reader discovers reasonings coming in conflict with his own cherished views, and sapping some of his venerated dogmas, let him not deal in hard and unkind epithets, but let him be assured that in my view there is here no vital conflict with the truths of revelation, only with the errors and dogmas enunciated by human minds." The italics are the author's. As any assailant of evangelical Christianity who was not an avowed infidel would be likely to try, in advance, to conciliate his Christian readers by writing in this strain, while no sincere defender of such Christianity would use such language, we are furnished, at the very threshold, with a clew to the real scope and purpose of the book. Before we go further, we take occasion to say, that Judge Nash wholly overestimates the influence of Coleridge and Carlyle on British and American thinking. It is undoubtedly considerable, and has been more considerable

than it now is, since the German philosophy which is filtrated through their writings, and is the source of most of their speculative novelties, is coming to be more fully and extensively understood. It is a great mistake to suppose that the immediate coterie or circle with which the author is conversant, constitute the mass of thinking minds that use the English tongue. There is no doubt that the influence of Dr. Mahan at Oberlin and Cleveland, and of Dr. Hickok at Hudson, have given this type of thinking a certain currency in parts of Ohio, and that through other agencies, it has obtained a foot-hold in some colleges and seminaries of the north-east and north-west. It has also struck more deeply and widely into the centres of learning and culture in this country than in Britain. Indeed it was in this country that this class of authors first found the ardent welcome, and admiring appreciation, that lifted them to the rank of guides and oracles. Their significance in the sphere of theology and philosophy in their own country, has not been so much indigenous, as a reflection from the oracular authority conceded to them by their American admirers. These, however, never amounted to more than a thin stratum among the various orders of our thinkers. They have, nevertheless, been forward and pretentious. They have pressed and obtruded their views with the earnestness of men who felt that they had a mission and a message; a body of new and precious truths to unfold to their fellow-men.

Among these are two late works, besides that here under review, significant both from their authors and their contents, which have simultaneously appeared to claim the attention of the public. We refer to Dr. Bushnell's "Nature and the Supernatural," and Dr. Hickok's "Rational Cosmology." We refer to them here, irrespective of what we may say elsewhere, for the purpose of signalizing the fact that they, with the book under review, are all largely founded on one radical principle borrowed from Coleridge, which they make their starting point. In the book now under examination, the source of it is explicitly acknowledged, and presented in full and formal quotations from Coleridge's "Aids to Reflection."

. Says our author, (p. 72,) "Before proceeding with the question which the last chapter (on "Moral Psychology,") clearly

propounds, let us for a moment consider the meaning of a few words, which are necessarily being repeatedly used. A clear understanding of these terms, will contribute to a clear understanding of the views here set forth.

"The first of these words is NATURE. For our explanation of this, a remark of Coleridge may be cited. It will be found in his 'Aids to Reflection.' 'I have attempted then,' he says, 'to fix the proper meaning of the words nature and spirit, the one being the antithesis of the other; so that the most general and negative definition of nature is, whatever is not spirit; and vice versa, of spirit, that which is not comprehended in nature, or, in the language of our elder divines, that which transcends nature. But nature is the term in which we comprehend all things that are representable in the forms of time and space, and subjected to the relations of cause and effect, and the cause of whose existence, therefore, is to be sought for perpetually in something antecedent. The word itself expresses this in the strongest manner possible; nature, that which is about to be born, that which is always becoming. It follows, therefore, that whatever originates its own acts, or in any sense contains in itself the cause of its own state, must be spiritual and consequently supernatural." This passage will be found on page 155 of Marsh's edition of the Aids to Reflection, and others of like purport appear elsewhere in that volume, and in his other works.

To the same effect says Dr. Hickok: "Take then this free personality; this spontaneous agency with its law written upon and rising out of its own being; and we have made a long advance in our way to the Idea of the Absolute. We have found that which may absolve itself from the domination of nature, and stand forth wholly supernatural. . . . But truly an activity that goes out of its own accord, as is the rational in humanity, and thoroughly supernatural as it is, yet is ever subject to the colliding influences of flesh and sense." Rational Cosmology, pp. 80-1. The second chapter of Dr. Bushnell's Nature and the Supernatural is only the development of this germ from Coleridge. Indeed it runs as woof through the whole treatise. As we have here found the seed-principle of three separate works, on subjects widely different, yet all of

unsurpassed importance, it will not be amiss to offer some suggestions upon it, as it is presented by the master, as well as in the various dilute forms and applications of it given by his disciples. We do not mean to imply that what is novel in it is original with Coleridge. It bears unmistakable traces of a German paternity.

1. There is no fallacy more common than that of arguments founded on etymology. The force of the terms nature and supernatural is to be ascertained from good usage, which is constantly advancing beyond the original etymological import of words, and is controlled by the growth of human thought and knowledge, of which language is the inevitable exponent. We even speak of the nature of God. Does nature here mean that which is "about to be born," or that God is not supernatural? This argument from etymology, a favourite one with this class of writers, is wholly impotent and unworthy. If valid, it is a two-edged sword, which is quite as fatal to them as to their adversaries. Horne Tooke argued that there could be no eternal and immutable truths, because the word truth is derived from trow, to believe! How would they relish such an application of etymology?

2. Nature as contrasted with the supernatural is not necessarily contrasted with the term spirit. The established sense of the term supernatural confines it to beings, forces, and works, above man and physical nature. It is contrary to all usage to apply it to any thing that man can be or do of himself, propriis viribus, or with the aid of any mere powers or laws of the physical world. There is, indeed, a narrower sense of the word nature, in which it is sometimes used for the physical universe in contrast with man. But when used in contrast with the supernatural it always includes man, both as to his corporeal and spiritual nature. Any other use of it confuses and vitiates all discussions on this subject. Men claim to be supernaturalists, or to have established supernaturalism, by maintaining that man has reason or free-will. It is in no sense true that whatever is a spirit is "consequently supernatural."

3. Neither is it true, that whatever "in any sense contains in itself the cause of its own state, must be spiritual." Does not the acorn or egg contain in itself that which is in some

sense the cause of the various states into which it passes in becoming the oak or the ostrich? Or did not these contain in the germs whence they were developed, the causes of their being what they are? On the other hand, if the Christian doctrine of regeneration is true, the spirit in fallen man does not contain in itself that which is the cause of its purest and most perfect state as a spirit. So far from this, God maketh it to differ by his Spirit dwelling in it. And so false is it that "being the cause of its own state" is a criterion of spirituality, that the word of God styles those, by way of eminence, spiritual and spiritually minded, who are born of the Holy Ghost.

4. Still less is it true, that it is a criterion of nature as distinguished from spirit, that "the cause of its existence is to be sought for perpetually in something antecedent." Is not the cause of the existence of every created spirit to be sought in something antecedent—the creative flat of God? What then can such language mean, unless that all spirits are but the Infinite Spirit in varied manifestations? Is this "the hidden mystery in every, the minutest, form of existence," of which Coleridge discourses so sublimely, (Aids, p. 315,) and which, he says, "freed from the phenomena of Time and Space, and seen in the depth of real Being, reveals itself to the pure Reason, as the actual immanence of ALL in EACH?" The italics and capitals are all his. Or if this pantheism be not intended, what is? Is it that the cause of the acts and states of the soul, or the will, are not to be sought for "in any thing antecedent?" But this is untrue. No act of will or choice is without its cause in the antecedent bias, desires, views of the soul, and the objective motives which address them. Every man knows this as surely as he knows that he ever put forth a free act of choice. Is not the cause of every act of God to be found in his Infinite Goodness and Wisdom? This is not, indeed, a physical or compulsory cause. It does not militate against the most absolute freedom of choice between contrary objects. But it is the cause of that choice being what it is and not otherwise, and of its being impossible to be otherwise, and at the same time free.

5. Being "representable in the forms of Time" is no criterion of nature as distinguished from spirit; and being "repre-

sentable in the forms of Time and Space," is no criterion of nature as distinguished from the supernatural. Can any spirit be conceived to be or to act otherwise than in time! And are not nearly all psychologists agreed that the idea of time is suggested to the mind by the succession of which it is conscious in its own acts and states? On the other hand, it is not representable in space. Yet it is not supernatural in any known or appropriate meaning of that word.

Finally, although the spirit is out of "the relation of cause and effect" so far as physical or any other causation inconsistent with freedom is concerned, yet it is not beyond the reach of the great law, that every event must have a cause. Every act of the will is an act of causation which in the first instance suggests to us the clearest idea of cause. Nor is any volition of the mind irrespective of antecedent, subjective states and objective influences which ensure the mind's choosing as it does and not otherwise, if it choose freely, i. e. if it choose at all.

The application by our author of his views of nature and the supernatural, coupled with another Germanism borrowed from

Coleridge, will appear in the following passages.

"We have already seen that the mind presents two aspects, two sides as it were; one toward the natural and the other toward the spiritual; the first is sometimes called the understanding, the faculty judging according to sense; the other the reason, the faculty judging according to the spiritual. . . These two principles are ever in conflict, the one against the other; the reason ever tending to subject the body, its passions and appetites to the wholesome restraints of law, of moderation and of temperance; the understanding ever tending to subdue the reason and spirit to nature, to govern it by natural causes, and to bring it in subjection to matter. . . These various ideas shadow forth the prevalence of the notion of an irreconcilable antagonism between these two faculties of man, these two forms of development, called here the understanding and the reason. The same idea is developed by Paul in Romans vii. 23, 'For I behold another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members.' Again, 'For they who live after the flesh mind fleshly things; but they who live after the spirit mind spiritual things.' Here the apostle clearly recognizes two distinct sources of action for man; what he calls in the one case the law of sin and death, in the other the law of the spirit. . This view clearly corresponds with our division of the understanding and reason, the one partaking of the flesh, the other of the spirit; the one leading the mind to carnal gratifications, the other to spiritual acts of duty." Pp. 178-80. The same exegesis is also applied elsewhere to Romans viii. 5—13. On this we remark:

1. That we do not object to the use of the words Reason and Understanding to denote different faculties or classes of faculties or modes of knowing in the soul, provided such use be clearly defined and steadily adhered to. There is doubtless a distinction recognized in the usus loquendi so far as this, viz. that whereas understanding or intelligence of some sort may be ascribed in a low degree to animals as well as men, reason or rationality cannot be ascribed to the brutes. When we think of a nature as rational we also think of it as immortal, not necessarily so, however, when we think of it merely as, in some sort, intelligent. There is certainly a faculty of intuition called sense, by which we immediately perceive external objects And there is certainly a faculty by which we perceive certain intuitive ideas and self-evident truths not given through the outward senses. We have no objection to calling this inward eye Reason in contrast with the Understanding as the discursive faculty. This, at times, appears to be all that Coleridge and others intend. But they sometimes mean a vast deal more, as may be seen from the passages quoted from the work under review. And they often give vague and mystical intimations of much more than they express. But, at times, they let out enough to appal us. Thus Coleridge says (Aids, pp. 307-8) "I should have no objection to define Reason with Jacobi, and with his friend Hemsterhuis, as an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena. But then it must be added, that it is an organ identical with its appropriate objects. Thus, God, the Soul, eternal Truth, &c., are the objects of Reason: but they are themselves

reason." To the same effect he says, p. 137, "Reason is the power of universal and necessary Convictions, the Source and Substance of Truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves." And, p. 142, "The Reason in all its decisions appeals to itself, as the ground and Substance of their truth." In this last passage the italics are his, thus proving it no incautious statement. We see not how it could be more explicitly or emphatically affirmed that the Reason in man is no mere cognitive faculty, but that it is God in the soul. It is not probable that Judge Nash means to teach pantheism, because he says much of a contrary purport, and does not appear to be aware of the abysmal depths in which he is floundering. This indeed may be said of Coleridge and most others who have caught up pantheistic theories. But what less than that the spirit in man, be it reason or will, is God, can be implied in the doctrine he adopts from Coleridge, that it is not that "the cause of whose existence is to be sought for perpetually in something antecedent?" He often speaks of the "divine in man," and of Reason as being the divine. What is the meaning of the following passage? "Hence it may be said that man's life is hid in God; since God's life in its fulness includes all life, the life of humanity entire, as well as of each individual man. All men will in this ideal state live upon God's truths and laws, so far as their capacities can take them in and work them out in life; and yet all humanity can exhaust but a fraction of that infinite fulness of life, which is found alone in God. . . This unity of life is entirely consistent with distinct personality; it by no means destroys either man's or God's individuality. Each lives his own life, though all live the same life. . . In this explanation is seen the error as well as the truth of pantheism. God does in one sense live and work in humanity, but yet in entire consistency with the distinct personality of each," pp. 420-1. This certainly indicates the author's adhesion, so far forth, to the "truth of pantheism." What "error" of that system it points out is less apparent. Pantheists usually hold that each separate phenomenon of God has it own individuality, as well as an identity with God. All the waves of the ocean have their separate individuality; they "exhaust but a fraction of its infinite fulness." Yet they are

phenomena of it, consubstantial, all-one, with it. So of the relation of man and nature to God, in modern Monism or Pantheism.

2. Admitting the distinction between Reason and Understanding in the only sense which, as we have shown, is allowable, there is no such "antagonism" between them as the author maintains, herein not only following, but outrunning his master. The understanding is not, in its own nature, a "faculty judging according to sense," any more than according to spirit. The discursive faculties, which Coleridge identifies with the understanding, act indifferently upon the matter furnished by our external and our internal intuitions, by sense or reason. The discursive operations of thinking under the forms of abstraction, generalization, judgment, reasoning, take place just as freely with reference to self-evident mathematical, moral, logical, or metaphysical, truths or ideas, as in reference to objects of sense. Indeed, these processes could be carried on to only a limited degree, if at all, upon objects of sense, without the aid of these primitive internal cognitions. Such an "antagonism" as that set up by our author supposes a dualism in the human soul; not a mere conflict of passions and desires, resulting from its depravity, but two constituent elements in its normal state, in its very essence as a human soul; the divine and the human; the natural and supernatural; the one judging solely according to sense, the other according to spirit; the one lifting us to God, the other sinking us to the dust. According to this, one part of the human soul is corrupt and corrupting, the other pure and purifying. The author fitly illustrates his theory by the old oriental notion of "two souls, the good and the bad, which were ever in conflict, each striving for the supremacy, and the man became good or bad, as the good or bad soul obtained the mastery." P. 179. The doctrine of Christianity supported by consciousness is, that the mind is one, indivisible substance, with various powers, sensitive, cognitive, volitional; that, in its normal sinless state, all these act harmoniously, and so far from being "antagonistic," mutually complete each other; that the senses are not antagonistic to the spirit, but are the inlets of knowledge, which is its needful food; that the body in sinless man is not antagonistic

to the soul, but is its appropriate residence and organ; that sin or depravity pollutes and depraves the whole soul, in all its moral and spiritual states and activities, sensitive and intellectual, emotional and volitional; not that it infects one part, and leaves the other stainless, making the man half-angel, halffiend. The understanding is darkened. The mind and conscience are defiled. The heart is deceitful and desperately wicked. As to the will, men will not retain God in their knowledge. As to desire, they desire not the knowledge of his ways. The senses, and the members of the body, so far as it is an organ of the soul, partake of the depravation. The eyes are full of adultery; the poison of asps is under their lips; their feet are swift to shed blood. The conflict delineated by the apostle between the flesh and the spirit, the law in the members and the law in the mind, is simply the conflict between remaining sin and holiness dominant, but, as yet, imperfect: between the residuum of sinful nature pervading the man in all his parts and faculties, and the sanctifying Spirit whose work is progressive but as yet incomplete. It has not the remotest reference to the distinction between reason and understanding. The words flesh and fleshly are used to denote the depraved state of the soul, not because it is debased through the influence of the understanding operating as a "faculty judging according to sense," but because, when it swerves from holiness and God, from fealty to the supreme law by which it ought to be regulated, of necessity the lower and animal propensities acquire an undue sway. But this does not imply that depravity has its exclusive seat in the body, or its origin in any faculties exclusively sensuous. This is not what is meant by carnal as contrasted with spiritual mind. On the contrary the desires of the wicked are expressly styled "the desires of the flesh and the mind (διανοιῶν)," Eph. ii. 3. The word νοῦς translated "mind," Rom. vii. 23, is also used Rom. i. 28, in the phrase "reprobate mind," also Eph. iv. 17, in the phrase "vanity of their mind," and elsewhere in like manner. So far is it from signifying that which is of itself antagonistic to another class of faculties which are, in their nature, debased and debasing.

3. It is a fatal objection to the author's view, that it traces the origin of depravity, not to the perverse action of free-will

in a being created every way upright, as God made man in paradise; not even to a privative cause; but to the very structure of the intellect as originally created, and the necessary antagonism in the working of its different faculties. This is only tracing its source beyond man to his Maker.

4. The necessary consequence of this is, that what the author calls depravity he denies to be sin. According to him the genesis of human depravity is as follows: "A mind left to itself would be left to the teachings of nature, and only its understanding could, under such teachings, be developed; the reason or spirit would remain unborn, unconscious, inactive, undeveloped; and the man, acted upon only by nature, would become a little more intelligent than the beaver or elephant, and as ravenous for the gratification of his own appetites as the

hyena and the tiger.

"Herein lies human depravity. Our nature is disturbed, unbalanced . . . That there is anything like sin in this state of depravity is impossible, since sin is a personal thing, the violation of an admitted law; while this depravity is in nature, though its fearful consequences, like the pestilence, and the carthquake, and the storm, afflict all humanity. Still it cannot be sin, a personal act, for which the individual is responsible or can be held responsible. It is depravity, or spoiling, or rendering crooked, a distortion of humanity for which all suffer, but for which no one will be punished. If the human soul lives up to its present duties, it will not fail of its reward in consequence of this depravity, this spoiling of its nature.

"Such then is the condition of humanity, the understanding and reason in perpetual conflict; the understanding born first, the reason last; the understanding strong, the spirit weak, the understanding taught by that exacting teacher, nature; the reason by a feebler one the spirit of another." Pp. 182-4.

How then, we ask, are men "by nature children," not only of depravity, but "of wrath?" How has "death passed upon all men for that all have sinned?" And how is depravity seriously to harm us, if "living up to such present duties" as we may, still retaining it, "we shall not fail of our reward." Where is the need of cleansing by the blood of Christ, and the washing of

regeneration, of anything more than natural religion? shall see. He says:

"The death of Christ is the peculiarity of Christianity, the corner-stone of the whole scheme. The necessity of this is laid in the necessity that some act should be presented to the universe, by which, while the repentant were forgiven, the sanctity, and goodness, and holiness of the law might be maintained. To pardon without some great act of this kind, might leave upon the mind of intelligence the impression, that there was little difference between obedience and disobedience." P. 187. This, however, can hardly be necessary for those "who are living up to present duties." However this may be, according to the above representation, the death of Christ is not penal, substitutional, expiatory, in satisfaction of divine justice. It is, like his life and teaching, designed simply to create an "impression" that there is not a little difference between "obedience and disobedience."

"Man, left to himself, would never attain to the spiritual, never attain to the ideal, to the conception of a God. Hence God revealed his existence, his law, his truth, to the spirit of man; and it is still necessary for our spirit to reveal to another these spiritual ideas, which can be derived in no other way. It is literally true that there is a spiritual birth; for what is born of the spirit is spirit. The spirit of the child is brought into consciousness by the spirit of another, and so is born of it. 'I have begotten you, says St. Paul, (1 Cor. iv. 15,) 'through the gospel.' Here he calls himself their father; he has begotten them by the truth, which he has poured into their minds; and which truth became to them a source of new life, a spiritual life." P. 182. According to this, regeneration seems to consist in imparting truth to the mind, and thus bringing the reason to birth or consciousness. It is no supernatural transformation of the soul by the immediate energy of the spirit of God, except in the transcendental sense of the word "supernatural," which is only another name for natural. We discover no regeneration in this system, beyond the Socinian moral culture and development of the germinal forces of nature.

The author's views on this subject will still further appear, if

we notice the kind of truth which he deems necessary to beget moral goodness, effective for regeneration, and the class of persons who are partakers of it. He says, (p. 128,) "what man believes to be this correct expression (of the universe) is truth to it, and must have the influence of truth on the life." "Even error believed, is better than unbelief; since the first will develope the spiritual in man, which the latter cannot do." P. 141. "From our previous analysis of human consciousness, it is clear that sin consists in acting in contradiction to and in violation of our moral judgments. These moral judgments are subjectively the law of God, to violate which is sin." P. 163. "All that is required of humanity is to act up to its own standard of rectitude, and all feel that they have ability to do that." P. 169. "This view of conscience presents important practical results. It gives a clew to the best mode of moral teaching, and takes away all ground for uncharitableness on account of a difference of conduct. There may be as much of moral worth in the one case as in the other; each acting up to his moral belief of what is right." P. 70. "The moral life, the spiritual life, the divine life in humanity are all equivalent expressions, and are all equally a life of faith." P. 110. "It seems a narrow view of God's mercy to suppose that earnest, sincere pagans are beyond the reach of his Spirit." P. 197. Referring to Livingstone's account of the conversion of the rain-doctor who found the belief in his power to make rain the most difficult of his pagan principles to abjure, he says: "Here we have the declaration of a most remarkable man, after his conversion, that he honestly did believe in his power to make rain; that with him this was no sham, no imposture; that he followed his incantations because he believed in the truth of his power. This single fact shows in what absurd things, absurd to us, but God's truth to them, the mind may honestly indulge. It will not do, therefore, to consign all pagan populations to the world of shams, and hypocrites, insincerities and impostures. And we learn from consciousness that what the mind receives as true, is true for it, and will develope its moral and religious emotions. It is certain then that there must have been pious souls, even under pagan superstition." P. 199. "The Greeks and through them other nations were educated to form moral

judgments, and taught the vital importance of obedience to them. Hereby was the truly spiritual in man developed." "Is the Hindoo mother a lie when she sacrifices her infant to her idol god?" Even the Sepoys are canonized, and the adage "there is honor among thieves" is adduced in illustration and support of the author's view. Pp. 64, 65.

We have quoted at this length, that there might be no mistaking the author's meaning, in regard to what is the most dangerous sentiment of his book, and runs, as our quotations indicate, like a thread all through it. It is a legitimate offspring of transcendentalism-a logical deduction from it. We are glad to say, however, that while he thus erects subjective beliefs of whatever sort into virtual truths or truth-powers for him who entertains them, and makes conformity to them moral goodness, he admits the reality of objective truth independent of personal faith. He asserts the obligation to seek this objective truth, and that we suffer loss so far as we are ignorant of or reject it. It is something for one who goes so far as he has done to escape the vortex of absolute subjectivity. We will further add, that there is no dispute that every man sins who disobeys his own conscience. But it does not follow that we escape all sin when we obey conscience, or that men are of course good and acceptable to God who live up to their own sincere convictions. The most common sins are sins of ignorance, secret sins. Sin does not cease to be such because we believe it right, nor are men of course good because they think they are, or sincerely mean to be so. The sin and woe of those who form false moral judgments, lie in forming such judgments, in calling good evil and evil good, putting light for darkness and darkness for light. Blindness to moral and spiritual truth is sin, and is among the most unequivocal proofs of moral corruption. Were the crucifiers of Christ blameless who knew not what they did? Was not Paul in need of mercy as a persecutor and blasphemer, albeit he did it ignorantly and in unbelief, nay verily thought that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth? Is not sin in its nature deceitful? Is it not declared "corrupt according to

the deceitful lusts?" There is a way that seemeth right unto a

man, though the end thereof is death.

In fact, on this system, there is an end of moral distinctions. Error, no less than the truth it denies, "developes the spiritual in man." Absurdities believed in are God's truth to the mind believing them, and will "develope its moral and spiritual emotions." Is not this monstrous? As to their effect on the soul, are Paganism, Atheism, Deism, Infidelity, one with pure Christianity? Will they all alike develope the spiritual in man? What then becomes of our author's invectives against persecutors? Are not they often sincere? Was not Paul sincere in persecuting the church? What becomes of his consistency, when he tells us that demoralizing publications ought to be suppressed by the state? Above all, what becomes of the gospel, and the command to preach it to every creature? Is it not true that Jesus Christ is the only name given under heaven whereby men can be saved? Is it not true that without faith it is impossible to please God? And how shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard? What Christian is not shocked to be told that the bloody orgies of Paganism, as truly as Christianity, wake the spiritual in man? What doctrine more dangerous, demoralizing, and subversive of all foundations can be propagated in the community, than that all is well with those who live up to their honest belief? What more does Deist, Infidel, or Universalist ask?

We might further notice the crude attempt of the author, in imitation of Coleridge, to invalidate the argument for the being of God from his works; on which the Bible founds in part the inexcusableness of idolatry; his denial of any source of knowledge except sense, consciousness, and revelation; and this in contradiction of his emphatic distinction between Reason and Understanding-a distinction unmeaning, unless Reason, as the inward eye, as really and intuitively discerns some first truths, as the outward eye perceives external objects; his assertion that all "discussions having for their object to prove an external world, and the manner in which we come to the knowledge of it, are not only idle, but wicked," p. 19; while he also tells us that "by the study of sensations, perceptions of an external world arise," when in fact, if we do not perceive external objects immediately, the "study of sensations" would never carry us beyond themselves, i. e. beyond our own sub-

jective states, i. e. beyond ourselves, which ends in idealism and monism; his attempted refutation of the argument for divine decrees from divine foreknowledge, on the alleged ground, that "time cannot be predicated of the Deity," p. 24; as if this, whether true or not, could at all undo the fact that known to God, and therefore certain and determined before the foundation of the world, was whatever should come to pass; his accounting for sin on the ground that free-agency implies inability in God to prevent it, without impairing that freeagency; as if the acts of men could not be rendered certainly good and yet be free; when he tells us that "in the character of God we find a necessity resting upon Him, and necessitating the character of creation, of the laws, and government, which He shall create and organize," and that "in all this the divine will acts freely in the highest sense of the term." "An honest man cannot steal; the very definition of such an act precludes the possibility of its being done by him; and still this condition is no limitation on his freedom and ability." Pp. 123-4.

We have thus taken pains to lay bare the real principles of this book, some of which are probably imperfectly comprehended by the author. His blunt, earnest, and assured style, notwithstanding the marks of slovenly haste which it often bears, will give it currency and power among a large class, who are poorly qualified to judge of its speculative principles. We understand that efforts are in progress to put it by the thousand in the libraries of the public schools of the country. The fact that suitable books are wanting, for the instruction of the young on political ethics, will facilitate its circulation. We greatly regret, therefore, that under cover of "Morality and the State," it should be a vehicle of transcendental, rationalistic theology, and of formidable errors in psychology, metaphysics, and ethics. We deem it our duty to expose the virus which saturates it, and more than neutralizes all the high and precious truth it teaches. We have thought it worth signalizing too, as an evidence that the transcendentalism which has been imported among us, is no mere ghostly shadow, haunting only the retreats of learning, and the closets of recluse thinkers; but a living, growing, pervasive thing, that begins to mould the thinking of our judges and counsellors, and worm itself into

the solution of the great problems of life, moral, religious, social, and political. As such, its subtle movements cannot be too closely watched.

ART. VI.—Rational Cosmology: or the Eternal Principles, and the Necessary Laws of the Universe. By Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., Union College. D. Appleton & Co. New York and London.

THE work whose title we have thus given in full, exhibits the results of much and earnest thought. Its aim is high; its field of research immense. We respect the author's talent; we honour, in themselves, his energy and industry; and what is more—much more—we have an abiding confidence in his piety. We desire to make this declaration frankly and fully at the outset of our remarks, that we may not afterward be misunderstood, if we shall be found, even conscientiously, and therefore very earnestly, to indicate our utter disagreement with many of Dr. Hickok's positions and conclusions.

The object of the book is to develop all that the title indicates. After an Introduction, the contents of which are "Facts and Principles-Facts determined by Principles-General progress of philosophical investigation-Theology and philosophy possible"-the author presents what he regards as "a concise and independent mode" for the "attainment of a clear idea of an absolute Creator and Governor." Then, much more at large, he discourses of the plan "of the creation itself;" of which he remarks in the general, that "To no finite reason, is it to be anticipated that this plan will ever reveal itself in all the clearness and completeness of the divine Ideal; yet nothing hinders, since such a plan certainly is, that the human reason may not earnestly and reverently apply its powers to the attainment of its grand outlines, and in the teaching of eternal principles find, by a rational insight, what and how creation must have been, and read her great laws, not as mere arbitrary facts, but as the necessary result of a work rationally begun and wisely accomplished."

"When the cosmos is" thus regarded as "attained in its plan and principle," he then proceeds to take "the facts" as he conceives them to have been "actually given in experience, and study them with the direct design to find their law as plainly determined in the eternal principle." This furnishes "the work" for the concluding portion of the book, but which, as the author states, "might be prolonged indefinitely." (Pp. 56 and 57.)

It will readily be perceived that the subject matter, as thus stated, admits of being viewed under two aspects, which may be designated, respectively, the one as the *physical*—the other as at once the *metaphysical*, *psychological* and *theological*. We shall have regard to these in the order in which they are here named.

In accordance with the plan of the book, as already briefly sketched, as near as may be in the very words of the author, we not only find (Chap. I. 4) "the Absolute as given in the Reason," but also (Chap. II. at p. 101) how God did, or using the present tense, how God does create matter; and that too in a way which would seem to leave very little room for the exercise of his good pleasure. For we are told on p. 15, that "By the insight of the reason, which no animal can exercise, man attains in many facts the principle which was before the fact, and which, wholly unmade itself, controlled and guided the maker of the fact in all its construction." Also (p. 17) that "Universal nature is more than bare fact; it is something made under the determining conditions of unmade principle: and this immutable principle, under which its being and all its ongoings have been determined, has now its counterpart in nature as the perpetual law of its working," &c. Also (p. 256) that "The universe in its eternal principles gives the creation in Idea, and in this we know what is possible." . . . "A universe so may be; yea, if a universe of working central forces be brought into existence, so it must be; but that the universe shall be so in actual fact there is demanded the exertion of creative Omnipotence."

It is the comparison of these and other passages of similar

import or tendency, that has led us to the conclusion already intimated—that the creation which lies at the foundation of the "Rational Cosmology" is one in which very little room would be left for the exercise of the good pleasure of the Omnipotent.

True indeed we learn (p. 20) that "This Creator of the cosmos must" (himself) "be wholly absolved from all the conditions which determine the cosmos"—he is not finite—he is not limited in himself-but then, if the principle which was before the fact controlled and guided the maker of the fact in all its construction, where is that perfect freedom which must belong to the Ever Blessed One revealed in Scripture-"the Living God" and "Everlasting King" of the Bible; whose perfection place him as much above all control in the exercise of his "good pleasure," as he is above being "tempted of evil?" Infinite wisdom and goodness unitedly, and always spontaneously, fix upon the plans best in themselves, and best adapted to secure the end in view, without the necessity of reference first to any principle, made or unmade, other than such as Infinite Excellence, because it is infinite, will spontaneously and in itself prescribe, not follow-much less be controlled by: and that is what we mean, when we say that God's "good pleasure" is gloriously above control. In what the creation of the "Rational Cosmology" consists, it will be easier to describe after an exhibition more or less distinct of those "eternal and unmade principles" to which reference has already been made more than once in the preceding quotations. But with respect to the very question-how God did or does create, we will say here what we desire to say, once for all, in unmistakable terms.

We have not forgotten the sensible shudder which we experienced some three years ago, on hearing it declared by one of the most gifted and pious men of our country, that there were some relations or qualities of things which were out of the region of will, and which, he proceeded to say, "not even the will of the Almighty could change." It was, we confess, with somewhat similar feelings, that we read the announcement in the "Rational Cosmology" of how, in accordance with—aye more, controlled by—certain eternal principles, how God, thus circumstanced, creates. Our first impulse was to exclaim—witness men, witness angels, while a being whose imperfect

knowledge of God's lower works is derived to so large an extent indirectly, through the restricted avenues of his senses, and who has had but "an atom of time" in which to view those works—witness men, witness angels, while a being thus circumstanced determines what the angels might well "desire to look into," if they could—witness all ye intelligences, while man, with the Bible in his hands to inform him of God's infinite perfections, determines how, within the stringency of eternal and necessary laws, the Almighty exercises the exclusive prerogative of omnipotence in its first great outgoing act—witness man determining how God creates!

Does not duty, in view of all this, clearly demand, that, feeble as may be the effect of the declaration, we should characterize every such attempt as being, in the very light of revealed truth, presumption of a very high order; though it be even perpetrated by good men—by those whom we verily believe to have a true love and reverence for the Father of Mercies of the Bible? All the rather do we conceive this to be duty in their case; for their goodness lends sanction and gives countenance to what we feel bound to regard as being in very strange association with that goodness itself.

We have endeavoured to express unequivocally what was our first impulse, nor are we prepared to say that we have recovered from it; but our astonishment was the less, when we found that it was such a conception of creation as might be "subjected to" that "insight of the reason" which sits in judgment, as we learn, on the conceptions of other human minds, (p. 92,) that it was such a conception of creation as this, with regard to which we were to be fully informed; a conception of a creation so called: which, being human after all in the extent of its horizon, would even thereby prove itself to be human also in its level.

The infinite propriety of the first and leading precept of the Second Commandment is ever illustrated by the fact that the idolator first himself forms an image of the deity which he would worship, and thus brings down his god to his own level: to worship afterward what he has thus degraded, seems, in comparison, to be almost a minor offence.

In like manner the exclusive prerogative of Omnipotence, viz.

creation, is here sought to be made intelligible by degrading it in the way already intimated; i. e. to a process within the purview of "the rational insight," which has somehow ascertained that among the foremost of "the eternal principles" of the material "universe" is this, that "matter is force." (P. 90.)

We are well aware that to the force here spoken of are attributed very marked peculiarities; yet the declaration that matter is force, would seem to us to find a very special embodiment in this—an elephant is strength; which sounds to us very much as would the declaration that Homer is the Iliad; Sir Isaac Newton is the theory of gravitation; or—what we rejoice to think is not true—that Dr. Hickok is the "Rational Cosmology." Nay more, might not the philosopher, in full hearing of a very fine echo, after a long and careful scrutiny by the "rational insight" come consistently also to the conclusion, that speaking itself was an articulate sound, just such as that which so interested and pleased him—that we do not need the corporeal and mental device of a speaker—and so the fable of Echo was not wholly a fable after all; even with respect to the physical facts of the case.

Yet, if matter be indeed force, it must be important to know exactly how this force is situated. That there may be no misapprehension with regard to this, we quote the author's own description of force, and of how it is situated. Being first concerned with the presentation of his own views, we omit, for the present, his reasoning to show that the ordinary conception of matter is a mere negation. At the conclusion of his remarks

upon that, he proceeds to say:

"Simple activity is spiritual activity, and has nothing in it that can awaken the thought of force; and it is only as it meets some opposing action and encounters an antagonist that we come to have the notion of force. In all push and pull there is counteraction, complex action, action and reaction, while simple spiritual agency can never be made a conception of physical existence. It cannot be thought as taking and holding any fixed position; it cannot become a permanent and have a 'where' that it might be conceived to pull from, nor a 'there' that it might be conceived to push to. It could not be determined to any time nor to any place, for it has no constant

from whence the determination might begin nor where it might end. When, however, the conception is that of simple action in counteraction, an activity that works from opposite sides upon itself, we have in it at once the true notion of force. From the difficulty of clearly apprehending counteraction or antagonism in a single activity, as always acting in opposite directions upon or against itself, and which must be the true conception, for the notion is that of one source for the antagonism, it will be more readily taken and equally available in result, if we here, and generally through the work, conceive of two simple activities meeting each other, and reciprocally holding back, or resting against, each other, and thus of the two making a third thing at the limit of meeting which is unlike to either. In neither of the two activities can there be the notion of force, but at the point of antagonism force is generated and one new thing comes from the synthesis of the two activities. To distinguish this from other forces hereafter found we call it antagonist force. In this position is taken, and there is more than the idea of being, which the simple activities each have; there is being standing out, AN EXISTENCE; being in re, reality, A THING.

"Let, then, an indefinite number of such positions contiguous to each other be conceived as so taken and occupied, and a space will thereby be filled and holden; an aggregate force will maintain itself in a place; and a ground is given on which other things may rest. A substantial reality here exists. This antagonism may be conceived to be of any degree of intensity, and the substantial ground will hold its place with the same amount of persistency, and stand there permanent, impenetrable, and real. Nothing else may come into its place until it has itself been displaced. It is not inertia, but a vis inertia; a force resting against itself, and thus holding itself in place. It rests, because it has intrinsically an equilibrating resistance." (Pp. 93 and 94.)

But this alone being regarded as insufficient to provide for "combinations and resolutions," "perpetual changes and processes through successive stages," he continues—"Our very primitive idea of matter must comprehend more than the idea of pure antagonist force, even that which may dissolve and

become a combination with pure antagonism. We conceive then of an activity going out in exactly the reverse process of our antagonism, even a beginning in the same limit of the meeting simple activities and working on each side away from the limit; a throwing of simple activities in opposite directions from the limit of contact. Not a counteracting and resisting, but a divellent and disparting activity; not an antagonistic. but hereafter known as distinctively a diremptive movement. Such an activity could not be conceived as space-filling of itself. Wherever the limit in which there might be conceived the contact of two simple activities should be, the diremptive movement would be away from the limit on each side, and thus a space-vacating and not a space-filling activity. The diremptive movement alone would be a disparting and going away of the activities from each other, and leaving a void. But if this diremptive movement be conceived as at the very limit and point of contact of the antagonism, the antagonist activity working toward itself in the limit, and the diremptive activity working from itself out of the limit, then must the diremptive movement on each side encounter the antagonist movement, and the simple diremptive activity going out on one side from the limit will meet the simple antagonist activity on the same side coming in to the limit, and these two simples of the opposite kinds of forces must make a new counteraction among themselves. And equally so with the going out and the coming in of the opposite kinds of forces in their simple activities on the other side of the limit, the one must encounter the other, and engender a new counteraction among themselves on this other side. The result thus must be that while the diremptive activity disparts and loosens the antagonism, the antagonist activity on the other hand restrains and binds in the divellency, and thus the diremption can neither go off wholly on either side and leave the limit void, nor the antagonism come up from each side and make the limit full, but both antagonism and diremption meet in the limit and make a third thing, which may be called indifferently an antagonist force loosed, or a diremptive force fixed.

"The pure forces in their contact in the simple limit may be known as units under the term of molecules, or molecular

forces; the working to the limit constituting an antagonist molecular force, and the working away from the limit constituting a diremptive molecular force. The combination of these forces in their joint interaction making a new compound as a third thing unlike either alone, may be known as also a unit, constituting a material atom, and may further on be known as a chemical atom or molecule. Our conception of matter must therefore be of this combination of distinguishable forces, though we shall find it convenient for the more clear apprehension of the principles of the universe to follow out the workings of each distinctly and separately." (Pp. 95 and 96.)

We have quoted the author at some length, in order that the "principle" which he advances, and to which he attaches no ordinary value, may be exhibited precisely as he has defined and expounded it, in the use of his own specially adapted

terms.

The quotations, even thus far, are also illustrative in another way. They show how much circumlocution becomes requisite, when every thing like symbol or concentrated representation of quantity or of mode of action, is studiously avoided. We say studiously, for although the author informs us in his preface, that "In portions of the intuitive processes here pursued, a help might at the outset have been given to some minds by the interposition of more diagrams," he adds, "and yet in the end the fastest and pleasantest progress will be found to have been secured by casting off all dependence on any such helps, and fixing the mind's eye directly upon the subjective ideal, as the pure ground in which the insight is to attain determinations of the developed principle. In two cases only, from the extent and complication of the intuition, has it seemed best to resort to the interposition of figures; in other cases care has been taken to use precise language, and to give descriptive illustrations and analogies, so that to a careful and clear inspection the process may be followed without much difficulty or discouragement. Nothing can make the journey easy to a mind that refuses to go alone and waits to be carried. The truths sought are not in the sensible phenomenon, nor at the conclusion of a logical process, but must be clear to the rational insight in their own necessity, if apprehended at all. To the intellect that does not so apprehend them, all forms of expression will be empty; to the mind that does so apprehend them, no interposed figures are needed or would be tolerated." (Pp. 6 and 7.)

Now although all this should even be conceded, yet when the attention of the reader is to be directed to what the "rational insight" of the author so clearly discerns, this cannot be done directly, but only through the medium of some symbols of thought; and it is vastly important that those symbols be not only accurate or even illustrative, but that, withal, they should be presented in a form so far concentrated as to make a synopsis or connected view not merely practicable, but easy. There may be more ways than one in which "the words of the wise are as goads;" and more ways than one in which we may be instructed by the proverb, without an irreverent use of it.

The usual adjuncts for the attainment of a concentrated exhibition of truth, and of that precision which belongs to true science, cannot be discarded, and no loss ensue. Casting them away on "principle" even, will not free us from the penalty. This is abundantly evident throughout the whole of Dr. Hickok's book, especially in so far as the communication of the author's ideas to others is concerned; and we are constrained to think that such an omission has sometimes led him to conclusions inconsistent with even his own premises: untenable as we must regard them to be.

It is after all conceded that help might have been given to some minds by the interposition of more diagrams; and we will go so far as to confesss that our own ideas have been thus aided. Even before we had reperused the passage here quoted, we had arranged a few simple symbols for ready reference which we will here exhibit and explain:

$$\left. \begin{array}{c} \text{Simple} \\ \text{Spiritual} \\ \text{Activity} \end{array} \right\} \underbrace{\begin{array}{c} L \\ \text{Spiritual} \\ \text{Antagonistic} \end{array}}_{\text{Antagonistic}} \underbrace{\begin{array}{c} L \\ \text{Simple} \\ \text{Spiritual} \end{array}}_{\text{Antagonistic}} \underbrace{\left\{ \begin{array}{c} Activity \\ \text{Simple} \\ \text{Spiritual} \end{array} \right\}}_{\text{Antagonistic}}$$

In this representation it will be observed:

1. The "activities" in question are noted as being "simple" and "spiritual."

- 2. "The very limit and point of contact of the antagonism" of the "two simple activities meeting each other, and reciprocally holding back, or resting against each other," must be understood to be at L, though the representatives of "the forces in their simple activities" are outspread from these both ways, in order that they may be separately and so distinctly exhibited.
- 3. "The forces in their simple activities" are represented by arrows; those of the same "kind" which are "antagonistic" by arrows turned inward, and those of the same "kind" which are "diremptive," by broken lines, indicating arrows turned outward; and thus "the going out and coming in" tendencies "of the opposite kinds of forces in their simple activities" are manifested.
- 4. The arrows looking inward press against and hold in the arrows represented by the broken lines; so we see that "the diremption" cannot "go off wholly on either side and leave the limit (L) void;" the "diremptive force" is thus visibly "fixed." Neither can the outer arrows "come up from each side and make the limit" (at L) "full;" they being kept asunder by the outward thrust against them of the diremptive arrows; the crowding in of the "antagonist force" is thus seen to be "loosed."
- 5. The direction of the movement of the diremptive arrows away from L, shows them to be "space-vacating" as respects L, while the others act the other way as "space-filling."
- 6. Each of the two broken arrows has, moreover, for its own special opposite an arrow of the other sort; and thus we see that "two simples of the opposite kinds of forces must make a new counteraction among themselves;" and that this must take place on both sides of L.
- 7. Two opposed arrows of the same sort, "in their contact in the simple limit," would represent a single "molecule;" "the working to the limit," seen in the arrows turned inward, "constituting an antagonistic molecular force," and the working away from the limit, seen in the arrows turned outward, "constituting a diremptive molecular force."

From all that has now been exhibited, it will be seen that the principle that "matter is force" must not be confounded with the hypothesis which regards atoms as special centres of force. This hypothesis not unfrequently advanced—of which Faraday makes such use-Dr. Hickok does not notice; though he heartily condemns the ordinary one. The hypothesis of centres of force was devised and adopted because the bare necessities of physical investigation did not require anything more than the laws of action, as to intensity, &c., of forces. This surely could not be the reason why the author of the "Rational Cosmology" left of matter nothing but force. He certainly intended in that very simplification to seize upon a "principle" behind the law. For he says, distinctly, that "If we have not the unmade principle determining the fact of gravity so to be, and with just such ratios, then we have no rational science of nature, and what we call a law of nature is still a bare fact; an arbitrary making; and no philosophy interpreting the making by its principle" (p. 17.) And again (p. 57) "Facts teach nothing until they are seen in their principles; but when the principle is applied to the fact, and the fact is read and expounded in the principle, then have we and only then, a rational philosophy." Although then the author might strangely seem to be one of a company who throw away every thing material but force, because they have no occasion for anything besides law to work with-however much more they may believe must lie behind it; although this is all so, yet the author of the "Rational Cosmology" is to be acquitted of all sympathy with them, not only because he eschews their deeds, but because his is "a principle" discerned by "a rational insight;" and, "in the teaching of eternal principles" we are to "find by" this "rational insight, what and how creation must have been, and read her great laws not as mere arbitrary facts, &c." (p. 57.) Moreover there are features of the force which he defines, so peculiar, that it requires a special designation, and so it is termed, by way of distinction and emphasis, "antagonist force." This is a force which finds no place among the formulas employed by the dealers in mere laws; except as being the zero of forces mutually destructive.

But does the announcement that matter is force, however understood, put us in possession of a principle after all? To us it seems very plain that it is no more than the statement of a more remote fact than that indicated by the other statement, that there is force where matter is; and (if it were becoming in us so to do) we would, therefore, respectfully suggest that the enunciation might have been improved by saying that matter must be force. The declaration (it seems to us) would then have been the appropriate expression of "an eternal and necessary principle," which we do not discern in the fact that matter is force now. This we cannot help thinking would have been more consistent; though our own objections to it would still have been as uncompromising as ever. We shall now endeavour to state what those objections are.

And here our difficulty "of clearly apprehending counteraction or antagonism in a single activity" being so great that we fear it will be insuperable, we avail ourselves, as we have heretofore, of the alternative suggested—of what we are informed "will be more readily taken and equally available in result;" viz. "if we here," "conceive of two simple activities meeting each other and reciprocally holding back or resting against each other."

Now, while we disclaim either the right or the wish to advise, we must yet beg to be indulged in one other suggestion. We cannot but think that the hypothesis (or "principle") would be improved, if provision were made for the antagonism all around the point, instead of two opposite directions only; in order that the peculiarities of the "antagonist force" might exhibit themselves in all directions around the point, when we attempt to influence that force from without, and thus provide for the phenomena exhibited in the actual world: but our objections are just as real against two such mere simple activities, as they would be if more were introduced at the same place, and we proceed therefore to observe:

1st. With respect to all that concerns either activity or counteragency, all physical force however derived, tends to produce similar effects; and these are appropriately described by saying, as physicists do, that force is that which tends to produce, or to modify, or to prevent motion. The elastic force of steam in a boiler may be kept completely in check by the opposing elastic force of a powerful spring, applied to the

safety-valve. Or the same effect may be attained by the application of a sufficient weight, thus counteracting elastic force by the action of gravity. Or, again, for the action of the weight may be substituted that of energetic human muscle, subjected to the continued control of personal effort, of which the man himself is all the while sensible.

Now all these—different it would seem in their origin—all severally serve to hold the *elastic* force of the steam in equilibrio; and however great they may be, if not of a crushing intensity, they will expend their extra energy in pressure on the boiler and its supports. Yet when the same steam is permitted to act upon appropriate machinery, the elastic force, which belongs to the steam, will set the machinery *in motion*, and that with an energy (if the force accumulated be sufficient) such as would overcome and drag away captive more than one thousand horses.

The physical effects or tendencies of force under all these circumstances, are then the same; however they may either be called into action, or else made to hold one another in check; or, under all these relations, force is force, however we may get at it, or however apply it; whether we compel rest by the antagonism of opposing forces (i. e. bring about an equilibrium) or, setting force free, let it exhibit its appropriate effect in superinducing the motion of matter. Only those who would give force a new place in physics, and require it to do, or tend to do, what it refuses to do at all, only they and no others will find it either "necessary" or credible that under the very arrangement of "two countervailing spiritual activities" (p. 139) there should "a new thing" "come from their synthesis;" viz. "antagonist force."

2d. Should we be otherwise disposed to adopt the dictum of the "Rational Cosmology" that matter is force, we might well pause in view of the seemingly inevitable consequence of such a step; when we see one who reverentially assents to the fact that God "upholdeth all things by the word of his power," but who yet also maintains that matter is force, express himself thus:—"The antagonism and diremption" are to "be apprehended" "to be the one agency of the Absolute Spirit in one and the same limit of their action" (p. 101.) Now as the anta-

gonism and the diremption are the very phenomena confessed of the matter which is force; insomuch that "at the point of antagonism" of the "two countervailing spiritual activities," "one new thing comes from their" mere "synthesis;" which new thing is represented to be an element of the "substantial reality," matter, the "diremptive" force being also associated with this, "at the very limit and point of the antagonism;" so that "matter is force; distinguishable as antagonist and diremptive" (def. at p. 90)—as all this is expressed in the very terms here exhibited in connection—and withal "the antagonism and diremption" are to "be apprehended" to be "one agency of the Absolute Spirit in one and the same limit of their action;"-are not the phenomena of matter then the veritable phenomena of the Absolute Spirit, and no thing else, except in their mere synthesis: - and what is this but the very verge of pantheism, if not PANTHEISM ITSELF?

We hesitate to embark in a boat which is so evidently drifting to the edge of such a cataract, and which has cast away its anchor in the rejecting of all matter except that which is force; and Dr. Hickok, as we should think he would, shrinks from any such plunge, though still endeavouring to hold to the boat. Let us hear him:

"The creation of the material is from God; its genesis is in him; its perpetuation and sustentation is from the continual going out of his simple activity; but this material is not God, nor at all competent to rise from its imposed conditions into the place of the Absolute. The Logos, or divine working word, is in the world; is the life and light of the world; and yet he was in the beginning with God, and ever is God, while the world is not he but his creature." (P. 102.)

3d. If the difficulties already specified were removed, then another would (and it actually does) present itself; which (making use of the terms of the "Rational Cosmology") we shall first exemplify, and then state distinctly. We can well conceive of two pugilists, each of whom has contrived, by his antagonism, to hold the one arm of his opponent completely in check; while the other arm of each, being left free, will show itself to be intensely diremptive; insomuch that it might seem as if it would be much more comfortable, if these mere activities

might be put in antagonism and show forth their diremption, without the intervention of any brawny muscles at all: but we have yet to learn how it could be done in this world of ours, or (in so far as we can discern) in any material world of which we have cognizance. Indeed we are taught as much in the "Rational Cosmology" itself. For on p. 99 we find that, "man is utterly merged in matter; and can thus put out no act that shall immediately meet another act in counteraction, but his every act of energizing must first encounter the forces," (matter "which is force," we presume) "in which he is incorporated." How then can any mere activity, in the sense of the "Rational Cosmology," be brought into antagonism with any other mere activity; when the very condition prerequisite to the putting in antagonism of such activities at all, seems to be that of the interposition of matter itself?* The way of escape from this is indicated as follows: "But with the conception of a Supreme Absolute Spirit all these difficulties are excluded. He can begin action in counteragency with no forces intervening," (no matter between) "and whatever positions he may thus take and hold by permanent forces, though subjective to himself, or within his own sphere of agency, they may be objective to all other being, for all being will be subjective to Him in whom all live and move and have their being." (P. 100.)

To escape thus, is to open the door more widely to Objection 2d; and, if we unhesitatingly shun that, the demand that we should admit that mere activity may be antagonistic to mere activity, requires us to admit a state of things the distinct exhibition of which is nowhere found; it requires, thus, that arrangements should first be present to constitute that very matter which is always itself interposed between activities, whenever we either find them or else place them in antagonism. Even gravitation and other kindred exhibitions of force are, none of them, either found or to be placed in antagonism, without the intervention of matter in some way. All the postulates, therefore, have about them too much of the character

^{*} Even those who approach nearest to the "Rational Cosmology," in arguing from the "principle" of the sufficient reason, even they suppose a material point, on which, at the outset, their elementary forces are to act.

of the petitio principii. The matter which is force, in these aspects also, of its relations, exhibits so much of the very marked peculiarity of the "antagonist force," that we must respectfully decline its acquaintance: we doubt its credentials.

4th. Several of the phenomena of gravitation especially (to mention no other exhibitions of force) are unprovided for, even with the aid of the additional postulates of the "Rational Cosmology;" particularly the action of that force through other bodies than those whose attraction may be in question—the veritable increase of the force in the same body or bodies under new circumstances—and that the appropriate changes in the action of gravitation occupy no appreciable time: all of which will be noticed hereafter.

5th. On the plan of the "Rational Cosmology," we would seem to need an additional postulate to account for the difference between solidity and fluidity; and how it is to be introduced does not appear, nor does the "Rational Cosmology," in so far

as we have discovered, any where discuss just that.

6th. We fear that if we adopted the "principle" of the "Rational Cosmology," it would, moreover, be requisite to provide for something like fits of diremptive excess of force and of the contrary, alternately prevalent within very narrow limits, close to the places held by the forces; to provide for the alternations of attraction and repulsion, which are exhibited when the molecules of bodies are brought nearer and nearer together; all which changes are contemplated in the atomic theory of Boscovich.

7th. If all these difficulties were not more than enough in themselves: the continued co-existence, at the same limit of the antagonist and diremptive activities, with nothing else interposed or associated but just what those activities are asserted to produce—all this is itself incompatible with the laws of force and motion, now universally recognized, and which Dr. Hickok would establish as "principles" in his own way.

For that the activities, or else the urgencies with which those activities either press or draw, that these are so many measures of the forces in action, or else kept in equilibrio, is what all the researches of science everywhere justify; insomuch that when

the activities are kept in equilibrio, the forces also are in equilibrio; &c., &c. Now either the activities of both sorts (antagonist and diremptive) would altogether keep one another in equilibrio, and the resultant (the force, in effect) be a zero of force; and thus the matter which is force be annihilated—nothing remaining as any effect of force or of activity: or else the efficient result (mechanical resultant), which must be single, would be in the one direction of the greater force, or of the more efficient combination of forces, and so two resultants, and their appropriate manifestations, could no longer have place.

To those who are at all familiar with physical science, this must be sufficiently evident, upon the bare statement of these conditions. Others may find an imperfect parallel, by trying to think of something like a cartridge in a cannon holding itself in shape in the direction of its length, while it, at the same time acts explosively, and thus speeds the ball on its errand, and withal produces the recoil of the piece.

8th. Apart from Objection 7th, as it is distinctly stated, we learn withal that we are to take for "the independent action of force" "the conception of two countervailing spiritual activities." (P. 139.) What the resultant of such activities must be we have distinctly stated before, but we repeat the statement here that the objection which it involves may have its place with the others. Being countervailing, the activities must, in accordance with the laws of force, be equivalent; and in the reasoning which follows the enunciation here quoted they are so regarded, and the symmetrical spherical form of creation is exhibited as a consequence of that condition of the forces.

Now the resultant of two such countervailing activities all nature, everywhere, proclaims to be an activity reduced to utter helplessness; and yet it is at the point of antagonism of activities (or of one activity and part of another) situated just so, that the "antagonist force" itself is said to be "generated"—in the passages already quoted;—and this is the force, for which it is claimed, that it does so much besides.

It is a very grave fact, that this helplessness—this zeroforce—does just what might be expected of it in its true character, when the author of the Rational Cosmology employs it with the expectation of producing such effects as we actually find in nature; as—with a sincere respect for him, but under the uncompromising pressure of a duty to be discharged with respect to his "philosophy" and its tendencies—we shall endeavor to make entirely manifest. Previously to that however some other things remain to be noticed.

We pause for the present in our enumeration of objections, and shall now try to show in what light we are to regard the "principle," that "matter is force;" if (waving everything that

has been advanced) we might after all accept of it.

We have already ventured to suggest that, in its present form, it is only expressive of a more remote fact than would be apparent if the laws of force alone were our limit. But whether matter is, or whether it must be force, what have we gained by knowing that, as long as the "rational insight" even can inform us of nothing more than the mode of action or of antagonism of the activities in question; or, if accurate measure as well as mode be clearly signified, it is at most with the law of action or of antagonism that we have to do? These working "principles" whether we gain them "by an immediate insight into things themselves;" or discover that they are "necessary determinations of the reason in its insight into the grounds of force;" or whether we, "at the best, only creep up from one fact to another on the ground of assumed uniformity in experience" (pp. 139 & 120); and then, withal, call these "principles" by their name when obtained by the "clear insight;" but laws of nature, and so only "bare facts" (p. 17,) when otherwise determined-no matter how we get them, they only inform us, after all, of how force, or activity, &c., is efficient or else countervailing, but still leave unanswered the question, What is force? To say that it is "generated at the point of antagonism" of "two countervailing spiritual activities" only makes that same question the more difficult to answer. We hope this is not beyond the reach of illustration?

As we describe force by stating what it does or tends to do, let the same be attempted in the instance of a piece of machinery: we will take for our example a sewing-machine. A sewing-machine, thus described, is an instrument so contrived as to do just this—to penetrate the cloth so as to intro-

duce the thread, and take a suitable stitch; and then to draw the stitch closely together, so as to hold all securely in place. Or, if we may, without offence, apply philosophical terms to such a case, we may say, that every machine of this sort must needs carry out the principle of being diremptive of the cloth, and place-holding in its adjustment of the stitch, just where the diremption was effected. But all this would give us no idea of the actual construction of any such machine itself.

Thus whatever insight we may gain, or however we may gain it, we only learn what force does or tends to do, or, if any more, at most how it is compassed about or situated, but what force is we do not know after all. When we know that, we shall perhaps know what matter is; -not force, we are well persuaded. And when we know what force is (if we ever do in this world,) we shall very probably be able to deduce from that principle what force may do or tend to do, and what, under the existing system of nature, it must do or tend to do (because it is force) everywhere; and then too we may hope to learn how force associated with matter, so that both may do work, (i. e. power) can be bottled up, as it were, for centuries in a ton of coal, and then suddenly set free under a steam boiler, developing somehow the efficiency which drives the engine. Until we are better informed with regard to veritable principles, which lie concealed here, while we as yet know only the laws which govern the tendencies or the effects of force or of activity, we may make use of the terms antagonist and diremptive, as being presumed to be more accurately descriptive of modes of action; but the question will still remain, "what has been gained except simply removing the mystery and our ignorance one step further back;"* and we would add, in the case before us, placing the matter to be explained more deeply in the shade?

Having obtained the view that matter is itself a combination and resultant of mere activities, the author of the "Rational Cosmology," as might have been anticipated, shows himself vehemently opposed to the old doctrine of *inertia* and all that pertains to it; or at least to what he understands by that doctrine. Thus, among other things, he says—"The sense

^{*} Dr. Hickok's own words with reference to gravitation in comparison with the old notion, "that nature abhors a vacuum." (P. 147.)

conception of matter can by no possibility admit of anything static or dynamic in nature. The supposed matter is wholly dead; mere *inertia*; and can possess nothing by which it may be conceived as holding itself in place whereby it may sustain anything, nor as moving from its place whereby it might push or pull anything, &c., &c." (Pp. 117 and 118.)

Our objections to regarding matter just thus, as mere inertia, are quite as intense—though we would rather state them, if need were, in our own way. Indeed we might even be more inclined to believe that "matter is force," than that it is inertia. But while we feel free to say this, we also feel nearly as free to say, that the inertia which Dr. Hickok has thus characterized is an inertia in which nobody believes. The statement involves a mere straining of the term beyond the sense in which it is employed in physics. We must be allowed an illustration again:—

The drones in a bee-hive do nothing toward the making of honey &c., nor toward the housing or preservation of it either—they are so far inert—they are veritably non-workers; but, alas, they have excellent appetites, and so consume that which they cannot produce. But will any one assert that, when we say, with this distinct explanation, that inertia is a very special characteristic of the drones, and say so truly, that we thereby make the drones to be mere laziness? That could not even be asserted, if it were also true, that it was not unusual for three or four workers at once to seize upon a well-developed drone, and guiding the paws, &c., of the unresisting inert, make good use of them in adjusting the waxen walls of the cells.

A live body (or what is consciously in it) may, moreover, through its activity, oppose any energy which we may put forth, and sometimes even weary us out by such an opposition. But when the same body is dead its derived activity is gone, and can no longer be brought into antagonism with ourselves; the dead body is a non-worker—it is inert: but we should find ourselves most unpleasantly situated if we should stumble over it, or our strength (our energy) tried, if we should endeavour to move it. We would find reaction embodied somehow, to oppose our energy, and to be, in effect, an opposing energy,

and so a *force-waster*, as far as we were concerned, in the sense, and to the same extent, that the activity we thus must *lose* was itself efficient (or might be efficient) in the live body opposing us before. Like the drone, the inert body cannot work, but it makes way with the product of the efforts of others, that can and do exert themselves.

And yet this non-working, this inert matter, may be set in motion by the application of extraneous force, and will then be found to be in a state of power; i. e. it will somehow have a force accumulated in it, or accompanying it, which is adequate to do work, to break up or even to wholly displace other matter, and to tell powerfully against any living energy that may be brought to oppose it; -to produce thus the appropriate effects of energetic force. The inertia of matter, its persistence in a state of rest, because it could not start itself, has been overcome, and its persistence in a state of motion established; a persistence which matter itself cannot check, much less overcome; to do that would require again the application of extraneous force. Even gravitation, that intimate associate of all matter termed ponderable, even gravitation has this characteristic of extraneous force, in its being more or less accumulated in the same body, according to circumstances. The mutual action of this sort in the case of the earth and the moon when they are nearest to one another is more intense than when they are farthest asunder, nearly in the ratio of 37 to 29; yet the matter itself of neither has been increased, nor has the size of either been changed thereby; and hence they both continue to turn around their respective axes in the same time as before, and with the same moment of inertia. Matter in a state of power is withal anything but "a mere negation," it is the substantial club in the hands of him who wields it, it is the somewhat with which he strikes; and if he, or something else, do not check it before it comes down, it may strike with terrible effect. Dr. Hickok would have the club made of something like mere human strength properly antagonized, but diremptive still.

The facts involved in the statement that matter is inert or non-working in the sense or senses thus illustrated, are these; that matter can neither originate its own transference through

space, nor yet control that transference when extraneous force has compelled it. These are facts as incontrovertibly established as are the laws of motion themselves, which indeed involve these very facts.

To explain and reconcile all the several facts in question may not be easy; but, rightly understood, the knowledge of them, and of the laws dependent upon them, is among the most precise and well ascertained that we possess. They are among the well ascertained affections and relations of things; and with instruments such as these of well determined form and measure, science has wrought out her well proportioned and beautiful results.

In accordance with the doctrine of inertia as here exhibited, it is found that the smallest force applied to the greatest mass will produce some motion, whenever the mass is left free to obey the force; i. e. when the mass is not restrained by an obstacle, or any other completely countervailing energy apart from that mass itself; though some considerable time may be consumed in superinducing the motion, under ordinary circumstances.

Now, if indeed some fraction of the extraneous force is, withal, consumed in changing the state of the mass from rest to motion, that portion is always in a constant ratio to the force itself; so that, be that force great or small, a similar fraction of the force will be left to transfer the body: and thus the law is maintained that motion produced by even the momentary action of force is proportional to the force impressed—a law confirmed everywhere.

Let it be seen, how the principle of the Rational Cosmology will deal with this: "A static force is that antagonism which holds itself at rest in its balanced counteraction. A dynamic force goes to the overcoming of a static. It may draw or expel, but it goes to the removing another force at rest, or to the retarding or accelerating another force in motion. Should the dynamic not be sufficient to overcome the static, still, in so far as its intensity of antagonism goes toward this, it is thus far dynamic though the static does not yield to it." (P. 118.) "The original intensity of antagonism is its quantity of matter." (P. 129.)

"The intensity of antagonism in any point of force is its measure to resist motion. If this intensity be small, a small measure of excess in the energy of one activity over the other will generate motion; and if this intensity be great, a greater excess of energy on one side of the activities must be necessary to generate motion. If then one point of force is to move another point of force," (one molecule to move another molecule, we presume,) "the former must have one of two prerogatives; either a greater intensity, and when just moved its impulse will overcome the latter and displace it, or, a strong excess of energy in one side of its activities that may move to a violent impulse, and then, though of less intensity, the strenuous movement of the former may displace the latter." "The force moved is as its static intensity; the force moving it as its static intensity combined with its excess of energy on one side, and however this be made up so as to exceed the force of the former, or force moved, whether by more static intensity, or more excess of energy in one activity, when thus exceeding it must generate motion.

"And the rate of motion, or velocity, must be proportioned to this excess of dynamic over the static force. The least degree beyond equilibration of intensity must move; and the augmentation of preponderance must so much more move, and thus as nothing but this excess generates motion and all the excess generates its own measure of motion, the degree of motion, or velocity, must be as the moving exceeds the moved

intensity of force." (Pp. 127 and 128.)

In accordance with all that is here quoted, it will be seen that the intensity of antagonism or quantity of matter may readily be so great that no small force or excess of energy could move it all; whereas the facts as already stated are all the other way, the smallest force moving the greatest mass, &c. The case as presented by the "Rational Cosmology" has only the laws of nature against it, in their working, everywhere; and this is what comes of the "thought-conception of space-filling force as the true substantial matter," which it is stated "involves the full conception of both statics and dynamics:" to which it is added that "counteraction in equilibrium must stand self-fixed." (P. 118.) The "philosophy" which involves

such conclusions is self-convicted as soon as it is applied; for matter, however great its "original intensity of antagonism," refuses to be "self-fixed," but quits its place when the smallest force is applied.

Here again, the counteraction in equilibrium proves itself to be effectually good for nothing or zero; viz. in its special self-fixing energy, as respects holding its place in space; and so it will, again and again, in other relations hereafter. Just how, after all, it is supposed that it can have any energy apart from its antagonism, will be considered in its appropriate place; but the truth must be told: this counteraction in equilibrium, this zero-force, (as it is in effect, in this and other operations attributed to it,) is force with all its energy so effectually checked, that it can do, or tend to do, nothing else; it is force with all efficient force for other purposes taken out of it, and finds its parallel in that rare condiment fresh-salt; which, if we could but obtain it, might be employed in a well recognized but suppositious experiment.

Nay more, "the intensity of antagonism in any point of force is its measure to resist motion." This we may accept, when we believe that a man who has large debts, with a credit which will exactly balance them—or whom we may regard as having had a large estate, which he has just entirely squandered—has really any greater riches than another who never had much property, but who has just fully expended all that he had. Has either of these (we would ask) any better defence against the attacks of coming want in the balance which he owns, over and above that of his fellow? There may indeed be reasons why the situation of the one is more deplorable than that of the other; but each has an equal "landed estate somewhere in Terra Incognita," and each has an equal amount deposited in the Utopian Bank.

We are withal told that "In this third principle of motion there is involved the conception of momentum, which on account of its wide application to physical science, it is important should be made clear and exact," (p. 129.) With this we entirely agree; and now append the explanation.

"In the body moving, its power of impulse or capacity to act on other bodies is an aggregate of force from two sources. It

has received the excess of intensity over its own in the body moving it, and this now becomes one part of its force to strike and move another body. This is measured by its own velocity, for it is this excess that has made the whole movement, and we may thus represent the force acquired by the velocity imparted. But its measure of intensity that it originally had, and which had neutralized just an equal amount of intensity in the body which impinged upon it, has not all been annihilated. It neutralized its own measure in the other body to produce motion, and left only the excess to pass over into the moved body, but itself remained in, and goes along with, and is indeed the very essence of, the moved body, and this original intensity it now has also, wherewith to strike and move other bodies. This original intensity of its antagonism is its quantity of matter. The aggregate of force in the excess imparted from the moving body, and which is represented by the acquired velocity together with its own original intensity of antagonism, and which is its quantity of matter, now constitute the capability the body possesses to generate motion in some third body: and this whole aggregate of motion generating force is what we comprehend under the term momentum. It is commonly said to be compounded of the velocity and quantity of matter, but it should not thereby be understood that mere motion has itself any moving force, or capacity to generate motion, but only that the motion is the index of the moving force which generated it, and which has been transferred to it from the force moving it."

"The principle involved in virtual velocities, when the less quantity of matter balances the greater, or more generally in all cases of equilibrium, refers at once to the conception of momentum. The less force balances the greater, because the motion of the less would be more rapid in the inverse ratio of

its comparative weight." (Pp. 129 and 130.)

By the moving body spoken of in the beginning of this explanation, is evidently to be understood the body put in motion—the body moved. And "the measure of intensity that it originally had," "has neutralized its own measure in the other body," &c.; "but itself remained in, and goes along with, and indeed is the very essence of the moved body, and this original intensity it now has also, wherewith to strike and move other bodies."

How do such intensities appear when brought into antagonism, &c., in actual experience? The two pugilists referred to in one of our former illustrations, had each "neutralized" his "own measure in the other" body's arm, by holding that arm fast, "and left only the excess" of strength, if any, which his opponent might possess, "to pass over" and overthrow or otherwise maltreat his adversary. But the strength of the restrained arm of the weaker man, "itself remained in, and goes along with and indeed" (matter being force) "is the very essence" of the arm itself, and "this original intensity," this strength of the restrained arm, (this "very essence" of the arm itself,) "it now has also wherewith to strike and move other bodies;" though the opponent of the weaker man, all the while holds the same arm fast. The strength is there—that is conceded, but the man now has it not with which to strike and move other bodies: he will have, when the strong man sets him free.

We desire not to comment on the other steps of the reasoning, but must leave them, as we have quoted them in full, to speak for themselves. That the intention has been to bring out the doctrine of momentum right, is evinced by what is afterwards said of virtual velocities: the exposition will be entitled to be called a demonstration, when it is admitted that 8 times 10 zeros, or 80 zeros, will amount to just 4 times as much as 5 times 4 zeros, i. e. 20 zeros.

"The first principle of motion is that it must be rectilineal and uniform." P. 120. The motion is represented as being produced by an excess of energy of one of two activities; and it is stated that "the excess of energy" in the stronger, "having nothing to balance it, will forbid that it should be holden in any one point; and yet, as the weaker activity continues its antagonism to the amount of its energy, there is a perpetual space-filling force, which cannot be holden in any one point of space. The result must be a constant force which cannot abide in any one position, and it is thus the idea of the generation of motion." (P. 121.) The deductions from this are, 1. That the motion must be incessant. 2. That it must be rectilineal. 3. That it must be uniform.

The first of these cannot be disputed, as the force is all the while acting; but the effect must even therefore be cumulative. When unobstructed force continues to act in the same direction, it continues to produce its appropriate effect in that direction; it inevitably accelerates. The motion will go on, faster and faster. The case becomes that of falling bodies. The veritable case contemplated here, but not reached, is that of the momentary action of force. Very remarkable it is, that that should superinduce a uniform and rectilineal motion. The conclusion of the "rational insight," apart from all experience, would, as it seems to us, be (as is usual in this connexion) the other way; viz. that the effect of a momentary action must, after a time, be worn out; but it is not so; it remains, and will remain (if unobstructed) ever, in all its intensity. How the "principle" of the "Rational Cosmology" would provide for that does not appear; unless it might be on the impracticable plan exhibited in the explanation of momentum. direction of the motion should also be rectilineal is the most simple arrangement supposable. It appears to us the most natural withal, because we have always been accustomed to its working. That such an arrangement is necessary, even in a subordinate sense, we had rather not assert, before we know what force is, at the very least. The fact, that a momentary force is ever afterward efficient, is itself specially emblematical of what must ensue from the application of a wrong "principle."

What will be the resultant of two forces acting at an angle, is also discussed. We are not disposed to analyze the reasoning, nor have we room for such an analysis: the conclusion is quite sufficient to condemn the whole as a demonstration of truth. It is, that if forces which act at an angle are "of unequal excess of energies, their composition must give the line dividing their angle in the inverse ratio of the excess of energy, viz. the greater excess to have proportionately the less space, and the less excess to have proportionately the greater space, on their respective sides of the divided angle between them." (Pp. 125 and 126.) The ratio is not that of the partial angles in question, but that of their respective sines. The contrary would introduce confusion everywhere, in ways to be specified hereafter. What is here stated of course vitiates also the conclusion with regard to the inclined plane.

The results being thus contradictory to fact, the inquiry may well arise, what were the phenomena in which the author of the "Rational Cosmology" supposed that he most distinctly discerned the working of his principles; and also in what precise way the "antagonist force" acts? He has not left us in the dark in either of these respects. He seems to have derived his idea of place-holding force from those complex phenomena of elasticity which are always due to a molecular displacement of matter. For on pp. 119 and 120 we have:

"It is also obvious that a static is nothing in nature without a dynamic, for were there no push nor pull there could be no holding place by an equal antagonism; and so also that there can be no dynamic in nature that has not also its static, for no push nor pull could be without a stand-point. In nature there is complete sophism of the υστερον πρότερον; and were there no way of attaining to the supernatural, both the perpetuation of rest and the beginning of motion would be absurdities; for you must first have your motion in the very act of holding at rest, and you must first have your rest as the hold-point or springboard of your moving some other body. The only way out of such an antinomy, between nature in the understanding and nature in the sense, is the apprehension of a supernatural in the reason. An absolute spirit has the spring to an originating act in himself, in that he is ethical law in his spiritual excellency to govern himself. He may originate action, directly from the claims as known to be due from himself to himself. He has an ethical stand-point and spring-board, and can thus put forth his spiritual act in counteraction and make a beginning. Spiritual activity put in counteragency makes a physical stand-point; takes a position and holds it; and in that a static force already is, from which all physical mechanics may go out in operation."

The author's idea of the precise mode of action of the antagonist forces is first discerned in the complex phenomena which would be presented if "two rigid metallic rods" were pressed "together at their ends," and then one "should procure a complete fusion of the metal in the two rods at the point of contact." The result is stated to be "an accumulation of the metal from both in a rude globe of molten matter about the point of contact." (Pp. 134 and 135.)

From this result, in which ten thousand oblique molecular

actions are concerned, it is actually inferred that the resultant of two antagonistic activities of this sort is not zero, but "a growth, a new-birth of forces from the original point of counterworking," (p. 140,) and that this veritable resultant is at right angles to the line of antagonism of the two activities; i. e. in a direction, or in directions, of the greatest accumulation of matter in the globe about the point of contact. We cannot be mistaken in this respect; for the idea is carried out in full, through ten entire pages, under the head of "The Material Creation a Sphere:" as well as abundantly elsewhere.

This supposed action is also exemplified by the effect produced by dropping a stone into a lake; also by the progress of sound.

We observe, in passing, that the waves of sound are compared to the waves on the disturbed surface of the lake; thus—"The percussion of solid bodies, or the force of the human voice, make their similar circular, or, as entirely surrounded, their spherical waves in the atmosphere," &c. (p. 138.) The waves in the water rise and fall in directions at right angles to their respective lines of outward progress: the waves of sound are those of alternate condensation and rarefaction in the respective directions of their lines of progress.

Two of the conclusions which have now been distinctly exhibited and on which we have already commented, would, if true, be so important in their consequences, that they deserve to be restated, together with a declaration and description of what those consequences would be. The first of these conclusions is—that two countervailing forces (or activities) have a veritable resultant, or resultants, at right angles to their line of antagonism; the second, that when forces of "unequal excess of energies" act at an angle, their composition "must give the line dividing their angle in the inverse ratio of the excess of energy:" which would imply that in the two triangles into which the parallelogram of forces is divided, the sides should be as their opposite angles, instead of being as the sines of those angles. Now the prevalence of only these two as laws in the world actual, would lead to the following results:

It would derange the motions of all the heavenly bodies, at once—would render utterly unsuccessful all astronomical prediction—would make nugatory every computation of the

architect—it would change the rate of all our clocks—it would do much more:--it would urge the ocean to career over the land; and thus go far to even falsify the promise held forth in the rainbow: for the effects would be cumulative. It would modify all the analogous actions of the imponderable substances; rendering twilight different in extent and duration from what it really is-make every telescope a happy accidentand change all the climates of the earth more or less. It would (unless some unforeseen compensation should arise) introduce discord into every stringed instrument of music ever made-it would toss the atmosphere into storms such as the world has never seen. All these effects, and more than we can think of, would take place; - and of all that is here asserted we fearlessly challenge the contradiction by any one who knows enough of the physical forces, to know how the Great, the Almighty Sovereign of All is really pleased to order them.

It is truly gratifying to turn from the paralogisms of the Rational Cosmology, and behold their author in a very different light. The introduction to his description of what he regards as the creation of matter, contains a paragraph which we regard as one of the very finest in his book; and there are many which indicate his ability. He says of "a Supreme Absolute Spirit:" "But in the knowledge he has of his own supreme excellency of being, there is an end in his own dignity and glory ever before him. He knows what is due to himself, and nothing can intervene that he should not be true to himself. 'He remaineth faithful, he cannot deny himself.' He sees that it behooves him, as a right consciously due to himself, to manifest himself in creation. Under such ethical behest, and not at all before the impulse of any constitutional craving, God arises to the work of creation, and becomes a beginner and Author of an existence which before was not." (P. 100.)

This is no appropriate part of the "Rational Cosmology"—it seems almost out of place in it. It is Dr. Hickok himself, when he has, with humble reverence, looked into the mirror of divine truth; and, having been cheered and reanimated by its reflected beams, he then skilfully holds up the mirror to others.

But "he straightway" forgets "what manner of man he was" —philosophically we mean, not otherwise—for, on the very

next page, the author of the "Rational Cosmology" begins his description of "creation, as an origination of matter," thus:

"Solely from the reason (this reason?), and not from any want as if he too had a nature, God puts his simple activity in counteragency. He makes act meet and hold act, and in this originates an antagonism which constitutes force; a new thing; a something standing out for objective manifestation, and holding itself in position as a reality distinct from his own subjective simplicity. This force fixes itself in position; holds itself at rest; and so far from being inert, its very existence is a vis inertive, or a force actively holding itself still. Combined with this antagonist activity, in the same limit of counteraction, is the diremptive activity;" as described in the passages heretofore quoted. We have already expressed ourselves with regard to any such exposition. What is intended by it, the views already commented on will sufficiently indicate.

After this we are informed as to how the material creation

progressed; how it became a sphere.


"Taking then the independent action of force, as the conception of two countervailing spiritual activities, and following out the action directly according to the necessary laws of motion, we come to the knowledge that matter must accumulate itself about the point of counteragency in the form of a sphere, and must take on all the properties of a solid globe, which has the whole space filled from the centre to the circumference with successive forces, in their contiguous positions, sent off from the central action of the original simple antagonism." (P. 139.)

As we have heretofore indicated and shown by quotation, the conception of the mode of action of the two activities is discerned in the reaction of an elastic spring-board. Thus, "you must first have your rest as the hold-point or spring-board of your moving some other body." Also it is said of "an absolute spirit" that "he has an ethical stand-point and spring-board." (P. 119.) The author, therefore, must suppose a reaction of the activities backward, "each agency turning its opposite back upon itself," (p. 140); a recoil, such as spiral springs crowded up between two arrows would have

Only one pressed spring would be needed; hence we presume

the idea of "counteraction or antagonism in a single activity," (p. 94,) heretofore spoken of; and the "conception of matter" as being a "combination of distinguishable forces," (p. 96); both the crowding in, and the reacting outward being where the spring is.

This arrangement might be practicable in the case of a pressed spring, a spring of a veritable elastic material; but the reaction would be the resultant of ten thousand molecular forces, instead of only two. But whether this be all so or not, the subsequent processes described are all in accordance with the impracticable laws of force already condemned; because found to be either inadequate, or else wrong, everywhere. The



processes are these: The simple reacting forces go out from the limit L, in the two directions backward from the arrow-points, toward P and P'.* Then it is asserted that, "while the simple reacting force would go out in right lines directly back each way from the point of contact, the compounded forces will rise, as it were in a ring, at the point of contact directly transverse of the original line of action." This ring E E' is here seen edgewise, and so appears like a straight line; it is afterward styled "the equatorial ring." Then the accumulation begins at right angles to the ring itself, as represented by the short arrows, and so two other rings are formed parallel to the ring E E'; and this "will be, in fact, the turning of the whole ring on each side from itself, and making it to flow in newly engendered streams of forces on both sides backward toward

^{*} The figure is, of course, our own.

the polar points" P and P'. These polar points are represented as keeping "the continued activity" "from going back any further in a right line" (P P') "as an axis;" and so those activities "must perpetuate this flowing back, on each side of the equator, in new generations of forces, till they meet in their respective polar points, and a proper globe is thus formed by a spherical layer all about the central point. This primitive globe is now self-balanced in all its points, but as the central action goes on, it must again push each way in the axis and generate two other polar points beyond, thereby elongating the axis," (as is represented in the figure) "and in this elongation there comes as before a static rest in the axial direction, and the central working must rise again in a new transverse ring, and repeat a new flow of forces in their rings from the equator each way to the poles, and augment the globe by another ensphering layer," &c. &c.; -- "and so on indefinitely, till the reactions in the accumulating forces of the globe balance the energy of the central working, and the globe ceases to grow." (Pp. 140-142.) Moreover "the continual working at the centre continually generates new balls within the old, expanding the old as the new are generated within them," "and the whole globe is held in one as it were by a perpetuated agency that runs through and connects every position. No portion of the material force is isolate from the rest, but the whole ball is concrete from the centre through its entire sphere." It is stated, moreover, that "By no way can the created matter be lost except through a dissolution of the central force," and, that gone, "the outlying forces in the globe would have nothing to rest upon, and they must all dissolve, and literally,"

> 'Like the baseless fabric of a vision, Leave not a wreck behind.'—(Pp. 143, 144.)

What shall we say then, when we remember that this very "central force" is the activity reduced to helplessness, the zero-force, which we have heretofore described and characterized? Why truly that what we have here quoted, accurately describes what the whole globe is, and what its fate must be.

Even if this were not so, we see, withal, that it is not nature in general, but the central force that abhors a vacuum; and, as

it used to be said, there is a limit to the abhorrence, so here: for though "an infinite energy at the centre may generate new layers infinitely," yet we are also told, that when the power that created "ceases to augment the central action against the ensphered reactions, the globe will have attained its determined magnitude." (P. 142.) The question then recurs as to "what has been gained, except simply removing the mystery and our ignorance one step further back," (p. 147;) but it is visibly applicable to the "philosophy" of the "Rational Cosmology," instead of the Newtonian theory of gravitation.

Another illustration of the actual state of things here supposed, seems to us to be precisely in point; but we forbear to employ it, lest our object should seem to be mere ridicule. But unfortunately for the "Rational Cosmology" there is a point beyond the ridiculous; and that the "philosophy" here in question has attained to it may readily be shown, for, in this connexion, that philosophy has ventured again into the region of exact science; the region of ascertained fact and well-determined law.

For "the insight of the reason" is next "turned" "to the eternally necessary and immutable law of gravity." (P. 148.) The ensphering action is reviewed, and farther exhibited, and it is stated, that "the central point expels the outlying points on all sides;" while the other points are so situated, that "each point" "must on the side towards the centre act upon it, and only on the side from the centre act upon the layer exterior to it," &c. (P. 150.) Then, besides, that "It is a necessary determination that a globe so generated should have in every molecular force a centrifugal and a centripetal tendency just balancing each other, and thus holding the molecule at rest. The centrifugal force, it is said, "is properly expulsion," and the centripetal "repulsion;" though the terms attraction and repulsion are retained under protest. (P. 151.)* Under the

^{*} There have been several attempts to account for gravitation; among others the elastic fluid supposed by Newton himself. Playfair found, by rigid investigation, that for this purpose, there is only required an elastic fluid, of which the density is as the distance from the central body, and the elasticity as a certain given magnitude diminished by the reciprocal of that distance. Here repulsion comes in at least appropriately.

head of "the principle of falling bodies" we have, what would seem to be an additional postulate, of "one simple activity of a greater energy working toward the centre, and one activity of a less energy working from the centre." (P. 155.)* Be that as it may, it is with the laws of repulsion and attraction here deduced from the consideration of the forces that we are principally concerned. On page 153 we have "the necessary law for repulsion," expressed thus: "directly as quantity of matter, and inversely as the cube of the distance."

Now as the cube of the distance is zero at the centre, the law will of course require an infinite repulsion at the centre, as the resultant of the finite "working" originally begun absolutely there. But an infinite repulsion once seated there, what is to prevent it from acting in the manner before described, and then "an infinite energy at the centre may generate new layers infinitely," (p. 142); and the globe must very soon be

beyond all bounds.

The inconsistencies do not even end here. For "the attractive force," withal, "must be directly as the quantity of matter and inversely as the square of the distance." (P. 154.) Now as in approaching the centre the repulsive force increases by a more rapid law than the attractive; if then, in the instance of any molecule, we have "a centrifugal and centripetal tendency just balancing each other, and thus holding the molecule at rest," then repulsion must prevail for points nearer the centre; and so, if matter under these circumstances could exist at all, it would be driven away from the centre, to the limit of the just balancing forces, and the sphere be hollow; while beyond the limit it must at first increase in density, &c., &c. Nay more, the attractive force, separately considered, is itself all false to nature. For it is "in all globes" (p. 154) that the law "must" prevail. Now the attractive force of the earth (its

^{*} Physical astronomy has demonstrated that gravitation is not modified by the interposition of the bodies which transmit it. How will "place-holding" force and the "principles of motion" dispose of this?

Gravitation withal exhibits itself not as an emanation, requiring (like light) time for its transmission. Its velocity, if not infinite, must be at least fifty million of times greater than the velocity of light, (Méc. Céleste.) How can so much more, or so much less force be there, without loss of time, when circumstances require it, if matter be itself force, definitely arranged already?

intensity we mean) has been determined in at last four different ways; and all involve the doctrine, abundantly confirmed otherwise, that every molecule attracts every other directly as its mass indeed, and inversely as the square of the distance between them. But just in accordance with that, the attractive force at the centre of a symmetrically arranged globe must be zero instead of the infinity due to the law of the "Rational Cosmology;" for the forces all around the centre hold one another in equilibrio there: it is the case of millions of countervailing forces, all reduced to zero, of course. With respect to other points within the globe, the well digested investigations of physics with respect to central forces show that in a sphere of a uniform density, the force varies directly as the distance from the centre; but when the globe is more dense toward the centre, the attractive force would not vary quite so rapidly with the increase of distance: the former is the case in question. The law as expressed in the "Rational Cosmology" is that of attraction on a particle outside of the sphere, instead of within.

Thus, with respect to both the attractive and the repulsive force, the solution of the "Rational Cosmology" has surpassed the point beyond the ridiculous to an extent that cannot well be exceeded; and this with its central force veritably zero. The despised inductive method would seem here not out of place, in leading as it does to the generalization;—That all false philosophies have this feature in common; the attempt to veritably make something out of nothing.

Afterward it is said, with respect to the law of attraction, that it "is true again, not only of all globes in respect to each one's own portions of matter among themselves, but of all globes relatively to each other." The law indeed prevails with respect to the action of a sphere on a molecule without it, and hence controls the action of one sphere on another; but the mode of illustration in the "Rational Cosmology" is peculiar. For, we learn that, "when any two globes come within each other's range of attraction so that the peripheries of their spheres cut each other, the point of contact is at once a point of antagonism, and their acting central forces must so work this commencing antagonism as to push each one back upon itself and begin an ensphering anew, with the central point at

the first point of contact, and the forces of each globe must be successively turned back in a hemisphere within itself, and both together must form a new globe around the central point, and like 'kindred drops both ultimately mingle into one.'"

We find, withal, that "Any masses of matter less or more, must stand to each other as two such globes when they have their gravitating forces brought in contact, and their common centre of gravity must work after this eternal principle." (Pp. 154 and 155.)

We must leave this illustration (as such) to speak for itself. In no other way scarcely, could all we have before said about precision and other matters connected with it, be so well justified.

The author's remarks on p. 268 convey an idea to which we would earnestly demur; viz. a central point of revolution for all the visible creation, as being the last conclusion to which the doctrine of gravitation must tend. The author of the "Rational Cosmology" however, or any one else, will find it difficult to make it even probable that absolute rest exists anywhere in all this wide domain. That there may be absolute rest, is derived by an *induction*: we do not find it realized.

We have no room for a criticism of the explanation of capillary attraction (p. 262, &c.) It leaves out we may say several of the facts; and those omitted will be found to condemn it; especially the *depression* of mercury in a glass tube of a fine bore, below the level of the mercury in the basin in which the tube is plunged; the very decidedly *convex* surface of the top of the column even then; &c.

We have already spoken incidentally of the principle of falling bodies, we can only speak here of results; having already occupied a greater space than we had intended.

On pages 157 and 158, the spaces traversed in successive and equal times seem to be correctly stated, after the principal fact has been assumed; and the reasoning, after the veritable quantities are introduced, goes on consistently, though involving errors already commented on before that. But then the law, when summed up, is on pages 158 and 159 applied to the velocities last acquired instead of the spaces variably traversed. Now the action of gravitation near the surface of the earth

being in effect constant, the velocity acquired during each successive moment is the same; and thus the velocity is twice as great at the end of two moments from the beginning of the fall as at the end of only one, &c., &c.: the velocities acquired being directly as the times, instead of the squares of the times. A different result established as a law would derange the action of gravitation everywhere.

At the top of page 160 we have the old error of angle for sine. Farther down the page we have the ratio of the height of an inclined plane to its length, which gives the sine and not

the angle; and so contradicts the other statement.

The principle of heat finds the "diremptive force" in place, (pp. 179, &c.;) the diremptive force being, in some of its relations, another name for the repulsive force of heat. Every thing else in connection with heat is married by the presence of

the old helpless antagonist force.

When the water in a canal is disturbed by the motion of a boat on the surface, the ripples are propagated faster than the motion of the boat on the surface, and so, far outrun the actual forward thrust in the water of the boat itself; and thus predict the boat's approach. So when a carpet is held at one end, so that it cannot travel along the ground, but then is violently shaken, we see waves, like those in the canal, rapidly exhibited in the successive folds of the carpet. When a stone is dropped into a lake, the waves superinduced are circular, but it is the wave that is propagated, the water is scarcely more moved onward than was the shaken carpet, as we may see by observing the light substances which float on the surface.

In his exposition of the principle of magnetism, (pp. 163, &c.,) Dr. Hickok supposes waves similar to these; but instead of attributing the motion to them after the manner here described, he supposes two such circular disturbances of the substance, or matter, or force, in question, themselves to be moved until their centres coincide, and they coalesce and give one circular arrangement, after an impracticable fashion; very much as in the instance of gravitation. We need not pursue the reasoning after this. It gives to a globe two poles situated at the extremities of the same axis, &c.

It will be quite enough here to add several questions, to

which any theory or explanation of magnetism is bound to reply. Why is the development of magnetism at or near the surface of the magnet much greater than it is in the region within? How is it that the earth has very possibly four magnetic poles; and that these are so far from the astronomical poles? Why do not the positions of greatest intensity coincide with those respectively at which the dip is 90°? What is the connection between the isothermal lines, and the lines of equal magnetic intensity? What shall we do with thermo-magnetism? Scarcely one of these does the "Rational Cosmology" consider at all; nor could it solve them without ruinous postulates.

Electricity (p. 171, &c.) is derived from the interrupted action of magnetism; which is the case after a special fashion with magneto-electricity. The careful inductions of science point all the other way with respect to electricity under other circumstances; and the ingenious and beautiful, though highly artificial, theory of Ampère, derives magnetism from currents of electricity; and explains the phenomena with unsurpassed success.

We seem to see a man of great intellect standing beside that special exhibition of science and art conjoined, a railway train with the locomotive attached. The philosopher having well considered what is before him, comes to a distinct persuasion, which is to him a clear insight, of how the whole ought to move. He then seizes upon the magnificent quartos of Tredgold on the Steam Engine, and without looking into them, exclaims they have their use, and forthwith converts them into a footstool, by means of which he mounts into the engineer's seat. He then announces the conclusion, that it is reasonable that the passenger-cars should have the precedence, because of the great value of the freight which they carry. He therefore "backs" the engine, and puts all in motion in conformity to that reasonable arrangement; and so in the end arrives at the place from which the train had started some time before, instead of that which they had been destined to reach.

On page 210 the vibrations of *Light* are represented as being spheroidal or rather ellipsoidal, involving a change of shape in spherical layers of masses; instead of those molecular

changes which the undulatory theory so imperatively requires; which theory withal has received such ample confirmations. The interference of light (p. 217) is attributed to cross-vibrations. Their direction is almost anything but that. Also (p. 297) we are told that "the angle of refraction is the same in all cases for the same substance." That the vibrations of the atmosphere which give sound were incorrectly stated, we have heretofore noticed.

On page 214 we find it stated of the sun, that "its light and heat are as determinate principles as its gravity, yea, they are eternally determined in its gravity." The late Professor Hassler had we believe some such idea. But if this be so, how is it that the same principle does not illuminate the dark bodies in space; such as the companion to Sirius which must yet be many times heavier than our sun; to say nothing withal of the relative light of red, yellow, blue, white, and green stars?

On page 219 we are informed that "the first geological formations must be plutonic, the crystallized and partially crystallized will underlie the composite, and the inner heat will at length be so confined and softened, that an atmosphere shall form, and the combination of water commence, &c."

On page 203 and elsewhere the tangential force is naturally enough put for the centrifugal force. This would accord better with the doctrines of force as laid down in the "Rational Cosmology;" but the substitution is just as incorrect as it is natural. The relations of central forces are among the things well-ascertained. They cannot now be overturned.

On page 204 we find, in effect, that the course of one of two fixed lines which meet a tangent, at the point of contact, will "evince a curve to be a hyperbola, or a parabola," &c. We cannot but think that this will be new to mathematicians. An embodiment of the idea may be found in this. If a target be placed so as exactly to touch the more remote bank of a river, and then a ball be fired from a given station, so as to strike the target at any angle, and then be reflected at an equal angle; then the precise course of the ball in its rebound, will "evince" the special form of the turns and bends of the river, both above and below the target.

Besides other errors of tangential force, &c., we find (p. 207)

that the radius-vector of a planet varies inversely as the velocity. When the velocity is variable at all, it varies inversely as the *perpendicular* from the centre of force on the tangent, and not as the radius-vector.

"The squares of the times of revolution" (of the planets) "must be as the cubes of the mean distantes." In the proof of this we find (p. 208) "a less or greater force, in carrying the planet through the same orbit," &c. A less or greater force could not carry the planet through the same orbit, the central force remaining constant. When impossible quantities are introduced into calculation, they must be represented as in impossible relations; in order that what is not to be found among the impossibles may appear among the possibles.

On the same page, and the next the relations of distances and times, are made to depend on the form of body from which a planet is thrown off. They depend essentially on the law of central force, its intensity, and the velocity of projection.

On page 209 we read, moreover, this comparison between a planet thrown off from "the circumference of a circular plane," and that "expelled from the equatorial surface of a sphere:"

"But when a planet has been expelled from the equatorial surface of a sphere, although revolving at the same time within the same orbit, yet must its force have been far greater. Every radius of the sphere has thrown off its own portion. and here the principle must be as the cube of the distance" (instead of the square, when thrown from the circle,) "and we shall have the determined formula that the squares of the periodic times will be as the cubes of the distances." Here we have the former difficulty of revolving in the same orbit with a far greater force which (if provided for) may possibly be compensated by a greater central force. But then we have every radius of the revolving sphere throwing off its own portion; though all revolve about the axis in the same time. The force could not be gravitation which admitted of that. Then, lastly, we have squares of distances for the planetary fragment of a circle, and cubes of distances for that of the sphere; because, it would seem, circles are as the squares of their radii, and spheres as the cubes of the same. We have heard of a conjecture that the days were longer in summer, because heat

expanded all bodies. The cases certainly are not quite parallel; but the connexion is no less unreal.

On page 330 we have a reproduction of the error exploded some two years ago at the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, viz. "The satellites revolve but do not rotate." If one person should take his seat in the middle of a room and another walk around him looking always north: the traveller would turn his back to the other when he was on the north side of the apartment; his face when he was on the south side: be turned sidewise when he was on the east and west sides respectively, &c., &c. He would revolve around the central body but would not rotate; and therefore would so present himself to the central body as to exhibit himself on all sides. So does not the moon; she shows nearly the same face always. Therefore it cannot be true that she does not rotate. But a body going round another and fastened to it by a rod so as to turn its face always inward, must face around on all sides once in doing so. That is what a body always facing another must do whether the connecting rod be there or no. This is the case with the moon and perhaps some other satellites.

On p. 331 we have—"The same conformity with the principle is found in the facts of the very slight excentricity of the moon's orbit, and the absence of all flattening at the poles. If the moon had been ejected from its primary with sufficient force to rotate, it must have been considerably elliptical in its orbit; and if it had rotated on its axis it must have been oblate proportioned to the rapidity of rotation. The facts all correspond to the determinations of the rational principle."

The stubborn facts are all the other way. The excentricity of the moon's orbit is very nearly the same with that of most of the larger planets, and it is more than three times as great as that of the earth's orbit. The moon does rotate, as has been shown already: and the form of the moon is that of an approximation to an ellipsoid; the shortest equatorial diameter being longer than the polar, and the longest of all, the equatorial diameter pointing to the earth.

On the same page the result of M. Hansen's profound analysis as regards the shape of the moon is thus gotten rid of—

"This general law of the satellites, that they constantly turn one face to the primary, has been sometimes accounted for by supposing that one hemisphere of the satellite is protruded towards the planet and is thus held in place, by an excess of gravity in the protruding part; but no fact of such protuberance appears, and the true principle determines the facts as they are given, without any gratuitous hypothesis." There is the usual fatality here as regards all the facts. The gratuitous hypothesis is a careful deduction. The part of the moon formed of more dense material, but not really heavier, is that turned away from us, and not toward us. Being more dense it is less protuberant. The lunar irregularities (and not the regular turning of the same face toward us,) led to this conclusion.

In regions such as these, which the most profound analysts enter with a wholesome dread, and within which they step with caution, the "Rational Cosmology" moves along with a step which it evidently regards as being well-assured, and specially becoming to itself. It here also displays its triumphs; as we have just now seen. Witness, moreover, its prediction that such retrograde comets as Halley's must become direct in their movements; which means, as we see, that "the line of ascending node" shall "revolve" "till the point is reached in the particular orbital plane of the comet, that equilibrates the right and left hand attractions through the whole revolution, and must then remain with slight oscillations to and fro that incidental disturbances will occasion." (Pp. 356 and 357.)

We add but one other exemplification, which may serve, withal, specially to illustrate what here immediately precedes.

On p. 337, "Because the axis of the earth is more than 90° turned from the axis of Uranus, the moons of Uranus must from the earth appear to move in a westerly direction."

Passing by minor criticisms on this, we observe that the sun, the moon, and very commonly the planets, appear to turn around their axes in a direction from east to west, while they really are turning from west to east—all because we must look upon them from the outside. Such motions may then in one part of their circuit appear the reverse of what they really are; but any method of measuring the angle between the axis of Uranus (or rather its parallel) and the axis of the earth,

which would make that angle greater than 90°, must itself succeed in putting south for north, and of course, also, west for east.

Are not exemplifications such as these among the triumphs of the "Rational Cosmology?" Let us hear what it says:

"That the moons of Uranus are retrograde has been a surprising anomaly from its first discovery, but that this exceptional fact is found to leap within the necessary determinations of the eternal principle, and is found anomalous only in appearance, the principle itself expounding why it must so appear, is a most conclusive example of that accordance of fact and

principle, which is alone true science." (P. 338.)

The concluding remark rightly understood is indeed true; and therefore it must be abundantly manifest by this time, that the "Rational Cosmology" is not true; or if true, that it must be true in other worlds than those of which astronomy has any knowledge. It stands condemned by a just criterion of its own selecting. Its author has failed, conspicuously failed; but he has failed where no man can hope to succeed. The philosophy, or rather science, at which he aims may be that of angels; it has not in this world yet been attained by unaided men. There is another path for them—"Nay, it is a point fit and necessary in the front, and beginning of the work, without hesitation or reservation to be professed, that it is no less true in this human kingdom of knowledge, than in God's kingdom of heaven, that no man shall enter into it, 'except he become first as a little child.'"*

In obedience to this noble aphorism (though not always in view of it) all veritable progress in physical science has been made. The science thus built up may be decried. It may be misrepresented as having "its full mission" "accomplished" "in complete and final positivism." That will be true when Mormonism is the perfection of civil liberty. It may be told "that it can vindicate its possession logically to no fact that it assumes beyond actual experiment." That may be true when it is shut out from the use of certain of its mental powers, or agrees to make use of only a portion of them: but it cannot invalidate its

^{*} Bacon's Valerius Terminus Of the Interpretation of Nature, Montague's Edition, Vol. I. p. 267.

mode of gathering its own facts. It may be told by those who would shut it up to less than this, that it "is in the end atheistic or" (mirabile dictu) "Pantheistic." It were sad indeed if that were true, for its method is evidently the humble child-like one of first carefully studying what God has permitted to be, without a previous determination of what it must be. This is the only way in which the book of nature can be successfully studied. That some of its students have wrongly read, and wilfully misinterpreted it, may be an argument against the only proper use of the book itself, when the abuse of a doctrine makes it untrue.

But this method has no philosophy; it terminates in mere facts. Its investigations can indeed go no farther, in themselves, than general facts, and those great pervading relations of facts, the laws of nature. But in the knowledge of these precise relations lies its strength, of their precision, not merely

of their generality.

But has it no principles—no philosophy? Yes! But both are heaven-born, and not of man's devising; and therefore they will be *eternal*. For there is one science which *can* begin where the "Rational Cosmology" would put itself; it is heaven-descended theology, which finds its perfection in Christianity; and derives its knowledge from Him who "was in the begin-

ing with God," and "who hath declared him."

With the Bible before him the Christian philosopher accepts as his great hypothesis the God of the Bible; and attributes creation to his "good pleasure;" and having learned the resources of that good pleasure, the Christian philosopher considers it philosophical to conclude that Infinite Wisdom might have devised a plan different, even very different, from that which we find; nay, that it would be very unphilosophical to think otherwise. This philosophy accepts withal the Bible's account of creation, which (in the words of the author of the Rational Cosmology,) "makes God a beginner and Author of an existence which before was not;" but that a veritable substance, infinitely beneath the blessed Creator himself. This the Christian philosophy receives in the simple faith of the little child, believing as it does that it cannot comprehend God's first great formative act. Other principles there may be, inferior to these; but the

humble student of the book of nature, is every day more perfectly convinced that the knowledge of them is still lodged where the Bible came from.

The unexpected length to which our remarks on the physical aspect of Dr. Hickok's book have run, constrains us to the most brief and general comments upon its psychological, metaphysical, and theological views. The points to which, in closing, we call attention are the following.

1. We encounter on the very first page, and repeatedly elsewhere, a characteristic infirmity of this class of writers—the attempt to give a decisive turn to the discussion of fundamental questions, by arguments drawn from the etymology of words. This is done by the author, in establishing his doctrine of principles as uncreated in contrast with facts as things made: his theory of the functions of understanding as distinguished from reason; his contrast between existence and being; his objection to the Scottish philosophy of common sense; his distinction between nature and the supernatural. Of this last we give a single specimen, because we shall have cause to refer to the passage for another purpose. On the fallacy of this kind of argument, it is needless here to expatiate.

Dr. Hickok tells us: "Nature, natura, (a nascor,) is a birth, an outspringing, a growth. . . . It is applied properly to every created individual thing, inasmuch as each separate thing has its own peculiarly constituted forces which make it to be what it is, and gives to it its own essential identity, and which secure that it must develop itself after the conditions of its original constitution. . . . That which was not created, or constituted of such conditioned forces, has not a nature, but must be wholly supernatural. Of all created existence we may say in general, it is Nature." Pp. 131-2. We need not repeat here the criticisms we have offered in another article, in regard to this view of nature and the supernatural, as it is given by Coleridge.

2. Dr. Hickok pronounces man's "free personality," "the rational in humanity," to be "wholly supernatural," "wholly above nature." Pp. 80, 81. Much more might be cited to the same effect. But, as we have just seen, he pronounces "all

created existence" to be nature. Where then are we? Are the free personality and the rational faculty in man uncreated? What else does all this mean? If uncreated, are they simply an effluence of the Uncreated One, consubstantial with Him? If any clew to a different meaning can be shown, we shall be thankful. We shall need a keener "insight of reason" than we yet dare profess, to detect it. This "unmade" part of our being, what is it? Is it, or can it be anything which God made, when he created man in his own image? We do not see how it differs from the "impersonal" reason of Cousin, which can only be a one divine essence permeating humanity, or from that of Coleridge which he pronounces "identical with its own objects, God, the soul, immortality." The prerogatives which Dr. Hickok ascribes to the reason are commensurate with its supreme dignity. "Reason," says he, "is not a fact; a somewhat that has been made; but from its own necessity of being, can be conceived no otherwise than a verity which fills eternity and immensity." P. 85. No wonder then that "the created facts being given, the reason may in them detect the laws by which they are governed, and when the insight of reason also determines that these very laws in the facts are such as the eternal principles made necessary, we have then a true and valid science of the universe, and may safely call the result of our work a Rational Cosmology." (P. 256.) "This immutable principle, which determines how the fact may, and, if the fact be at all, how it must be, is given in pure thought alone, and is no appearance in the sense." P. 18. "If the creator must make and guide the universal cosmos after the determination of immutable principles," &c. p. 56.

According to this, if God puts forth any creative act, he can do so only in conformity with certain eternal laws, which necessitate the production of the results actually accomplished, and no other. The only election left to the Creator respects the degrees and times of the forth-putting of his creative energy, but not the quality or manner of the working thereof. These latter are determined by immutable necessary laws. It is the province of reason to detect these laws, and their eternal necessity; how a creation must be if it be at all. Such insight and nothing else is true science. Dr. Hickok then proceeds to

unfold these laws, as seen by the insight of reason; to show how force, i.e. the antagonisms and diremptions of activities, and the necessary laws seen by the reason to govern its working, must develop all the forms and properties of matter, mechanical, chemical, organic, and inorganic, physiological, vegetable, animal; gravity, cohesion, repulsion, heat, light, electricity, magnetism, &c.! Such is the prerogative of reason. according to Dr. Ilickok; not to see what creation is, and that being such, it must have had a creator, but to see how it must be, and the eternal laws which necessitate that the creative act produce what is produced, if it be exerted at all! That faculty which can do this, he may well assert "fills eternity and immensity." We hardly know how to speak of the stupendous daring, the heroic audacity of such an attempt on the part of a mortal. The utter failure of the attempt, already made too apparent in the examination of the physical part of his book, is no discredit to Dr. Hickok's powers. His only discredit lies in not knowing better than to essay an insight into what is beyond mortal ken. We will just here, before discussing another point that arises in this connection, note another prerogative which he awards to reason, in which its divine dignity culminates. "The being is bound to be his own end." P. 84. "It (the rational) can make its own conscious worth and dignity its end of action." We think so too, if Dr. Hickok's account of it be correct. With the exception of its being incarnate, and, according to the author, susceptible of some kind of subordination to the Supreme Reason, (we can hardly see what,) wherein does it differ from Him, of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things, to whom be glory for ever?

But who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? Who by searching can find out God? Who can fathom the great deep of his counsels? We see enough indeed of the outbeamings of his infinite excellence and uncreated glory, to know that he is entitled to our absolute homage and devotion. But the light which reveals this, also discloses an infinitude beyond, utterly unsearchable by us. The beams which disclose also veil him. He covereth himself with light as a garment. What we know, are only parts of his ways, and how little a portion is heard of him? But, as Dr.

Hickok portrays man and his Maker, is God the being who dwelleth in light which no man can approach unto, whom no man hath seen or can see? Dr. Hickok says that he is. But we see not why he should say so without renouncing his system.

3. As to these necessary laws or truths, which the reason sees to be such, and which govern uncontrollably the whole construction of the material universe, and by which the human mind can develop the necessary forms of matter, animate and inanimate, as it develops the science of geometry from its axioms; we say, 1. There is no evidence of their existence: 2. There is evidence that, whether they exist or not, we cannot know them. The question is not, whether, or in what sense, there are any necessary truths or relations. On this we may presently say something. But it is whether there are necessary unmade principles, which necessitate that, if the Creator puts forth creative energy at all, it must issue in the precise laws and products which we find in the material universe. We say there is no proof of them. If they have being, we are incapable of ascertaining them. By laborious experimentation, observation, and induction, we are constantly learning that certain laws do exist, some governing all matter, others particular kinds of matter. But by no human "insight of reason" can it be proved that these laws could not be otherwise, if such were the good pleasure of God. Dr. Hickok, in attempting to prove it, as has already been shown, has undertaken to prove not a few things to be necessarily true, which are actually false. Is it not too much to deserve serious refutation for any man to claim, that if God exerts his energy at all, it must be in such a way as to produce light, heat, and electricity, and the precise laws which now shape their action? that "matter must impress itself upon the senses?" (p. 110;) that, "with the complicated and nicely adapted organism of the eye given in conception, it may be a clear insight of the reason that matter, as a space-filling force, must give all the conditions requisite for vision?" (P. 116.)

Can any knowledge be more purely empirical than all that we know or can know in regard to the susceptibility of the

senses, or any of them, to impressions from material objects? Is it possible to know the first fact in regard to the capacity of any bodily sense, or the power of other objects upon it, except by experience and consciousness? Is it possible to demonstrate before-hand that vision will result from the structure of the eye, or that it will be destroyed by lesion of the optic nerve or brain? Would it not be quite as easy to prove that the brain must be intensely sensitive, while, in fact, as Sir Charles Bell has observed, "that part of the brain which if disturbed or diseased takes away consciousness, is as insensible as the leather of our shoe?"

The same writer observes, "When the bones, joints, and all the membranes and ligaments which cover them, are exposed, they may be cut, pricked, or even burned, without the patient or the animal suffering the slightest pain." If a priori reasoning has place in regard to the existence, kind, and degree of animal sensibility, would it not quite as easily prove the contrary of all this, as that a "space-filling force" must furnish the conditions requisite for vision, or that matter must impress the senses?

With regard to necessary truths, in the strictest sense, they are those, the contradictories of which to the human mind are neither supposable nor conceivable. These, however, are, with slight exceptions, truths of relation rather than of actual existence, and chiefly pertain to the formal sciences of Logic and Mathematics. A close analysis will show the necessary judgments in these sciences, to be chiefly reducible to the simple principles of identity and contradiction: viz. that we must think a thing to be what it is, and not what it is not. Space and time are necessary in our thought, as the illimitable void receptivities in which all bodies and all events must have place. The metaphysical ideas of causality and substance have this conditional necessity; that, if events are given, they must have a cause, if qualities are given, they must have a substance. The mind is unable to judge otherwise. The idea of the good is necessary on the supposition of the existence of moral beings: of the beautiful, on the supposition of esthetic faculties; of the true, on the supposition of intellectual and rational faculties. While, however, we cannot conceive of a perfect God as desti-

tute of either of these ideas and attributes in absolute perfection, it is conceivable that man, had it been the will of God. might have been made a sentient, but not a rational being, or an intelligent being, to a certain extent, and yet not an esthetic or moral being. But within the realms of actual existence, the range of necessary principles, ascertainable by us as such, is exceedingly narrow. As to all created substances, or events, what can we pronounce to be necessary regarding them even in our conception, that is not implied in saving, that bodies must be in space, events in time, and that they must have a cause? But this in no appreciable degree limits the divine activity, or the possibilities open to creative energy. It determines not how, nor where anything must be brought to pass. It limits not the Holy One, and leaves all things possible with God, to be executed according to the good pleasure of his will. The laws of nature are uniform, not by any compulsory necessity that they should be so, as that the sum of the angles of a triangle must be equal to two right angles; not because God could not, for cause, wholly change their working, as he has been pleased to do in the case of miracles; but because, for wise and holy reasons, it has pleased him that they should abide, and that seed-time and harvest should not fail during the present dispensation. But how long this system of physical nature shall last, we know not. The scoffers of old and of late, who reluctate against the reign of a personal God in nature, providence, and grace, have asked "Where is the promise of his coming? Do not all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation?" But the answer of the Supreme Reason to this is, that as he destroyed the wicked of old by a deluge of water, and a rain of fire, so "the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto judgment and perdition of ungodly men." See 2 Peter ii.

On Dr. Hickok's theory, nothing, so far as matter is concerned, is left to the free disposal of God, except the bare supply of the "force" requisite to the creation and sustentation of created things. All else is remanded to the domination of "immutable principles," as relentless in their necessity as fate. He may exert more or less of the vis creativa. But that is all.

The manner and measure of its working, and the results to which it comes, are determined by an overbearing necessity, which is beyond the reach of Omnipotence. Where then is Providence? What rules us and the universe? A free personal God, or a fatalistic necessity?

4. The fundamental doctrine out of which Dr. Hickok evolves his whole system of "Rational Cosmology" is that "matter is force," purely and simply force. What then does he mean by force? Recurring to what we have already frequently referred to, he tells us, "When, however, the conception is that of simple action in counteraction, an activity that works from opposite sides upon itself, we have in it at once the true notion of force." (Pp. 93, 4.) This subject has been sufficiently discussed in its relations to natural philosophy. We wish now to consider it as related to metaphysics and theology. It appears then that force is the resultant of counter activities. Whose activity, whose action in counteraction? Certainly that of some agent or substance. Certainly we may insist on this with one who postulates necessary truths on so liberal a scale. If there be any truth, which the "insight of reason" cannot avoid discerning as a first truth, it is that all qualities belong to some substance, all attributes to a subject, all actions to an agent. Whose action and counteraction then is it that thus develops itself as force, i. e. as matter? Surely it can be no other than God's. What else then is matter than the activity of God, God in act? Says Dr. Hickok, "Solely from the reason, and not from any want as if he too had a nature, God puts his simple activity in counter-agency. He makes act meet and hold act, and in this originates an antagonism which constitutes force; a new thing; a something standing out for objective manifestation, and holding itself in position as a reality distinct from his own subjective simplicity." (P. 101.) "This material is not God, nor at all competent to rise from its imposed conditions into the region of the absolute." (P. 102.) We are glad that Dr. Hickok disclaims and tries to escape monism. But whether he can do it logically, without renouncing the fundamental principle of his Cosmology, is another question, which fealty to God and truth requires us to put and answer. After all disclaimers, he teaches that God's "act

meeting and holding his act," gives the "antagonism which constitutes force," or matter. If this is any "new thing" beyond God's activity in antagonism "standing out for objective manifestation," or in any other sense "distinct from his own subjective simplicity," we do not see it. Indeed Dr. Hickok explicitly declares, "the antagonism and the diremption to be the one agency of the Absolute Spirit." (P. 101.) "All being will be alike subjective to Him." (P. 100.) At all events, most pantheists will be satisfied with such a που στω, and will readily found their systems upon it. Dr. Hickok says truly, "there is a dualism; the world is not without its Maker, and the maker is not in and of the world." (P. 21.) But we confess that this dualism does not "exist or stand out" on his theory, any further than the dualism between the agent and his activity. The most common pantheistic formula is, that the Absolute being comes to exist or stand out in objective manifestation, by becoming an object to himself in Nature and Humanity. Some say that He does this in coming into selfconsciousness. Self-consciousness implies distinction; distinction limitation: thus the Infinite evolves itself and becomes objective to itself in the finite. Still these men would say "there is a dualism," in the monism. The finite is not the infinite, although of it, as the flower is of the plant, the wave of the ocean. The main thing is that the finite is not a created substance distinct from the Infinite Creator, but an act or evolution of him. When we consider the divine prerogatives ascribed by Dr. Hickok to the reason in man, along with his definition of matter as force or the antagonism of divine activities, we feel ourselves nearing that awful vortex of modern German philosophy, from which all but the most dauntless speculatists must recoil with horror. Says Chalybaus, in his historical survey of Schelling's philosophy: "If in all this, we never forget the main point, namely, that apart from this living impulse, movement, and activity, there is nothing material or real whereupon or wherein these indications of power occur, but that the very real and material itself consists intrinsically of the play of these mutually determining activities, we may then be enabled to grasp at once intelligibly and intuitively the principle of the whole system; that all is in its essence one and

the same."* Coleridge, whose dissertation on this subject has been stigmatized by some as a plagiarism upon Schelling, and by himself acknowledged to evince a "coincidence" with him, dicourses in a similar tone. "There is strictly speaking," says he, "no proper opposition but between the two polar forces of one and the same power. Every power in nature and in spirit, must evolve an opposite, as the sole means and condition of its manifestation." Aids to Reflection, p. 287. "The transcendental philosophy demands, first, that two forces should be conceived which counteract each other by their essential nature; secondly, that these forces should be assumed to be both alike infinite, both alike indestructible." Biographia Lit. p. 169. "The identity of Thesis and Antithesis is the substance of all Being; their opposition the condition of all existence, or Being manifested." Aids, p. 287. All this seems to us so very like Dr. Hickok's divine activities in antagonism, constituting matter, as to show very clearly, their substantial identity. And when once the antagonism is posited, his process of worldbuilding, or evolution, seems to us little more than a modified reflection from that given by Schelling, and the Pantheistic Transcendentalists. Notwithstanding his analysis and rejection of the schemes of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin, the germinal elements of that monism which is common to them all, seem to us to lie in his radical principles. The variations are such as enforce themselves upon a Christian man. But as to their real character, and logical consequences, they are circumstantial rather than fundamental.

The simple doctrine of Scripture and reason we take to be this: that the physical universe and its constituent parts are not mere acts of God in mutual antagonism; but that they are entities, substances, created from nothing by his omnipotence, distinct and separate from him, yet dependent upon his sustaining, and subject to his governing power; that these substances or entities are also made the subjects or media of certain physical forces, acting according to uniform laws, which forces and their laws exhibit the distinct and invariable modes of the the divine control over matter; that he governs and disposes and acts in and through them, by his all-controlling provi-

^{*} We quote from Tulk's Translation, p. 222.

dence; that it is his prerogative to make or unmake, or modify this whole material frame or any part thereof, according to his good pleasure, not being necessitated otherwise than by that moral necessity which forbids him to deny himself, and ensures that he doeth all things well. We do not believe, that, to any extent of the least moment, in such a discussion, he is constrained by any eternal necessity, so that he can produce nothing but his own activity in antagonism and diremption; or that he is unable to impart to matter, if he be pleased to create it, any properties, he may please, not mutually self-contradictory. If he cannot create material substances other than his own "act holding his own act," much less can he create immaterial or spiritual essences or substances. Indeed Dr. Hickok tells us, p. 84, that spirit as being "self-activity and self-law," is "essence which is not substance." Still if it is activity, it must be the activity of some person or thing; -of what, or whom? Whose activity is the free, responsible, rational "essence" within us? Whose, ours or God's? Does the trans cendentalism of Schelling develop a more "insoluble ego?" There is no escape from these difficulties but in the simple recognition not only of the absolute substance and absolute cause, but of derivative, dependent substances, and second causes, distinct from God's mere act, yet created and sustained by his act. Otherwise the distinction between God and the creature, holiness and sin, freedom and fatalism, is a sublime fiction. Is it demanded that we explain how this is possible? How God by his Almighty working can create and uphold that which is not his mere activity? We freely confess ourselves unequal to such a demand. We have no "rational insight" which can fathom the measureless profound of divine possibilities. These are things too high for us to meddle with. We rest in the Apostle's solution, in which our faith and philosophy begin and end, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past finding out!"

ART. VII.—Demission of the Ministry.

The last General Assembly adopted the following overture, viz.

"Resolved, That it be referred to the Presbyteries whether the following sections shall be added to the 15th chapter of the

Form of Government, namely,

"16. The office of a minister of the gospel is perpetual, and cannot be laid aside at pleasure. No person can be divested of it but by deposition. Yet, from various causes, a minister may become incapable of performing the duties of the office; or he may, though chargeable with neither heresy nor immorality, become unacceptable in his official character. In such case he

may cease to be an acting minister.

"17. Whenever a minister, from any cause not inferring heresy, crime, or scandal, shall be incapable of serving the church to edification, the Presbytery shall take order on the subject, and state the fact, together with the reason of it, on their record. And when any person has thus ceased to be an acting minister, he shall not be a member of any Presbytery or Synod, but shall be subject to discipline as other ministers, provided always, that nothing of this kind shall be done without the consent of the individual in question, except by the advice of the Synod; and provided, also, that no case shall be finally decided except at a stated meeting of the Presbytery.

"18. Any minister having demitted the exercise of his office in the manner herein provided, may, if the Presbytery which acted on his demission think proper, be restored to the exercise thereof, and to all the rights incident thereto, provided, that the consent of the Synod be obtained, in case his demission was

ordered by the Synod in the manner above recited."

This overture makes a distinction between the exercise of the ministry and the ministry itself; the former may be demitted, the latter cannot be laid aside either at the pleasure of the party, or by the action of the Presbytery. Once a minister, always a minister, unless in cases of deposition. The overture proposes that the want of ability to discharge the duties of the ministry, or want of acceptableness, shall, provided the party consent, be a sufficient reason for the demission of the exercise of the office. Should, in the judgment of the Presbytery, these reasons exist, the Presbytery may, with the advice of Synod, enforce this demission, without the assent of the party concerned. The effect of the demission contemplated is not to deprive the minister of his office, but only of certain of its prerogatives. He ceases to have the right to sit and act as a member of Presbytery; but he does not become a layman. He is subject, not to the session, but to the Presbytery; and may be restored to all the privileges of his office, by the simple vote of the Presbytery, without any renewed trials or ordination.

To have any intelligent opinion as to the propriety of the proposed measure, we must, in the first place, understand what the ministry is. Is it a work, or an office? If the latter, what are its peculiar characteristics? In what sense is it "perpetual?" Why may it not be resigned as other offices may be? There is a large body of distinguished men, ancient and modern, and some Christian sects, who deny that the ministry is an office. They assert that it is simply a work. The distinction between the clergy and laity is said to be not merely human as to its origin, but altogether arbitrary. No such distinction, it is said, is recognized in Scripture, or consistent with the common prerogatives of Christians. It is maintained that, in virtue of the universal priesthood of believers, all Christians have equal right to preach, baptize, and to administer the Lord's Supper. Such was the opinion of some of the Fathers, and such is the opinion of some of the most eminent modern scholars. It is not, however, the common doctrine of the church; and it is not the doctrine of our church. The ministry is properly an office, because it is something which cannot be assumed at pleasure by any and every one. A man must be appointed thereto by some competent authority. It involves not only the right, but the obligation to exercise certain functions, or to discharge certain duties; and it confers certain powers or prerogatives, which other men are bound to recognize and respect. Lawyers, physicians, merchants, and mechanics, are not officers. Any man may be a physician or merchant. No man is bound to discharge the duties of either. But judges and magistrates are officers. They are appointed to the posts which they occupy; they are bound to discharge its duties; and they are invested with certain prerogatives in virtue of their appointment. That the ministry is in this sense an office is plain from the numerous titles given in the New Testament to ministers, which imply official station. They are not only teachers, but overseers, rulers, governors. The qualifications for the office are carefully laid down, and the question, whether these qualifications are in any case possessed, is not left to the decision of those who aspire to the office, but to the church, through her appointed organs. Men are, therefore, said to be called, appointed, or ordained, to the work of the ministry, by those who have authority thereto. And accordingly, the people are required to obey those who have the rule over them, and whom the Holy Ghost has made their overseers.

But what is the nature of this office? Is it a temporary, or a permanent one? According to one view, the office of the ministry has relation to one particular church and is dependent on that relation. A man is a husband in relation to his own wife, and to no other woman. If legally separated from her, by her death or otherwise, he ceases to be a husband. A man is a governor of a particular state; he is no governor in relation to any other commonwealth; and when his term of office expires, or he resigns his post, he ceases to be a governor, and becomes a private citizen. According to this theory, minister and pastor are convertible terms. A man is a minister only in relation to the church which chooses him to be its pastor. Outside of that church he has no official power or authority; and when his connection with his particular congregation is dissolved, he becomes a layman. If elected by another church, he is reordained. This is the pure Independent theory. Many cases of such reordinations occur in the early history of the Puritans of New England. It is very evident that this is an unscriptural theory. All the ordinations specifically mentioned in the New Testament, i. e. all the persons therein mentioned as ordained to the work of the ministry, were thus ordained, not in

reference to any particular church, but to the church at large. According to this Independent theory, no man can be ordained to preach the gospel to the heathen; and some of its advocates are consistent enough to teach that no provision is made in the New Testament for the conversion of nations outside the church. It need not be said that this is not the common doctrine of Christians, or that it is not the doctrine of Presbyterians. We hold in common with the great mass of believers, that the ministry is an office in the church universal, designed for her enlargement and edification; that it is not dependent on the choice of any particular congregation, or on the relation which the minister may sustain as pastor, to any particular people. It is in this repect analogous to naval and military offices. A captain in the navy is as much a captain when on shore, as when he is in command of a ship; and he may be transferred from one ship to another. His office is permanent. The Romish theory on this subject is, that orders, or ordination, is a sacrament; and a sacrament is a rite instituted by Christ, which has the power of conferring grace; and grace is an internal spiritual gift. In every case therefore of canonical ordination there is this peculiar grace of orders communicated to the soul. In ordination to the priesthood this grace is, or includes supernatural power, giving ability to transubstantiate the bread and wine in the Eucharist into the body and blood of Christ, to remit sin, to render the sacraments efficacious, &c. &c. Here then is an internal something constituting a man a priest, of which he cannot divest himself, and which by no act of man can be taken from him. It may however be forfeited. tismal grace, including the remission of sin and the infusion of a new principle of spiritual life, may be lost by mortal sin, and can be restored only by the sacrament of penance; so the grace of orders may be lost by certain crimes, such as heresy or schism. Hence in the Romish church a priest, when convicted of such crime, is degraded before he is delivered over to the secular power to be executed. This service of degradation however is declarative, rather than effective. It declares in a solemn and official manner that the offender has forfeited the grace received at his ordination and has become a layman. It is evident that the ministry, according to this theory, must be in a peculiar sense a permanent office. It can neither be voluntarily laid aside, nor can a man be deprived of it. If the Holy Ghost is received in a specific form, or mode of manifestation, in ordination, he remains, until the condition occurs on which he has revealed his purpose to withdraw. If the gift of prophecy, or of miracles, or of tongues, were conferred on any man, he could not divest himself of that gift, nor could he be deprived of it by any act of the church. It is so with the grace of orders. This however is not a Protestant doctrine. It is one of the essential and necessary elements of that cunningly devised system of Romanism, which is after the working of Satan with all deceivableness of unrighteousness.

Protestants however also teach that the office of the ministry is permanent, though in a very different sense from that just stated. It is permanent, first, because it is not assumed or conferred for any limited or definite time. And, secondly, because the candidate in assuming the office is understood to consecrate himself for life to the service of God in the work of the ministry. This is also the light in which the church regards the matter when she, through her appropriate organs, ordains him to the work. There is nothing however in the Protestant, and especially in the Presbyterian, doctrine of the nature of the ministry or of ordination, to forbid the idea that the office itself, and not merely the exercise of the office, may, for just reasons be laid aside, or demitted.

The Protestant doctrine, as we understand it, on this subject is this. First, that the call to the ministry is by the Holy Ghost. The Spirit of God is said to dwell in all the members of Christ's body, and to each member, as the apostle teaches us, is given a manifestation of the Spirit. 1 Cor. xii. 7. That is while the Spirit manifests his presence in his enlightening and sanctifying influence, in different measures, in all the followers of Christ, he gives special gifts and qualifications to different individuals of their number; dividing to every man severally as he wills. In the apostolic church, he gave to some the gifts of plenary knowledge and infallibility, and thus made them apostles; to others, the gift of occasional inspiration, and thus made them prophets; to others, the gift of teaching, and thus made them the teachers or preachers of the word:

to others again, the gift of healing, of miracles or of tongues. Some of these gifts we know, both from the New Testament and from actual observation, were designed to be confined to the first age of the church. They have accordingly ceased. We have no inspired and infallible men-no workers of miracles, no speakers with tongues. In other words, we have no apostles, nor prophets, nor men endowed with supernatural power.

There are other gifts, however, which we learn from Scripture observation were designed to be permanent. The Holy Spirit confers the gifts for the ministry; and by thus conferring them, and exciting the desire to exercise them for the glory of God and the service of Christ, thereby manifests his will that those thus favoured should consecrate themselves to the preaching of the gospel. This is the true, divine call, to the

ministry.

Second: The evidence of this call to him that receives it, is the consciousness of the inward gift and drawing of the Spirit, confirmed by those external workings of providence which indicate the will of God as to his vocation. The evidence of the church is everything which tends to prove that the candidate has the qualifications for the office of the ministry, and that he is led to seek it from motives due to the operation of

the Holy Ghost.

Third: Ordination is the solemn expression of the judgment of the church, by those appointed to deliver such judgment, that the candidate is truly called of God to take part in this ministry, thereby authenticating to the people the divine call. This authentication, or ordination, is, under all ordinary circumstances, the necessary condition for the exercise of the ministry in the church; just as the judgment of the session that the candidate for baptism or for admission to the Lord's table, has the qualifications for church membership, is the necessary condition of church-fellowship.

As, however, neither the candidate nor the church is infallible, there may, and doubtless often is, mistake in this matter. A man may honestly believe that he is called of God to the ministry, when he has never, in fact, been thus called. The Presbytery may concur in this erroneous judgment. If a mistake is made it ought be corrected. If both the man himself

and the Presbytery become convinced that he never was called to the ministry, why should they persist in asserting the contrary? So long as the man clings to his office, he thereby says, he believes he is called to it by God; but this he may be thoroughly convinced is not true. Why then should he be required to assert what he knows to be false. The Presbytery join in this false testimony; nay, they take upon themselves the whole responsibility of the falsehood, if they interpose their authority, and refuse to allow a man to demit an office to which both he and they are convinced he never was called. It is not merely, therefore, a man's right to demit the ministry, if he is satisfied God has not called him to the work; but it is his solemn duty to do it. And the Presbytery have not only the right to allow him to do it, but they have no right to prevent it. They cannot force a man to be a minister against his will, and against his conscience; much less can they righteously force him to lie to the church, and to the Holy Ghost, by making him say he is called, when he knows that he is not called.

There is nothing in the Protestant doctrine of the ministry, or of ordination, which stands in the way of the demission of the sacred office. We do not hold that the judgment of the church is infallible; so that it can in no case be recalled or reversed. We do not hold that an inward gift, the grace of orders, is conferred in ordination, so as to be beyond recall. Neither is there anything in the ordination vows, or the obligations assumed by the candidate, to prevent his laying the office aside. He does indeed promise to devote himself for life to the work of the ministry. But this promise is obviously conditional. It is conditioned on the possession of physical ability. If rendered paralytic or voiceless, the promise does not bind him. In like manner it is conditioned on the inward call of God. The man believes that it is the will of God that he should be a minister; and, on the ground of that belief, he promises to devote himself to the work. If he becomes satisfied that he never was called, in other words, that it is not the will of God that he should preach the gospel, then the ground on which the promise was made no longer exists.

The principle of demission is clearly recognized in our stand-

ards. That is, it is distinctly recognized that a minister may cease to be such, and become a layman. What is deposition but the declaration, on judicial grounds, on the part of a Presbytery, that a minister of the gospel is no longer to be regarded as such? And what is that but a reversal of the judgment pronounced at his ordination? It is saying that the Presbytery erred in deciding that the person in question was called of God to the ministry; for if he had been thus called, it was for life, and no Presbytery could take away a permanent office conferred by God. The only difference between deposition and demission lies in the nature of the evidence on which the Presbytery reverses its former judgment. In the case of deposition, it is some grave offence, some heresy or crime, which clearly proves that the minister convicted of such offence is not called of God to preach the gospel. In the case of demission, it is anything, not involving a moral or religious offence, which satisfies the judgment and conscience of the man himself, and of the Presbytery, or even of the latter alone, that the minister demitting his office, or called upon to demit it, was never called of God to the sacred office. Of course mere physical infirmity, or the weakness or imbecility of age, can never be such a proof. A minister or missionary, nay, Paul himself, after a life devoted to the service of God, in the ministry of his Son, crowned with every manifestation of the divine favour, might be superannuated or paralytic, yet no one would dream that this was any evidence that he had entered the ministry without a call from God. The evidence in question must be the opposite of the evidence of a divine call, viz. the want of fitness for the office, the want of a desire to discharge its duties, the want of success, and the consequent inability to serve God or the church in the work of the ministry. All this may, and in many cases is apparent, where there is every evidence of Christian character, and therefore where any act of discipline would be uncalled for and unjust.

As therefore there is nothing in the nature of the ministerial office, nor in the nature of ordination, nor in the obligations assumed by the candidate when he is ordained, nor in the infallibility of the Presbytery, incompatible with the demission of the sacred office, it follows that for proper reasons, it may be

laid aside. In the second place, as before remarked, it ought in the case supposed to be laid aside. To continue to profess to be called of God, when we are satisfied that such is not the fact. and when the Presbytery and the Christian public are equally convinced on the subject, is to profess a conscious untruth. This at first was a mistake in all concerned; but when the mistake is discovered and made apparent, then to persist in it, gives it the character of falsehood. In the third place, it is highly desirable that those who have thus mistaken their vocation, should be allowed to correct the error. It is not only wrong to constrain a man against his judgment, will and conscience, to retain the ministerial office; but it cannot be done. The office is in fact, in multitudes of cases, laid aside. Men once ordained give up their ministry. They not only cease to exercise it, but they virtually renounce it. They lay aside the title, they do not attempt to discharge its duties; they do not claim any of its prerogatives. They devote themselves to some secular pursuit, and are merged in the general class of laymen. For this, in the cases supposed, they are not to blame, and therefore they cannot be justly censured. They are often useful members of society and of the church; but they are not ministers. Now if this is done, and must be done, it is surely proper that it should be done regularly; that provision should be made to meet cases of this kind. Besides, it is a great evil that our church courts should be encumbered with nominal members, who are incapable of discharging the duties of membership. And it is a still greater evil that men should be allowed to sit in those courts, and exercise the powers of an office, to which all concerned are satisfied they have no legitimate call, and the duties of which they cannot fulfil. Such ministers are not only an incumbrance to our church courts, disturbing the natural balance of our system, but it is a disgrace to the ministry and to the church, to have men notoriously incompetent, (however worthy they be,) and who are merely nominal ministers-men who are laymen in their whole spirit and pursuits, designated and recognized as invested with the sacred office. It is best that things should be called by their right names. If a man is not a minister of the gospel (i. e. one

who either does or has served God in the gospel of his Son) he should not be so designated or so regarded.

It is objected to all this, that if we make it thus easy to get rid of the ministry, less care will be exercised in entering it. We doubt the fact. The ministry in our country and in our church, is not often entered from worldly motives. It is not sufficiently attractive to the mercenary. It is commonly an honest mistake on the part both of the candidate and of the Presbytery, when men are ordained by the church who are not called of God. But even if the fact be admitted which the objection assumes, it would be unwise to make the ministry a culde-sac, which whoever wanders into in the dark, must stay in it. It would be far better to make the egress from the ministry so wide that all who want to leave, or who ought to leave it, may do so with the least possible difficulty or delay.

If our readers agree with the principles above stated, they must regard the overture submitted to the Presbyteries as an illogical, half-way measure. It assumes that the office of the ministry cannot be demitted; but that a man may lay aside its exercise and be divested of its prerogatives. It assumes that the office is in such a sense permanent that it cannot be got rid of, except by deposition. But this assumption is illogical. It necessarily follows from the Protestant and Presbyterian doctrine of the ministry, of ordination, and of the fallibility of all church courts, that the office is not permanent in any such sense. That doctrine supposes that both the candidate and Presbytery may err; and it supposes that the error when discovered may be corrected. It is only on the assumption of the Romish doctrine of "the grace of orders," that the ministry can be regarded as in any such sense permanent as that it cannot be demitted. Besides, deposition implies that the office of the ministry is not in such a sense permanent as to be inconsistent with demission. Deposition merely does for one reason, what demission does for another. Both reduce a minister to the condition of a layman. The one, therefore, is just as consistent with the true permanency of the office as the other.

Another objection to the overture as it now stands, is that it undertakes to separate things which in their nature are inseparable. If the ministry is an office of divine appointment, if men are called of God to be ministers, then the obligation to discharge its duties, and the right to exercise its prerogatives, are inseparable from the possession of the office. If God calls a man to be a minister, what right have we to say he shall not act as such? By allowing him to retain the office, we say he has a divine call to it; and if so, he has a divine right to exercise all its functions. The overture, therefore, in our view, involves a contradiction. It in effect says, that a man is, and is not a minister, at the same time; that he was mistaken in supposing he was called by the Spirit to be a minister, and nevertheless he is a minister. These are contradictory judgments.

We would greatly prefer a simple clause providing that whenever any minister, in good standing, is fully satisfied in his own judgment and conscience, that God has not called him to the ministry, he may, with the consent of Presbytery, resign the office; and in case the Presbytery is satisfied that a minister has no divine vocation to the ministry, although he himself may think otherwise, they shall have the right, (with the consent of the Synod, if that be thought desirable) to cancel his ordination without censure, as in deposition it is done with censure.

SHORT NOTICES.

A New History of the Conquest of Mexico; in which Las Casas' Denunciations of the popular Historians of that War are fully vindicated. By Robert Anderson Wilson, Counsellor at Law: Author of "Mexico and its Religion," &c. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. 1859.

Whether the sources of popular Mexican history are authentic or legendary, is a question which was started years ago, and now begins to be discussed thoroughly and elaborately. Nearly twenty years since, General Cass, whose official life, largely devoted to Indian affairs, and whose scholarly habits invest his opinions, on such a subject, with high authority, called in question the accuracy of the documents on which the historians of Mexico have relied, in an able article in the North American Review. This volume by Judge Wilson is a copious

and able contribution to the same side of the question. The author proves, from facts ascertained by his own personal observation, that many of the statements made in the reports and narratives sent to Spain by the original conquerors of Mexico must be false, and that many of the sketches and historical accounts given by ecclesiastics are but monkish legends. He also adduces other evidence in support of this view. These are the materials out of which the modern popular histories of Mexico have largely been constructed. It is painful to be obliged to think that a large part of the rare manuscripts and obsolete works, which Prescott grudged not the most lavish outlays to procure, is but legendary lore, and that many of the scenes he invests with a dramatic fascination, are but splendid illusions, which the author mistook for facts verified at immense cost. This volume, however, arrays many facts in support of this view. It will not, however, antiquate Prescott's history. Whatever may become of its historical authorityeven if it should be proved, to any extent, a fiction—it is still a thing of life as a beautiful artistic creation. There can be no doubt, nevertheless, that Judge Wilson's work sheds valuable light upon the history and antiquities of Mexico. The following language of General Cass, in a letter to the author, shows the need of such a work. "I was led, some years since, to investigate the truth of the early reports of the state of civilization among the Mexicans at the time of the Spanish Conquest. I became satisfied, to use your language, that the accounts were not merely exaggerations but fabrications; and I am glad to find that that impression has been confirmed by the able and critical inquiry you have made." The large and beautiful typography of the work enhances its value.

Religious Cases of Conscience, Answered in an Evangelical Manner. By the Rev. S. Pike, and the Rev. S. Hayward. New Edition, with an Introduction by the Rev. Henry A. Boardman, D. D. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: R. Carter & Brothers.

Those Christians who are acquainted with this book need no endorsement of it from us. We are of opinion, however, that it is less known now, than it was in the last generation. It stands as a type of a kind of preaching and religious instruction less in vogue of late than in a former period. Our practical treatises have been more occupied with urging the church to a becoming aggressive activity, than with elucidating the manifold cases of conscience in every attitude and relation of the Christian life, that must and will arise, where experimental religion prevails. We have no doubt, that the church and ministry suffer loss, so far as this kind of spiritual instruction is wanting.

Dr. Boardman, justly says, in his judicious introduction, "it is only necessary for a preacher to announce one of these themes from the pulpit, to enkindle a feeling throughout his congregation, which will reveal itself by the most unambiguous tokens." No preaching is so powerful as that which sheds scriptural light upon the conscience; which alarms the presumptuous, guides the erring, comforts the desponding, strengthens the fainthearted, establishes the doubting—"by manifestation of the truth commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the

sight of God."

This book consists of lectures on the various questions with which the minds of serious Christians are liable to be exercised, delivered in London more than a century ago. The questions discussed respect our own spiritual state, and the means of promoting it, our dangers and temptations, our duties to others in various stations and relations. They are discussed with great clearness and force, and in the concentrated light of evangelical truth. The work has characteristics which have given it life for a century, and the church will not now "willingly let it dic." Its wide diffusion at this time would aid in giving depth and strength—a sound and robust development—to that new-born Christian life, with which God has of late been pleased so wonderfully to bless our church and land. In saying this, we do not of course imply approbation of every statement or opinion which it contains.

Debt and Grace, as related to the Doctrine of the Future Life. By C. F. Hudson. Fourth edition. Boston: John P. Jewett and Company. 1858.

The doctrine elaborately maintained in this work is, that the eternal punishment of the wicked consists in their annihilation at death. Whatever support can be contributed to this doctrine by affluent learning, scholarly culture, brilliancy and force of style, and dialectic astuteness, is subsidized for the purpose in this massive and compact volume. The number of editions it has reached, notwithstanding the immense burden of quotations from ancient and modern sources, which the author's exhaustive reading has enabled him to pack into it, evinces its power. Little can be said in defence of his position, which he has left unsaid. As the alleged annihilation continues for ever, he wastes no time in reducing the significance of the terms "eternal," "everlasting," as applied to the future punishment of the wicked. He labours to show that the terms "destruction," "perdition," "lost," &c., as used in reference to unbelievers in the Bible, import their annihilation, while

such terms as fire, &c., denote the instruments thereof. Of course, we have no room here to undertake a refutation of this subtle and dangerous book, which is likely to promote what we believe to be one of the most threatening and pestilent heresies just now crowding upon us. We will only say in the most

general way:

1. The future existence of the wicked in a sentient and agonized state, is so palpably set forth in the constant representations and implications of Scripture, as to enforce itself upon all plain, unbiassed readers. It requires an endless amount of special pleading to vacate the Bible of this obvious meaning. If it does not, therefore, teach this doctrine, it is no sufficient guide to the people of God, on a subject most fundamental.

2. The church, in all ages and countries, has taken this to be the mind of God as set forth in his word. We speak not of the opinions of individuals, or of exceptional cases. We speak of the mind of the church as expressed in her symbols, her literature, her theology. Has the Holy Ghost left her to grope

into utter error on so fundamental a point?

3. One test prescribed by our Saviour for trying teachers and doctrines is their fruits. The doctrine of the future and eternal punishment of the wicked, however it may startle delicate sensibilities, may safely abide this ordeal, as compared with any and all creeds which deny or impugn it—especially annihilation. A doctrine which has these three marks will still hold its place. All efforts to overthrow it, however they may subvert the faith of some, will prove abortive. They might, if it were possible, deceive the very elect. But, happily, this is not possible.

The State of the Impenitent Dead. By Alvah Hovey, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Newton Theological Institution. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

This well written little volume appears to be designed as an antidote to the foregoing, and is well adapted to its purpose. Without following the arguments, suggestions, and rejoinders of Mr. Hudson, into all their labyrinthine windings, which would only divert the reader from the main issue, Dr. Hovey confines himself to this issue. He clearly proves from Scripture, that the state of the impenitent after death is a state of consciousness and of misery, which will know no end. His reasoning is clear, compact, and conclusive. As an antidote to an insidious, ruinous, and spreading heresy, his little book meets a present and urgent want.

Infant Salvation in its Relation to Infant Depravity, Infant Regeneration and Infant Baptism. By J. H. A. Bomberger, D. D., Pastor of the Race street Evangelical Reformed Church, Philadelphia. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1859.

Dr. Bomberger has set forth many precious truths in a perspicuous and interesting manner in this little volume. So far as the first three chapters are concerned, the most important qualification of its merit which we have noticed is some language that looks toward universal redemption and grace, founded on the Arminian construction of some passages in Rom. v. This of course involves the amissibility of grace, unless we take Universalism as the alternative. Out of this emerge all the questions in issue between Arminians and Calvinists, which we

do not feel required now to discuss.

In his fourth chapter, Dr. Bomberger says, "in Baptism the child receives . . . immediate release from the penalty of original sin;" "the removal of the stain or pollution of native depravity;" "the present renewal of the nature of the child, in Christ Jesus, by the Holy Ghost;" the promise of "such spiritual blessings as will promote the growth of the grace granted them at their baptism." If we understand this, along with the context, it means, 1. that saving grace is always imparted at baptism: 2. that it is liable to be lost afterwards. After the recent full discussion of these subjects in our pages, it is hardly necessary for us to reiterate our objections to such a doctrine.

A Memoir of the Life and Times of the Rev. Isaac Backus, A. M. By Alvah Hovey, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in Newton Theological Institution. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1859.

The Rev. Isaac Backus was pastor of a Congregational church in the eastern part of Massachusetts during his earlier ministry. His previous Christian development had been in one of the separate churches of Connecticut, which came into being in the great revival of 1840, by separation from the churches under the Saybrook Platform, chiefly in order to clear themselves from the fellowship of unconverted members and ministers. This training, as all must see, was a good propaideutic for the ultimate adoption of the Baptist system, i. e. the exclusive church-membership and baptism of professing converts. in due time became a Baptist preacher of great zeal and influence. He did much to disseminate the principles and promote the early growth of his sect in New England and other parts of the country. He compiled an ecclesiastical History of New England, as viewed from a Baptist stand-point. We are glad to learn from the Preface to this volume, that the "Backus Historical Society," are about to publish a new edition of this work, now out of print. This Memoir by Dr. Hovey is designed as an introduction to this history. It is itself a repository of considerable historical matter, that probably would not have been published in any other form. Of course it has a higher value for Baptists than for others. It is not to be expected that the author should see events in which his denomination is deeply implicated with the eyes of a Congregationalist or a Presbyterian. But, with all needful abatement for this sectarian feature of the work, we still recognize its value as a contribution to our materials for catholic American church history.

The Pioneer Bishop: or, The Life and Times of Francis Asbury. By W. P. Strickland. With an Introduction by Nathan Bangs, D. D. Third Thousand. New York: Carlton & Porter.

A full biography of the Apostle of American Methodism has been a desideratum. This want has been met by Dr. Strickland in this volume, which bears the imprimatur of Dr. Bangs and Bishop Jones. The author has shown exemplary diligence in gathering facts, and a good degree of skill in weaving them together. While he, of course, takes a Methodist rather than a Presbyterian view of the materials with which he deals, yet the spirit manifested is generally candid and catholic. The book is neatly printed, and supplies a mass of information in regard to the planting and early growth of the great Methodist communion in our country, which will be interesting to Christians of every name, and augment the materials for perfecting our ecclesiastical history.

The New England Theocracy: A History of the Congregationalists of New England to the Revivals of 1740. By H. F. Uhden. With a Preface by the late Dr. Neander. Translated from the Second German edition by H. C. Conant, author of "The English Bible," &c. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1859.

This work is the first fruits of an attempt by Dr. Uhden, begun at the instance of Neander, to present in German an account of American revivals. As he set himself to the accomplishment of this work, he became satisfied that it was necessary to bring to view those peculiarities of our early history which have largely conditioned our religious development. Among these peculiarities, none is more distinctive or potential, than the ecclesiastico-civil regime of congregationalism in New England, during the first century of its history. Out of this arose various ecclesiastical customs, conditions of church membership, half-way covenants, &c., which acted powerfully on the state of religion, and produced the peculiar attitude of things in which the first of our great awakenings appeared. Of course, an understanding of the character and

effects of this theocracy, is requisite to an understanding of many of the distinctive features of this revival. This book is interesting to us, chiefly as showing the view which a competent German takes of this part of our early religious history. We do not remember any other treatise which occupies the same ground completely and exclusively. We hope that this "monograph" will be followed by the complete survey of American revivals, of which we understand it to be an earnest. It is not to be expected that the subject will be treated as it would be by one who had lived our religious life. For this very reason, it may shed a light upon our condition, which could not emanate from ourselves. Even its errors may instruct us.

The Primeval World: A Treatise on the relations of Geology to Theology. By the Rev. Paton J. Gloag. Author of a "Treatise on the Assurance of Salvation," &c. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1859.

The title of this book suggests at once a volume devoted to the controversy about the creative days in Genesis. This subject is not neglected by the author, but it does not form the chief matter of his book. He treats of Geology as affording a refutation of the development-theory, corroborating the doctrine of a personal Creator of all things out of nothing, and furnishing new and copious illustrations, of His Goodness. We are glad to notice, "that he has been unable to think the period has arrived, when a satisfactory theory reconciling the Mosaic cosmogony with the facts of Geology, can be confidently advanced." This modesty is grateful to those who are familiar with the dogmatism so prevalent on this subject.

Salvation by Christ: A series of Discourses on the Important Doctrines of the Gospel. By Francis Wayland. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The discourses in this volume are substantially those which appeared some time since, under the title of "University Sermons." A few have been omitted and a few added in order to adapt the volume to wider circulation. The topics treated are those which pertain to our common salvation. The matter is solid, judicious and evangelical. The spirit, earnest and catholic.

The Four Gospels, according to the Authorized Version, with original and selected Parallel References and Marginal Readings, and an original and copious critical and explanatory Commentary. By the Rev. David Brown, D. D., Professor, Free Church College, Aberdeen. Philadelphia: Wm. S. & Alfred Martien. 1859.

This copious title explains the general character of the volume to which it is prefixed, and its adaptation to meet an existing want. Whatever contributes to increase the knowledge of the Scriptures among the people, by promoting the intelligent study

of them, will be readily appreciated by the Christian public. This Commentary is thoroughly evangelical, and turns the best fruits of modern exegesis to good account in elucidating the doctrinal and practical import of the Gospels. Although the amount of matter is large, the ingenuity of the printer has compressed it within a convenient and portable compass, adapted to general circulation.

The True Psalmody: or Bible Psalms, the Church's only Manual of Praise. Philadelphia: Wm, S. Young. 1859.

This is the production of a committee of ministers and elders of the Reformed and United Presbyterian churches of Philadelphia, appointed for that purpose, at a meeting held in the Cherry street Church, Philadelphia, August 16th, 1858. Whoever wishes to see the argument for the exclusive use of scriptural Psalms in public praise clearly and strongly presented, will find it in this little volume. The authors make skilful use of the criticisms which have been made upon various collections of psalms and hymns in use in different churches. This, however, proves nothing. It is precisely what would be, if the use of human compositions were expressly and confessedly authorized by Scripture. The great mass of Christians cannot be persuaded that they are forbidden to praise God in "hymns and spiritual songs," which set forth, in metrical form, those clearly unfolded Christian truths of the New Testament, which were revealed but dimly, in germ and shadow, before the incarnation. If they are to be confined to the Psalms, most would prefer the version of the common English Bible to that of Rouse.

The Types of Genesis briefly considered as revealing the development of Human Nature in the World within, and without, and in the dispensations.

By Andrew Jukes. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans & Roberts. 1858.

There is a genuine typology of the Old Testament which, interpreted by the spiritual mind, according to the analogy of faith, is highly instructive and edifying. There is a fanciful typology, which educes the most extravagant conceits from purely fictitious analogies, until the plain word of God is turned into a mere hieroglyph, the meaning of which it requires a Swedenborg, or other new revelator, to evolve. A large class of writers on the types are intermediate between these, fanciful at times, yet, on the whole, having a strong ground-work of truth, which they present in fresh and vivid aspects. To this order we assign this book. It shows a refined culture. It is suggestive even when fanciful. There is a quaint, devout, and quietistic vein, which, along with other signs, reveals the vol. XXXI.—NO. II.

type of the later productions of the school which grew out of the labours and peculiarities of the late Edward Irving. The peculiar doctrines of that school, however, are not explicitly enounced.

The Great Day of Atonement: or Meditations and Prayers on the Last Twenty-four Hours of the Sufferings and Death of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Translated from the German of Charlotte Elizabeth Nebelin. Edited by Mrs. Colin Mackenzie, author of "Delhi, or Six Years in India," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

This copious title exhibits the character of the book to which it is prefixed. The meditations on the successive events of our Saviour's expiring day are brief, sententious and fervid.

Life at Three-Score: A Sermon delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, November 28, 1858. By Albert Barnes. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1859.

Mr. Barnes has chosen the following among the things confirmed by his long experience, as those which he thought most worthy to be signalized in this discourse. 1. He has found life more and better than his early hopes. 2. The world is disposed to favour young men. 3. He is confirmed in his practice and advocacy of total abstinence from intoxicating drinks. 4. In his conviction of the importance of industry. 5. Of the value of personal religion, and that the Bible is a revelation from God. These positions are maintained with his usual ability. Under the head of industry, Mr. Barnes shows himself a model of that virtue, and an illustration of its efficacy, from whom most of us may learn something to our advantage. All his commentaries, he tells us, have been written before nine in the morning, and are due to the fact that he has risen at four. Four hundred thousand volumes of them have been circulated in this country, and as many or more in foreign lands. A close economy of time works wonders. One octavo page a day, "would account for all that Jerome, or Chrysostom, or Augustine; that Luther, Calvin, or Baxter have done." We are sorry to see that he characterizes the opposition he encountered in his early ministry, on account of his doctrines, as "efforts made from without to crush a young man," and represents the Assembly which sustained his appeal from the decision of the Synod of Philadelphia, as giving "its sanction to the views of doctrine for which we (Mr. Barnes and others) had struggled." Resistance to doctrines deemed in conflict with truth, it is unfair to represent as an "effort to crush a young man." This is simply a misrepresentation of the real issue, adapted, if not designed to make his adversaries odious. And it is quite certain that many voted to sustain Mr. Barnes's

appeal, who were the life-long antagonists of his doctrines. It is one thing to "sanction" a man's opinions, and another not to think them extreme enough, or that he has proved himself so incorrigible in regard to them, as to warrant his immediate suspension or deposition from the ministry.

Christian Brotherhood: A Letter to the Hon. Heman Lincoln. By Baron Stow, D. D., Pastor of the Rowe street Church, Boston. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The late wonderful outpouring of God's Spirit has done much to quicken in Christians the consciousness of their essential unity, and of the duty of more effectually manifesting that unity. This volume from a leading Baptist clergyman is a timely and judicious effort to promote this feeling in his own communion, with respect to other bodies of Christians. We think, however, that the more large-hearted among our Baptist brethren will experience peculiar difficulties in exorcising the sectarian spirit from their body, until they can see their way clear to commune with other Christians at the Lord's table. So long as they are cut off from this most simple manifestation of Christian unity, the tendency to divisive and proselyting sectarianism will be formidable. The yearning for more intimate fellowship and manifest unity with other Christians, which we rejoice to see is beginning to show itself, must induce questionings as to the propriety of exclusive sectarian communion at the Lord's Supper. Such questionings, we also rejoice to see, are becoming urgent in that denomination. While fidelity requires us to bear this respectful testimony, we warmly appreciate the appeal of Dr. Stow, and cannot doubt that it will be blessed in furtherance of the unity it seeks to promote. He utters wholesome truths and counsels which would not be heeded if given from without his communion. Indeed all may do more to promote catholicity in their own denominations than elsewhere. This is eminently that sort of charity which begins at home.

The Earnest Christian; Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Harriet Maria Jukes, wife of the late Rev. Mark R. Jukes. Compiled and edited by Mrs. H. A. Gilbert. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1859.

The Memoirs, Letters and Journals which compose this volume exhibit a Christian lady of devoted piety. The book belongs to the class sought for in Sabbath school libraries, and is fitted to be useful. We think it would be improved, however, by being wrought more into the form of a continuous narrative, and by a somewhat more fastidious selection from letters and journals not designed for publication.

Palissy the Potter: or the Huguenot Artist, and Martyr. A True Narrative. By C. L. Brightwell. New York: Carlton & Porter.

A volume made up chiefly from Morley's "Life of Palissy," a Huguenot martyr, who displayed high artistic genius, and is described by Lamartine, as "showing how to exalt and ennoble any business, however trivial, so that it has labour for its means, progress and beauty for its motive, and the glory of God for its end."

The Harvest and the Reapers: Homework for All, and How to do it. By Rev. Harvey Newcomb, Author of "Cyclopedia of Missions," &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

This book deals with the great religious problem of our time and country—indeed, of Protestant Christianity:—Through what appliances can the masses be reached by evangelical influences? How can we impress that great under-stratum of society that surrounds our sanctuaries, but never enters them? Mr. Newcomb answers, very justly, that the members, as well as pastors of churches, must enlist actively in the work; and makes many valuable suggestions as to the best mode of doing it. This is an urgent matter, which already commands the earnest consideration of the Church, and must command it more and more.

The Accepted Time for Securing Gospel Salvation, and from the Analogy between Temporal and Spiritual Affairs, answering certain Doctrinal Excuses sometimes urged for neglecting it. By L. H. Christian, Pastor of the North Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia; Author of "Faith and Works." Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson. 1859.

The usual cavils of the impenitent in apology for their apathy, founded on election, decrees, inability, &c., are refuted in this volume, mainly by showing, that, if well founded, there is the same ground for indifference and inaction in temporal affairs. In temporal, as well as spiritual things, all success is dependent on the help and sovereign pleasure of God.

Historical Tales for Young Protestants. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Among the innumerable books of religious reading for the young, those issued by our Board of Publication have a certain select and reliable character, which is obvious in this volume.

Grace Triumphant; or, a Sketch of the Life of Lieut. R. W. Alexander, who fell at the siege of Delhi. By the Rev. David Herron, Missionary in India.

A Word to Parents, or the Obligations and Limitations of Parental Authority.

The above are well written little volumes or tracts published by our Board, whose title speaks their object and character. A Mother's Gift to her Little Ones at Home. A Book of Sweet and Simple Talk about Serious Things, founded on easy texts of Scripture, and fitted for children between the ages of four and eight years. New York: Carlton & Porter.

The Former Days. History of the Presbyterian Church of Geneva, by Hubbard Winslow. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1859.

This discourse not only gives the history of one of the important churches of our country, but the Appendix also gives much interesting information in regard to the town in which it is located—one of the most beautiful in our country.

The Life of John Milton, narrated in connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical, and Literary History of his time. By David Masson, M. A., Professor of English Literature in University College, London; with Portraits, and specimens of his Handwriting at different periods. Vol. I., 1608—1639. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington Street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 658.

This age is prolific in historical works of the highest order. The productions of Sparks, Bancroft, Prescott, Irving, Motley, and others, in our own country; of Alison, Macaulay, Milman, Grote, &c., in England, to say nothing of those of the French and German historians, take rank with the standard works of Gibbon and Hume. To this list must now be added the work of Professor Masson. To English and American readers no period of the history of their common ancestors is more interesting or more important than that designed to be embraced in these volumes. It is the intention of the author to exhibit "Milton's life in its connections with all the more notable phenomena of the period of British history in which it was east, its State politics, its ecclesiastical variations, its literature and speculative thought." Commencing in 1608, the life of Milton proceeds through the last sixteen years of the reign of James I., includes the whole of the reign of Charles I., and the subsequent years of the Commonwealth and of the Protectorate; and then passing the Restoration, extends itself to 1674, or through fourteen years of the new state of things under Charles II. "Milton's life divides itself, with almost mechanical exactness, into three periods, corresponding with those of the contemporary social movement; the first extending from 1608 to 1640, which was the period of his education and of his minor poems; the second extending from 1640 to 1660, or from the beginning of the civil wars to the Restoration, and forming the middle period of his polemical activity as a prose writer; and the third extending from 1660 to 1674, which was the period of his later muse and of the publication of Paradise Lost. It is the plan of the present work to devote a volume to each of these periods." A more extractive programme could

hardly be presented. The research, fidelity, and ability, of which the present volume exhibits abundant evidence, are a guaranty that the work of Prof. Masson will be worthy of its high and interesting theme.

The Whole Works of Robert Leighton, D. D., Archbishop of Glasgow. To which is prefixed a Life of the Author. By John Norman Pearson, M. A., of Trinity College, Cambridge. With a Table of the Texts of Scripture, and an Index of the subjects, compiled expressly for this edition. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Large 8vo. pp. 800, double column.

The two most important British editions of the works of Leighton are those of London in 1835, and of Edinburgh in 1840; the one, however, contains some materials not found in the other. In this American edition the deficiencies of the one are supplied from the other, so that this is the only edition which includes all the literary remains of the illustrious author. It contains his Commentary on the First Epistle of Peter, and other practical exegetical pieces; between thirty and forty sermons; his Exposition of the Creed, of the Lord's Prayer, and of the Ten Commandments; twenty-four Theological Lectures, with many minor pieces. This is a rich treasury, as no writer in the English language is superior to Leighton in the rare gift of exhibiting doctrinal truth in such a form as to excite devotional feeling.

Memoirs, Select Thoughts, and Sermons of the late Rev. Edward Payson, D.D., Pastor of the Second Church in Portland. Compiled by the Rev. Asa Cummings, Editor of the Christian Mirror. In three volumes. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut Street. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1859.

The republication of Dr. Payson's works by a Philadelphia house, will, we hope, bring them to the notice of a new and large class of readers. Payson's religious experience, although to so painful a degree marked and marred by a desponding spirit, was so profound, and led to such zeal in his Master's service, and his labours were so eminently blessed, that his memory is dear to American Christians. So far as the influence of his holy life can be perpetuated and extended by the perusal of his writings, a most desirable end will be accomplished.

Hermeneutical Manual; or, Introduction to the Exegetical Study of the Scriptures of the New Testament. By Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., Principal and Professor of Divinity in the Free Church College, Glasgow, Author of Typology of Scripture, &c. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., No. 40 North Sixth Street. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859. Pp. 526.

This work consists of three parts; the first, "Discussion of facts and principles bearing on the language and interpretation

of New Testament Scripture;" the second, "Dissertations on particular subjects connected with the exegesis of New Testament Scripture; third, "The use made of Old Testament Scripture in the writings of the New Testament." This statement, considering the established reputation and high standing of the author, is sufficient to call the attention of biblical students to this important work.

A Grammar of the New Testament Diction; intended as an Introduction to the Critical Study of the Greek New Testament. By Dr. George Benedict Winer. Translated from the sixth enlarged and improved edition of the original, by Edward Masson, M. A., formerly Professor in the University of Athens. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1859.

Ever since the first publication of this work in Germany, in 1822, it has remained without a rival, and has become a standard in England and America, as well as in its native land. No work is so often referred to as an authority in the interpretation of the New Testament as this book of Winer. It is easily accessible, in this new translation, to American students, as Messrs. Smith & English, of Philadelphia, have imported an edition of the work, which is already on hand. The second volume is expected by the 1st of June.

A Collection of the Acts, Deliverances, and Testimonies of the Supreme Judicatory of the Presbyterian Church, from its origin in America to the present time; with Notes and Documents explanatory and historical: constituting a complete illustration of her polity, faith, and history. By Samuel J. Baird. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chesnut street. Pp. 880.

This is a second edition of an admirably executed and indispensable work. The author says in the preface, "The present edition, although numbering no more pages, is so condensed as to contain, besides all that is in the former work, sixty or seventy pages of additional matter, which will be found to add materially to the value of the whole." Mr. Baird has fairly earned the thanks of the whole church, so cordially tendered him by the General Assembly of 1856, for the manner in which he has performed a most laborious and responsible task. His work is to the records of the Presbyterian church, what Cruden's Concordance is to the English Bible.

A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Epistle of Paul to the Philippians. By John Eadie, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature to the United Presbyterian Church. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1859. 8vo. Pp. 293.

This Commentary is constructed on the same plan as that of the exposition of the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians by the same author. Prof. Eadie's writings have an established reputation in this country as well as in Great Britain. He is familiar with the modern exegetical writers, as well as with those of an earlier date. His own commentaries are learned, accurate and orthodox.

Annual of Scientific Discovery: or, Year-Book of Facts in Science and Art. For 1859. Exhibiting the most important Discoveries and Improvements in Mechanics, Useful Arts, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Astronomy, Geology, Zoology, Botany, Mineralogy, Meteorology, Geography, Antiquities, &c. Together with Notes on the Progress of Science during the year 1858; a list of recent Scientific Publications, Obituaries of eminent Scientific Men, &c. Edited by David A. Wells, A. M., Author of Principles of Natural Philosophy, Principles of Chemistry, Science of Common Things, &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington st. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. London: Turner & Co. 1859. Pp. 410.

This long descriptive title gives all the information concerning this work that is needed to exhibit its nature and value. There are hundreds of educated men, not specially devoted to scientific pursuits, to whom such a compend must be in a high degree interesting and valuable. They can find in this volume what it would require weeks or months of study to gather from the numerous scientific journals, and other publications of the past year.

Illustrations, Expository and Practical, of the Farewell Discourse of Jesus:
Being a Series of Lectures on the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth
Chapters of the Gospel of St. John. By the late John B. Patterson,
M. A., Minister of Falkirk. Second Edition. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
38 George St. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1859. Pp. 478.

This is a posthumous work. The lamented writer died while engaged in delivering to his people a course of lectures on the Gospel of St. John. The impression made by these discourses led to a desire for their publication. Those contained in this volume were selected for the purpose, on account of the special interest attached to the portion of Scripture to which they relate. The work has met with a cordial reception, as is evinced by a call for a second edition.

Commentaries on the Laws of the Ancient Hebrews: With an Introductory Essay on Civil Society and Government. By E. C. Wines, D.D., Professor of Greek in Washington College, Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut St. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1859. 8vo. Pp. 640.

This work was originally published six years ago by Putnam & Co. We can but repeat the judgment which was then expressed in this journal. "We commend the volume to our readers as exhibiting the results of an extensive and discrimi-

nating research; as offering the fruits of enlightened and patient thought; sound in its general principles, and lucid and instructive in its illustrations; elevated and often eloquent in language, and presenting comparisons of great force and beauty between the principles of the Hebrew Commonwealth and those of our own."

The Presbyterian Historical Almanac, and Annual Remembrancer of the Church. For 1858-59. By Joseph M. Wilson. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street. 8vo. Pp. 316.

This is a novel enterprise. The design of the work is to present the condition and operations of the whole body of Presbyterians in Great Britain and America during the past year. With this view the author, evidently with much care and labour, has collected the published minutes or records of no less than twenty-eight distinct and independent ecclesiastical bodies, and from these authentic documents compiled these accounts. The volume contains a great body of valuable information, nowhere else accessible in so convenient a form. It is embellished with the portraits of fourteen ministers, Moderators of the bodies whose proceedings form the bulk of the work, and with representations of twelve churches in which their late sessions were held. We hope Mr. Wilson will find such encouragement as to induce him to continue the publication of this work from year to year.

Poems by Rev. T. Hempstead. New York: Published by M. W. Dodd, 509 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 190.

Mr. Hempstead has become extensively known by the numerous occasional pieces which have appeared in the public journals over his initials. Most of these poems are conversant with natural objects, and exhibit a fine sense of the beautics of nature. Others are intended to give expression to the tender affections of domestic life. In all, the versification is smooth and the language felicitous. The thoughts and images are elevated, and a strain of pious feeling pervades the whole. Mr. Hempstead was born, not made, a poet.

The Protestant Theological and Ecclesiastical Encyclopedia: Being a condensed Translation of Herzog's Real Encyclopedia, with additions from other sources. By Rev. J. H. A. Bomberger, D. D. Assisted by Distinguished Theologians of various Denominations. Part VIII. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1859.

We have repeatedly called the attention of our readers to this valuable work. It is issued in Parts of 128 double column pages at 50 cents each, and will form, when complete, three super-royal octavo volumes. The numbers are sent free of postage to those who send the subscription price in advance. Part VIII. comes down to the word "Ezra." This is by far the most comprehensive and important work of the kind in the English language.

Bitter-Sweet, a Poem. By J. G. Holland, author of "The Bay Path," "Titcomb's Letters," etc. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1859. Pp. 220.

So it appears that "Timothy Titcomb, Esquire," is Mr. J. G. Holland; and as the Preface to his former volume is dated from the "Republican Office, Springfield," we presume he is editor of a newspaper at that place. We have read this poem. which we think is saying not a little, of more than two hundred pages of poetry, for to us this species of writing, unless it has decided merit, is most unreadable; we would greatly prefer to sit down to a table of logarithms. We found this volume increase in interest to the end. "Bitter-Sweet" might be translated "The Mission of Evil, or the Permission of Evil, and the manner in which it is overruled for good." We need not say that it is a difficult subject to be handled satisfactorily in prose; and we doubt whether it gains anything in this respect by substituting poetry. The poem, however, contains many striking thoughts, beautifully and powerfully expressed. It is in the form of a dialogue, and enlivened with narratives of touching pathos.

The Theology of Christian Experience, designed as an Exposition of the "Common Faith" of the Church of God. By George D. Armstrong, D.D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of Norfolk, Va. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1858.

The title so clearly expresses the object of this volume, as to supersede the necessity of any attempt to state it in different language. It was a happy idea thus to set forth (or to make the attempt) an exposition of the common faith of evangelical Christendom. The people of God are agreed on all those great fundamental truths, which enter into Christian experience; and it is important that this should be made known, and proved to the world. As Dr. Armstrong is a distinguished minister of our own branch of the church, our favourable opinion of his success in this somewhat difficult undertaking, must of course be of less account than that of our brethren of other communions. We must be permitted, however, to say that we think he has done well. We should be glad to know how our Baptist

brethren, (Dr. A. has written a very able work on Baptism,) and Methodist, and others regard it.

A Commonplace-Book of the Holy Bible; or the Scripture's Sufficiency practically demonstrated. Wherein the Substance of Scripture respecting Doctrine, Worship, and Manners, is reduced to its proper Heads; Weighty Cases are resolved, Truths confirmed, and Difficult Texts illustrated and explained. By the celebrated John Locke, author of the Essay on the Human Understanding, who died in 1734. From the fifth London edition. Revised by Rev. William Dodd, LL.D. With an enlarged Index. Published by the American Tract Society.

A long use of this manual has given us a very high appreciation of its value. It affords great facilities for comparing Scripture with Scripture, on all the great points of Christian faith and practice. It shows the Bible to be a self-interpreting, sufficient, and perspicuous rule of faith and life; and also that it contains the evangelical and orthodox system of doctrine, beyond all doubt or gainsaying. The Tract Society has done a good work in making it easily accessible to ministers and private Christians.

The Mother's Mission. Sketches from real Life. By the author of "The Object of Life." Boston: Henry Hoyt, 9 Cornhill. 1859. Pp. 330.

The Evening of Life; or, Life and Comfort amidst the Shadows of Declining Years. By Rev. Jeremiah Chaplin. A new edition, revised and much enlarged. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 281.

Pleasant Pathway; or, Persuasives to Early Piety. Containing explanations and illustrations of the beauty, safety, and pleasantness of a religious life; being an earnest attempt to persuade young people of both sexes to seek happiness in the love and service of Jesus Christ. By Daniel Wise, author of "The Pathway of Life," &c. New York: Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. 1859. Pp. 285.

Story of Bethlehem. A Book for the Young. By John R. McDuff, author of "The Morning and Night Watches," &c. &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 202.

Youth's Bible Studies. Part V., the Gospels. American Tract Society, New York, 150 Nassau street. Pp. 228.

Opposite the Jail. By the author of "Carey Hamilton," &c. Boston: Henry Hoyt, 9 Cornhill. Chicago: William Tomlinson. Pp. 333.

The Huguenot Potter. A True Tale. Boston: Henry Hoyt, 9 Cornhill. Chicago: William Tomlinson. Cincinnati: George Crosby. 1859. Pp. 239.

The Parlour Preacher; or, Short Addresses to those who are determined to win Christ. By W. Mason, Author of "The Spiritual Treasury." Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 821 Chesnut street. 18mo. Pp. 108.

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- What Think Ye? or, Questions which must be answered. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 18mo. Pp. 88.
- The Gospel Fountain; or, The Anxious Youth made happy. By James Wood, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 18mo. Pp. 295.
- Bethlehem and her Children. By the Author of "That Sweet Story of Old." American Tract Society. Pp. 128.
- Geschichte der Erzväter für die Iugend. History of the Patriarchs, for Youth. English and German. American Tract Society. Pp. 384.
- English and German Primer. American Tract Society. Pp. 224.
- Little Jane; or, Sunshine in the House. Written for the Board of Publication. Philadelphia: 821 Chesnut street. Pp. 119.
- The Pastor of Gegenburg. Translated from the German. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 91.
- Early and Latter Rain; or, The Convict's Daughter. Philadelphia; Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 234.
- Jessie Morrison; or, The Mission of Flowers. By Harriet B. McKeever. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 156.
- The Children of the Church, and Sealing Ordinances. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 110.
- Clouds and Sunshine; or, The Faith-brightened Pathway. By the author of "Annandale." Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 223.
- Fe Will Not Come; or, The Sinner without Excuse. Written for the Board of Publication, by a Disabled Minister of Bethel. Philadelphia: 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 36.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

E. W. Hengstenberg, Ecclesiastes explained. 8vo. pp. 272.

Thomas Aquinas, in omnes D. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas Commentarii. 3 vols. 12mo. pp. 1436.

G. Estius, in Omnes D. Pauli Epistolas Commentarii. Second edition in 3 vols. Vol. I. containing Romans and 1 Corinthians. 8vo. pp. 792.

T. Schott, Epistle to the Romans explained. 8vo. pp. 319.

R. Stier, Epistle to the Ephesians explained. 8vo. pp. 427. An abstract of his larger commentary.

C. A. Harless, On Ephesians. 2d edit. 8vo. pp. 574.

B. Weiss, The Epistle to the Philippians explained, with a critical history of its exposition. 8vo. pp. 356.

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PRINCETON REVIEW.

JULY, 1859.

No. III.

ART. I.-1. Introduction à l'Histoire du Buddhisme, India. Par E. BURNOUF. Paris, 1844.

- By R. Spencer Hardy. 2. Manual of Budhism.
- 3. Eastern Monachism, by the same.
- 4. Notices of Chinese Buddhism. By Rev. J. Edkins. Shanghae: Published in the North China Herald, 1855-6.

In the antiquity of its claims and the wide-spread influence of its dogmas, Budhism comes to us as one of the most imposing systems which man has ever devised. Commencing with India, where it held sway for more than a thousand years, it sent its missions into Cashmere and Thibet on the north, to Ceylon on the south, to Birmah, Siam, Java, China and Japan, on the east, and to this day, though driven from the country of its birth, it holds sway in nearly every country of its adoption; while the number of its votaries far exceeds that of any other religious system on the globe.

To have sustained itself so long and so 'successfully, this system must have had some power of adaptation to the wants of mankind, and must also have found those in the course of its progress who have advocated its principles both with learning and zeal. Though it may now appear to us as a decayed and worn-out system, it has had its youth and vigour. The time was, when Kings and Emperors thought it their highest glory 50

to contribute to its promotion. It is the only system too of any note, except Christianity, which ever propagated itself out of the country of its birth, by persuasion. It has weathered many a storm of persecution; and endured until it has rivalled or outstripped indigenous systems of belief.

In the following article it is proposed to give some account of the main features of this system, relying for authority mostly on the works named at the head of this article. The system, however, comes to us under so many different aspects, it has in the long course of its history undergone so many changes, and is represented by so many different countries, and oftentimes by so many schools in each country; and the sources of authority are moreover so little known to occidental writers, that it is not easy to give even its main features. Some other writer, investigating from another point of view, may find features which seem to him entirely irreconcilable with those here presented. The object in the present instance was to investigate Budhism in China, but as it is a plant of foreign growth there, it was thought more satisfactory to trace its peculiarities in its native land; and then mark the changes which have occurred in transplanting it to another soil. This article divides itself therefore into Budhism in India and Budhism in China.

Before entering in detail upon the consideration of this subject, it seems necessary to refer to the sources of authority from which information is derived. These divide themselves into the remote or original authorities, and the nearer or those accessible to European students. The original sources of information come through the medium of the Sanscrit and Pali. The former is the authority for the Northern school of Budhists, and is that from which the sacred books in China were translated. A large collection of Budhist books, written in Sanscrit, was made by Mr. Hodgson, while British resident in Nepaul. Considerable portions of these were translated by Mons. Burnouf into French. He divides these books into three classes. First, the Sutras, or works which were intended to represent the sayings of Budha, but which were afterwards much enlarged. The second class treats of metaphysics, or the doctrinal parts of the system; and the third, of the discipline and morals, or the externals of the system.

Burnouf appears to favour the opinion that the Sanscrit was the learned language of both Budhists and Brahmans, while the Pali was the spoken language of Magadha—the country in Central India to which Budhism owes its origin. The Pali, however, became a highly cultivated language. Hardy says that in Ceylon he found thirty-five works on the grammar of this language, some of them of considerable extent. He supposes that it held universal sway in India during the prevalence of the Budhist faith, and that it prevailed to some extent in Bactria and Persia. The Southern school of Budhists, as Ceylon and Siam, look to the Pali as the medium through which they have received their sacred books. It was in Ceylon, and mostly from Singhalese authorities, that Hardy collected the materials of his Manual of Budhism.

Upon many points, and in fact in all the main features of the system, these two sources of authority, the Northern and the Southern, the Sanscrit and the Pali, agree. Some features appear more prominent in one than in the other, but this may be owing partly to the different way in which they were seen by Hardy and Burnouf-the former an English missionary in Ceylon for twenty-five years, and looking mostly at the practical features of the system—the latter a learned Professor in Paris, examining it mostly from a literary and philosophical point of view. In reference to Budhism in India, our labour will be to arrange and compile mostly from these two sources, such information as will give an idea of the main features of the system. For the sake of convenience we adopt, with some modification, the division of Burnouf, and consider 1st. The origin of the system, or Budha himself. 2d. The metaphysics or doctrinal part, and 3d. The externals of the system-its morals and discipline.

The first point of inquiry is its origin. Here we have to distinguish between the real historical origin, and that mythical exaggerated account which is now current in all Budhist countries. The historical founder was Gautama Budha,* who

^{*} Burnouf conjectures that the term Gautama or Gotamo (which, like Budha, is spelled in every variety of form,) was the sacerdotal family name of the military race of the Sakyas. (Introduction, p. 155.) Sakyamuni is one of the common designations of Budha in India and China, and means "sage of the house of Sakya."

was born in the kingdom of Magadha, a country of Central India, lying between the Ganges and the Himalayas, in the year 618 B. C. He probably appeared among his countrymen as a simple ascetic, in the same manner with the Brahmans, and differing in no respect from them, either as to manner of life or teachings, except about the method of escape from the inevitable law of transmigration. The idea of transmigration, which the Budhists have borrowed from the Brahmans, is that the visible world is in a state of perpetual change; that death succeeds life, and life death; that the animal or man is reproduced in some other form efther as animal or man, without any end. From this fatal law of change, Budha proposed the possibility of escape by entering upon the state called Nirvana, or as most writers upon this subject say, upon a state of annihilation. This doctrine of the Nirvana is the central one of Budhism, and though subject to modification and change, like every other part of the system, has yet maintained its place more uniformly than any other doctrinal feature. Its rites and ceremoniesthe externals of worship-have changed less than its teachings. This may be true of all false systems. Error has no certain ground to stand upon. It claims to be progressive, but only shifts its position from one sliding foothold to another, and finally rests for quiet in the mere externals of worship.

The followers of Budha, unlike those of Confucius, were unwilling that their founder should retain a mere historical position; and they have accordingly embellished his life with every extravagant fancy which even an oriental imagination could furnish; and not only that, the doctrine of transmigration has furnished them with an easy method of supplying biographies ad libitum. Books are filled giving accounts of him as he appeared in various states and personages, sometimes as an animal and sometimes as a man, before his appearance on earth as a Budha. Our slow imaginations weary in attempting to follow back the present Budha through the interminable existences in which he has appeared.* And then

^{*} The Budhists have a method of getting at the indefinite period which has past, which will bear some comparison in length to the days of creation according to modern geologists. They divide the periods in which changes have taken place into Kalpas. Eighty small Kalpas make one large one. One way of getting at the length of a small Kalpa, is the following. During its con-

there were twenty-four, some say one hundred Budhas beyond him. "Between the manifestations of one Budha and the advent of his successor a long period is represented as intervening, in which the religion revealed by one Budha becomes extinct. When the next Budha appears, he revives by revelation the doctrines of the Budhistical faith. The religion of the present period, it is said, will endure five thousand years, of which two thousand four hundred, or not one-half, have already passed." (Turnour's preface to a translation of the Mahawanso, p. 28.) We shall not attempt to pass back into the interminable period of the preceding Budhas, nor into the former lives of the present Budha, merely remarking in passing that though tedious in the extreme, they sometimes contain passages of real beauty, where the moral is pointed with force, sometimes with a fable which might grace the pages of an Æsop. We append two by way of example, in a note,* taken from Hardy's "Manual of Budhism."

As already intimated, Budha was born in the kingdom of Magadha. He was the son of the king of that country, and left his father's house at the age of nineteen, to lead the life of

tinuance the age of man gradually decreases one year at a time from an immeasurable length down to ten years, and then increases in the same ratio from ten to eighty thousand years. Now it took twenty of these small Kalpas to complete the world; through twenty more it remains in the same state. We are in this division of which there are eleven more small Kalpas to come. These are the Kalpas of establishment; and then come forty small Kalpas of destruction; which, together, make eighty or one great Kalpa. Notices of Chinese Budhism.

* The unwise use of strength is represented by the son of a carpenter who was called by his father to kill a mosquito that had lighted on his buld pate. The boy seizes an adze, and strikes such a blow that he not only kills the

mosquito, but his father too.

Another represents the folly of spending our thoughts on the present. A turkey-buzzard sees the carcase of an elephant floating with some drift-wood in the current of a river. The buzzard flies to the prey and congratulates itself on the feast which it has for so many days. Intent upon its prey, the wood and the carcase float on; and still and quiet the buzzard is borne out to ocean. Its food becomes less, the wind arises, scatters the drift-wood, the bones of the elephant sink, and the buzzard then realizes, as it looks out on the broad ocean, -its food and its support all gone and no land in sight-how foolish it was to have been so engrossed with its appetite. Vain then were its efforts. Its heavy wings could not bear it to land, and wearied and tired it sank beneath the waves.

an anchorite; at thirty, he suddenly came to the perception of the true wants and conditions of mankind. After this he lived forty-nine years, and discoursed to his disciples "of the revolutions of the wheel that perpetually carries mortals through the four miseries, that is birth, sickness, old age, and death; and of the excellent fruits of the religious system which he proposed;" or, in other words, a release from transmigration by entering upon the state of Nirvana. The death of Budha occurred at the age of seventy-nine, in the year 543 B. C. The time of his death is the point from which Budhists reckon. There has been much discrepancy as to this period, the Chinese annalists generally placing it further back; but the one just given is now usually received. In appearance and stature, Budha was represented as very extraordinary. He is said to have been twelve cubits high, and when his foot touched the earth, a lotus sprang up at every step. Thirty-two beauties are enumerated respecting his person. Not only did he possess these, but he was considered the beau-ideal of all that is most beautiful, praiseworthy, and great. Among his praises, it is said "the eye cannot see anything, nor the ear hear anything, nor the mind think of anything more excellent, or more worthy of regard than Budha." One of the perfections ascribed to Budha is complete knowledge. "There is no limit," it is said, "to the knowledge of the Budhas, and they are the only beings ever existent of whom this can be predicated. From them nothing can be hid. All times as well as all places are open to their mental vision." (Manual of Budhism.) Budha is on account of this knowledge considered a revealer. It is through him alone that anything is known of past history, that is, of the times preceding the present Budha. The scheme of religion is developed by revelation through Budha, and his inspired disciples; the age of inspiration having passed away in the century preceding our era. (Turnour's preface to the Mahawanso, p. 28.) One of the titles of Budha is, that he is omniscient of the present, the past and the future. Miraculous power is also ascribed to Budha, and to some extent to his disciples. There is also a class of beings higher than man, who, in their invisible state, often perform very wonderful things. On certain occasions they appear in human form, and confer great blessings upon the faithful followers of Budhism. These marvellous tales of the power of Budha and his followers, who are able to call the invisible world to their assistance, fill up the pages of the Mahawanso, which was intended as an historical poem, giving an account of the early progress of Budhism.

Notwithstanding Budha's omniscience and miraculous power, he is never described as the Creator or Governor of the universe. Though worshipped by the common people as God, according to philosophical Budhism, he is in no sense God. He helps beings to obtain Nirvana, but not by any power which he exercises, but only by revealing the way. Wisdom and intelligence are ascribed to him in the highest degree, but no power or efficiency either over men, or the universe at large. He is often called a Saviour, but it is only in the sense of a revealer-he points out the way. The rest is accomplished by the individual, and the opus operatum efficacy of good works. The title of Saviour is a common one. Huc says that to the question, "Who is Budha?" a Mongol always replies, "The Saviour of men." In the Mahawanso, the object of his obtaining the supreme omniscient Budhahood, is said to be that he might redeem mankind from the miseries of sin. And again, he is said to be the vanquisher of the five deadly sins, the Savidur and dispeller of the darkness of sin.

There can be more than one Budha-not at a time-but in succession, after the lapse of Kalpas. Any being may be a candidate for this state, though it can only be obtained by being made the uniform object of pursuit through innumerable ages. In this process, they pass through countless phases of being from any of the lower order of animals to dewas, (who are the highest in the order of sentient beings, and are celestial or angelic in their nature.) In this incipient state, they are called Bodhisatwas. In the birth in which they become a Budha, they are always of woman born, and pass through infancy and youth, like ordinary beings. At death they enter Nirvana, or a state of non-existence, as is generally supposed. According to this view, Budha at his death B. C. 543, ceased to exist. He is no longer Budha, neither did he enter upon any other state of being. (Eastern Monachism, p. 5.) This places the worshippers of Budha in the marvellous position of

worshipping an extinct being. It is a matter of curiosity to see how the Budhists meet such an objection. Hardy gives the following, (Eastern Monachism, p. 228.) An individual is introduced with the objection, that if Budha now receives the offerings of men he has not obtained Nirvana, as in that state all cleaving to existing objects is destroyed; he is not existent, he cannot receive the offerings made to him. Nagasena, an expounder of Budhism, replies that he does not receive the offerings that are presented. Budha has attained Nirvana. Nevertheless, those who make offerings to him will receive the three great favours—the happiness of this world, of the dewalokas and Nirvana. Although Budha does not receive the offerings of the faithful, the reward of those offerings is certain. This statement is enforced by several comparisons, as of fire. Budha in the world was a brilliant flame. There is no desire in the flame to consume the grass or fuel, so there is none in Budha to receive the offerings. The flame does not exist. because of its desire to consume, but consumes what is placed in its way.*

This attempt at reconciling so absurd a thing as the worship of an extinct being has practically been of no avail. The people worship him not only as if he had not passed into Nirvana, but as if he had all the power of a god—a power which, in primitive Budhism at least, is never ascribed to him.

We come next to the consideration of the metaphysical or doctrinal part of the system. We have just seen that Budhism is theoretically atheistic.† Budha did not speak of any God. He did not claim to be himself God, and if extinct, in the state of *Nirvana*, he can be, in no sense, God. The fundamental

^{*} It is also said that Budha, foreseeing what would happen in future times, told one of his disciples, "when I am gone you must not think there is no Budha; the discourses I have delivered, the precepts I have enjoined, must be my successors or representatives, and be to you as Budha."

[†] Hodgson, in speaking of the four principal schools of philosophy in Nepaul, (Asiatic Researches, Vol. xvi., p. 423,) mentions one which he terms Theists. They speak of one God, an intelligent being under the name of Adibudha. Although they deny his providence and government of the world, yet all beings were created more or less directly by him; and in order to escape from the fatal law of transmigration it is necessary to return to the bosom of God. This, though found in the midst of Budhism, is, as Burnouf remarks, only Brahmanism under another name.

idea of Deity, that of exercising power and control over the universe, is absent from the system. In this respect it is the very opposite of Brahmanism, which is Pantheism. Brahm is the only entity in the universe, the world and all it contains being only a manifestation of the Supreme spirit. In an atheistic system like Budhism the question immediately arises, what is their theory of accounting for the creation and government of the world?

The Budhists do not trace back the origin of all things to the calling them into existence out of nothing, but keep going back in the circle of existence—the bird is produced from the egg, and that from a former bird, and so on. If pressed still farther, they make ignorance the first term in the series of existence. Thus says Budha, "On account of ignorance, merit and demerit are produced; on account of merit and demerit, consciousness; on account of consciousness, body and mind; from body and mind, the six organs of sense; from these touch, then desire; from desire sensation, from sensation cleaving to existing objects-thence renewed existence: on account of reproduction of existence comes birth; from birth comes decay, death, sorrow, crying, pain, disgust and passionate discontent. Thus is produced the complete body of sorrow. From the cessation of merit and demerit is the cessation of consciousness, then of the body and mind, then the six organs of sense, and so on, until there is a cessation of birth and cessation of decay, and so the whole body of sorrow ceases to exist." (Quoted Manual of Budhism, p. 391.)

Here we have an abstract quality or ignorance, producing another abstract quality called Karma, or merit and demerit. This Karma (of which it is necessary to say more soon) produces consciousness, and consciousness endowed with physical force, produces body and mind. The Brahminical account is something similar. "Whilst Brahma formerly in the beginning of the Kalpa, was meditating on creation, there appeared a creation beginning with ignorance and consisting of darkness. From that great being appeared fivefold ignorance, consisting of obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom and utter darkness. The creation of the Creator thus plunged in abstraction was the fivefold (immovable) world, without intellect or reflec-

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tion, void of perception or sensation, incapable of feeling and destitute of motion. Since immovable things were first created this is called the first creation."* This imperfect creation was succeeded by eight others, each more perfect than the preceding. The difference between the two systems appears to be that Brahmanism assigns the creation of this ignorance or darkness to Brahma, who is thus the original essence, and in some sense the first cause. But Budhism ignores any cause saying the beginning of duration does not appear. Ignorance was the first in the order of existence and duration; and what was beyond, it does not pretend to affirm. Thus a king is represented inquiring of Nagasena the expounder of Budhism: What is the root or beginning of past duration? what of future duration? what of present duration? The reply is, the beginning of these is ignorance or deception, and then follows the sequence in the order given above of consciousness, &c. An illustration is taken from a circle of which the priest asks the king if he can find the beginning or end-so it is, he says, with duration. There is no end to the order of sequences.

As Budhism thus rids itself of a Creator, let us next see how it disposes of a governor and controller of the universe. The second thing in the order of creation is said to be Karma—or the sum of merit and demerit. This is an abstract quality pervading all existence. In fact, Burnouf translates its equivalent as the moral existence, the being worthy of recompense or punishment. It does not seem, however, to be so much a part of existence as a law. No personality is ascribed to it. It has that kind of efficiency which is often ascribed to a law of nature. In the individual it is the sum of merit and demerit, and determines his state and character. Budha declared that "it was not by his own inherent power, nor by the assistance of the Dewas, (the highest of sentient beings,) that he obtained the Budhaship, but by the Karma of previous births." (Manual of Budhism, p. 448.) The Karma appoints whether the being to be produced shall be an insect or a worm, a fowl, a beast, a man, or a Dewa. The Karma is controlled by its own character. If it be good, it must necessarily appoint the being that will be produced to a state of

^{*} Wilson's Vishnu Purana quoted Manual of Budhism, p. 393.

happiness; but if evil, it appoints the being to a state of misery. It works without the aid of material instrumentality; as the earth causes the seed to germinate, so the *Karma* produces a new existence; neither the earth, nor the seed, nor the *Karma*,

possesses mind.

This Karma forms the connecting link in the theory of transmigration—a theory common to both Brahmans and Budhists. The idea of that theory is not that the soul passes from one state of existence into another, but that all the elements of existence are dissolved or broken up at death, and that the being no longer exists. And yet, the abstract Karma—the sum of merit and demerit, exists not as an entity—as an individual—or as a soul—but like a seed, determining what the next reproduction will be. It may not be like that immediately preceding, but varied according to the sum of merit and demerit, of all the preceding existencies. Thus a man may during his present existence, be one of the most meritorious of beings, but latent in his Karma, like an hereditary disease, may lie the crime of murder committed ages ago, which in the next stage of existence will have to be expiated. (Manual of Budhism, p. 396.)

One of their illustrations on this subject, is as follows:—Milk put away for the night becomes curd, from this curd comes butter, and this butter turns to oil. The priest asks, Now if any one were to say that milk is curd, or that it is butter, would he speak correctly? The king answers, No; because of the milk, oil has been gradually produced. In the same way says the priest, one being is conceived, another is born, another dies; when comprehended by the mind, it is like that which has no before and no after; no preceding and no succeeding existence. This illustration is applied to the same being, as the child and the grown up man.*

^{*} An objection to this system, very naturally arises on the ground of moral responsibility. The king says, If the same body and mind is not again produced, that being is delivered from the consequences of sinful action. The priest replies, This does not necessarily follow. A man steals mangos. The owner of the fruit seizes him and brings him to the king. The thief replies, I have not stolen his mangos; the mango he planted was one; these are other, and different from that; I do not deserve to be punished. But the king rightly decides in favour of the owner, because the mangos stolen are the product of the one he had planted. So, in like manner, one body dies, another body and

It will be seen that this theory of the Karma introduces, instead of a moral governor, an abstract quality, which determines by a kind of blind law-by rule and measure-the state of each individual. It takes away the idea of responsibility to any supreme controlling power, and throws it into the hands of a blind fate, which like the germinating principle in plants, determines its precise state and form. As Hardy says: "It acknowledges that there is a moral government to the world. but it honours the statute book instead of the lawgiver, and

adores the sceptre instead of the king."

This theory also helps us to understand what is peculiar in their teachings in regard to man. The connecting link in transmigration is not the soul, any more than it is the body. and the latter may vary in form through the successive stages of existence, from an insect to a Dewa. That is said to be a heterodox idea, that represents the soul "as flying happily away like a bird from its cage." But though heterodox, it is no doubt very commonly entertained. The philosophical theory however is, that the Karma is the connecting link. In the conversations already referred to, the king asks if the mind and body that are conceived in the present birth, are conceived in another birth? The priest replies, "No: this nama and rupa, (or mind and body,) acquires Karma, whether it be good or bad, and by means of this Karma another mind and body is produced." Thus the soul as well as the body, commences at each successive birth de novo.

Man, according to Budhism, is composed of five elements, which Burnouf gives as form, sensation, idea, conceptions, consciousness. These unite in the thinking, sensitive principle, the moment birth occurs. It is these united, that make the man-the individual; just as the different parts of a chariot, the wheels, the covering, &c., make the chariot. No one of the separate parts can be called a chariot, but the whole put together.

But the central or fundamental idea, in the metaphysical, or doctrinal system of Budhism, is that of Nirvana. This, how-

mind is conceived; but as the second mind and body is produced by the Karma of the first mind and body, there is no deliverance from the consequences of sinful action. (Manual of Budhism, p. 429.)

ever, presupposes—what is an axiom in Budhist faith, namely, that sorrow belongs to whatever comes into the world. All that is present and passing-all the phenomena of existence are evil. From this evil, the way of escape is by entering Nirvana-the primary idea of which state was release from present evil. And as evil is connected with everything that exists, it involved a cessation of all the known forms of existence. To this state man was taught to look forward, as one of perfection. There was to be not only a deadness to the world, but an abstraction from all forms of existence. Thus the four principles or grounds of supernatural power are said to be, 1st. The faculty of conceiving the abandonment of every idea of desire; 2d. of thought; 3d. of energy; 4th. of investigation. From all which, says Burnouf, it results that the Budhists attribute supernatural faculties to him who has reached the point of imagining that he has renounced all idea of desire, of thought, of effort, and of investigation or meditation, that is, to him who has, as it were, disengaged himself from all mental activity. (Introduction, p. 625.) This method of looking at all existing things as evil, and attempting to disengage the mind from all contact with passing phenomena, seems to have led them to adopt the conclusion, that everything objective was an illusion. In one of their books, which Burnouf translates, (p. 465) it is said, "that the Bodhisatwa, to whom it belongs, to live in the perfection of wisdom, must not stop at form, nor at sensation, nor at idea, nor at conception, nor at consciousness. Why so? Because if he stops at form, he lives in the notion, that form exists; he lives not in the perfection of wisdom. To one in this state form is intangible, and the same is true of sensation, idea, conceptions, consciousness-all which things are intangible to one in the state of perfection of wisdom." Again, "form is said to be an illusion, and illusion itself form."

This idea, that all things are an illusion, seems to extend only to the objective, and not to the subjective, though Hardy says the Budhists consider man as a nonentity. The Northern Budhists, however, speak specially of the non-reality of external things, and this mostly in connection with a preparation for the state of *Nirvana*. The mode in which that state was to be reached, was by the cessation of evil desire, and that involved

a cessation of the elements of existence. The attempt was to be made, to divest one's-self of all passion and enjoyment, and thus by considering all things as an illusion, prepare for the state of perfection. Thus Budha says to Purna, a rich merchant, who had determined to adopt the life of a devotee: "Where there is no pleasure, there is neither satisfaction nor complacence. Where there is neither satisfaction nor complacence, there is no passion. Where there is no passion, there is no enjoyment. Where there is no enjoyment-the devotee, O Purna, who is affected neither with pleasure, passion nor enjoyment is said to be very near to Nirvana. There are, O Purna, sounds adapted to the ear, odours to the smell, tastes to the sense of taste, feelings to the touch, laws to the mindall which are qualities desired, sought after, loved, transporting, giving rise to passion, and exciting the desires. If a devotee, perceiving these qualities, has no satisfaction in them, seeks not after them, feels no inclination towards them, has no complacence in them, it results that he has no pleasure; he is said to be very near Nirvana." (Burnouf, p. 252.)

Both Sanscrit and Pali authorities agree in teaching that Nirvana means annihilation. Hardy's statement on this subject is as follows: "The unwise being, who has not yet arrived at a state of purity, or, who is subject to a future birth, overcome by the excess of evil desire, rejoices in the organs of sense, and commends them. These, therefore, become to him like a rapid stream, to carry him onward toward the sea of repeated existence; they are not released from old age, decay, death, sorrow, &c. But the being who is purified, perceiving the evils arising from the sensual organs, and their relative objects, does not rejoice in them, nor does he commend them, or allow himself to be swallowed up by them. By the destruction of the one hundred and eight modes of evil desire, he has released himself from birth, as from the jaws of an alligator; he has overcome all attachment to outward objects, he does not regard the unauthorized precepts, nor is he a sceptic; and he knows that there is no egotism, no self. By overcoming these four errors, he has released himself from cleaving to existing objects, he is released from birth, whether as a Brahma, man, or any other being. By the destruction of birth, he is released

from old age, decay, death, sorrow, &c. All the afflictions connected with the repetition of existence are overcome. Thus, the principles of existence are annihilated, and that annihilation is *Nirvana*. (*Eastern Monachism*, p. 291.)

But upon this point there is a satisfaction in knowing how this doctrine is presented by the Budhists themselves. One of the conversations which Hardy quotes (Eastern Monachism, p. 398,) commences with the idea that Nirvana is independent of any exterior cause. It is, of course, independent of Budha, for it is a state to which he attains. If it is annihilation, it is like space, in which the individual being is lost and swallowed up. But to proceed with the conversation. The king makes the statement that everything must have a cause—the son has a father, the scholar a teacher, the bud a seed. But the priest replies, Nirvana is not a thing that can be produced, and therefore it has not been said by Budha that it has a cause; it is a mystery not to be understood; it cannot be said that it is past, present, or future. The king says, Then you speak of a thing that is not; you merely say that Nirvana is Nirvana, therefore there is no Nirvana. The priest replies, Great king, Nirvana is-it is a perception of the mind, the pure, delightful, free from ignorance, and evil desire is perceived by the rahats who enjoy the fruition of the paths. He then compares it to the wind, the colour of which cannot be told, neither can it be said that it is long or short; it cannot be taken into the hand, yet the wind is; even so Nirvana is-destroying the infinite sorrow of the world, and presenting itself as the chief happiness of the world, but its attributes or properties cannot be declared. Again, the king asked the priest, Is the joy of Nirvana unmixed, or is it associated with sorrow? The priest replied that it is unmixed satisfaction, entirely free from sorrow. The king does not at first understand this, as there is sorrow in attaining it. But the priest shows that there are many things that are pleasant in the fruition, which, in the acquisition, are attended with sorrow. Now while the logical conclusion seems to be that Nirvana means the annihilation of the thinking subject, inasmuch as, in that state, he is released from the evils of existence, from all cleaving to and delight in existence in any form, yet some of their representations, such as those above referred to, give an apparent substantiality to this state. It is, and it is a state of happiness. Still that happiness has nothing of activity about it. Budhism knew of no implantation of right affections and holy desires which could be as active as the evil had been, and in the exercise of which heaven could consist. It only spoke of rooting up the evil, and of the cessation of evil desire, which necessarily clave to, and was connected with existence. This made its heaven, annihilation. Goodness on earth is quietism, indifference to existing objects. The less satisfaction, pleasure, or complacence the Budhist took in anything existing, the nearer was he to being released from the fatal law of transmigration, and the nearer his approach to *Nirvana*.

The counterpart of Nirvana is properly existence, or this world of sorrow through which human beings are called to pass in the countless changes of transmigration. But the idea of annihilation is one from which the human mind revolts, and such a Nirvana has often been exchanged for a place of reward, and as a counterpart, a place of punishment has also been invented. Punishment, except in the course of transmigration, does not appear at first to have been very prominent, but afterwards became one of the principal features of Budhism. This punishment does not, however, seem to be final and eternal, except in the case of five deadly sins.* It is more like purgatory, and is in the course, or line of existence, on that endless wheel of transmigration, the whole course of which is sorrow.

Before proceeding with the externals of the system, we will quote Burnouf's summary of the metaphysical system of primitive Budhism. "Although it is difficult to form a precise opinion concerning a system so imperfectly known, as by the Sanscrit books of Nepal, he figures Sakyamuni in entering upon the life of a religious devotee, as adopting the atheistic doctrines furnished by the Samkhyas, (one of the Brahman schools,) which, in ontology, denied the existence of one God,

^{*} The sins which shut a man out of Nirvana, even though they have been committed in some former state of existence, and he may be unconscious of them, are Patricide, Matricide, the murder of a rahat, wounding the person of Budha, (his life cannot possibly be taken,) and lastly, causing a schism among the priesthood.

and held to the multiplicity and eternity of the human soul. and in physics, to the existence of one eternal nature, endowed with qualities which transform themselves, and possess the elements of those forms which clothe the human soul in the course of its voyage through the world. Sakvamuni borrowed from this theory the idea that there was no God, as also, the doctrine of the multiplicity of the human soul; that of transmigration, and that of Nirvana, or deliverance, which appertains in general to all the Brahman schools. Only at this day it is not easy to see what he meant by Nirvana, since he did not define it. But as he never spoke of God, Nirvana to him was not the absorption of the individual soul in the bosom of the universal God, as the orthodox Brahmans believe; and as he never spoke of matter, his Nirvana was not the dissolution of the human soul into its physical elements. The word void, (vide,) which appears in all the monuments which are proved to be the more ancient, induces me to think, that he saw the supreme good in the complete annihilation of the thinking subject." "That which Budhism denies, is the eternal God of the Brahmans, and the eternal nature of the Samkhyas; that which it admits, is the multiplicity and individuality of human souls, of the Samkhyas, and the transmigration of the Brahmans. That which it wishes to attain, is the deliverance and freedom of the spirit, as wishes all the world in India. But it did not enfranchise the spirit, as the Samkhyas supposed, by for ever detaching it from nature; nor as the Brahmans supposed, by plunging it again into the bosom of the absolute and eternal Brahma; but it took away the conditions of its relative existence, by precipitating it into an empty void, that is, to all appearance, into annihilation." (P. 520, &c.)

The next point is the externals of the system, including its morals and discipline. The term morals, we shall use in a wide sense, as referring to good works—whatever confers merit. Budhism recognizes the fact that man is in a state of sin or sorrow. The four sublime verities, or fundamental axioms of its doctrine, are 1st. That sorrow exists. 2d. That it belongs to whatever comes into the world. 3d. That it is desirable to be delivered from it. 4th. That deliverance can be obtained by

knowledge alone.* (Burnouf, p. 290.) Instead of this fourth axiom, it might rather be said that deliverance can only be by the acquisition of merit. The knowledge that is necessary, is only to know how to perform good works. There is no dependence on the merits of another, and no expiation of sin by the sacrifice of another. Sacrifices with the Budhists are only offerings. Sacrifice of life would be inconsistent with the first of the fundamental precepts of Budhist morality-not to take the life of any living thing. "Their religious ceremonies consist in the offering of flowers and incense, which are accompanied with the sound of instruments, and the recitations of chants and prayers." (Burnouf, p. 339.) The performance of these ceremonies, together with alms-giving, as well as those actions which belong more strictly to mere morality, are looked upon as efficacious, in the acquisition of merit. It is fortunate for their system, that merit may, in their view, be more easily acquired, than demerit. Thus, it is said, "a man gives alms, or keeps the precepts; by this means, his mind is filled with satisfaction; again and again, this satisfaction wells up within him, and he is induced to acquire a greater degree of merit; it is like a perpetual fountain, continually flowing over; but when a man does that which brings demerit, his mind becomes sorrowful, and he is deterred from pursuing the same course like a river that is lost in the sand of the desert. It is in this way, that merit increases and becomes great, whilst demerit is diminished." (Manual of Budhism, p. 459.) Merit too is easily acquired, especially by alms-giving. This is said to be the first of the four great virtues, namely-alms-giving, affability, promoting the prosperity of others, and loving others as ourselves. The greatest merit is acquired by offerings to Budha; as a florist, who presented to a former Budha eight nosegays of jessamine flowers, received in the same birth, elephants, horses, sons and daughters-eight of each, was preserved from being born in hell during a hundred thousand Kalpas, and received blessings without number in the world of men. The merit of

^{*} Those who comprehend these truths, and conform their conduct to them, are called *Aryas*, or elders, in opposition to ordinary men, who do not reflect on these important subjects.

alms-giving decreases in proportion to the demerit of the person to whom they are given, "just as the seed planted on poor ground does not yield so much as that on good." But, so great is the merit of almsgiving, that if he gives food to dogs, crows, &c., with the intention of receiving merit, he will have long life, prosperity, beauty, power, and wisdom, in a hundred births. (Eastern Monachism, p. 83.)

Hearing the bana, or word, by the same sort of inherent efficacy, also, confers great benefit. This is not the doing of the precepts, but simply hearing, or reciting them in an unknown tongue. This gives occasion for the adoption of those "vain repetitions, which the heathen use." The bana, or word, is one of the three precious gems,* and is literally worshipped, and benefits are expected to be received in consequence of this adoration, as much as if it were an intelligent being. (Eastern Monachism, p. 192.) The most efficacious mode of almsgiving is to provide for the recitation of the word. Budha is reported to have said, "Were one to give the three robes (necessary for the priest,) to Budha, the Pasi-Budhas, or the rahats, though the material of their fabric were as soft and smooth as the tender bud of the plantain, the hearing or reading of one single stanza of the bana, or word, would bring him a greater reward; indeed, its reward would be more than sixteen times greater." He, however, says, that in order to the full enjoyment of the benefit, it requires attention, and that each one should exercise meditation, and observe the ordinances, that he may attain wisdom.

Besides these works, or efforts, the main object of which is to acquire merit, Budhism also inculcated a system of morality. In fact, Burnouf thinks that the prominent characteristic of primitive Budhism was its morality, and in this respect, it was distinguished from Brahmanism, the prominent features of which were speculative philosophy on the one hand, and mythology on the other. But Budhism, by its morality, and especially by its holding to the principle of universal charity, or self-sacrifice, for the good of others, has obtained for itself the first rank among the ancient religions of Asia. These

^{*} The three precious gems, are, Budha; the truth; and the associated priesthood.

characteristics of primitive Budhism, which rested chiefly in simple moral rules, and which set forth Budha as an example of intelligence and virtue, which any one might propose to follow, are to be distinguished from that second age of Budhism, in which Budhas and Bodhisatwas were invented, to compete with the mythology of Brahmanism, and in which the metaphysical dogmas and the discipline developed themselves, to the almost entire exclusion of morality, so that it no longer became the principal object of religion. (Pp. 335-7.)

In external regard for propriety, there was more of it about the Budhist system than the Brahman. As for instance, the Budhist, besides a mat to sit upon, and a bowl for begging, was also to have three garments, but the ascetic among the Brahmans went entirely naked. Woman also, was placed in a higher social position, and this in itself would tend to a higher tone of morality. Even the nunneries, however corrupted in a later age, showed a desire to elevate woman to the same religious privileges with man. Precepts were also given for the proper performance of the relative duties, as those which belong to husband and wife,* parents and children, master and servant, and for the way in which one friend should assist another.

The more general precepts of Budhism are usually given as ten in number. The 1st. is not to take life, (which includes all animal life, insect as well as man.) 2d. Not to steal. 3d. Not to commit adultery, (with the priest forbids all sexual intercourse.) 4th. Not to lie. 5th. Forbids all intoxicating drinks. 6th. Not to eat solid food after mid-day. 7th. Forbids attendance upon dancing, music, singing, and masks. 8th. Forbids to adorn the body with flowers, or to use perfumes, and unguents. 9th. Forbids to use high, or honourable seats, and

^{*} It is said there are five ways in which a husband ought to assist a wife. 1st. He must speak to her pleasantly, and say to her mother, I will present you with garments, perfumes and ornaments. 2d. He must speak to her respectfully, not using low words, such as he would to a servant, or slave. 3d. He must not leave the woman he possesses, by giving to her clothes, ornaments, &c., to go to a woman who is kept by another. 4th. If she does not receive a proper allowance of food, she will become angry, therefore she must be provided for, that this may be prevented. 5th. He must give her ornaments, and other similar articles according to his ability.

couches. 10th. Forbids to receive gold or silver.* Some of these precepts are such only as an ascetic is bound to obey. In some things it will be seen that the Budhist precepts have erred as much by excess as they have by deficiency in others. They are deficient in the whole class of precepts which are enumerated in the first table of the Decalogue, and which form the proper basis of religious reverence or worship, in distinction from mere morality. Again, they err by excess. Precepts which are too strict, that is which make the same of tithing mint, anise and cummin, which they do of the weighter matters of the law, defeat their own object. This is seen in the precept about taking life. It doubtless owes its extension to animals, to the idea of transmigration. But, it has had the effect of leading to a disregard of human life. Thus, in Major Phayris' Report on Pegu, he says, "Perhaps the main cause of the disregard of human life which exists (in Pegu) may be tracedparadoxical though it be-to the Budhist religion, which forbids the taking of all animal life, but draws no broad distinction between the life of the lower animals and that of man. When the passions are excited, the feeble bonds which restrain from murder are soon burst asunder. There is little doubt, but at the capital it is infinitely easier to compound for the killing of a man, than of an ox."

One point worthy of commendation, though apparently not much acted upon, is the inculcation of charity, or self-sacrifice, for the good of others. One of their leading maxims is this, "Whatever of happiness is in the world, it has arisen from a wish for the welfare of others. Whatever misery is in the world, it has all arisen from a wish for our own welfare." (Journal of American Oriental Society, vol. 1st, p. 133.) The object too, at which the Budhist ascetic aimed, was not to elevate himself alone, but to extend the benefit to other men. Thus Budha addresses one of his disciples, "Thyself made

^{*} These precepts are not always uniformly given. In some books, only eight are enumerated. In one Chinese work, the ten prohibitions enumerated, are—1st. Killing. 2d. Stealing. 3d. Adultery. 4th. Lying. 5th. Selling wine. 6th. Speaking of others' faults. 7th. Praising of one's self, and defaming others. 8th. Parsimony joined with scoffing. 9th. Anger, and refusing to be corrected. 10th. Reviling the three precious ones.

free, free others; having reached the other shore, lead others there; being consoled, impart consolation; having thyself attained to complete *Nirvana*, be the means of others attaining to it," that is, he was to induce others to become devotees.

The observance of all other precepts of Budhism will avail but little, unless in some stage of his existence a man has been an ascetic. Asceticism is a necessary consequence of the first principle of speculative Budhism, that evil is connected with all passing phenomena. Evil desire was to be checked, and attachment to the objects of sense loosened, "as a drop of water falls off from the lotus leaf." In order to accomplish this object, a course of voluntary poverty and chastity was entered upon. Budha himself was an ascetic, and it is a part of his system which he borrowed from Brahmanism. The organization of the priesthood was different, but the principle of asceticism belonged to both systems. Budha, in the same manner with the Brahmans, gathered around him his disciples, and they adopted the life of mendicants. There seem early to have arisen distinctions among his followers-some carrying these principles much further than others. Some retired into the solitude of forests; and monasteries, at a very early period in the history of Budhism were introduced. Some even carried the renunciation of things present to the extent of giving up life. An instance is given of a young Brahman retiring to the depths of a forest, to be devoured by a hungry tiger. "He gave up life," he said, "not for the sake of royalty, not for the joys of pleasure, not for the rank of Sakra, not for that of a sovereign monarch, but for the sake of arriving at the state of a perfeet Budha." All had not this zeal, and therefore, they were not required to adopt the strict rules imposed upon the priesthood. These are called Upasakas, or, what we would term the laity. In one of the legends quoted by Burnouf, it is asked, "What does the mendicant state require?" "It requires the observance during one's whole life, of the rules of chastity." "That is impossible; is there no other way?" "There is another, my friend; it is to become an Upasaka." "What does this state require?" "It requires the keeping of one's self during life, from every inclination to murder, to theft, to pleasure, to falsehood, and to the use of intoxicating drinks." (P. 281.) Still, it was necessary in some stage of a man's existence, to have been an ascetic, as will be seen by the quotation from Hardy, given in a note."*

It is not necessary to enter into particulars concerning the rules specified for the observance of the priesthood. Celibacy, as well as voluntary, *i. e.* individual poverty, was enforced. The candidate was to have his head and beard shaven, put on a yellow robe, receive a bowl for begging alms, and place himself under one more advanced for instruction.

A more important point, and one which made a broad line of distinction between the ascetic, or priestly class of the Budhists and the Brahman, was, that the former disregarded all distinction of caste. The Brahman, arrogated to himself the highest position among the four castes—he was the head of Brahm, while the others were parts of his body. The lower classes could not attain to the religious privileges and distinctions of the Brahman. The Budhist on the other hand, of whatever class, might enter upon a life of asceticism. This was not owing to any clearer ideas of Budha, in reference to social

* It is related, that Milinda, the king, was one day reflecting on religious subjects, and he wondered how it was, that if householders could enter the path leading to Nirvana, any one should take the trouble to observe the thirteen ordinances—the practice of which is so difficult, and he accordingly went to the priest with his doubts on the subject. The priest told him, That myriads of householders, or those who had not renounced the world, had obtained Nirvana. The king replied, If a sick man can be cured by simples, why torture his body by emetics, or violent purgatives? if water can be procured from a natural fountain, it is to no purpose to dig wells or tanks; so, if a man who enjoys worldly possessions, can obtain Nirvana, of what benefit are the thirteen ordinances? The priest replies, That besides the advantages, (such as fearlessness, protection, freedom from evil desire, &c.,) and virtues, (hatred avoided, no habitation required, meditation exercised,) attendant upon the observance of the thirteen ordinances, no householder obtains Nirvana, unless he has kept the thirteen ordinances, in some former state of existence. He amplifies the benefit of such a course by such comparisons as the following. Men eat food, that they may receive strength, take medicine to drive away disease, enter a ship to cross the sea, use flowers and perfumes, that a fragrant smell may be emitted; so he who would receive the full benefit of asceticism, practices the thirteen ordinances. As water for the nourishment of grain, fire for burning, women for contention, treasure for independence, withs for binding, a couch for repose, a place of refuge for safety, the mother for rearing children, jewels for ornament, garments for clothing, scales for equality, the lamp for dispelling darkness, and the precept for restraining the disobedient, so is an attention to the thirteen ordinances for the nourishing of asceticism, the burning up of evil desire, &c." (Eastern Monachism, p. 15.)

equality, but having established chastity, i. e. in the Romish sense of not marrying, as one of the rules of the priesthood, its existence and continuance was provided for, by opening the door for all classes to enter the priesthood. Directly, Budhism made no war on caste, for it has co-existed with it on the island of Ceylon. But its indirect influence, in lowering the distinction which had been given to the Brahman, was, no doubt, the principal reason of the opposition and persecution which they met with from them. They would not have objected so much to Budha's proclaiming deliverance from the fatal law of transmigration, but placed as they were at the head of the system, they did not like to have their position interfered with. But whatever Budhism lost in this respect, by being brought into antagonism with Brahmanism, it was more than made up by its increased facility for propagation in other countries. Brahmanism was confined necessarily to its own country, or could only be propagated in equal ratio with the Brahminical caste. Like Judaism, it was confined by its hereditary priesthood. But Budhism, by admitting all who chose to take its vows into its priesthood, though driven out of the country of its birth,* was not destroyed. The new convert, of whatever rank or nation, could at once enter the novitiate, and look forward if he chose, to becoming himself a Budha, or, at least, obtaining Nirvana. The facility thus afforded for entering the priesthood, gave full scope for its propagation into other countries.

Besides this, there were other things in the system itself, which need to be taken into consideration, in accounting for its wide-spread progress. These are chiefly the partial truths which it contained: 1st. The fact that it recognized man's sinful, or lost condition. It spoke to the universal consciousness, by saying that man is in misery. The first of its four great truths was, "that every existent thing is a source of sorrow." This is, indeed, pushed to an extreme, by making evil a necessary part of existence, and as always connected with matter—thus, pushing its more logical followers into idealism here, and leaving them no hope but that of apnihilation, hereafter. 2d. It proposed a remedy for these evils, and the remedy proposed

^{*} Budhism flourished in India, from one thousand to twelve hundred years.

is that which is the most natural to the human heart, namelymortification of evil desire; man making himself good; purchasing merit. 3d. There were also held out motives drawn from a future world, to bear upon men's actions in this, and which answered in some measure to the longings of the human heart for a life beyond the grave. Whatever Nirvana was, philosophically, it was looked forward to by all as a state of happiness, a release from the inevitable law of transmigration, and by many Budhists it was exchanged for a heaven of action and sensible enjoyment. We have, in these partial truths, sufficient to account for the wide-spread influence of Budhism. Its leading doctrines were at least partially adapted to the wants and capacities of human nature. One thing, wherein primitive Budhism failed in this respect, was afterwards supplied. It was, originally, a system of atheism. There was no God who had created, and who sustains all things-no being, in fact, to worship. This want was supplied by making a god of Budha, and by adopting, so far as Northern Budhism was concerned, the prevailing mythology of India and China.

Having considered the more prominent points in the system of Budhism, it would be a matter of no little interest, to trace the efforts made for its propagation. This, excepting in reference to China, we can only do in the most cursory way; and yet it is a matter of no little interest, as it would help to throw light on a point, which every writer on Budhism has felt pressing upon him, namely—the resemblance between Budhism and Romanism. Is that resemblance owing to any historical connection between the two, or has it arisen entirely from similar workings of the human mind in reference to certain fundamental ideas?

The fact of this resemblance early attracted the attention of the Roman Catholic missionaries to the East; and, at first, it was supposed that the Budhists had borrowed from the Christians, as it was known that missionaries from the Syrian church had penetrated eastward, as far as the province of Shen-Se, in China, in the seventh and eighth centuries. But, as Budhism was found to have existed prior to our era, this supposition would not do. Premare, an able missionary of the Romish faith in China, ascribed the resemblance to the devil,

who had thus imitated holy mother church, in order to scandalize and oppose its rites. (Williams's Middle Kingdom,

vol. ii., p. 257.)

It is indeed not strange that there should be a resemblance in many particulars, when the leading idea which lies at the foundation of both systems is the same. Philosophically the systems are different, but in their religious bearings upon man, the main idea—that of the acquisition of merit, by good works is prominent in both. Asceticism, if not the growth of this idea, is fostered by it. In both systems a higher degree of holiness is hoped for, by renouncing the world. The Budhist is the more consistent in his renunciation, because he believes that evil is connected with everything existent. Now, though it be not strange that men should adopt the same ideas in different parts of the world, yet it is strange that they adopt precisely the same methods in carrying them out—that the priests, for instance, should adopt the same rules of celibacy and voluntary poverty, that both should shave the head, that both should have the same system of monasteries and nunneries, that both should use the rosary. There are other points of resemblance, such as auricular confession and veneration of relics, which Burnouf, perhaps naturally enough, writing as he did, in the midst of a Roman Catholic nation, attempts to account for on general principles. In respect to auricular confession, he says, "The most ancient legends represent it as established, and it may be easily seen to connect itself with the very foundations of the Budhist faith. The fatal law of transmigration, which we know attaches recompenses to good actions and penalties to bad, allows also of making amends for the one by the other, as it offers to the guilty person the chance of recovering himself by the practice of virtue. Hence comes that expiation which occupies so large a place in Brahman law. This theory passed into Budhism, which received it entire, together with so many other elements of the Hindoo social state, but it there took a peculiar form, by which its practical application was easily modified. The Budhists continued to believe with the Brahmans in the compensation of bad actions by good, for they admitted with these, that the latter are fatally rewarded, and the former are fatally punished.

But since on the other hand they did not believe in the moral efficacy of tortures, by which, according to the Brahmans, the guilty person might efface his crime, expiation was naturally reduced to its principle, that is, to the sentiment of repentance, and the only form which it took in practice was that of acknowledgment, or confession. (P. 299.)

Veneration of relics is another practice common to both systems. A hair of Budha, twelve feet in length, was the occasion of an embassy in the sixth century, from China to Siam. And to this day a relic of the body of Budha, of bead-like shape, is preserved in a temple near Ningpo. This veneration of relics, some of the legends imply was instituted by Budha himself. Burnouf thinks it originated with his earliest disciples and immediately after his death, who, he says, "were doubtless inspired by it with sentiments of respect and regret, entirely accordant with human nature. To be led to render to Sakva honours worthy of a sovereign, his disciples had only to remember that he belonged to the royal race of the Sakvas: to be led piously to preserve his remains, they had only to recall to mind that their master had been a man of whom there was nothing left but these poor remains. Sakya, to them, had entered into the state of complete annihilation; at all events, however this annihilation was understood, there was an end of his mortal person, inasmuch as it was to return no more to this world. It was therefore a proof of their being profoundly penetrated with thoughts of Sakya, that they piously gathered up all that was left of him, and the worship paid to his remains could not but result naturally from the conviction entertained that death destroys the entire man." (P. 353.) Thus, according to Burnouf, veneration of relics came from a desire to preserve what was left of the body, for whatever had been subject to death had been annihilated. Another stimulus to this worship, as Professor Salisbury well remarks, after quoting the above, was the need of some object of worship which could not be satisfied with the atheism of primitive Budhism. (Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. i. p. 296.)

While willing to give all due weight to the influence of human nature in working out similar results from the same fundamental ideas; and while, in fact, it is no help to Romanism, whether the resemblances which exist were actually borrowed from Paganism, or are the result of the same ideas working out in the same form and to the same conclusions, yet there are reasons for supposing there was some historical connection. How far it may have influenced opinion and practice, must be left for the ecclesiastical historian to determine.

1. One reason for the belief in an historical connection arises from the fact of the general activity and intercourse which existed among the nations in that part of the world, before and at the beginning of the Christian era. We are apt to judge of the past by the present; and the immobility which now characterizes Asiatic nations, we at first suppose always existed. But it must be remembered that we were once the barbarians, and that the great centres of civilization were not merely around the Mediterranean, but on the banks of the Euphrates and Indus. Cities lie buried, where teeming millions passed and re-passed, not only in the conflicts of war, but in the arts of peace and civilization. We need to people again those blank wastes, as we do the region of the Rhine and the Rhone, and gather larger nations into those wider territories. In those days, travellers and emigrants passed along the high steppes of Central Asia as men now do the passes of the Alps. Some six hundred years before the birth of Christ, Lau-tsz, a Chinese philosopher, journeyed through Central Asia, some think as far as Judea, or Greece. In the first century, a colony of Jews settled at Khai-fung-foo, on the Yellow River; and in the same century, and perhaps earlier, Budhist priests went from India to China, and, as will be seen, that intercourse was kept up for centuries. The Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, sent an embassy to China, and in the year A. D. 226, a Roman merchant was received with great respect by the prince of the three kingdoms. This Roman, whose name is given in the Chinese annals, is said to have given an account of his own country to the Chinese. Not only was this intercourse carried on by land, but also by sea. The commerce, of which we have a glimpse in the sacred narrative, in Solomon's time, was not confined to Tyre, and Joppa, and Ezion-geber, but eastward it doubled Cape Comorin, and passing through the Straits of Sunda, India and China exchanged products.

2. Not only was there this general activity among the nations, it was also manifest among the disciples of the different religious systems. The Budhists went forth to the work of propagation with an amount of mental energy, zeal, and devotion, which, so far as they are concerned, has long been extinct. The selection of the sites of their temples and pagodas shows that in former times many of the priests were men of intellectual cultivation and taste; and that by their own devotion to the cause, they commanded an amount of influence which led to the consecration of large sums both from private individuals and those high in rank. The Budhist missions were commenced at an early period in their history. In the 12th chapter of the Mahawanso-an historical work in Pali-is an account of the sending of priests into various foreign countries, for the establishment of the religion of Budha. This took place at the close of the third convocation, which was held B. C. 307, for the purpose of healing schisms in the Budhistic church. (Turnour's Introduction to the Mahawanso, p. 45.) The Mahawanso is written in poetry, and the filling up the deeds and exploits of these priests is given in an exaggerated, marvellous air. The priests who were sent out, were endowed with supernatural power, and their preaching, or repeating the discourses of Budha, was attended with extraordinary success. In Kashmir it is said one hundred thousand persons were ordained priests by the thero, or head priest, who were sent to convert that country, and from that period to the present day, the author says, the people have been fervently devoted to the three branches of the faith, and the land has glittered with the yellow robes of the priests. (P. 73.) Similar success is said to have attended the efforts of the other theros, of whom there were eight; each of whom, in the respective countries to which they were sent, succeeded in inducing one hundred thousand to enter the priesthood. The names of most of the countries to which these missions were sent, have been identified, and so far as identified, they were the countries in and about modern India. Of these missions, one of the most permanent and important was that to Ceylon. In many of these countries,

the monuments of Budhism, in the shape of temples, &c., still remain. One of the most zealous early promoters of the system was Asoka, an Emperor of India, who began to reign, B. C. 258. One of his proclamations, found inscribed upon a rock at Girnar, in Guzerat, refers to the establishment of Budhist usages in the dominions of Antiochus the Great. Another edict of his is supposed to contain the name of Ptolemy of Egypt.*

From what has been said, it is manifest that the influence of Budhism spread at an early period far beyond India. Clemens of Alexandria, and Tertullian, speak of the Budhists and Brahmans as well known. Tertullian, in his Apology, says, "we are no Brahmins, or Indian gymnosophists, no dwellers in the woods, no recluses, retired from the haunts of men." (Neander, vol. 1st, p. 273.) This language he uses to show that the Christians were not mere ascetics, but were thankful for the good things of God's providence. Still, there was creeping over the church at that time, a tendency to that very asceticism which Tertullian rebuked. We can easily see how an admiration for the ascetic life should have sprung up in the minds of the early Christian church. That system was in the vigour of its youth. It was rapidly progressive, bringing other nations under its influence. To a certain extent also, it seemed to chime in with the teachings of Christianity, to renounce the world, and mortify the body. Successful and apparently religious, it recommended itself outwardly as well as inwardly, falling in, as it does, with the innate tendency in man to selfrighteousness. If positive testimony were wanting, we should still feel that there was no method so probable, for accounting for the resemblances which exist between asceticism in the East and the West, as to suppose a historical connection, or in other words, that Monachism as it exists in the Romish church was oriental and pagan in its origin.

If as yet we have to rely upon probability, in reference to the derivation of many opinions and practices which crept into the early Christian church, there are still other points in regard

^{*} See "Memoir of the History of Budhism," by Prof. Salisbury, in Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 1st.

to which there can be no doubt that they were oriental in their origin. "New investigations and discoveries," says Neander, "have pointed out the way through which Budhism might spread its influences even to districts within the compass of the Roman Empire." In reference to the Gnostic systems, he says we recognize "the spirit of Brahmanism, and especially of Budhism—that longing of the soul for release from the bonds of matter, of nature; for reunion with the primal spirit, from which all life has flowed; that striving after entire estrangement from human passion, and from sublunary things, which strove to pass beyond the limits of finite existence." There was a tendency in all these sects to reproduce the idea that all matter-everything existent, was evil. But, holding as they did to what Budhism did not, namely, to the being of God, it manifested itself in a dualistic principle. The derivation of Manicheeism from Budhism, Neander considers as a point settled on historic grounds. (Vol. 1st, p. 484, &c.) Mani was a Persian by birth, and embraced Christianity at an early age. His attempt was to reform the church from what he considered Judaizing tendencies. He divided the church into two distinct grades-the Exoterics, or auditors, and the Esoterics, or the elect, the perfect, who were the sacerdotal class—the Brahmins of the church. They formed the link of transition from the earthly world—the circle of the metempsychosis—and the kingdom of light. Their mode of life was to answer to this position-utter estrangement from the world in the Budhist sense. They were to possess no worldly property, but were bound to lead a strictly ascetic and contemplative life, to abstain from marriage, from all strong drinks, and from all animal food. Other points showing the derivation of Manicheeism from Budhism, are mentioned by Neander, but we cannot pursue them. This is only stated as an example of the influence which oriental systems exerted in corrupting the church.

There are but few fundamental systems of error in the world; and these have grown old and decayed, independent of Christianity; and it seems to be one of the arts of the adversary, to reproduce them in contact with, and in opposition to the Christian system. Hence Confucianism, or a system of dependence on the principles and precepts of

morality, without the necessity for a divine agent. Hence, Budhism, or a system of good works, founded on asceticism and mortification of the flesh, which has been reproduced in Romanism. Hence, Pantheism, which has grown old and run to seed in gross idolatry in India, reproduced in Germany. And finally, Tauism, the peculiar features of which are communication with spirits, which has been reproduced in modern Spiritualism. These efforts of the devil at progress—this deluding of his followers to think he has manufactured something new, when it is merely the old revamped, show how wonderfully short, after all, he is for weapons to carry on his warfare against the truth.

Having considered the main features of the Budhistic system, we will attempt a brief historic sketch of Budhism in China, noticing, at the close, some of its prominent peculiarities in that country, and the principal schools into which it is divided.

It is said, that as early as B. C. 217, priests from India arrived at the then capital of China, in Shensi, to propagate their religion. Afterwards, a warlike expedition of the Chinese led them to a country where a golden statue was taken, and brought to the emperor. This, the Chinese author states, was the origin of the statues of Budha, which were afterwards in use.*

The usual time, however, to which is referred the introduction of Budhism into China, was during the reign of the Emperor Ming-te, in the year 66 of our era, and is thus given by Dr. Morrison, from the Chinese account. "The emperor dreamed one night that he saw a golden man, of tall stature, large neck, and splendid as the sun and moon. When he inquired of all his ministers respecting it, one said, 'In the west there is a Deity, whose name is Foe;† is it he of whom your majesty has dreamed?" Messengers were then sent to the kingdom of Teen-lo to inquire respecting their religion, to obtain some of their books, and bring some of their Shamun, or priests. The Shamun said that Foe was fifteen cubits tall, of a golden yellow colour, his neck large, and that he shone like the sun,

^{*} Remusat, as quoted by Edkins, in Notices of Chinese Budhism.

[†] Foe, or Fuh, is the ordinary designation of Budha, in China.

and moon. He is capable of endless transformations. There is no place to which he cannot go; he can understand all things, and he greatly commiserates and delivers the multitude of living men." (Chinese Repository.)

The early history of Budhism in China was one of alternate reverses and successes. Now it was favoured by the reigning emperor, and then opposition was stirred up, especially by the Confucianists, and edicts were sent out against them. At first all the priests seem to have come from India, for we have no account of native Chinese being introduced into the priest-hood until A. D. 335.

The work of preparing translations of Budhist literature was early commenced. These sacred books having been found to have been erroneously translated in many instances, the work was performed over again in the fifth century. An Indian Budhist was appointed to a high office under the emperor, and eight hundred priests were called to assist; while the king himself, who was an ardent disciple of the new faith, was present at the conference, holding the old copies in his hand as the work of correction proceeded. More than three hundred volumes were thus prepared.

In order to facilitate the same work of fuller acquaintance with Budhist literature, Chinese pilgrims frequently found their way to India. The two most celebrated were Fa-hian, and Hiuen-tsang. The former returned to his native country, A. D. 414, after an absence of fifteen years. Fa-hian went by land, probably taking the usual route, which was to the North-west of the Tsung-ling mountains. In his work on Budhist countries, which has been translated by Remusat, he describes the flourishing condition of Budhism in the steppes of Tartary, among the Onighours, in Affghanistan, where the language and customs of Central India then prevailed. It was also prosperous on the upper course of the Indus, on either bank-"declining in the Punjab, and in a languid state, although existing, on the Jumna and the Ganges. In its most sacred seats-east of the Ganges, the birth-place of Sakya, and the scene of his early career, it had fallen into irreparable decay, and its monuments were crumbling into those

mounds of rubbish which are still found in Gorhack-pore and Tirhut, although a few columns then standing are still erect." In Ceylon he found Budhism triumphant. He stopped at Java* on his return by sea, and found Budhism unknown there; but it afterwards rose into prosperity. Fa-hian procured some copies of sacred books, which he translated and edited on his return. (See Notice of Remusat's Trans. in Chinese

Repository, vol. ix., p. 334-368.)

The next most celebrated Chinese Budhist who visited India was Hiuen-tsang, (his life and travels have been translated by M. Julien,) who set out on his journey A. D. 629. He also went by land, passing through the north-western extremity of China, westward to the region watered by the Oxus and Jaxartes, where the Turks were then settled.† Passing into India, he spent five years on the banks of the Ganges, studying the Sanscrit and reading Brahminical and Budhistic literature. During his stay, which was prolonged to sixteen years, he went south, and completed the tour of the Indian Peninsula. On his return to his native country, he took with him one hundred and fifteen grains of relics, taken from Budha's chair; two gold statues of Budha, three feet three inches in height, and others of silver and sandal wood. Besides these, he took with him six hundred and fifty-seven different works, borne on twentytwo horses. The Emperor Tae-Tsung, t who is praised by Gibbon as the Augustus of the East, was then on the throne, and received the traveller with the utmost distinction. At the command of the Emperor, he wrote a description of the western countries, through which he had passed. With the assistance of twelve monks he revised and translated many worksseven hundred and forty in all. Among them were three

^{*} With respect to Java, his words are, "Heretics and Brahmans are very numerous there; the law of Foe is there out of the question." Other sources of information show that Indian colonies went to Java, A. D. 76, and that Budhism began to spread in the second century. After Fa-hian's time, it became a centre of Budhist influence to other islands in the Indian Archipelago. It was about this period, A. D. 418, that Budhism was introduced into Japan. (See Prof. Salisbury's Mem., Vol. 1st., American Oriental Society, p. 117.)

[†] About this time, A. D. 643, a Byzantine emperor sent an embassy to China. † The same emperor received with equal favour the Syrian Christians, who arrived A. D. 639, only seven years before Hiuen-tsang's return.

works on logic, treatises on grammar, and a lexicon. The life and adventures of Hiuen-tsang have been made the basis of a novel, written apparently by a Tauist, who represents his "undertaking so distant and dangerous a journey to obtain the sacred books of Budhism, and by translating them into his native tongue, to promote the spread of that superstition among his countrymen, as the highest possible excellence at which the Budhist aims. The effort and the success that crowns it are identified with the aspiration of the Tauist after the elixir of immortality, the hermit's elevation to the state of Budha, and the translation of those whose hearts have been purified by meditation and retirement to the abodes of the genii." (Edkin's Notices of Budhism, p. 20.)

Not only did Chinese pilgrims pass to India, but great numbers of Indian Budhists came to China. At the beginning of the sixth century it was estimated that their number was upwards of three thousand. The persecutions to which the Budhists were exposed from the Brahmins, seem to have driven them beyond the Himalayas. This is the period usually assigned for the expulsion of the Budhists from India; but there are some facts respecting this intercourse between China and India, which would favour the supposition that it was not completely expelled from India until a later period. The history of the Sung dynasty mentions the arrival, A. D. 951, of a monk with a number of companions belonging to different families in western India. A little later, a Chinese priest returned from the western countries with relics and Sanscrit copies of Budhist works, written on palm-leaf, amounting to forty volumes. The next year, a hundred and fifty-seven Chinese priests set out, with the Emperor's permission, to visit India, and obtain Budhist books; but nothing is said of their journeyings beyond Cashmere. On one occasion, the son of a king of eastern India was a visitor. In 982, a priest of western China returned from India, with a letter from a king of that country to the Emperor, containing congratulations on the favour shown to Budhism in China. (Edkins.)

One of the most celebrated Indian Budhists who visited China, was Bodhidharma, the twenty-eighth of the Patriarchs. He seems to have been advanced in life when he left India. He left A. D. 526, and went to Canton by sea. On his arrival, he was immediately invited to Nanking, and received by the Emperor with the honour due to his age and character. The Emperor said to him, "From my accession to the throne, I have been incessantly building temples, transcribing sacred books, and admitting new monks to take the vows. How much merit may I be supposed to have accumulated?" The reply was, "None." The Emperor said, "and why no merit?" The Patriarch replied, "all this is but the insignificant effect of an imperfect cause, not complete in itself. It is the shadow that follows the substance, and is without real existence." The Emperor asked, "then what is true merit?" The Patriarch replied, "it consists in purity and enlightenment, depth and completeness, and in being wrapped in stillness and vacancy. Merit such as this cannot be sought by worldly means." The Emperor said, "which is the most important of the holy doctrines?" The Patriarch answered, "where all is emptiness, nothing can be called holy." The Emperor asked, "who is he that thus replies to me?" The Patriarch replied, "I do not know." The Emperor, says the Budhist narrator, still remained unenlightened, and no wonder. The answers of the Patriarch, however, are very much in accordance with the metaphysical ideas of primitive Budhism, which regarded everything objective as an illusion. The main idea of Bodhidharma was to bring men to see the importance of a contemplative life, and to this end he discouraged the use of books. He is the recognized founder of the Esoteric school of Budhism in China, of which more by and by.

Bodhidharma, not satisfied with the result of his interview with the Emperor, crossed the Yang-tsze, and took up his abode at Lo-Yang. Here, according to the narrative, he sat with his face to the wall for nine years, and hence was called by the people, "Wall-gazing Brahman." The Emperor sent messengers to invite him back, but they did not succeed in their errand. The Chinese Budhists, after witnessing the self-control and contemplative life of the Indian sage, seem to have been stimulated to great efforts to conquer the power of the external world. Thus, one who sought to imitate his example, says, "Formerly, for the sake of religion, men broke open

their bones, and extracted the marrow, took blood from their arms to give to the hungry, rolled their hair in the mud, or threw themselves down a precipice to feed a famishing tiger. What can I do?" Accordingly while snow was falling, he exposed himself to it, till it had risen above his knees, when the Patriarch observing him, asked, "what he hoped to gain by it?" The young aspirant to victory over self wept at the question and said, "I only desire that mercy may open a path to save the whole race of mankind." The Patriarch replied, that such an act, (that of standing in the snow,) was not worthy of comparison with the acts of the Budhas. It required very little virtue or resolution. His disciple, says the legend, stung with the answer, took a sharp knife, severed his arm and placed it before the Patriarch. The latter expressed his high approval of the deed, and afterwards appointed him to succeed him as Patriarch in China.*

Bodhidharma had five successors in office. The last in the list, in accordance with his request, did not appoint a successor. In the five petals, as he expressed it, the flower would be complete; he himself, the first of the six, being the stem on which the others grew. It is related of one of these patriarchs, that he was repeatedly invited to court by the second Emperor of the Tang dynasty, but always declined. When a messenger came the fourth time, and informed him that if he refused to go, he had orders to take his head back with him, the old man merely held out his head in token of his willingness to die. The Emperor respected his firmness, and spared his life. In keeping up esoteric doctrines or traditions, this kind of apostolical succession was necessary. The doctrines were handed down through a succession of teachers, each instructed personally by his predecessor, from the time of Bodhidharma,

^{*} Bodhidharma is said to have died of old age, after five attempts to poison him. One Sung Yün, who had been to India after Budhist books, came to inspect his remains. As he lay in his coffin, he held one shoe in his hand. Sung Yün asked him, "whither he was going." "To the western heavens," was the reply. Sung Yün then returned home: the coffin was afterwards opened and found empty, excepting that one of the Patriarch's shoes was lying there. By imperial command, this shoe was preserved as a sacred relic in the monastery. It was afterwards stolen, and now no one knows where it is. (Edkins.)

and so further up in the series to Sakyamuni himself, and the earlier Budhas. (*Edkins' Notes*, p. 12, 18, and 33.)

Budhism, which was introduced into China by imperial favour, was afterwards variously regarded by the reigning emperors. In the fifth century, one of the emperors of the Sung dynasty made it a capital crime to construct images of earth or brass, or even to worship them. The books and images were to be destroyed, and the priests put to death. His successor, however, reversed this order, and issued an edict permitting a Budhist temple to be erected in each city, and forty or fifty of the inhabitants to become priests. During the reign of this emperor, which lasted for thirty years, embassies from other countries came, congratulating him on the prosperity of Budhism in his dominions. One of these was from the king of Aratan, who describes his country as lying in the shadow of the Himalayas, whose snows fed the streams that watered it. He praises China as the most prosperous of countries, and its rulers as the benefactors and civilizers of the world. Another embassy was from Ceylon, in which it was said, "that though the two countries are distant three years' journey by sea and land, there are constant communications between them."

The sixth century, about the time of Bodhidharma's arrival in China, appears to have been a period of great prosperity. It was at this time that there were so many refugees from Brahminical persecution in India. The prince of the Wei kingdom, Northern China, spared no expense in providing maintenance for them in monasteries. The number of temples at this time is said to have been thirteen thousand. One of the predecessors of this king had erected an image of Budha more than fifty feet high. More than a hundred thousand pounds of brass were used in its construction, and seven hundred pounds of gold. Four years after its construction he resigned his throne to his son, and became a monk. This practice of becoming priests was followed by other Emperors at a later period. One of the most noted instances of this kind, was that of Liang-wu-ti, who at three different times assumed the Budhist vows, and his ministers had to pay a million of taels, (more than a million of dollars,) for his release. He finally died in a monastery at eighty-six years of age; his adopted

son, whom he had appointed to succeed him, not having furnished him with the proper food. It was early alleged by the Confucianists, that the dynasties which ruled over China had become shorter in their duration since Budhism had been introduced, and that although this Emperor continued so long on the throne, yet he finally died of starvation.

The third persecution against the Budhists was in the year 845; 4,600 monasteries were destroyed, and 40,000 smaller edifices, while more than 260,000 priests and nuns were compelled to return to common employments. This persecution was reversed by the succeeding Emperor, who, after a short time came into office, upon which the Confucian historian expresses his regret. The two previous persecutions, he says, had continued six or seven years, but this, only one or two. These three appear to be, if not the only, at least the more prominent persecutions in the history of Budhism in China. The Emperors generally contented themselves, if opposed to it, with inveighing against the system, and usually, when in favour of it, contented themselves with making offerings, and assisting in the erection of temples and pagodas.* Once or twice decrees were made that those who were to become priests should be examined in the Budhist classics, after the manner of the literati in the Confucian classics, but the practice seems never to have come into very general or long continued use.

Priests seldom held office under any of the Emperors. It occurred once under a mother of one of the Emperors, and

^{*} Pagodas in China had their origin in Budhism. They were intended, primarily, as depositories for the relics of Budha, in the same way with the topes of India, though they seem afterwards to have been erected from their supposed favourable influence on the surrounding country. Though not quite so frequent as represented in pictures of Chinese scenery, they are still frequent. There are said to be nine within thirty miles of Shanghai. At Joyang, in the Tsin dynasty, (A. D. 350) there were forty-two, from three to nine stories high. These pagodas belong mostly to an early age in the history of Budhism in China. The zeal which manifested itself in journeys to India, also expressed itself in gorgeous temples, and towering pagodas. Some of the early ones remain to the present time—one in the Chih-kiang province is said to be fifteen centuries old, and the age of the great majority of them is numbered by centuries. The zeal of Budhism, at the present time, seldom goes beyond repairing what their fathers built.

the historians animadvert upon it as one of the monstrosities

accompanying a female reign.

The only other point in the history of Budhism, which it is necessary to notice, is the controversy or antagonism between it and Confucianism. Between Budhists and Tauists there has been but little antagonism. In some points they have become so much blended that it is hard to draw the line of distinction. The attempt was made by more than one Emperor to amalgamate the two systems. And though unsuccessful, the idols of both are often found in the same temples. The Confucianists have usually made war equally on both, and yet with the inconsistency which necessarily belongs to a system lacking so much of the religious element, they generally, in times of sickness or trial, seek aid from what they ridicule and oppose. Few go so far in their opposition as to refuse the employment of priests at their funeral ceremonies. When a certain mandarin prohibited it, it was considered as something remarkable. The reason which he gave, in the words of another, was in the true spirit of practical atheism. It was, "that if there were no heaven, there was no need to seek it, and that if there were, good men would certainly go there. If there were no hell, there was no need to fear it, and if there were, bad men would go there." (Edkins, p. 29.)

The ground which the Confucianists took in their remonstrances against Budhism was, 1st. That it was a foreign religion. One of them says that Tauism, speaking as it did of mercy and moderation; and the original religion of China, of which the fundamental principles were benevolence and rectitude, were enough for China, and the Emperor ought not to follow any other. The seventh of the sacred commands of Kanghi is, "Degrade strange religions, in order to exalt the orthodox doctrines." A second ground of objection was the follies and superstitions connected with Budhism. In the year 819, on the occasion of a grand escort of a bone of Budha to the capital, the vice-president of the board of punishments presented a memorial on the subject to the Emperor, in the course of which he inquires in strong and bold language, "Why a decayed bone—the filthy remains of a man who died so long

before, should be introduced to the imperial residence?"*
They inveighed also against the monks as idlers, as unprofitable members of the commonwealth. One wished to have the monks and nuns turned out of the monasteries, and compelled to marry and raise up families. "The sum of the whole is, these dissolute priests of Budha are lazy; they will neither labour in the fields, nor traffic in the markets, and being without food and clothing, they set to work and invent means of deceiving people." Another, speaking of a festival, says, "The most of the worshippers are women, who like these worshipping days, because it gives them an opportunity to see and be seen in their fine clothes; and most of the men who go there, go to amuse themselves and look at the women."

Other objections rested more upon a doctrinal basis. As, for instance, it was objected that the priests showed a disregard to the principles of filial duty by leaving their parents. In the amplifications of the Sacred Edict, Budha himself is accused of this want of filial piety in leaving his father and mother. And as an inference from this it is asked, "If he regarded not his own father and mother, wife and children, are you such fools as to suppose that he regards the multitude of the living, or would deliver his laws and doctrines to you?" Some of these objections take an atheistic ground. In the eighth century a Confucian mandarin, in a remonstrance addressed to the emperor, says that the wise princes of antiquity secured prosperity by their good conduct, not by prayers and offerings. The emperor went to the other extreme, and when his territory was invaded, simply set his priests to chant their prayers, and it is said the barbarians retired. The Confucian commentator in

^{*} The superstitious follies of the priests were sometimes treated in a very practical way. On one occasion, a monk professed to the Emperor his willingness to be burnt, when the erection of a certain temple was completed. His desire was granted, and an officer sent to see that the temple was built, and the feat carried into execution. The pile was made, and the priest called on to come forward. He excused himself, but in vain. He looked around on the assembled crowd for some one to save him; among priests and people, none however offered to help the trembling victim of his own folly. The stern voice of the imperial messenger bade him ascend the pile. He still lingered, and was at length seized by the attendants, placed forcibly on the pile and burnt." (Edkins' Notices of Chinese Budhism.)

condemning the confidence placed in the prayers of the priests, remarks that to procure happiness, or prevent misery after death by prayers or any other means, is out of our power, and that the same is true of the present life.

In their controversies with the Budhists, the Confucianists seem at times to have denied the immortality of the soul, and of course a future state of rewards and punishments. Their idea was that virtue was to be performed for its own sake, and that its influence only extended to worldly honour and prosperity. Motives drawn from a future world were never brought to bear upon men's conduct here. To this the Budhist objected that motives drawn from a future world were necessary to lead men to virtue. "The countryman," he says, "is diligent in ploughing his land, because he expects a harvest." The doctrine of Sakya speaks of hell, and the people fear to sin; of heaven, and they all desire its happiness. It points to Nirvana as the spirit's final home.

There is no question but this filling up the gap in man's necessities as a religious being which Budhism attempted was one primary reason of its success in the land of Confucius. The sage regarded man merely in reference to his life here, and while his unsatisfied followers derided the follies and superstitions, and inveighed against Budhism as a foreign religion, its temples were crowded with worshippers, and its monasteries or pagodas not only appeared in every city, but graced every point of beauty on hill side, mountain top, quiet nook or valley, throughout the empire. The prevalence of the system may be understood from the fact that a census, taken by imperial command in the thirteenth century, gives the number of Budhist temples and monasteries as 42,318, while the priests or monks numbered 213,418.

Without entering further upon the details of the history of Budhism, we will notice briefly its more prominent peculiarities, and the principal schools into which it is divided.

One peculiarity common to northern Budhism is the adoption of the mythology of other systems or indigenous systems of belief. Southern Budhism appears much more strict; images of Budha alone (so far as we are informed,) being allowed in Budhist temples. But with northern Budhism there

has been a complete adoption of the older Hindoo mythology. together with a long list which the imagination, history and other sects have supplied. It was certainly a very cool assumption on the part of the Budhists which led them to make Budha not only superior to the deities worshipped by the Brahmans, but to represent these deities as waiting upon and listening to the discourses of the man Budha. Among them is Brahma himself. Shakra, or Indar, the chief of the Devas or gods, is also represented as one of his disciples. "In some Chinese temples their images are said to form a pair among the auditors of Sakyamuni." The Hindoo divinity which occupies the most prominence in Chinese Budhistical worship is Yama, or as he is known in China, Yan-lo, or the ruler of the dead. He is often represented in their temples surrounded by representations in alto relievo, setting forth the various modes of punishment and torture in the unseen world. The common people seem all to expect to meet him after death, and to be judged with the strictest impartiality. He is also supposed to fix the hour of each man's dissolution.

It is unnecessary to go into a detailed account of the different idols worshipped in China. Some of these are historical beings, others have been borrowed from the Tauists, whilst still another class are inventions of the imagination, created in some cases to teach a moral lesson, or to symbolize an idea. Of this latter class one of the most common is Kwan Yin, or goddess of mercy, who is represented under different forms. One of the common representations of Kwan Yin is that of a female figure, holding in her arms a child, which has often been compared to the Virgin Mary, holding in her arms the infant Saviour, whereas the idea intended is rather that of bestowing children on those who pray for posterity. (Edkins.)

The philosophic Budhists symbolize all this mythology and idolatry. They are mere signs of ideas. Thus the four fierce figures which stand two on each side of the entrance to a Budhist temple, represent protection, Budha intelligence, Kwan Yin mercy. When he bows before the image and makes offerings of incense, candles and gilt paper, this also is a symbol, and indicates the reverence with which he should receive the instructions of Budha.

The common people, however, look upon these idols as divinities, and pray to them as beings possessed of power to govern and control the world, as able to remove sickness and disease, and all the evils which flesh is heir to. Thus Budha himself, who is in no sense a god, who neither claimed any power or control over the universe, who rather ignored a god, and who in their earlier books is represented more as a teacher, as the wise and the good, who would lead mankind into the paths of Nirvana, who according to the strict interpretation of Nirvana is not, has come to be in the minds of most of his worshippers a powerful divinity. The founder of an atheistic system, and who according to that system has passed into annihilation, retains his hold on his followers, by a worship which shows his system to be a lie.

Budhism in its present manifestation in China is little else but gross and stupid idolatry. The Budhists are very fond of comparing their doctrines to the lotus,* and often plant them in ponds, in the vicinity of their temples; but the greenness and freshness of the flower has all passed away, and left nothing but the stagnant filth of the pond behind.

The priests have become as a class, weak, effeminate and lazy, having but little zeal for religion or cleanliness, and for the most part ignorant of their own system; except as they are called to pass through its outward forms of worship. Many of their most costly temples, on which have been spent in former days immense sums and imperial patronage, have been suffered to go to ruin.

Besides their prominent position as upholders of idolatry, the Budhists have made their main impression on the Chinese mind as defenders of a future state of existence. They differ, however, among themselves as to what this future state is. One of the more popular representations drops the idea of Nirvana entirely, and speaks of the western heavens, or the

^{*} One of the favourite books of Indian Budhism which has been translated into Chinese, is called the Lotus of the good law. Its name is thus explained by one of the commentators, "As the lotus grows out of mire and yet preserves its freshness and purity, so the doctrine of this book, the good law, assists men to retain their original nature unsullied, and undisturbed amidst the misery and corruption around them."

heaven of Amida Budha. The description of this is not as an abstraction, but as a place of green woods and bright skies, where summer and winter are unknown, and where the soil is of gold. Into this place of blissful pleasure the common people hope to be born from a lotus flower; and that their souls may pass safely over the bridge into these western heavens, the prayers of the priests are invoked, especially after death. Opposed to this region of happiness is not merely hell, over which the Hindoo God Yan-lo presides, but the whole six modes of existence, the 1st. of which is Heaven, or the abode of the Devas or gods. 2d. Earth or man. 3d. Demons or hobgoblins-ghosts. 4th. Hell. 5th. Wandering, hungry spirits. 6th. Animals. The first three of these are assigned to the good, the latter to the wicked, though the highest good is not to be subject to any of these transmigrations. For whoever comes into the circumference of this wheel, may go where it sinks into misery, as well as where it rises into comparative happiness. The only certain good, therefore, is to escape from its rounds.

Metempsychosis, or the idea of previous existence, which the Budhists adopted from the popular belief of the Hindoos, has become quite a prevalent belief among the Chinese. In accounting for misfortunes to which they may be subject, they are often referred to as punishments for sins in a former state of

existence.

The idea of morality, and what constitutes the essence of virtue, was more clearly set forth by the Confucianists than by the Budhists. The only respect in which the latter could claim any advantage was in the motives to the exercise of virtue which they claim should be drawn not merely from the present life, and the practice of virtue for its own sake, but also from a future state of existence. It is, however, to be taken into consideration, that if Budhism brought in the future as a motive to the exercise of virtue, it was of no great practical advantage, for the method in which future good was to be obtained was not, strictly speaking, by moral, but by meritorious actions, which consisted mainly in offerings, in saying of prayers, repeating over the name of Budha, and almsgiving.

The use of charms and the practice of magical arts has been

charged upon the Budhists by the Confucianists. And in the year A. D. 515, several priests were put to death for practising magical arts. There was a sect also among the Budhists, founded about A. D. 720, which had some secret doctrines, and professed to repeat charms with great effect. This kind of superstition was, however, more properly a characteristic of the Tauists.

It only remains to refer to the different schools of Chinese Budhists. The main division is into the Esoteric and Exoteric schools, though there are more or less important subdivisions of each. The Exoteric school is rather the main body of Chinese Budhists who worship Budha, as if he were a god; who believe in the fabulous stories and legends of Budhas, Bodhisatwas, &c.; who in fact are idolaters, and who generally give up the idea of Nirvana as an abstraction or annihilation, and substitute the material heaven of Amida Budha. This is popular Budhism in China. Budha is said to have foretold this period, that the true doctrine would be followed for five centuries after his death. After that, for a thousand years, a system of forms or image worship would prevail. This would subsequently give place to another called the "final system," which would terminate the present Kalpa.

Esoteric Budhism owes its origin in China to Bodhidharma, the famous patriarch who came from India in the sixth century. One of the main characteristics of this school is its discarding the use of books. A Chinese writer thus speaks of Budha and Bodhidharma. "The former taught great truths and the causes of things. He became the instructer of men and devas (gods.) He saved multitudes and spake the contents of more than five hundred works. Hence arose the Exoteric branch of the system, and it was believed to be the tradition of the words of Budha. Bodhidharma brought from the western heaven the seal of truth, and opened the fountain of contemplation in the east. He pointed directly to Budha's heart and nature, swept away the parasitic and alien growth of book instruction, and thus established the Esoteric branch of the system containing the tradition of the heart of Budha. Yet, he adds, the two branches while presenting of necessity a different aspect, form but one whole." In connection with this Esoteric branch or

school there were no secret doctrines. They protested against book knowledge or the performance of outward rites, and insisted upon greater attention to the cultivation of the heart. Outward rites have usually been considered not essential by the followers of this school. They may be necessary for the ignorant, but not for those who comprehend the deeper principles of the system. They do not worship the image themselves—an image only symbolizes an idea. With them religion is entirely a matter of the heart, or of the contemplative faculty, and therefore offerings are unnecessary. A man is to rise above the objects of sensation, and attempt to realize the state of Nirvana in this life. The outer world is to become obliterated. Abstraction is the highest state, and as a consequence the distinctions between virtue and vice occupy an inferior position. These distinctions belong to the imperfection of the present state. This was carrying out the idea of the unreality of the present which belonged to primitive Budhism. The Chinese Budhists, however, made more of the mind or heart. The mind itself is Budha (that is, intelligence). "To know, was all that was needful. To become Budha the mind only needs to be freed from every one of its affections, not to love or hate, rejoice or fear. To do or to aim at doing what is virtuous or vicious, is to leave the heart and go out into the visible, tangible world. Let the mind do nothing, observe nothing, aim at nothing, hold fast to nothing-that is Budha. Then there will be no difference between living in the world and entering Nirvana. Then human nature, the mind Budha and the doctrine he taught all become identical."* It will be seen that this view, so far as it recognizes a god at all, does it under a pantheistic form. Budha is the mind. There is nothing real but the mind, and the mind and god are identical. The finite and the infinite are one, and that an abstraction.

The followers of this contemplative school, although apparently not numerous, are in higher repute than the priests of the Exoteric system, especially by the Confucianists, who look with contempt upon the image worship of the multitude.

^{*} Edkins quotes the above from a little Chinese work published in the Tang dynasty.

We have thus gone over all that we proposed in the consideration of this system. The gigantic figure which has spread itself over Asia has long since passed the zenith of its power. The decrepitude of old age is upon it. It woke up for a time an energy and civilization which it had not the vitality to sustain. And now when, after a long and uninterrupted trial, the inherent weakness of a system of asceticism and works of merit is manifest, when it can no longer present the bold front and opposition which it once could, when the door of access to all Budhistic countries has been thrown wide open, may we not hope for the triumph of that righteousness which is by faith on the Son of God? The enemy may, and doubtless will, arouse himself; he may re-appear in another form through the influence of Romish zeal; but there the giant figure lies torpid and dying, his hold on his victims relaxed, and now let the only Saviour of the world be lifted up, and he will draw all men unto him.

ART. II.—Christologie des Alten Testamentes und Commentar über die Messianischen Weissagungen, von E. W. Hengsten-Berg Dr. u. Prof. der Theol. in Berlin. 3 Vols. 2d Edition. 1854–1857.

A CHRISTOLOGY of the Old Testament is an exhibition of its doctrine concerning Christ. The scale upon which such a work is projected will vary according to the author's conception of his task. In its widest range it will embrace a discussion of both types and Messianic predictions; or it may be so limited as to exclude the types and confine itself to the predictions of the Messiah; or it may be still further restricted to such predictions as have exclusive and undivided reference to Messiah's person and work.

Each of these methods of treatment has its advantages and adaptations to its own special end. The last and most restricted has the advantage in point of directness, brevity and impressiveness. The passages brought under discussion are

proportionally few, their reference undeniable, their meaning clear, their fulfilment beyond dispute. For the purposes of apologetics, or of elementary instruction, this is therefore to be preferred. Complicated questions are avoided, distracting matters of secondary moment are shut out, the main issue is distinctly presented and readily settled: Jesus of Nazareth is "he of whom Moses in the law and the prophets did write."

But he who aspires to a full acquaintance with the lively oracles must not stop here. The spirit of prophecy is in all its utterances the testimony of Jesus. All the prophets, as many as have spoken, have foretold of these days. In order to learn what holv men, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, were enabled to declare of the coming and power of the Lord Jesus, it is not sufficient to examine a few occasional passages of the plainer sort; but all which are in any wise related to the coming Saviour or his work, even though it be obscurely or indirectly, must be brought under review. Every ray of light adds to the gathered brilliancy of the focus, and it is astonishing what new illumination arises from simply bringing passages together. A key is found in one quarter which is needed for the unlocking of a difficulty in another; a suggestion here supplies a missing link there: this perplexed passage would be a hopeless labyrinth but for the happy circumstance that the clue is preserved elsewhere; and thus by patient investigation and comparison the prophetic doctrine of Christ may be elicited in its full extent. It is moreover to be observed that this extended study of the Messianic teaching of the prophets is an important aid to the safe and thorough prosecution even of the more limited method before referred to; for the understanding of individual passages must be both corrected and furthered by a knowledge of the general analogy of prophecy.

This is the task which Hengstenberg has undertaken in his Christology and Commentary on the Messianic Prophecies. Every prediction which bears any relation to the future Redeemer, or which sheds any light upon the conceptions formed of him, or the mode of representation employed respecting him, is examined and commented on sentence by sentence, and word by word. It is needless at this late day to speak of

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the ability with which this has been done. The work was immediately upon its appearance, admitted to the rank of a standard authority, not only in Germany, but in England and America. And most of the subsequent treatises upon the same subject, not excepting those of Roman Catholic writers, such as Bade and Reinke, have been little more than diluted reproductions of this. The second edition presents no change of plan, or material alteration of sentiment, from the first. The omission of the Messianic Psalms is due to the fact, that a fresh discussion of them was considered needless since the appearance of the author's commentary on the entire book. careful revision has made it a more adequate expression of Hengstenberg's latest and most mature views, and afforded an opportunity for introducing what might be thought necessary by way of defence against recent opponents. Minor corrections are to be found in almost every page, sometimes consisting in the modification, insertion, or omission of a single sentence, at others involving long paragraphs. The great body of it, however, is exactly reprinted from the first edition, original typographical errors even being occasionally retained; e. g. I. p. 392, last line בלרת: III. 2. p. 56, note guomoda, which are duly preserved in the American and English translations.

It is not our intention at present to inquire whether the interpretations and comments of Hengstenberg may not be susceptible of improvement in some of their subordinate details, but rather to present a few hints as to the relation of the general plan of this work to Christological science in its highest and most complete form, the direction in which further progress is to be expected and desired, and the extent to which it may be carried. It was remarked at the outset that Christology, in its largest sense, demands an investigation of the types, as well as the Messianic predictions of the Old Testament. It is only when these are brought together, and their combined force is properly estimated, that it can be seen how truly Christ was the centre and heart of the former economy, and how every line which it contained pointed forward to Him.

Types are in scholastic phrase real, as opposed to verbal prophecies; prophecies not in words, but in things, presented not to the ear, but to the eye; persons and things, acts and relations, which prefigure those to come. That such types exist in the Old Testament is universally admitted by believers in its divine origin; and in fact certain of them are so clearly evidenced in themselves, and so explicitly sustained by inspired authority, that they force themselves upon the most reluctant vision. Who can, with the book of Psalms before him, deny the typical character of David? Or who can read the Epistle to the Hebrews, and not admit that there are types among the Levitical institutions? But when we ask after the number of these types, and the extent of their signification, there is the greatest possible diversity in the answers given. The ancient allegorists crowd the Old Testament with types of the most arbitrary and fanciful description; every imagined resemblance, however casual or constrained, is held to constitute a typical relation, irrespective of the essential meaning of things, and heedless not only of correct principles, but of any principle whatever. The same course has been pursued, though not to equal lengths, by some professed expounders of the types in modern times.

Reacting from these palpable incongruities, and seeking a fixed and evident rule to guide them, through all the intricacies of the subject, others have laid down the maxim, that nothing but an express divine statement, in every instance, affirming the fact, can be a sufficient warrant for assuming the existence of a type. Thus, Bishop Marsh in his eighteenth Lecture: "The only possible means of knowing that two distant, though similar historic facts were so connected in the general scheme of Divine Providence, that the one was designed to prefigure the other, is the authority of that word in which the scheme of Divine Providence is unfolded. Destitute of that authority, we may confound a resemblance subsequently observed, with a resemblance pre-ordained; we may mistake a comparison, founded on a mere accidental parity of circumstances for a comparison founded on a necessary and inherent connection. There is no other rule, therefore, by which we can distinguish a real from a pretended type, than that of Scripture itself. There are no other possible means by which we can know that a previous design and pre-ordained connection existed. Whatever persons or things, therefore, recorded in the Old Testament, were expressly declared by Christ, or by his apostles, to have been designed as prefigurations of persons or things relating to the New Testament, such persons or things so recorded in the former are types of the persons or things with which they are compared in the latter. But if we assert that a person or thing was designed to prefigure another person or thing, where no such prefiguration has been declared by divine authority, we make an assertion for which we neither have nor can have the slightest foundation."

Nothing could be more welcome, certainly, than such an inspired exposition of all the types of the Old Testament, as Bishop Marsh here supposes. If the conversation of our Lord after his resurrection, with the two disciples on their way to Emmaus, had been preserved in full, in which, beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them, in all the scriptures, the things concerning himself, it would have been of inestimable value. But in what part of the sacred writings is there such a professed enumeration of all the types, as to warrant any one in saying, that none others but those so declared are to be admitted to have existed? So far from this, the allusions to them, wherever made, are seemingly of the most incidental and casual description. They are introduced in the exigencies of an argument, or for the sake of an illustration, and in such a way as to leave the impression that individual specimens only are selected from a mass of others which might with equal propriety have been similarly used, had the occasion called for their employment. And when these incidental allusions are culled out and brought together, they appear to form no connected and self-contained system, no intelligible reason can be given why just these particular cases should have been constituted types, and no others. recognition avowedly rests upon the mere force of an authoritative statement of fact: their existence is fruitful of no further consequences than as so many additional exhibitions of divine foreknowledge, and the entire subject thus loses its interest and importance. It is moreover assumed without proof, that the divine intention in this matter can be exhibited in no other way than by the express statements of his word, and these repeated in every individual case. For if the purpose

of God can be made known in other ways; if it can be disclosed by the event, revealed in general statements, under which particular cases may find their place, or inferred from analogous instances where it is expressly declared, then the entire argument based upon the contrary supposition falls to the ground; and it is as unreasonable to admit no types of Christ, for which the direct warrant of explicit scriptural statements cannot be brought, as it would be to admit no predictions of Christ which are not explicitly affirmed in the New Testament to have been fulfilled in him.

The rigid rule of Bishop Marsh must for these reasons be relaxed, so as to admit implicit as well as explicit types, those which may on sufficient grounds be inferred, as well as those which are expressly declared. The important question now arises, what grounds are to be held sufficient for the admission of types, and how extensively are they to be found in the Old Testament? There are three general considerations which appear to cover all that is most important upon this point, and these conspire to the same result. 1. There can be no safer guide in the interpretation of the sacred volume, than that which inspiration affords. The principles upon which the evangelists, apostles, and our Lord himself explain and apply the Old Testament must undoubtedly be the correct principles. The methods which they employ in the determination of what are to be esteemed types, are beyond controversy the proper methods. If now, from an induction of the various types recognized and expounded in the New Testament, these divinely sanctioned principles and methods can be developed in such a definite and practicable form, as to be applied to all other cases, the inspired warrant of such a procedure is as real as if conveyed by explicit statement, in every individual instance. This examination will disclose at the outset, that the New Testament recognizes two classes of types as existing in the Old, which may be respectively denominated legal and historical. The former are found in objects or institutions, which owe their being to divine enactment, e. q. the paschal lamb, declared by two apostles to be a type of Christ, 1 Cor. v. 7; John xix. 36; comp. Ex. xii. 46; the high-priest, the tabernacle and its services, Heb. viii. 1-5. The latter are found in objects or events

belonging to the sacred history, and which are brought into being under the control of God's gracious providence, e. q. Isaac, Gal. iv. 22, etc.; Solomon, Heb. i. 5; the veil upon the face of Moses, 2 Cor. iv. 13, etc.; the Exodus, Matt. ii. 15, comp. Hos. xi. 1, and the flood, 1 Peter iii. 20, 21. Now if, as we have already seen, we may not stop short with the individual cases thus directly mentioned, neither may we be content with a mechanical application of the analogies thence deduced to a few individual cases beyond, but without expecting or finding any system, and screening ourselves from all inquiry as to the reasonableness of the proceeding, behind the bare authoritative statement of inspiration. If the inspired interpretations alluded to are not mere sovereign dicta, but are based upon real and ascertainable principles, these should be investigated, discovered and applied. These principles must have been very far reaching. The applications unhesitatingly made of Old Testament objects, and of passages relating to them, to the objects of the New Testament are so numerous, of such a character, and have so much the appearance of instances selected at random, that they can hardly be explained upon any other hypothesis, than that every thing in the Old Testament is in some sense typical; that its legislation and its history, its ceremonial institutions, its persons and its events have not only their own intrinsic, historical or legal value as facts, persons, or institutions pertaining to the time then present, but in addition possess prophetic bearings, and stand in a distinct and intelligible relation to things which were to come after; that the entire connected scheme with all its individual parts, points forward to the new dispensation, and may be properly and without violence to its true, original, divinely ordained intent. regarded as foreshadowing what belongs to it.

2. The result thus reached by induction is further confirmed by the general statements of the inspired writers. The law comprising the ceremonial institutions, and by consequence involving the entire economy to which it indissolubly belonged is declared, Heb. x. 1, to have contained a shadow of good things to come; Gal. iii. 24, to have been a schoolmaster to bring unto Christ; Gal. iv. 1-5, to have been a system of tutors and governors, under which the infant church was in training

with reference to her majority. The same thing is with similar explicitness asserted of the history of the Old Testament. After reciting a number of occurrences in the wilderness, the apostle adds, 1 Cor. x. 11: Now all these things happened unto them for ensamples, τύποι, types as it is in the margin of the English version. And in another place, having applied to Christ a passage from the typical experience of David, he adds, Rom. xv. 4: For whatsoever things were written aforetime, were written for our learning. These various statements which simply embody in didactic form the current tenor of New Testament representation, certainly teach that the Old Testament was not only a preliminary, but a preparatory dispensation. It was a scheme of training devised and conducted by God, with constant and direct reference to the gospel, which he purposed thus to introduce. Of this training there are two co-ordinate lines, one conducted by the Spirit of God as the revealer of his will, and the other by his providence as the executive of that will, both shaping their way to a common end. Each of these lines embraces two constituents closely intertwined. The line of preparation under the conduct of the Spirit of God, embraces revelations made through the organs and representatives of God, and acts prescribed to be performed by men, or by their representatives on their behalf, that is to say, the prophetic word and the Levitical ritual. The providential line of preparation embraces events accomplished by the immediate agency of God, such as the mighty works which wrought Israel's deliverance from Egypt, which at Sinai made them the Lord's people, at Jordan and Jericho put them in possession of the promised land; and events wrought by the agency of men, still, however, under God's direction and control; or more briefly, miracles and the free acts of men. Under the four heads of the inspired word of God, the divinely appointed ritual, the agency of God, and the agency of man, may be summed up everything which belongs to the Old Testament. These are the several constituent portions of this grand scheme of preparation for the coming of the Son of God, and the economy to be introduced by him, and to each is allotted its appropriate function in the work. Each, therefore, contemplates the future, is framed with reference to

the future, points forward to the future, owes its peculiar form and character to the nature of that future, for which it is designed to serve as a preparation. They must each, from the very purpose which they are intended to accomplish, be predictive at least in so far as the beginnings of a plan give promise of the execution of the remainder, and the fig-tree putting forth leaves foretells the approach of summer.

We here interrupt our argument for a moment to remark that these four branches of the scheme of God answer with unerring precision the end of their ordination: the only particulars in which a disturbing element can by possibility find place are those in which the free agency of man is allowed to enter as a prominent factor. In regard to the revelations and the direct acts of God, or the prophecies and the miracles of the Old Testament, not the slightest deduction can be made from the perfection with which they perform their allotted work of preparation, and with which they consequently point forward to the good things in reserve. The same is true of the ritual as prescribed of God; as actually performed by man, its predictive character was often marred by neglect of its requirements in whole or in part, or by mingling heathen and uncommanded observances. These human excrescences, where they exist, are contrary to the spirit of the economy upon which they have fastened themselves; they partake not, therefore, of its predictive character. Aaron, the high-priest, offering sacrifice to God, and Solomon building God's temple, are predictive; but Aaron casting the golden calf, and Solomon rearing high places to the abominations of the heathen, are not. And so with the sacred history. Where the free acts of men follow the ordinance of God, they carry forward the work of preparation for Christ's coming, and are predictive of it. When they forsake his ordinances, they violate the fundamental law under which the old economy was established, forsake its spirit, run counter to its entire tendency, and the predictive character is obliterated and lost. It is the bud which grows from the life of the tree, is fed by its sap, and forms its genuine development, not the unsightly excrescence which, though joined to it, is not of it, which is prophetic of the flowers and the fruit. Moses interceding for the transgressing people points forward

to the Redeemer and his work, but not Moses speaking unadvisedly with his lips; so Samson delivering Israel from the Philistines, but not Samson in the arms of Delilah; the theocratic reigns of Hezekiah and Josiah, but not the anti-theocratic reigns of Ahaz and Manasseh.

Omitting for the present the consideration of the first of the four constituents into which we have resolved the old economy, viz., the inspired word, with its prophecies of Christ, we resume the proof from the premises now before us, that the remaining three, the ritual, the supernatural events, and the human actions of the Old Testament are, with the limitations just insisted upon, in the strict and ordinary sense of the term, typical of the new dispensation. A type is a prophetic similitude. The prophetic feature has already been established: it has been shown that they do point forward to the good things of the future, and give indication both of their coming and character. If now this prophetic feature exhibits itself in the form of a similitude to future things or events, then their typical character is settled. This is distinctly asserted of the ritual, which is declared Heb. x. 1, to have had a shadow of good things to come, but not the very image of the things, i. e. not the objects of the gospel in their absolute and perfect form, but a representation or outline of them. That it is not, however, confined to the ritual, but characterizes the Old Testament throughout, will appear from considering the nature of that preparation for the gospel which it was the plan of God to accomplish by means of it. In order to its being properly understood and embraced on its ultimate appearance, the great truths upon which it is based must first be exhibited to men and lodged in their minds and hearts. It was to this end that Israel was selected to be put in training, and made a theatre for the unfolding of the plan of grace. The great truths of salvation one day to be propounded to the world were taught to them, and by means of them to others in lower and rudimental forms, exhibited in symbols, woven into their history, and made a constituent of the very life of the nation. Spiritual and heavenly things were thus brought down to human capacity by material and earthly representations, and their laws and workings made familiar through the medium of forms which might be endlessly

varied, and with which they were in constant contact. It is thus that a teacher would prepare his pupil to apprehend an abstract or spiritual idea, by repeated exhibitions of concrete or material forms in which it was involved. The deliverance of man from everlasting ruin was foreshadowed by a long series of deliverances wrought for Israel, throughout their history, from external foes. These taught essentially the lessons involved in the former of the grace and power of God, the helplessness of man, the warrant and the necessity of faith. There is, in fact, a double series of such deliverances running through the Old Testament, one consisting of those which are wrought, like that from Egypt, by God's mighty hand and outstretched arm; the other composed of such as marked the period of the Judges, wrought by the hands of men raised up and commissioned for the purpose. The two series converge at that point where Christ, who was at once God and man, became our Redeemer. Preparatory to the coming of the great high-priest a temporary priesthood was established, to perform the offices of mediation and atonement, that men might be familiarized with these great functions, and taught their meaning and necessity. So the prophetic office in Israel was to prepare the way for the reception of the great Prophet; and the kingly office for the reception of the true King of Israel. The altar of sacrifice taught that without shedding of blood there was no remission. The material temple taught that God was dwelling in the midst of his people. The temporal sanctions of the theocracy displayed the same rectitude of the divine administration which shall distribute the awards of eternity. The sufferings of God's children from the malignity of wicked men prepared the mind for the sufferings of God's dear Son from the same source. The humiliation and oppression of Israel, appointed of God to achieve a glorious task, is cognate with the humiliation of God's greater Servant charged with the same mission. The entire history of Israel is thus quickened and pervaded by religious truths. These are made to enter into their perpetual daily experience. They are engrafted, in the most striking manifestations, upon the great epochs of their national existence. They are with the most impressive solemnity exhibited in sacred symbols at the national

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capital. And these truths thus presented to the Israelite at every turn are the same that were afterwards to be brought out in their higher spiritual applications in the Gospel of Christ.

This is precisely what is intended by the assertion that the Old Testament is full of types of Christ, and the coming dispensation. Everything in the former economy which really belongs to it and shares its spirit, takes part in the work of preparation for that which was to come; and this preparation is conducted by means of perpetual exhibitions and inculcations. in lower and temporary forms of the truths realized in the gospel. The same relations are maintained; they are only transferred to a different sphere. The old economy was so constructed, as to be in every part the shadow of the gospel substance, the type of its ever-enduring realities. It is not necessary that the Israelites should have known these things to be types, nor that they should have had a conception of what they prefigured. They accomplished their end when Israel learned the lessons they conveyed. The future application to be made of those lessons was already in the mind of the great Teacher, who would disclose it at the proper time; the pupil did not need to know it sooner. The awakening of a conscious anticipation of the future in the minds of the people is the function of prophecies, not of types.

3. In addition to what may be inferred from the practice of the writers of the New Testament, and their general statements upon this subject, a third consideration warranting the same conclusion, is the resemblance, which in actual fact holds between objects belonging to the two dispensations. A proper exhibition of this point would require a detailed presentation of these analogies, which we have not now the space to make. A few have been already hinted at. There is, however, the less need of such an exhibition, as the existence of the resemblance is confessed. Even Bishop Marsh does not dispute it; he only apprehends that "a resemblance subsequently observed" may be confounded with a "resemblance preordained," and hence refuses to admit a type until its preordination shall first be settled by express divine statement. But does not the existence of a pervading system of analogies, found not in what is external and contingent merely, but resting upon and embodying the same essential truths, show that we are dealing with what is not fortuitous, but designed? And whose design can it possibly have been, but that of God? Merely accidental resemblance, it is true, does not prove a type; casual or fancied points of comparison may mean nothing; but in the general unity of plan which marks the two dispensations, the reproduction of individual objects in their main essential features, is presumptive evidence that this was designed of God, unless the contrary can in any individual case be shown.

If now there is this extensive system of types in the Old Testament, it is plain that a discussion of them necessarily belongs to a complete Christology. And whatever advantages may attend the separate treatment of the Messianic prophecies, as in this work of Hengstenberg, or of the types, as in the Typology of Fairbairn, both must be combined, if the aim is to furnish a connected survey of all that the Old Testament contains of Christ. Such a combination must bring out the part allotted to each in the divine plan, and the relation which they sustain to each other. Hofmann, whose chief merit consists in having drawn increased attention to the fact that such a relation exists, although he utterly failed in his attempt to point out its true nature, actually undertook to sustain the paradox that there is nothing prophetic except types; that the prophecies predict nothing directly and in the strict sense; they merely detect, infallibly, those germs or premonitions of the future which exist in contemporaneous types; and that consequently the prophecies of any period disclosed just so much of the future as is indicated by the types of that period, and no more. His attempt to establish this in detail, leads to perpetual forcing of the plain sense of the prophecies, and emptying them of their evident meaning, in order to reduce them to the level required by his theory. See a statement of his views in the Biblical Repertory, for April 1858. This depreciation of the prophecies for the sake of exalting the types really nullifies itself; for unless the evidence is afforded by the prophecies of a plan laid by one who knows the end from the beginning, the ground for believing in the existence of types is insecure. Messianic prophecies are, without doubt, the main

and guiding element in Christology. Types occupy an humble and less conspicuous place. They are, besides, more obscure and difficult, and must borrow light from contemporaneous prophecies rather than impart it. They are, however, too important to be left untouched. The premonitions of the coming dispensation, afforded in the providence of God, belong to one scheme of preparation with that conducted by his Spirit, in the sure word of prophecy. They go along together, hand in hand, with growing fulness as the old economy advances. In what respects they supplement each other, how their harmony is preserved in the midst of diversity, to what extent they are conditioned by each other in form or contents, and what is the sum of their respective revelations, are questions which fall

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within the legitimate province of Christology.

If, however, a writer upon this subject restricts himself as Hengstenberg has done, to the Messianic prophecies, two methods may be adopted in their treatment. He may simply select the various passages predictive of Christ, subject them to a careful analysis, and elicit their meaning. Or he may go a step farther, and in addition seek to gather these all up into a common unity, inquiring into the characteristics of the Messianic predictions communicated through each of the different prophets, their mutual relations, and the relation in which the Messianic predictions of each prophet stand to the body of his own particular ministry; and exhibiting in connected form the grand resultant of the whole, that figure of the Messiah and the dispensation he was to introduce, beheld alike by all the ancient seers, though variously viewed and seen from different sides. The first of these methods collects the materials; the second, in addition, systematizes them. The second is the more complete, and is the result towards which investigations in this field must tend, if the subject is to receive a thorough, not to say exhaustive, treatment, and to put on a properly scientific form. The first, however, is an indispensable pre-requisite. The system, if it is to be of any value, if it is to be better than a mere fancy, must be preceded by a diligent and careful collection and examination of the appropriate facts; and the more untrammelled the collector is, or unbiassed by antecedent theories, the better. It is the first of these methods which Heng-

stenberg has pursued in the volumes before us. He does the part of collection and examination. He passes in review the various prophecies of Christ, and developes their meaning with that learning, ability, clearness and evangelical soundness, which have made him the prince of German commentators. But he has attempted nothing beyond: and the reader has at least this satisfaction in consequence, that the results of the author are independent of any system to be built up or any theory to be established. So far was he in his first edition from attempting to exhibit the Messianic revelations in their true order and connection, that his arrangement of the prophets seems to have been determined wholly by considerations of convenience, and not to rest upon any discernible principle. Isaiah is put at the head of the prophets; then follow Zechariah, Daniel, the remaining minor prophets, Jeremiah and Ezekiel. In the present edition he has improved upon his former plan by arranging the prophets in their chronological order, showing by a general survey of the ministries of several of them that their Messianic predictions were not isolated utterances, standing apart from all the rest of the communications which they were inspired to make, and giving an occasional conspectus of all the Messianic revelations of an individual prophet. But what he has done in this direction, while it supplies a more convenient disposition of the facts, and facilitates a review of them, does not accomplish their scientific distribution, or their reduction to a system in which their position is defined, and their mutual relations determined.

That such a system does exist, however, which it is the province of Christology to trace out and exhibit, may be inferred antecedently from the universal fact that there is a plan and order in everything that God does. Infinite wisdom invariably pursues a method and adapts means to ends, and this in a manner worthy of the eternal mind. Human science, in its various departments, simply uncovers the plan of God, and it attains its truth and its perfection only as it approximates the exact exhibition of that plan. And especially in a scheme devised for the training of men through successive ages with reference to the advent of the Son of God and the introduction of his great salvation, we must expect that he who appointed

to the winds their weight, and to the waters their measure. would adjust everything with the nicest precision, and that all would betray the most admirable contrivance and the greatest appropriateness to the contemplated end. God's ways, it must indeed be remembered, are not as our ways; and he who approaches their investigation with his mind made up in advance as to the plan and method which they must contain, will be sure to substitute a human for the divine conception. But avoiding the presumption of prescribing a plan for God, it will be safe to begin the study of his proceedings with the belief that he has a plan, and reverently to examine them with a view to its discovery. The prophecies, forming as they do part of a great system of teaching, we may be sure, were not communicated at random, but with that method and proportion which, in the view of the Most High, were best adapted to promote that training which was to be accomplished by them. every period of the history of Israel those instructions were imparted to them which were appropriate to their existing necessities, and were best suited to carry forward the work of preparation to its destined end. And as Christ's coming was the end of all, we would expect that the revelations concerning him would be the soul of every prophetic ministry; that the peculiar features of the former would determine what is most characteristic in the latter; and consequently that the Messianic predictions of the several prophets, instead of being loosely connected with their other revelations of the future, would be most firmly fastened in the texture of the whole, being that indeed for which all the rest exist, and from their relation to which they derive their chief value, the centre from which all beside radiate, the base on which they rest, the principle and spring by which they are controlled. And while the extremities, so to speak, of a prophet's ministry, his subordinate and inferior revelations may be influenced to some extent by accidental causes, the heart of that ministry, its Messianic prophecies, must be shaped by what lies back of and above all these. Hence the true classification of the prophets and the real purport of their ministries, considered on the whole, and with reference to the plan of God, is to be sought in what they reveal of Christ, and what preparation they make for his coming.

It is no reason for closing our eyes upon the evidences of such a plan, that rationalists have sought to pervert them to the ends of unbelief, by confounding the gradual unfoldings of the Divine purpose of mercy through Christ, with the growth of a merely human idea, and its constant adaptation, in its form and the extent of its presentation, to the necessities and the condition of the people, with anticipations, longings, and vague conjectures, awakened in human hearts by the course of events. The Divine approves itself as such by the truth of its disclosures, and the exactness of their fulfilment. An idea, which after being inculcated with growing clearness for centuries, meets such a realization as that of the Messiah found in Christ, must be born of God. And the whole nature of the doctrine concerning the Redeemer, as of the religion to which it belongs, from which men were perpetually relapsing, and to which they needed to be ever afresh recalled by supernatural agencies brought to bear upon them, proves itself from heaven, and as far removed from the offspring of man's natural heart, as light from darkness, or holiness from sin. No apprehension need be entertained, therefore, of playing into the hands of unbelief by searching that out, which can only add to the convincing evidence of the presence and control of God. A plan wrought out through long ages, and in which men are the unconscious instruments, can be referred to no other than the Supreme directing mind.

Nor need it be apprehended that any constraint will thus be laid upon the Divine sovereignty. God reveals freely and at his own pleasure, what and when he will. But the actings of infinite wisdom need not be capricious or unwise, in order to be free. God's doings cannot be constrained into some petty channel hewn by man, but they flow majestically onward in the bed created by himself. It is not for man to say prior to observation, that God must have disclosed the particulars in his plan of mercy, after just such a fashion, or in just such an order. But when we see how he has chosen to reveal them, we may assert without hesitation, that there is a Divine fitness in his methods. We may not presume to understand all the reasons which lay in the eternal mind, nor explain in all their details, the workings of his plan which we behold, but we shall

undoubtedly find enough to repay attentive study, and give us new impressions of his wonder-working skill.

The anticipations awakened by the considerations already presented, are fully borne out by the facts of the case. Without pretending to a full delineation of the plan upon which the Messianic predictions of the Old Testament are constructed, we shall merely allude to a few obvious features of their arrangement, in proof that such a plan exists.

The growing fulness and clearness of the prophecies of Christ cannot fail to strike the most superficial observer. They begin with the comprehensive, but vague promise, which immediately succeeded the fall. They are continued until the character of the Redeemer, the nature of his work, and the marks for his identification, are drawn with such distinctness and precision, that there can be no mistake nor doubt in

applying them.

The Messianic predictions of the Old Testament may be divided into two great periods, viz. that which precedes, and that which follows the settlement of Israel in Canaan. The first of these was preliminary to the second, which furnished the more direct preparation for the coming of Christ. The immediate ends of the first period were twofold; the creation and segregation of a people of God, and the placing them in circumstances adapted to the training which they were to receive. The book of Genesis records what was done to compass the first of these ends; the remaining books of the Pentateuch, (of which Joshua may be regarded as the complement,) record the accomplishment of the second. The Messianic promises of the Pentateuch arrange themselves in precise conformity with this design of the entire history. Those of Genesis are individual, directed to particular patriarchs, the progenitors and representatives of the future nation of Israel; and these revelations keep pace with the various stages of the history, and serve to mark its several epochs. The great epochs of the patriarchal history are the fall, the flood, the call of Abraham, and the descent into Egypt; and with each of these is coupled one distinct promise of its own, made respectively to Adam, to Noah, to Abraham, and to Judah. Adam trembling before his judge, in expectation of

immediate death, received the simple promise of salvation; the tempter and his machinations shall be crushed by the seed of the woman. This promised victory over the serpent, however, was so far from being immediately gained, that the descendants of the woman fell almost universally under his power, and the earth was swept by a flood, one faithful family only being spared, as a fresh beginning of the human race. It was then that Noah, inspired to forecast the destiny of his sons, spoke of Jehovah as the God of Shem and Japhet, in his enlargement dwelling in his tents. The hope of salvation thus revived afresh, seemed doomed to a new disappointment, when Japhet in his expansion abandoned the worship of Jehovah, and even the descendants of Shem were almost wholly given over to idolatry. The utter extinction of the hope of the world, which such a state of things appeared to threaten, was prevented, however, by the selection of Abraham to be the head of a chosen race to be taken into covenant with God, and put in possession of a land where their training might be conducted. The promise of salvation was accordingly renewed to him, and adapted to these new conditions; he shall have a numerous seed, be put in possession of the land of Canaan, and in his seed all nations of the earth shall be blessed. This was confirmed, but neither enlarged nor altered in its various repetitions to Abraham himself, to Isaac and to Jacob. But the promised enlargement of the seed had scarcely begun before circumstances, which they could not control, seemed to threaten once more the frustration of the expected blessing. They were obliged to leave the land of their father's sojournings, the land of their own anticipated inheritance, and go down into Egypt. And lest they might apprehend that the possession of Canaan, and the consequent preparation for a blessing through them upon all nations was thus forfeited, the promise was once more renewed in the most emphatic manner to all the sons of Jacob, that they would come into the possession of Canaan; and to Judah, that out of his seed Shiloh would spring, the prince of a peaceful abundance to receive the obedience of the nations.

Thus ends the patriarchal period, and the record of its training for the coming salvation. The promise was repeated as

often as the emergency demanded, and in a form adapted each time to the exigencies of the case. The terms of the earliest promises, the seed of the woman, the blessing upon Shem, and the seed of Abraham also, left it doubtful whether it was from the body of their descendants, or an individual of their race that the salvation was to arise. It was not until the process of expansion into a nation was actually beginning, that more precise instruction was needed upon this point, and in the promise of Shiloh, to arise out of the tribe of Judah it was afforded.

After the decease of the patriarchs, Israel swelled into a numerous nation. In compliance with his promises to their forefathers, God broke the bondage of Egypt, and led them forth to Canaan. But as might have been confidently anticipated, the end of all was not lost sight of in the prosecution of the means. The individual promises of Genesis are now succeeded by national promises concerning the salvation to arise out of Israel, and the person who was destined to effect it. The first is implied in the ritual, by which the covenant relation of the people to God was scaled and perpetuated, as that is presented in the books of Exodus and Leviticus. It taught the necessity of mediation, atonement, and purification, in order to communion with God. But as this communion and God's consequent favour and blessing were already pledged to them and to the world, they were thus assured that these essential pre-requisites, of which the form was now given, would be provided in their substantial reality. The types by which this is taught belong not to the providential types of history, but were communicated directly by the Spirit of God. They thus fall under the same category with his revealed word, and may therefore not inappropriately be classed among the direct Mes. sianic promises. In the book of Numbers, Israel is brought into conflict with the heathen Midianites, and a heathen seer is obliged to foretell, Num. xxiv. 17, the rising of a star out of Jacob, and a sceptre out of Israel, to destroy all their foes. It is the promise of the theocratic kingdom culminating in the Messiah. A further prediction is given in the book of Deuteronomy. Moses was giving his last instructions, and the people must anticipate his departure. But they are assured, Deut.

xviii. 15, that they would not then be dependent on the miserably deceptive occult arts practised by the heathen. God would raise them up a prophet like unto Moses, unto whom they should hearken. It is the promise of the prophetic order

culminating in the Messiah.

The people, thus assured of the mediation, atonement and purification, needed to perfect their covenant intercourse with God, of the coming king who would secure them against, and destroy all their foes, and of the prophet who would instruct them in all that they yet needed to know of the will of God. were located in Canaan, and their recently received divine constitution was set in operation. We thus reach the second period of Messianic prediction, the period of more direct training for the advent of the Saviour. This, like the foregoing preliminary period, is accomplished in two series of promises, respectively linked with individual and national experience. The individual experiences employed as means of instruction regarding the coming Saviour, culminate in the life of David; and the inspired lessons combined with them, or wrought out of them, are mostly written in the Psalms. The national experiences improved to the same end, culminate in the period of Assyrio-Babylonish oppression; and the lessons engrafted upon this period are written in the books of the Prophets. David was led through a varied experience, adapted to serve as a basis for instruction concerning the future Messiah, and which was employed for this end. He passed through a period of severe trials, rose to royal sway, and was made the head of a new dynasty. Each of these particulars furnished a link of connection with the great Redeemer, which inspired Psalmists were enabled to detect and to develope. The persecuted righteous, Psalms xvi., xxii., xl., xli., lxix., theocratic kings, Psalms ii. cx., the seed of David, 2 Sam. vii. 12-16, Psalms lxxii., lxxxix., culminate in him, find in him their ultimate ideal. The people were taught by the Psalmist to rise from these characters placed before their eyes to the true conception of the Messiah, by a method which may be likened to that which theology employs in arriving at a conception of the divine perfections, from the qualities of man, elevated, purified and freed from all defects and imperfections. The universal relations of man are

in two Psalms idealized in the same way that the particular experience of David is in those just referred to; man as the creature of God, Psalm viii., and as a party to the marriage relation, Psalm xlv. The true idea of man shall be realized in the Messiah, as that of marriage shall be realized in Messiah.

siah's relation to his people.

The sins of Israel at a later period, and the judgments with which they were visited, led to a fresh series of national experiences, from which occasion was taken to teach new lessons of the person and character of the Messiah, and of the dispensation he was to introduce. At each stage of the painful process of discipline through which they were carried, the sins and distresses of the present were made to exhibit the need of intervention by the great Deliverer, and to set forth by contrast the blessings he would introduce. The chosen people were rent into two hostile kingdoms. One had openly deserted the sanctuary of God, and established idolatry as the national worship. other was far gone in corruption, and alternated in successive reigns, according to the character of its princes, between the worship of idols and of Jehovah. To save Israel from an utter apostasy which would have frustrated the design of their selection as the covenant people—to check the corruption of the mass, and save the holy seed from extinction-it was necessary to employ those severe but salutary measures of which they had long ago been forewarned by Moses. The corrupt portion of the people must be cut off and removed, and the pious remnant themselves purified by a period of trial-must be freed from their deadening influence. It was for this purpose that the Assyrio-Babylonish empire was raised up. Assyria first overwhelmed Israel, and threatened Judah. As the latter did not take warning, but, in spite of temporary reformations, still declined from bad to worse, Babylon completed the work by overthrowing Judah, and carrying the better portion of the people into captivity, leaving the remainder to perish in the siege and in the miseries that succeeded. The exiles were subjected to a seventy years' discipline, at the close of which a fresh sifting was instituted, and the better portion once more selected and brought back to be the nucleus of the restored theocracy. The fourfold division of the prophets thus created

has been remarked upon a former occasion—(see Art. on Hosea, Bib. Rep. Jan. 1859); according as they preceded the Assyrian invasion in Israel or Judah, preceded the Babylonish invasion, laboured in the exile or after the return. It was their faithful ministries, conjoined with these great events of Providence, interpreting and applying them, which wrought the marked change produced upon the people by this means. The form of instruction needed was different in each of the periods just indicated, according to its particular exigencies. To each were supplied its own appropriate lessons; and at the base of all these lessons the prophets placed Messiah and his work. It is not incidentally and occasionally that they speak of him, and in the midst of other things to which greater prominence is given; but the Messianic times form the back-ground of every prophetic picture, whether the fore-ground be light or dark. Every experience of the people is made to illustrate, by contrast or comparison, the future Hope of Israel.

To the present corruption of the people they oppose the time when Jerusalem and its inhabitants shall be holy; to the sinfulness of the princes, and their impotence before their foes, that King who shall reign in righteousness, and be a covert from the storm; to the humiliation and oppression of Zion, her future triumph and glory; to the disastrous schism of Judah and Israel, the period of their complete re-union. When Judah were in apprehension from Syria, Isaiah reassures them by the promise of the birth of Immanuel. As a pledge of deliverance from Assyria, he points to the child that is born, and the son that is given, whose name is Wonderful. In the foresight of Judah's captivity, he shows how the great Head of his people must likewise pass through sorrow and humiliation to his glorious reward. Jeremiah predicts the loss of the ark, but speaks of the time when it would be no longer missed from the new effulgence of the Divine manifestations; the approaching temporary interruption of the royal and sacerdotal offices gives him occasion to speak of Him in whom they would be perpetual. When the temple lay in ruins, and Canaan was forsaken of its former inhabitants, Ezekiel sets forth the Messianic period under the image of the temple rebuilt on a larger scale than before, its services restored, and the land once more apportioned among the tribes. When the predicted seventy years had brought about the period of the expected restoration, Daniel foretells that seventy weeks shall intervene before the advent of the great Restorer. He sees the future succession of human empires, and this gives occasion to predict that all shall be ultimately swallowed up in the empire of Christ. The meanness of the structure reared by the exiles, as compared with Solomon's more splendid temple, leads to the promise, by the mouth of Haggai, that this house should be filled with the Divine glory in a higher sense than that which had preceded it.

And thus it is universally: whatever the immediate occasion of any prophecy may be, it is improved to give some lesson concerning Christ. Each prophet is thus led to survey the character or work of the Redeemer from his own particular point of view as furnished by the circumstances in which his ministry is exercised. We can thus see why one is commissioned to disclose certain features of the Messiah distinct from those revealed to another. We can see how these supplement and complete each other; and while each is peculiarly fitted to make its own distinct impression adapted to the special end of its communication, the whole combined makes up that total of prophetic instruction, which the Spirit of God saw fit to impart prior to Messiah's advent.

A minor blemish of this second edition of the Christology as compared with the first, upon which we may spend a few words in closing, is that Hengstenberg has taken occasion to introduce into it his pet fancy about significant numbers. This idea which he first applied extensively to the structure of the individual Psalms, then to the book of Revelation, and then to the Song of Solomon, is now fastened to the prophecies. In some of the most important of them he finds or imagines the words and verses carefully counted into conformity with this newly devised standard. Thus of the great prediction of Messiah's vicarious sufferings, Isaiah lii. 13; liii. 12, he says that the first three verses are introductory, the last two form the conclusion, which added make five, the signature of the incomplete. The body of the prophecy shows its completeness by consisting

of ten verses. This is divided into seven verses relating to the humiliation and suffering, and three relating to the exaltation of the servant of the Lord. The seven is, as usual, divided into four and three. Three verses contain an exposition of his sufferings, and four of their cause, his representative character.

The objections to this, and to all that he says besides of the same import are, 1. Its trifling character; it is a petty business for the sacred writers to be everywhere arranging their sentences and words with a view to the exhibition of these significant numbers, especially in such a detailed and recondite manner as is here assumed, and when no imaginable end of utility or beauty is answered by it. 2. The proof adduced is to the last degree precarious and insecure. In exhibiting the structure of the Psalms particularly, he makes every number a symbolical number. Three is the signature of the blessing, four of the earth, five of incompleteness, six is a double three, seven is the signature of the covenant, eight is a double four, nine a triple three, ten the signature of completeness, eleven is half the number of the alphabet, twelve the number of the tribes of Israel, and the multiples of any of these numbers have the same significance with the numbers themselves. With such an array of significant numbers to be used upon occasion where could he fail to find them, particularly as the liberty was taken of lopping off one or two verses from the beginning or end, as the introduction or conclusion? 3. These numbers may just as readily be applied to any other composition as to the Scriptures. Hengstenberg's own books are as full of them as the inspired writings of the Hebrews. If his own methods are worth anything, his Christology is pervaded by a constant regard to them, not in its words and sentences alone, but in its lines and letters. Thus the title page of the first volume of the Christology is divided into three parts by parallel lines, to indicate, no doubt, that the work was to appear in three volumes. It is besides manifestly governed by the number ten, the symbol of completeness. The number of words to the first period is ten; the number of lines above the first horizontal stroke is ten; the number of words, including the year of publication, beneath the same stroke is ten; the number of lines

beneath this stroke is five, marking the volume therein described as the incomplete part of the complete whole, whose title is given in the ten lines above. Other numbers also appear, though less prominently, upon the same page, chiefly twelve, the number of the tribes; and seven, the signature of the covenant; to signify that this complete work has relation to the truth of the covenant made with the twelve tribes. The very first word, which is that by which the work is most generally known, contains twelve letters. So does the name of the author; to this two initials have been prefixed, manifestly for the sake of making the number fourteen, which is twice seven. That this was from design is the more apparent when it is observed that the letters in the name of the publisher are also twice seven. The ten lines above the first horizontal stroke are divided by a period into seven and three. Between the first stroke and the second are four words, beneath the second are three lines; adding these we have once more seven. We do not think it necessary to pursue the investigation into the succeeding pages, but they who are disposed to make further discoveries for themselves, can scarcely count in vain. If any one were to suggest that some of these numbers may be due to the printer, rather than to the author, we answer that Hengstenberg has relieved us of that difficulty, by holding the sacred writers responsible for the Masoretic verses, with which they had far less to do than a modern author with the typographical arrangements of his printer. And now, if any portion of the sacred writings, whose words and verses have been so pompously counted off, can be shown to possess greater evidence of artificial or numerical structure, than the page just examined, we will admit that there may be something in it.

ART. III.—The Atonement in its relations to Law and Moral Government; by the Rev. Albert Barnes. Parry and McMillan: Philadelphia, 1858.

This book, as the author states, is the result of his best efforts to meet difficulties on the great doctrine of the Atonement—difficulties which have occurred to himself, and much perplexed him; and it has been published with the laudable desire of relieving other minds beset with like embarrassments. It is a book on law, written by one who had, in early life, intended to enter the legal profession, and is dedicated to a lawyer of high repute.

The class of persons who are supposed to encounter the difficulties which it is the design of the book to remove, are presumed to be conversant with law, and of a philosophic or sceptical turn of mind. The claims of this class to the standing of philosophers may be more readily estimated, after a consideration of their reputed difficulties.

It seems strange that the author should have felt himself under any obligation to apologize for dealing so much in law, as if he were travelling beyond his profession, in attempting the discussion of legal principles. His special object demanded the examination of legal principles, and his theme, if rightly apprehended, is a matter of law from beginning to end. Of such importance is the apprehension of this truth, that the man who has failed to discover it, has failed to discover the Gospel. That this book is chargeable with this tremendous oversight, notwithstanding its title-page, will appear in the sequel.

The plan of the book is, for the author's purpose, a very judicious one. In the first place, we are presented with certain difficulties which are said to embarrass philosophic minds in the investigation of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement. These difficulties are followed by a statement of the objects which an atonement is intended to secure. Then, in as many consecutive chapters, the author argues the probability, necessity, and nature of the Atonement. Having thus determined what the Atonement ought to be, he proceeds to confirm his own independent conclusions from the Bible. This, with a

chapter on the extent of the Atonement, comprising an argument conducted on the same principle, (of first determining what the Scriptures ought to teach, if they are to be received by men, and then citing a few apparently confirmatory passages in support of the sentence of Reason), concludes the whole.

As the principle stated in the last sentence is a fundamental one with the author-one which has given direction to all his investigations in connection with the great theme of this book, and has manifestly ruled and determined his mind in all the conclusions herein recorded, it must be a matter of primary interest to ascertain whether this principle be valid. question to be determined is simply this: Are we able, independently of Revelation, to determine what a revelation must reveal and teach? This brings up the well known and very important question: What is the province of Reason in matters of faith? It would prevent a great deal of confusion in the consideration of this question, if those who discuss it were to observe the distinction between a judge and the law which guides and governs him in his decisions. The potentia cognoscens must be distinguished from the norma judicandi. The confounding of these two things usually leads to the exaltation of the lamp of human reason--the light of nature, into a standard whereby the word of God is to be tested, and approved or condemned. It is one thing to approach the sacred volume with an apprehending power in order to learn; another, and a very different thing, to draw near with an independent revelation of our own, in order to judge of the matter that volume contains. It is one thing to ascertain the sense of a given proposition as laid down in the Holy Scriptures; another, to judge of the truth of that proposition, and to pass sentence upon it, in accordance with an outside and independent standard. He who approaches the word of life for the latter purpose must be sadly lacking in that grace of humility which is one of the leading traits in the character of those who have received Christ as their Prophet.

It is true that right reason hath, even in matters of faith, a judicium contradictionis; and if any deliverance purporting to be a message from God, were found to contain a contradiction of an already authenticated communication, whether

that communication have come through the medium of nature, or of Revelation, the reputed message were to be rejected. But this is a different doctrine from that which would have us receive the word of God upon the ground of its agreement with our own views. What is this latter, but an attempt to establish our faith, not in the power of God, but in the wisdom of man?

The principle, therefore, is wrong. It is wrong first to determine what God is, and then to come to the Bible to confirm our doctrine. What are we-creatures who have opened our eyes upon the teeming wonders of a wondrous universe, some thirty, or three-score years ago, and have spent the greater part of this period in correcting errors into which we have been continually falling-what are we, that we should attempt to solve, on principles of law, as received by men, the central mystery of redemption, only drawing on the Bible in support of our foregone conclusions? It may be right and wise to speak to them that know law in legal phrase, and to discuss with such the principles of law may be eminently judicious; but if in the doing of this right and laudable thing, we introduce principles determining the very nature of the Atonement, and draw upon Scripture merely for confirmation, we assume an attitude towards the word of God, which must be exceedingly offensive to its Author.

As already charged, this principle has controlled the author of this book from the beginning to the end of his work. This is no mere inference, though it were a most warrantable one, from the spirit and method of the entire discussion. It is an avowed principle. (See pages 320, 321, &c., and the author's work on Slavery and the Church, pages 37, 186.) Indeed, the proof may be found in almost any page of the present volume. Whether he is reasoning with lawyers, or discussing with theologians, the most important points connected with this subject, he invariably settles the whole matter, by an appeal to reason—as a judge and rule—confirming only occasionally by a reference to Scripture.

From the fundamental and determining principle of the book, we proceed to notice some of the reputed difficulties which philosophic minds are said to encounter in the investigation of the Scripture doctrine of the Atonement. The first of these is given in the form of a presumptive objection, against the doctrine of pardon through the substituted sufferings of the innocent for the guilty. In human governments, it is alleged, no such arrangements are adopted-none such would be allowed. Pardon is extended only where there is danger of severity-where the trial may not have been fair-where there are some mitigating considerations, either in the character of the individual, or in some circumstance connected with the commission of the offence. Where such reasons are not found, pardon is never granted among men-where such reasons do

not exist, the offender languishes in prison, or dies.

Thus it is with men; and therefore—Therefore what? What, we ask, must be the conclusion of a philosophic mind as to the Divine administration? Why simply this, that God would never pardon one whom he had found guilty. The very circumstances under which, as stated by this philosopher, human governments never extend mercy, are, without an exception and in perfection, found wherever God judges and condemns. As a philosopher, then, such ought to be his conclusion. But such it is not. When he comes to speak of the Divinc Government, he introduces a new principle, viz: that God can extend pardon where it ought to be extended, without bias, or danger either of error or of evil. This may pass with some men for philosophy; but it appears to us, that from the analogy in question the conclusion of a truly philosophic mind would have been exactly the reverse of the dictum here so quietly and complacently assumed. Human governments, we are told, never pardon except "where the law in its operations is too severe"-" where there are mitigating circumstances in the case, of which the law in its regular operations cannot take cognizance," or "where the offender manifests such a spirit of penitence, that the interests of justice will not suffer by his release." Now as there can be no error in judging where God is judge, and no severity in the operation of a righteous law administered by a righteous Sovereign, and consequently no mitigating circumstances in any case where that law has been broken and that Sovereign offended, and as tears of penitence (if such could be found) are not the balm for injured justice,

how could a philosopher come to any other conclusion than that God would never pardon sin? How, in view of these unquestionable truths, could he ever glide into the persuasion that there are cases where pardon should and ought to be extended? The idea is an unphilosophic assumption, unwarranted by the premises. A fair comparison of the two administrations, the human and the Divine, would have shut up this reputed philosopher to the dreadful alternative of eternal wrath. Had he not been kindly furnished with a new principle in the second member of the comparison, he might have seen that where an omniscient and righteous Judge, administering a law which is holy, and just, and good, pronounces a man guilty, pardon, so far as human reason can discover, is for ever impossible. Blessed be God there is pardon—pardon for the chief of sinners; but the scheme by which it is secured, and in which it hath been disclosed, is one which human wisdom in its highest efforts has never conceived—one which exhibits the manifold wisdom of God. The glad tidings that God can be just, and yet the justifier of the ungodly, have come to our ears, not from the lips of earth's philosophers, but from the lips of men inspired by the Holy Ghost.

The principle which forms the very kernel of the second chapter, viz: that there has everywhere been a deep-seated conviction, that pardon should in certain cases be extended to the guilty—a principle which the author of this book adopts, and applies to the case of the sinner and the Divine administration, is a most dangerous one. It will be seen that it is but the echo of the first presumptive objection, as it is, indeed, the all-pervading idea of the book. The impression produced on the mind of any careful reader must be this: that if the Divine government would avoid the appearance of harshness and severity, sin must be pardoned, and the Atonement is the expedient by which, with a due regard to the interests of the universe, this can be done. This is the sum and substance, the beginning, middle, and end of the whole matter.

Now if this principle be true—if it be true that pardon ought in certain cases to be extended to the guilty, we would like to know how in such cases salvation can be ascribed to the good pleasure of God, or to the exceeding riches of his

grace. Such cases would certainly seem not to be included in those specified by the apostle, Ephes. i. and ii., for he refers the predestination, election, and actual redemption of all concerned, to the good pleasure of the will of God, and assigns, as the ultimate end, the manifestation of His own glorious grace. But if justice could not be exercised against the guilty, without reflecting upon the Divine administration, representing it as "harsh, tyrannical, severe," where was there any room for good pleasure or choice? How, we ask, could a scheme, to which the Divine government was compelled, in order to avoid the appearance of cruelty, ever be to the praise of the glory of God's grace? Such a scheme might reflect honour upon those high intelligences whose moral sentiments, expressed or entertained, compelled the adoption of it; but one hymn of praise it could never evoke, either from the subjects of Redemption, or the angel hosts who rejoice before the throne. In fact, the doctrine is so subversive of the whole economy of grace, and so derogatory to the Divine character, that it is painful either to read or review it.

On all these preliminary objections of reputed philosophers, we would remark once for all, that the fundamental assumption of them is false. They assume that the Atonement is a perfectly plain, common-sense transaction; that there is no mystery about it-nothing that has not its parallel in the principles of human jurisprudence and the administration of human law. Hence we have a chapter on the embarrassment felt among men through lack of an Atonement, and a correlative one on the probabilities of some such arrangement being made. These chapters warrant the conclusion that among other things, the design of the book is to smooth down the gospel, and make it so plain and philosophical, that there shall remain nothing of mystery about it-nothing too high for reason-nothing requiring faith; and thus to commend, on the ground of its entire comprehensibility, an economy before whose impenetrable mysteries the great apostle of the Gentiles stood in reverent awe, and cried, "O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!" And what is this but to degrade the mystery

of all mysteries—the mystery of the obedience, and sufferings, and death of the incarnate God, to the level of the every day transactions of the erring administrators of human affairs? If men can see that the principles of the whole economy are embodied in the science of human jurisprudence, where, we ask, is the marvel of redemption? If this be true, what reason is there for representing a ransomed church, as the great mirror in which angels and principalities shall see reflected the manifold wisdom of God? If the nature and bearings of the central work of the whole economy may be determined a priori, from principles of human law, what need was there that angels should stoop down from their own habitations to look into these things?

To satisfy our readers that this is no unfair representation of the spirit and tendency of the book, one quotation, we are persuaded, will be more than sufficient. In the chapter on the embarrassments experienced for lack of some such arrangement as an atonement, a case of forgery, which occurred in England in the last century, is cited as an illustration. Dr. Dodd, a subject of high standing and excellent name, had, in an evil hour, used, without authority, the name of the Earl of Chesterfield on a bill. The fraud was detected. There was no question of his guilt. Such, however, was the sympathy of the public toward the man, and such his conduct, both before and after the commission of the offence, that every possible effort was made to save him. The paper itself, which was indispensable to his conviction, was purposely put within his reach, but through some strange infatuation he neglected to destroy it. "A petition for his pardon, drawn up by Dr. Johnson, and with his name at the head, received at once no less .than thirty thousand signatures, and all the warm feelings of the sovereign himself prompted him to clemency. The benevolent feelings of a large part of the British nation would have been gratified with his pardon. But on the other hand, there was the explicit judgment of the law. There was the aggravated character of the offence—an offence tending to destroy all confidence in a commercial community." "The law was suffered, therefore, to take its course. The offender died, and the world approved the stern decision of the sovereign."

And this is the case that is to illustrate the necessity of an atonement, or some such device! What are we to think of the philosophy, or the theology of an author who could cite this case to illustrate the necessity of the Atonement? According to our author's philosophy, an atonement was the very thing required to relieve both the government and the nation, in this embarrassing juncture. But is this a philosophic, or reasonable view of the case? Why, it must be manifest, almost to a child, that the whole embarrassment arose from the injustice of the penalty then attached to the crime of forgery. And it must be equally manifest that the thing required was not an atonement, but an adjustment of the penalty. If Dr. Dodd had been sentenced to imprisonment instead of death, there had been no such manifestation of sympathy. It was the glaring disproportion between the offence committed and the penalty to be endured, that thrilled the national heart and stirred up the merciful to the rescue. But where this disproportion is not found, where the penalty is the rightcous award of the transgression, whether the case occur on the footstool, and under the magistracy of man, or in Heaven among the first-born subjects of the Sovereign Jehovah, the judgment and punishment of the transgressor can never be regarded by any right-minded intelligence, as "harsh, tyrannical, or severe." Where a sentence is just, it cannot be unjust to inflict it.

But there is something worse than bad philosophy in this case of forgery: it is brim full of the worst ingredients of a corrupt theology. What! the case of a forger overburdened with an unrighteous penalty, set in comparison with that of a transgressor of God's law, visited with the sentence of a law which is holy, and just, and good, and that by the Judge of all the earth! Are we to infer from the harshness of the government of George III. in putting Dr. Dodd to death for forgery, a similar harshness on the part of the righteous Jehovah, in putting the sons of Adam to death for rebellion against his own august Majesty? Ah no; let God be just, though all the sons of men be tyrants. We believe that the judgment of God is according to truth against them which commit such things; and that judgment is, "the soul that sinneth, it shall die."

And what is true of this case, is true of all others that are or can be cited on this behalf. There can be no case found among the sons of men, or in the history of law and government, to furnish a true parallel to the case of the sinner, as he stands related to an offended God, administering a broken law. What would be wrong, or harsh, or cruel in a finite, erring man, sitting in judgment on a fellow-man, can never, with the sanction of sound reason, much less of Scripture, be set up as a standard whereby to measure the righteousness or severity of God. If it could be shown that human law is infallible in the wisdom of its enactments, that the penalty annexed is always the righteous measure of the offence, that those who administer it are omniscient and unswerving in their moral rectitude, and that the sentence is ever in accordance with the law and facts of the case, and then, that, after all, the government felt embarrassed for lack of an atonement, there might be some ground for such analogical reasonings as those which make up this book. On such a firm basis a man might found, with all the independence of Scripture which characterizes our author, and with some show of plausibility, a system of theology emerging from an Atonement, measured and determined in all its essentials, and in all its relations and objects, by the great principles of human law. From such premises on the human side, a man of a philosophic mind might argue out the necessity and probability of an Atonement on the Divine. But what are we to say either of the philosophy, or the theology which draws such an inference from the imagined wants of a government, where law is fallible and penalty often unjust? Why, the fact is, when we come to run these principles to their legitimate and avowed conclusions, we begin to tremble before the blaze of that wisdom and justice they would so irreverently tarnish, and so presumptuously impugn.

We pass now to the theology of the fourth chapter; a chapter on the objects to be secured by an Atonement. These objects as enumerated by our author are as follows: The maintenance of the authority of law; the securing of the object contemplated by the penalty; the insuring of the reformation of the offenders in whose behalf it is made; the protection of the interests of the community against evils which might arise from the

pardon of the guilty; and the guarding of the government from disparagement in the eyes of the world.

On this enumeration, we would remark that it is singularly defective, and defective on the great essential point of all. If carried out and applied, as it is, to the Atonement, it represents God as determined, in the providing of Redemption, by considerations drawn exclusively from without, and from the finite. There is not in the whole enumeration, nor is there in the whole compass of the book, a single intimation of the satisfaction of Divine justice being included among the objects of the Atonement! The only thing that wears the least semblance of an acknowledgment of this all-important truth, is the reference which the Atonement is said to have to law and penalty. But even this semblance vanishes when the author comes to state the relation between the Divine law and the Divine nature. On page 80, after raising the question why the thing that is commanded is right, and why the thing that is prohibited is wrong, he lays down three theories, viz. that which refers it to the will of the lawgiver, that which refers it to the nature of things, and that which refers it to the bearing of the thing commanded or prohibited upon the happiness of the creature. Which of these theories exhibits the true foundation of the distinction between right and wrong, our author does not undertake to determine, but merely adds, with characteristic unsatisfactoriness, that "it is a question which has never been so determined as to demand the assent of all men!" What a reason for declining a candid avowal of his own doctrine, on a question which lies at the very foundation of virtue! Is there, after all, nothing fixed and certain, even in morals, but those principles and maxims which have commanded the assent of all men? If this be true, the sooner the Bible is laid aside, and a congress of the kindreds and tribes of this world assembled to determine upon a universal creed, the better.

Our author, however, might as well have stated in plain terms what his views on this question are, for in saying that "a difference of opinion on these points does not affect his position," he has disclaimed the doctrine that the law of God is a transcript of the Divine nature, as forming any part of his system, and thus has indirectly denied that there is anything in the nature of God requiring the punishment of sin. That this is his doctrine on this subject, will be still more manifest as his theory of the Atonement unrolls.

We are, therefore, justified in affirming, that this book does not include among the objects to be secured by the Atonement, the satisfaction of Divine justice, and in representing it as a scheme which exhibits God as determined throughout by the interests of the universe. That such a system can never be reconciled with the word of God, ought to be patent to every reader of the Bible. That word uniformly represents God as acting with reference to himself, and for his own glory; nor can there be a single passage pointed out, in which he is said to have been determined by the interests, or sentiments, or "finer feelings" of his creatures. And what is this but to make the glory of God the chief end for which all things were created? and what is this would-be philosophy, but an attempt to subordinate God himself to the universe, which his own power and wisdom have brought into existence, and continues to sustain? It is true that the best interests of his creatures are secured by that administration, which hath for its final end his own glory; but to elevate these interests into the determining cause of all that God has done, or will do, yea, or can do, in the economy of redemption, is to reduce the I AM, the Alpha and the Omega, of whom, and through whom, and to whom, are all things, to a state of vassalage to the universe!

The fact is, the doctrine which underlies this whole theory of the Atonement is subversive of theism altogether. A being determined by considerations outside of himself cannot be God. It is essential to the very nature of God that he be independent and omniscient; but with these attributes a determination ab extra is utterly and for ever irreconcilable. What an amount of bad philosophy and worse theology would the church be saved, were men to get their minds thoroughly imbued with the answer given in our Shorter Catechism to the question, "What is God?" "God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." Were theologians to learn this first truth, and couple with it that noble utterance with which the Catechism opens, viz. "Man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy

him for ever," they would never be found framing theories which would strip God of his justice, and set the universe above the throne of their Creator. What is true of man's end and man's happiness, is true of the end and blessedness of all the moral intelligences which God has created; and it is true of man that it is only in the advancement of the glory of God that he can have any true enjoyment. Nor is this to humble either man or angel. God is himself the highest end for which even He could act. As he could swear by no greater, so he can work for no greater. Can we conceive of God as stooping to a lower than the highest end? And if his own glory be an end becoming the forth-putting of the might and wisdom of God himself, surely he may well claim, for the advancement of that glory, the highest service of the highest seraph! Ah! there are none of the enraptured hosts who stand with veiled vision before the blaze of that glory in the temple above, who would regard it a bondage to be employed in advancing it. What child of God is there upon the footstool, who does not look upon that service as the source of the sweetest enjoyment, and look forward to the beholding of that glory as the richest reward? What then, are we to think of a theory of the Atonement, a theory of the redemption work accomplished by the Son of God, which leaves all this out of view-a theory which makes all the objects of the Atonement terminate upon something outside of, and therefore beneath God? It cannot be the theory of the Bible, for the Bible expressly teaches that the glory of God was the end of the whole emprise. Such, however, is the doctrine of this book; and this fact is sufficient to stamp it as another gospel.

But besides this defect in the objective reference of the Atonement, the book is defective on another point, which we must regard as a vital one. Is it not a singular fact, that a work on the Atonement should leave out of view the obedience of Christ? Is it not still more glaringly singular, that a work professing to exhibit the Atonement in its relations to law, should be chargeable with such an omission? This charge we do prefer against this book. It ignores, both by its silence and by its principles, the part which the obedience of Christ has achieved in the great work of Atonement!

Now law, as all men who know law teach, embraces two elements, precept and penalty. Indeed, our author has gone further than this, and exhibited the penalty as the mere adjunct. In conformity with these elements of law, there are two things required from those who will satisfy it, viz: obedience and suffering, the latter, of course, only where the law has been broken. If then the precept or rule, as our author teaches, be the main thing in law, one would expect that obedience ought to be the main thing in an Atonement. How comes it then, that the Atonement described in this book is destitute of this essential element? How comes it, that the thing required by that which, in our author's estimation, is the sum and substance of law, is not to be found in his system? Here is evidently a departure from what his own premises would have driven a logician to, as it is a departure from the faith of Christendom. Let any man take up the confessions and catechisms of the churches of the Reformation, or the works of such men as Turretine, Calvin, or Owen, and mark the prominence given to the obedience of Christ in the work of redemption, and we are fully persuaded he will conclude that the theology of this book is not the theology of the Reformation. The key to this exclusion of Christ's obedience from any share in the Atonement is to be found in the author's aversion to the doctrine of imputation. If it had been admitted that Christ was made under the law, that he might redeem them that were under the law, and that his obedience had anything to do with making the many righteous, it might have become too manifest, that whilst living under the law, there was a righteousness wrought out, available as the judicial ground of the justification of his people, and which might therefore be imputed. But as our author denies the existence of any such righteousness, and the possibility of imputing it, even if it did exist, it behoved him to keep it in abeyance, or merge it in the notion of a service done to the universe.

And as there is nothing in this Atonement to meet the claims of the precept, so there is nothing to meet the demands ofth e penalty. As there is no legal obedience, so there is no penal suffering. Having stripped the poor sinner of the only robe that could cover his nakedness, the author proceeds

to remove from the lintel and door-posts of the house in which he has taken refuge, the sacrificial blood which alone can avert the sword of the destroying angel. He speaks, it is true, of sufferings; yea, of sufferings unto death; but of what avail are these, if not inflicted in satisfaction of law, and by the hand of justice? The reasonings employed against the doctrine, that Christ bore the penalty due to our sins in his own body on the tree, are enough to produce the most painful impression on the mind of any one, who has trusted in those very sufferings, as his shield against the wrath of a righteous judge. They are, in the main, the very arguments of Socinus, and would, if carried out, lead to the adoption of the entire Socinian system, with regard both to Christ's work and person.

His first objection—for it is no argument—against the doctrine that the sufferings of Christ were penal, is that it would imply on Christ's part the experience of remorse-an objection which has been echoing from Socinian to Remonstrant, and from Remonstrant back to Socinian, from the days of Socinus, up to the hour in which it received a fresh repetition in this book. And after all, what is it worth? Why it obviously rests on two false assumptions; 1. That remorse is a necessary part of the penalty. 2. That imputation implies a transfer of moral character. If the former be true, how comes it that children are visited with penal suffering. Here is surely penal suffering, but where is the remorse? It is not remorse, but death, that is the penalty denounced against sin. "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." "The wages of sin is death." "They which commit such things are worthy of death." Remorse may be a part of the woe of the lost, but what has this to do with the doctrine that Christ's sufferings were penal? Is it logical to argue from the mental emotions connected with the infliction of the penalty on one who has actually transgressed, and is morally corrupt, to what must be the experiences of a sustitute who has never sinned, and who is holy, harmless, and undefiled? As already stated, this reasoning must be propped up with the assumption, that imputation implies a transfer of moral character; and without this prop it is utterly insupportable. That such an assumption is false, is so obvious that there is no need

of refuting it. Would the imputation of the debt of Onesimus to Paul have been attended with an experience of the regrets of Onesimus for contracting it? Did the sons and daughters of Achan, who were put to death for Achan's sin, undergo the same mental anguish as their father, who had coveted and hidden the silver, and the wedge of gold, and the Babylonish garment? These cases settle the whole controversy. Those who hold that imputation implies a transfer of moral character, must prove that these are not cases in point, or they must acknowledge that their boasted principle is false. But to prove that these are not cases in point, is simply impossible, for they embrace the fundamental principle of imputation. That principle is, that what personally, and in law, belongs to one, is made the judicial ground of dealing with another. Paul recognized this principle, when by his letter he bound himself, and that in law if Philemon had chosen, for the debts of Onesimus. Joshua and Israel, or rather Jehovah, (for the whole transaction was by the order and counsel of the Lord,) recognized it, when Achan's family were stoned to death, and burned with fire, for Achan's sin. And if this was not the principle on which the Amalek of Saul's day suffered for the sin committed by the Amalek who lay in wait for Israel when he came up out of Egypt, four hundred years before, we would like to be told what interpretation we are to put upon the following language. "Thus saith the Lord of hosts, I remember that which Amalek did to Israel, how he laid wait for him in the way, when he came up out of Egypt. Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." No righteous exegesis can ever eliminate from this passage the fundamental principle of imputation. There it is as manifest as language can make it. He who proclaimed himself from Sinai, "a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that 'hate him," here illustrates the principle of that righteous law, by commissioning Saul to execute upon the fourth generation the sin of a buried ancestry. And did space not forbid, it were easy to show that there is no principle more uniformly recognized, or more frequently

illustrated, either in the Scriptures, or in profane history, than the one which we have been defending, and which it is a primary object with our author to ignore. It is uttered from Sinai with the voice of thunder, and is endorsed and re-iterated by our Saviour in the days of his flesh. Yes, it mingles with that voice of lamentation which a rejected Redeemer lifts up over the devoted Jerusalem: "That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar. Verily, I say unto you, All these things shall come upon this generation." Before these utterances it becomes us to bow, and exclaim, with one who was favoured with the sight of things within the veil, "O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!"

The next objection urged against the doctrine of penal suffering, viz. that it would have involved, on the part of the sufferer, subjection to eternal death, is from the same source as the former, and confounds the design of the sufferings with the period of their duration. The attribute eternal belongs to the latter, and not to the former. It simply expresses the duration of the suffering, if man is to be the sufferer. That the sufferings of Christ, as our legal substitute, were not eternal, arose from the infinite dignity of his ever-adorable person. For the objector whom this glorious truth will not silence, or satisfy, the word of God has no further answer.

We cannot, however, take leave of this portion of the book, without noticing one other argument, which our author has advanced against the doctrine that Christ's sufferings were penal. "If such were the nature of the Atonement," he argues, "there could be no mercy in the case. When a debt is paid, there is no forgiveness; when a penalty is endured, there is no mercy. In the case of one who should be willing to pay the debt, or to endure the suffering, there may be the highest benevolence; but there is no mercy exhibited by him to whom the debt is paid, or the penalty of whose law has been borne." This argument he illustrates as follows: "It would have been kindness, indeed, in an Egyptian to have come in

voluntarily, and aided the oppressed and burdened Hebrew to furnish the tale of bricks;" but there would have been no kindness or compassion evinced by the task-master who had appointed the task, for the whole demand would have been complied with. So far as he who performed the work was concerned, and so far as the burdened Hebrew was concerned, it would have been a transaction of mere law and justice; so far as the task-master was concerned, there would have been in the

case neither mercy nor compassion."

This passage is a specimen of what we must regard as a deplorable feature of the theology of this book. It is an attempt, on the one hand, to furnish a palliation, if not an apology for sin, and on the other, to disparage the character, law, and government of God, by representing them as harsh, tyranical, and severe. The animus of the foregoing illustration must be palpable to any candid mind. Why not put the case fairly? Inadequate as it is to illustrate the relation of a rebel sinner to an offended God, yet, had it been fairly stated, it would have sustained the very doctrine it was designed to overthrow. The case fairly stated would stand thus: A law of Egypt, which the king is as unable to change as he is to change his own nature, demands at the hands of a Hebrew very heavy toils and great suffering. The king, however, so loves the Hebrew that he spares not his own well-beloved son, the heir of Egypt's crown, but sends him into the brick-fields as a slave, to furnish for the Hebrew the 'tale of brick' demanded by the law. The son enters with all his heart into the gracious purpose of his father, delighting to do his father's will, and loving the Hebrew with the same intensity of love. He takes the place of the Hebrew in the field of toil, and when the term of service closes, he gives into the hand of Egypt's law the full tale of brick, and claims the emancipation of those for whose deliverance that service was rendered, and those sufferings endured. This is the case fairly put; and so far as such a case can illustrate the work of Redemption, it is from beginning to end, an illustration of the very doctrine our author has been labouring to destroy. It exhibits a king girt about with justice, and moved with a love that will hesitate at no sacrifice. Who, with his eye upon such an act of kingly condescension and compassion. could have the heartlessness and injustice to conclude, that there was nothing of mercy manifested by him who originated the whole scheme of deliverance? And when we substitute for the unrighteous enactment of Egypt's tyrant, that law under which man is held amenable to penal suffering-a law which is holy, and just, and good; and in the place of Pharaoh, Him who so loved the world as to give his only-begotten Son; and instead of an heir to the crown and kingdom of Egypt, the Heir of all things; and for the poor slave in the brick-field, suffering under an unrighteous bondage, the rebel sinner filled with enmity against his rightful Lord and Sovereign, who embraces in his character all moral excellence in infinite perfection, and then finish the comparison with what the Scriptures reveal of the free and sovereign grace wherewith the Eternal King stooped to extend his sceptre to his enemy, what but astonishment at the magnitude of the grace, and what but tenfold astonishment at the insensibility that has failed to discover and admire it, can possess the soul of any right-minded moral intelligence? Yes, penal suffering on the part of the substitute is not inconsistent with the manifestation of mercy to those in whose place he stood. It is justice that awakes the sword against the Shepherd, but it is mercy that spreads her wings over the sheep. Justice has her vindication in the infliction of the penalty, mercy unveils her face in the transfer of the penalty from the transgressor to the substitute. Here is mercy, not on the tremendous terms of this book, not mercy obtained by the sacrifice of God's truth, and law, and justice; but mercy sustained throughout, by every principle of law and truth, and righteousness; the mercy of Him who is "just and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus."

We do not deem it necessary to dwell long upon what our author says on the extent of the Atonement. We find in his chapter on this subject nothing more than common-place misconceptions and objections. He limits the discussion to the relation of the Atonement to the human race, not because from his view of its nature, it has any special suitableness to men more than to angels, but simply because there is no intimation that it "was designed to secure the salvation of any other fallen being than man." According to Mr. Barnes, therefore, the

Atonement is limited to the human race; and its limitation is determined, not by its nature, its sufficiency, or its suitableness, but simply by its design. Suppose we apply this to its relation to the human family. Unless Mr. Barnes holds that the Atonement was designed to secure the salvation of all men, he cannot maintain that it was designed for all men. If its limitation is determined by its design, and if its design is determined by its actual or revealed effect, then, if the fact that it was not designed to secure the salvation of angels shows that it was limited to the human race, the fact that it was not designed to secure the salvation of all men proves that it was limited to those whose salvation it does secure. Mr. Barnes has stumbled at the very threshold of his argument. He begins by teaching the very doctrine which he labours through the whole chapter to refute. That doctrine is, that the extent of the Atonement is determined, not by its nature, its sufficiency, or its suitableness, but by the effect it was designed to secure. Yet he argues from its suitableness and sufficiency that it was designed for all men, while he admits that it was not designed to secure the salvation of all. He therefore refutes himself. He says the sources of evidence on this subject must be, 1, analogy; 2, probabilities from the nature of the Atonement; 3, the testimony of Scripture. Under the first head, he argues from the abundance and suitableness of the materia medica, to a like sufficiency and suitableness of the provisions of grace. But he forgets that, by his own showing, the question does not relate to the sufficiency or suitableness of the Atonement, but to its design. The argument from analogy, if it is worth anything, is simply this: God has made abundant provision for the physical wants and maladies of men, therefore it is probable that he has made similar abundant provision for their spiritual This no one denies. The argument from analogy, necessities. therefore, proves nothing to the point. God has made the earth productive, and stored it with inexhaustible treasures of silver and gold. Does this prove that he designed that all men should be rich? Does it prove that this provision of the sources of wealth was designed for those who never enjoy them? If so, the purpose of God has failed. Because God has given healing virtue to plants and minerals, does that prove that he

designed that all men should be healed of their diseases? Things were designed for the ends which they actually accomplish. If, therefore, the *materia medica*, notwithstanding its abundance and its efficacy, does not heal all men, it was not designed to heal them. It was designed to heal those whom it does heal, and no others. In like manner the Atonement of Christ, however abundant and suitable for all men, was designed for those who are thereby actually redeemed.

His argument from the nature of the Atonement is equally inconclusive. He argues that there is nothing in the nature of the atonement to limit it to a particular class of men; and from the dignity of Christ's person, that there is no necessity for such limitation. "If," he says, "the Sufferer had been a mere man, then it would seem necessarily to follow that the Atonement must have been limited. It would be impossible to conceive how a mere man, however pure in character, elevated in rank, or lofty in virtue, could have such merit that his sufferings could avail to the redemption of the entire human race, &c." According to this, the necessity for the Divinity of Christ as a redeemer arises from the number to be redeemed. Had fewer souls been the objects of redemption, then the merit of a creature, of an angel or a man, would have sufficed. Such is the legitimate consequence of the principle involved in this argument. According to the Bible, the necessity of the Atonement arises from the nature of sin and the justice of God; and therefore the same merit in the Redeemer would be demanded if one soul or millions were to be redeemed. All that Mr. Barnes's arguments under this head can possibly prove, and all, we presume, they were intended to prove, is that the Atonement is, from its nature, suitable for all men, and, from the dignity of the Redeemer's person, sufficient for all. This we cheerfully admit. This is the doctrine of our church, and of the church universal. But what has this to do with the question? So far as the extent of the Atonement is concerned, the point in debate is not its nature or its value, but its design. Mr. Barnes admits that we cannot infer the design of the Atonement from its suitableness and sufficiency. According to him, it is sufficient and suitable for angels as well as for men, yet he says it is limited to the human race. After admitting

this, he turns round and argues that it is designed for all men, because it is sufficient and suitable for all. This, as every one

sees, is a non-sequitur.

It is palpable that the only source of knowledge as to the design of what God does is his own declarations on the subject. The testimony of Scripture, therefore, instead of coming last, as it does in Mr. Barnes's argument, as though its only office were to confirm the deductions of our own reason, should come first and determine the question beyond dispute or appeal. Our author refers to the passages usually quoted to prove that the Atonement has equal reference to all men. One of these passages is John iii. 16, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, might not perish, but have eternal life." The argument here is that as the word χόσμος, world, means men, mankind, the human race, therefore the design of God in sending his Son as a Saviour, had equal reference to all men. If this proves anything, then it proves that when we call our Lord, Salvator hominum, as all Christians do, we mean to say that he is the Saviour of all men; that when Paul says, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners, he means all sinners. It is true, that the design of Christ's work was to save sinners. but it is not true that he designed to save all sinners. In all such cases the words, men, world, sinners, designate the class of persons whom Christ came to save. In John iii. 16, for example, our Lord teaches that the design of God in sending his Son was the salvation of men, not of angels; of men generally, and not of Jews exclusively. The declaration that men and not angels, men generally and not the Jews only, are embraced in the design of God, does not teach that he designs to save all men. Our church has adopted the Westminster Catechism, which teaches, that "God having out of his mere good pleasure from all eternity, elected some to everlasting life, did enter into a covenant of grace, to deliver them out of the estate of sin and misery, and to bring them into an estate of salvation by a Redeemer." According to this, election precedes redemption. God elects some to everlasting life, and sends his Son to redeem them. The work of Christ, therefore, has a special reference to the elect. Such is the doctrine of

our church. Now, suppose some one should turn to our hymn book, and endeavour to prove that the church which sanctions that book, teaches that Christ died equally for all menbecause in the hymn book it is said in substance, over and over, perhaps a hundred times, that "God pitied dying men, and sent his Son to give them life again;" or that the Lamb of God "sustains the dreadful load of man's iniquities;" or, "Lord, what is man, that he should prove the object of thy boundless love?" or, "to save a guilty world he dies;" would such an argument amount to anything? Does the hymn book contradict the Catechism? Is saying that Christ came to save sinners, to save men, inconsistent with saying that his death had a special reference to his own people? If not, then the argument for an indefinite Atonement founded on such passages as that quoted above amounts to nothing. The illustration which our Lord himself uses, is derived from Moses lifting up the serpent in the wilderness. The design of God in this transaction was twofold; first, to illustrate the method of salvation, as we learn from the use made of the incident in the New Testament; and secondly, actually to heal a certain portion of the people. Now there is no question: 1st. That the method of cure proposed to the Israelites was adapted to all. It was as well suited to one case as to another. 2. That it made no matter whether one, or ten thousand was healed by the appointed means. One man's looking at the serpent did not hinder another man's looking. There was no possibility of exhausting the healing power of the means of cure. There could be no tendency to such exhaustion. 3. That the cure was offered freely and sincerely to all the afflicted. 4. That in fact some were healed and others perished, and so far as the design of God was concerned, the lifting up of the serpent was intended as a means of cure, to those whom it was rendered effectual, and not for those who perished. Many, doubtless, never heard the proclamation; many who heard it were too stupid to avail themselves of the means of restoration; some, no doubt, preferred trusting to some other remedy. 5. Notwithstanding this limitation in the design of God, in providing this method of cure, it would be perfectly proper to say in general terms, that God so pitied the dying Israelites, that he

ordained that whosoever looked on the brazen serpent should not perish, but be restored to health. No one would be authorized to infer from this language, that God intended the provision as much for those whom he had determined to save, as for those whom he had determined to allow to perish. The application of all this to the work of Christ is too obvious to need any remark. That work is adapted to the salvation of all men. It is sufficient for all. It is freely offered to all. It was designed for God's own people, and in perfect consistency with his limitation as to design-it may be said, as in the case of the Israelites, that God so pitied dying men, or he so loved mankind, or the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believed in him should not perish, but have eternal life. Such declarations afford, therefore, no argument to disprove the plain doctrine of the Bible, that Christ laid down his life for his sheep; that their salvation was the end intended to be secured by his death, and that he died for them in a sense in which he did not die for those that perish.

Another passage quoted is Heb. ii. 9. "He tasted death for every man." Of course, Mr. Barnes knows that the word for man is not in the Greek. It is simply δπέρ παντός, for every one. Does this mean for every sensitive creature? Mr. Barnes says, No, for irrational creatures are not the objects of redemption. Does it mean every rational creature? He again says, No, for unfallen angels do not need redemption. Does it mean every fallen rational creature? Again the answer is, No, for the atonement was not designed for fallen angels. What then does it mean? It means that Christ tasted death for every one of the objects of redemption. It is, and must be, thus limited. Christ tasted death for every one of those whom God designed to redeem by his blood. It is on this principle that Mr. Barnes limits the text, and says, it does not mean every creature, nor every intelligent creature, nor every intelligent fallen creature, but every one of those embraced in the design of God. Whether that design includes all men or all the people of God, depends not on this passage, but on the general doctrine of the Bible. If the Scriptures teach that God designed to save all fallen beings by the death of Christ, then the passage means that Christ tasted death for every intelligent fallen creature.

If they teach that he designed the salvation of all men, then it means that Christ tasted death for all men. But if the Bible teaches that God designed to save his own people, then it means that the Redeemer tasted death for every one of the elect. The question is not as to the meaning of the words, about which there can be no dispute, but simply, as to the point, who are the redeemed. Christ died for every one of the objects of redemption. In this exposition, both parties must agree, and therefore the passage cannot decide anything.

Mr. Barnes, of course, makes the common objection from the universal offer of the Gospel. If salvation is offered to all men, on the ground of the death of Christ, he must have died for all. He uses the familiar illustration of captives in a foreign land. Such captives do not wish to be informed merely of the ability of some one to redeem them; they wish to know "whether it is the intention 'of such an one,' thus to appropriate his wealth:" whether the offer of deliverance is founded merely on the fact that he in whose name the offer is made, is a man of wealth, or on the ground that the ransom is actually paid or provided; whether the offer is made "to mock their misery by the exhibition of wealth, which cannot in any event be theirs," or whether it is made in good faith, &c. &c. This is intended to prove that the offer of the gospel to all men, must be insincere, and a mockery, unless Christ died for all men. As soon however as the case is fairly stated, the weakness of this argument, and the grossness of the misrepresentation which it involves, become apparent. Suppose a man hears that his own family, together with many other persons, are held in captivity; suppose the ransom demanded for his own family is the same in value as that demanded for the ransom of the whole body of captives. He determines to pay the ransom, with the design and purpose to deliver his own children, whom he can constrain to accept deliverance at his hands. When the ransom is paid, although designed for the deliverance of a part, yet being sufficient for the deliverance of the whole, he offers redemption, not only to his own, but to all who choose to accept it. Is there any mockery in this? Does the fact that the ransom was paid with a special reference to some, prevent its being freely offered to all? If those to whom it is

offered prefer their bondage; if they refuse to be indebted to him who has paid the ransom for their deliverance; if they think they can deliver themselves; if on these, or any other grounds, they refuse the offer of deliverance, the guilt and folly are their own. If a king makes a feast for his friends, does this prevent his sincerely inviting all who choose to come and partake of his bounty? If God, in giving his Son for the redemption of his own people, has paid a ransom sufficient for the deliverance of all men—does the purpose for which that ransom was paid, present any barrier to the general offer of salvation? It is a weary business to have to answer the same objections, and correct the same misrepresentations, day after day and year after year.

The impression made upon our minds by this book is a very painful one. We have great respect for its author. He has been a laborious and successful pastor and writer. He stands deservedly high in the estimation of the community. That such a man should put forth a book so thoroughly rationalistic in its principles and spirit as the one before us, is deeply to be lamented. We can hardly believe that it contains truth enough to save the soul. A man might as well attempt to live on the husk of a cocoa-nut. We have no idea that Mr. Barnes, as a Christian, lives on the doctrine of the Atonement as here presented. There is a sense in which we are full believers in the difference between the theology of the intellect and the theology of the heart. A man in the retirement of his study, may, by a perverted train of thought, satisfy himself that matter has no existence—but he is an idealist only so long as that train of thought is present to his mind. The moment he goes out into the world he resumes his normal state, and is as much a believer in the existence of things external as other men. Thus really good and devout men may spin out a theory which to their understanding seems true and consistent, but which they believe only so long as the pen is in their hand. Their inward practical faith is determined by the direct assertions of the Bible and by their own religious experience. We rejoice to believe that Mr. Barnes is a thousand times better than the theology of his book.

ART. IV.—Lectures on the Moral Government of God. By NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D., late Dwight Professor of Didactic Theology in Yale College. New York: Clark, Austin & Smith. 1859.

THE great prominence of Dr. Taylor in the theological conflicts which issued in the disruption of the Presbyterian Church, the loosening of the bonds between Presbyterians and Congregationalists, the formation of opposing parties among the latter, and the planting of rival theological seminaries to propagate their respective views, will lead many to scrutinize this full and authentic exposition of his system with peculiar interest. We say full, for although these volumes comprise but a portion of his theological lectures, which are, as we understand, to be published, yet they contain his entire series of lectures and disquisitions on the moral government of God. On this subject, and its applications, he laid out his chief strength. In this department chiefly he claimed to have made decisive and momentous contributions to theological science. Here he and his adherents challenged, in his behalf, the honours of discovery and invention. Here the cardinal principles of all that is distinctive and peculiar in his metaphysics and theology are most elaborately stated and defended. All that has been known as the cardinal principles of Taylorism is here subjected to exhaustive discussion.

Although these volumes are posthumous, they are not unfinished or fragmentary. They, with the volumes yet to follow, are the mature products of the author's life-long labour, and of continual retouching, with a constant eye to their ultimate publication. Indeed, few publications bear more unequivocal marks of the labor limæ. In some cases it goes to a length of inducing weak and cumbrous forms of statement, while the more free and unstudied expressions of the author are generally remarkable for precision and force.

This authentic exposition and defence of his system is welcome, because it enables us to settle some questions of historical justice. Dr. Taylor's previous outgivings of his system were partial and fragmentary, as they came forth in the discussions

of occasional controversies. He and his adherents claimed that he was injuriously misunderstood and misrepresented by his adversaries; and that the recoil from his system which rent our Church, and founded new institutions for the support of orthodoxy in his own communion, was largely due to groundless prejudice and "devout calumny." These volumes will brush, away all mist that may still overhang these allegations. We deem them quite as important for the light they shed upon past conflicts, and the merits of the respective polemics, as for any power they possess to revive controversies already fought through, or to re-vitalize a system whose first meteoric success was only eclipsed by the rapidity of its decline. We do not intimate that this system is yet extinct, or absolutely effete. But we do assert, without fear of plausible contradiction, that since its first flooding irruption upon our American churches, it has been steadily ebbing. Old-school doctrines have been steadily gaining influence and ascendency. They have shown their power in the quiet but rapid growth of the bodies which cling to them most tenaciously; in the comparatively stationary or retrogressive condition of most of the bodies which repudiate them; in the extensive reactionary movement within these bodies in order to their conservation from further waste and decay; in the new forms of latitudinarian theology itself which overshadow the issues of Taylorism, so obtrusive twenty years ago; and in the fact that many admiring pupils of Dr. Taylor, who still eulogize him as the oracle of his day, are forward to discard his fundamental ethical principles. How much of any peculiar theory of moral government can survive the overthrow of its fundamental ethical principle, it is not difficult to imagine.

In order to appreciate Dr. Taylor justly, it is necessary to look not merely at his theories—which, of course, stand or fall upon their own merits—but at the circumstances and surroundings which evoked and largely moulded his thinking. All men, while they have the roots of their character and achievements in themselves, are strongly impelled and guided in their development and outworking by the external influences in which they find themselves immersed. Even if they sturdily withstand all that besets them, they are not unaffected by it. The

conditions and objects that environ them are the provocatives and objects of their thinking. If these do not sway them—even if they are strenuously resisted—still, they incite this very antagonism, and give it their own "form and pressure." It is impossible to understand the genesis of Dr. Taylor's theories irrespective of the atmosphere he breathed, the training he enjoyed, the forms of doctrinal and practical opinion which in his view most urgently required an antidote, and the evils, real or supposed, which he aimed to remedy. Much less is it possible, without this, to account for a certain two-sided or ambiguous aspect of many of his writings, which has been an enigma to multitudes; or to reach the most favourable construction of his spirit and aims of which his case admits, and in which

Christian charity will rejoice.

The principal circumstances affecting Dr. Taylor's early theological development, which require to be noted in this connection are, 1. The wide prevalence of Infidelity and Atheism, which appalled good men, during the period of his theological training and early ministry. Its focus was France-but it radiated thence over Christendom, and shot its most baleful rays over our own country, then so deeply in sympathy, on political grounds, with revolutionary France. Presidents, Senators, jurists, public men of every grade, caught the infectioncolleges and literary institutions were deeply inoculated with the virus. It was quite a matter of ton to be sceptical. consequence was, that the mind of the Church was largely engrossed with the refutation of Deism, Atheism, and the various forms of scepticism, open or masked. The great theological works of this period were mostly apologetic. Dr. Dwight, Dr. Taylor's theological instructor, achieved his highest fame and his grandest success by his celebrated discourses on infidelity. They revolutionized the current of opinion and feeling in Yale College, prepared the way for those revivals of religion which signalized his administration, and exorcised the fell spirit of infidelity from the institution. His whole system of theology, and tone of preaching, bear traces of being shaped with the especial design of confronting and overpowering infidels. Dr. Taylor's mind, both from its own peculiar structure and from the impulses given it by his teacher, would inevitably gird itself for the conflicts which then agitated the Christian world, and with ample confidence in its ability to solve difficulties which had before embarrassed the ablest defenders of the faith. This explains why most of his theological peculiarities, while they have to do with the very nature of the Christian life, are yet adopted for the purpose of strengthening the apologetic side of theology, and silencing infidels and sceptics.

2. At this period scepticism began to develope itself openly within the precincts of the New England churches, under the title of improved and liberal Christianity. Unitarianism and Universalism had obtained control of the metropolis of Puritan Congregationalism, of its most ancient and renowned seat of learning, and from these centres of influence had already propagated themselves into the very heart of Massachusetts, poisoning her more powerful churches, and commanding the favour of her educated and aristocratic classes. These heresies, which repudiate nearly all that distinguishes Christianity from heathen morality but the name, began to worm themselves into the adjacent States, having strong ecclesiastical and social ties with the old home of their birth and dominion; and to assume a formidable attitude which engaged the anxious attention of the friends of truth and piety throughout the land, but especially in New England. Dr. Taylor's speculations have a special respect to the objections levelled at the evangelical system from this source. Endorsing many of their objections to old orthodoxy, he endeavours to reconstruct the evangelical system so as to evade them. To this point much of his strenuous argumentation tends. He concedes much to the cavils of these errorists against the doctrines of the church, for the sake of proving that the doctrine of eternal punishment, which they most of all abhor, is demanded by the benevolence of God, on which they rely to subvert it. In maintaining and denouncing the eternal misery of the wicked to the uttermost, no divine is more emphatic, uncompromising-we had almost said, unrelenting.

3. Orthodoxy in New England had been undergoing transmutations in the laboratories of successive metaphysical schools, until it began to crystallize into the arctic dogmas of Emmons.

What these were, we have so recently pointed out, as to supersede the necessity of distinct specification here.* This system in its higher or lower potencies, tinctured much of the practical, and even revival preaching of many of the most able and earnest orthodox divines of New England. Divine sovereignty, election and decrees were intensified and pressed out of their scriptural relations and proportions, into that foreground which the Scriptures award to Christ and him crucified. They were largely employed to offend, startle, and alarm the unconverted, to perform the office of the law in producing conviction of sin; while submission to, or acquiescence in them, was often made the hinge-point of true conversion. Thus the love of God in Christ, the true inspiration of evangelic preaching—the power of God unto salvationwas often shaded into relative unimportance. Of course, all this arrayed orthodoxy in gratuitous horrors, which invigorated the Universalist and Unitarian defection, while it was like an ague-chill, alternating with the warm life of the gospel, in congregations still cleaving to the faith once delivered to the saints. This was keenly felt by Dr. Dwight, and the large class whom he represented in New England, who lost no opportunity of denouncing the sublimated hyper-Calvinism of Hopkins and Emmons, especially the latter, in regard to decrees, the divine production of sin, exercises, resignation, &c. It was inevitable that, to a mind like Dr. Taylor's, surveying this whole subject from the stand-point of one striving to clear the gospel of incumbrances which hindered its access to the unconverted heart, and exposed it to the assaults of Universalists, Unitarians and Deists, the whole doctrinal system in vogue should seem to require reconstruction. The peculiar state of speculative theology in New England, as may readily be seen by those conversant with the facts, had much to do with determining the drift of Dr. Taylor's speculations. This was so, not only as it presented the offensive features already noted, but also as in other respects it furnished the germs of those peculiarities which constituted the essence of his own system,

^{*} Article on Edwards, and the successive forms of New Divinity, in the October number, 1858.

and which he employed in assailing, not merely Hopkinsianism and Emmonism, but the whole Augustinian, or Calvinistic system. We refer here to the doctrine of natural ability, then naturalized and nearly universal in New England; to the dogma that moral quality pertains exclusively to exercises, which was prominent in Emmons's scheme; to the wide prevalence of the dogma, that all virtue consists in benevolence; to the nearly universal rejection of the doctrine of imputation, whether of Adam's sin, or Christ's righteousness, inaugurated by the younger Edwards; to the governmental scheme of atonement, no less in vogue, and having the same author. Here we find the seed-principles of a large part of the treatise on Moral Government. The peculiar chaotic state of New England theology, when Dr. Taylor came upon the theatre, furnished the motives, the means, and the objects of his innovations. As his reading and theological culture scarcely extended beyond the astute metaphysical theologians of New England, he knew little of standard Augustinian and Reformed theology, beyond the fragmentary representations and misrepresentations of it, found in these second-hand, and in many respects, hostile authorities. To the day of his death he never comprehended this theology in its import, spirit, logic, power. He often confounds it with certain dogmas which it disowns, mere New England provincialisms, and quite as often with the caricatures of its adversaries.

4. It deserves consideration in this connection, that Dr. Dwight held the utilitarian theory of the nature of virtue; that it consists exclusively in benevolence, or a desire to promote the happiness of the universe. Dr. Dwight did not work this theory out to many of its logical and practical results. Nor did it so figure in his published writings, as to attract any marked attention. Yet there is reason to suppose it was a favourite theory with him, and that he signalized it even more in his private instructions than in his published works. And we do not doubt that his influence encouraged Dr. Taylor's speculations on this subject, till they culminated in startling dogmas, from which Dr. Dwight probably would have recoiled—at all events which, after being distinctly brought to public

notice, justly awakened the deepest distrust and dislike of his whole system.*

Passing now from these objective moulding influences to notice the subjective peculiarities of inward life and intellectual constitution that contributed to make Dr. Taylor the theologian he was, it is to be observed that his extraordinary power was rather in the line of logical acuteness and ingenuity, than in that breadth and depth of insight, without which the mere logical faculty is quite as likely to precipitate us into error, as guide us to the truth. There are three ways in which the mind comes to the knowledge of truth: 1. Intuition. 2. Testimony. 3. Logical deduction from what is known by intuition and testimony. It is obvious that logical processes can unfold only what is enveloped in the premises from which they start; that the truth of the conclusions reached depends on the truth of the premises, and the accuracy of the reasoning process. It is obvious still further, that all reasoning must ultimately start from truths given by intuition or testimony, else it is but a chain without a staple; that it can have no stronger evidence than the self-evidence of its ultimate premises; that the longer and more involved the steps which intervene between first premises and the conclusion, the greater is the liability to error; and that if any conclusion reached by reasoning militates against any self-evident truth, the process is thereby clearly evinced to be faulty, either in the premises or the reasoning, whether we can detect the flaw or not. Now when we say that Dr. Taylor's breadth and depth of insight were not commensurate with his logical power, we refer to that want of insight into the intrinsic

^{*} In a letter from Dr. Taylor respecting Dr. Dwight, we find the following: "In my senior year, I read as an exercise before Dr. Dwight, an argument on the question, 'Is virtue founded in utility?"—a question in which he always felt a peculiar interest. To those who preceded me he said, 'Oh, you do not understand the question;' but when I had finished my argument he remarked with great emphasis—'that's right,' and added some other commendatory remarks, which, to say the least, were adapted to put a young man's modesty to rather a severe test. But it certainly had one good effect—it determined me to make intellectual efforts, which otherwise I probably never should have made; not to say the very kind which, above all others, I love to make."—Sprague's Annals, Vol. i., pp. 162, 163.

nature of moral good and evil, the self-evident excellence and obligation of first moral truths, which an inspection of his reasonings will bring to light. Discerning no intrinsic good but happiness, he reasons at all lengths, and in all directions from this hypothesis; he follows the remorseless bent of his logic, whatever first principles and sacred instincts it overbearseven though, to use his own favourite phrase, it "go down Niagara." A consequence of this was, that within the field of his vision he saw with the greatest confidence and assurance, while he pushed his reasonings within this circumscribed area with all the greater force and momentum, because he did not take that broader survey of first truths which would have made them brakes to check the impetus that bore him so rapidly and confidently to startling conclusions. Hence the remarkable assurance and self-reliance with which he propounded principles confessedly at war with the doctrines of all branches of the church, his marvellous confidence in the power of his reasonings to enforce the assent of adversaries, and his difficulty of understanding how men should reject them on grounds creditable to the head and heart. is further to be observed, that Dr. Taylor believed that the true power of Christianity was to be found in those bodies that hold certain elements of the reformed and evangelical faith. Especially did he regard the doctrine of eternal punishment as vital to effective Christian preaching. On the whole, he found more in the practical and doctrinal tone of the Presbyterian and Congregational churches that was congenial to him than elsewhere. On the other hand, he regarded Unitarianism and Universalism as emasculating the gospel of all that can arouse the soul to salutary concern and earnest religious efforts, yet he deemed it necessary to reconstruct the accepted orthodox system, so as to obviate certain objections, to which he agreed with these errorists in thinking it obnoxious. This accounts for the double-faced aspect so often and plausibly charged against him and his system. He was often charged with seconding Unitarians in their assaults on the orthodox faith. In response, he claimed to be the most earnest and relentless adversary of these heretics, and to be unwaveringly devoted to the doctrines of Calvinism, which he was undertaking, not

to overthrow, but to place on a firmer basis. Within certain limits and in a certain sense, all this is true. It is quite certain that he adopted and echoed the arguments of Socinians against important parts of the orthodox system. It is no less true that he expected thus more effectually to vanquish them, and retain intact the essentials of the orthodox faith. Did he succeed? The answer to this question will bring us at once to the consideration of the distinctive features of his system.

Dr. Taylor's estimate of his own theological achievements in comparison with those of his predecessors, appears in such

passages as the following:

"All the attempts made by theologians to systematize the great and substantial truths of both natural and revealed theology have hitherto proved utter and complete failures, by a necessity arising from the manner in which they have been made. For in all these attempts there never has been any exhibition, nor even professed attempt at exhibition, of that great and comprehensive relation of God to men, to which all things besides, in creation and providence, are subordinate and subservient; his relation to men as administering a perfect moral government over them as moral and immortal beings, created in his own image." Vol. ii. p. 2.

"So unreflective and careless on this subject have been the prominent theological writers, Catholic and Protestant, Orthodox and Latitudinarian, that from the times of Origen, not to say of Irenæus, they have scarcely, to any extent worthy of notice, given any form to the great scriptural doctrine of justification, which has not in my view involved down-right Antinomianism, the subversion of the law of God in one of its

essential elements." Ib. p. 151.

"Have the Orthodox ministry then thus pressed men to act morally right under God's authority, grace or no grace? . . . Have they not, to a great extent, taught a mode of dependence on the Holy Spirit, which, instead of enhancing as it does, man's obligation to act morally right in obedience to God's authority, absolutely subverts man's obligation so to act, and God's authority to require him so to act? . . . And more than this,—where in the whole range of theological literature, can be found anything, which even in pretence can be esteemed

a thorough treatise on the high relation to God, to which his every other relation is subservient—that of the supreme and rightful moral Governor of his moral creation?" *Ib.* pp. 25, 26.

This is extraordinary language. The moral government of God is his government of moral beings. Every treatise on theology is a treatise in regard to God's government of such moral beings as we have knowledge of. It treats of the being, attributes, law and gospel of God, of our relations thereto, and of what is necessarily implied therein. Dr. Taylor could not have meant that his assertion is true, except in a narrow sense corresponding to his own arbitrary restriction of the meaning of the words "moral," "government," etc. It is quite true that no one has treated the subject after the method of these two volumes, or founded his reasonings upon the same fundamental principles. It is in these that the primary peculiarity of Dr. Taylor's system lies. To these are to be traced its strength and its weakness.

Dr. Taylor undertook to silence those who insist that the eternal punishment of the wicked is incompatible with benevolence in God. In doing this, he contended that benevolence in God as moral governor, required the everlasting punishment of incorrigible sinners, and that failure on his part to threaten it would prove him to be a malevolent being, without right to govern his creatures, or claim to their confidence. He undertook to prove this by argument as cogent as mathematical demonstration. The argument is simply this: The happiness of sentient beings, or the means of such happiness is the only good; therefore, benevolence or the desire and purpose to promote such happiness is the only virtue, or the sum of all virtue. Sin, as the opposite of benevolence, consists in selfishness, or the preference of other sources of enjoyment to seeking the happiness of the universe. A moral governor cannot show himself truly benevolent, entitled to reign, or to command the confidence of his subjects, unless he promotes benevolence in his subjects by the highest rewards, and discourages selfishness by the extremest penalties. So far as he comes short of this, he fails to show perfect benevolence; for he fails to do what he might do to promote perfect benevolence, and thereby perfect happiness. This is the sum of the argument developed by the author in manifold forms, and occupying a large portion of his book. It seems, if the premises be granted, to be quite conclusive. The conclusion, however, though with a single qualification yet to be noted, proved by Scripture and not discordant with reason, does not prove the truth of the premises. A false conclusion proves the premises from which it is deduced false. A true conclusion, however, may happen to come from false premises as well as true, and therefore proves nothing with regard to their truth or falsity. From the premise, "all colleges have astronomical observatories," it follows that Yale College has such an observatory. The conclusion is true, the premise false. If the foregoing is a true account of morality, and if this gives us the differentia of moral government, then we must award to Dr. Taylor the honour of having first given it, as he claims, a thorough and systematic treatment. But it is time for us to verify our account of his

system.

"Benevolence then, as the primary, morally right affection, is the elective preference of the highest happiness of all-the sentient universe-to every conflicting object." Ib. 255. On the next page and elsewhere, he speaks of veracity and justice as "forms of benevolence." Each of them, "contemplated as including this principle, is truly and properly said to be morally right, and is properly called a virtue. But then its moral rectitude consists exclusively in the element of general benevolence, since if we conceive the particular disposition, affection, or purpose to exist, as it may, without this element of general benevolence, we necessarily conceive of it as a form of selfishness. If again, we conceive of the element of general benevolence as existing in the same degree without the particular disposition, affection, or purpose, we necessarily conceive of the same degree of moral rectitude. . . . When, however, we contemplate justice or veracity, or any particular disposition, purpose, volition, separately from, or as not including either the benevolent or selfish principle of the heart, it is neither morally right nor morally wrong. At the same time it must be admitted that justice, veracity, &c., each being conceived as a particular subordinate purpose or disposition without general benevolence, and including its appropriate executive action, are in some

sense right, but not morally right. They are right as they are fitted to promote some limited good necessary to the general good. It may be truly said of any of these subordinate acts, that it ought to be done. But its rightness or oughtness is not moral rightness or moral oughtness, for this is a predicate only of (general) benevolence, or that which includes it." Pp. 256-7. He proceeds to describe this oughtness or rightness, as being like that of a watch or pen, with reference to the end for which it is made—a "mere natural fitness." The italics are all the author's. This representation clearly annihilates all virtue but benevolence, all sin but selfishness. Truth, justice, lying, fraud, cruelty, aside from the benevolent or selfish spirit which may prompt them, are void of moral character. They belong to adiaphorous things as truly as running or walking. The consequence is, they become morally good or evil, according to circumstances.

Says Dr. Taylor, "There is no kind of subordinate action, which in any circumstances is fitted to subserve the end of benevolence, which in other circumstances may not be fitted to subserve the end of selfishness, and be prompted by this principle." Vol. i. p. 53. "At the same time there are few, if any kinds of subordinate action, which in all cases are fitted only to promote the end of selfishness, or which in some possible circumstances may not be fitted to subserve the end of benevolence, and be performed from this principle." Ib. p. 54.

"And now, if we suppose the essential nature of things to be so changed, that the authority of law and the public good as depending upon it would be destroyed, and absolute and universal misery follow, unless the innocent were to be punished, would it not be right to make innocence, now become the true and necessary cause of such fearful results, the ground of punishment? If it is now right or just to punish the disobedient, it would then be so to punish the obedient—to punish for a thing having the same relative nature, though it should have another name." Ib. pp. 134, 135.

We do not see how any language could more utterly confound and vacate all moral distinctions. Actions are right and wrong not intrinsically, but solely as they are instrumental of happiness. The end sanctifies the means, whatever they may be. Desert of punishment and the righteousness of its infliction depend not upon the culpability of the victim, but upon its relation to the public good. This determines whether the woes of punishment may righteously be inflicted upon the innocent, or the wicked! These are the inevitable logical results of the theory that virtue is founded in utility, that it has no intrinsic quality, but is merely the means of happiness. All actions and dispositions are indifferent but benevolence, and even that is good, not intrinsically, but as a means to happiness, as will yet more fully appear! On such a subject, argument is out of place; there is no doubt what the primary intuitions of every unperverted mind reveal on this subject. Let him who undertakes to speculate them away, find anything out of the Bible more certain with which to begin or end his reasoning if he can. Dr. Taylor does not hesitate to impress these intuitions into his service where it suits his purpose, and to make them oracles for determining what scripture may or may not teach. He says in reference to imputation as misconceived by himself, "that a morally perfect being, even Jesus Christ, cannot be ill-deserving, is an intuition." Vol. i. ii. p. 158. Indeed, we accept as the conclusive refutation of the above ethical theory, the very language which Dr. Taylor hurls with prodigious force at his own imagination of the doctrine of imputation.

"Indeed, if we are to rely on the necessary decisions and judgments of the human intellect—without which we can rely on nothing as true—then in this scheme these necessary decisions concerning law, justice, truth, equity, veracity, moral government, everything which lies at the basis of faith, of confidence and repose in God, are changed into their opposites; law ceases to be even respectable advice; for the lawgiver abandons its claims by sovereign prerogative, justice is converted into injustice." Ib. p. 159. Suppose all this were so—what then, if Dr. Taylor's ethical theory be true, and if our intuitive "necessary decisions respecting justice, truth, equity, veracity, moral government, everything which lies at the basis of faith, of confidence and repose in God," do not bury this scheme for ever out of sight? So true is it that men who speculate away their own moral instincts, are compelled after

all to recognize them-and to use them as both shield and sword in defensive and offensive warfare. They can no more eliminate them from their practical faith, than an idealist can act as if there were no external world.

But we have not yet reached the lowest deep of this ethical theory, to which logical necessity precipitates, and our author follows it "down Niagara." Why is benevolence singled out to be made the comprehensive generic virtue, rather than justice, veracity, &c.? And why is selfishness made the only sin? "Inasmuch as one is perfectly, or, in the highest degree fitted to prevent the highest misery, and to produce the highest well-being of all other sentient beings, and of the agent himself; and the other is perfectly, or in the highest degree fitted to prevent the highest well-being, and to produce the highest misery of all other sentient beings, and of the agent himself." Vol. i., p. 19. But is there no good, and no wellbeing but happiness? No evil, but misery, &c.? Let the author answer. "Nothing is good but happiness and the means of happiness, including the absence of misery, and the means of its absence." Ib. p. 31. "Nothing is evil, but misery or suffering, and the means of it, including the absence of happiness and the means of his happiness." P. 35. goodness, or the worth, or the value, or the excellence of a thing, is not the absolute nature, but the relative nature of that of which it is the predicate; or more particularly, it is the real nature of that of which it is predicated, as related to sentient being." P. 31. "All the evil which pertains to action on the part of a moral being, is its fitness or adaptation to produce misery or suffering to other beings and to himself." P. 35.

According to this, moral acts and qualities, even benevolence itself, have no intrinsic moral quality whatever. Their excellence is wholly "relative," and consists simply and exclusively in their being means of happiness. It is the happiness of beings too, considered simply as "sentient"—whether their sensibility be corporeal or spiritual, animal, esthetic or moralthe quantum rather than the quale. Says Dr. Taylor, in vindication of the doctrine that the love to God primarily required by the divine law is the love of benevolence, not of complacency:

"The love of benevolence is the love of the well-being, or of the highest happiness of the sentient universe. As God comprises in himself immeasurably, 'the greatest portion of being,' and of course compared with the universe besides, the greatest capacity of blessedness, his perfect happiness has more worth than any that can come into competition with it. If then the mind does not primarily love the highest blessedness of God, and his perfect character as the means of this end, and this on account of its perfect fitness or adaptation as the means of producing this end, it does not love his character on account of its intrinsic loveliness or excellence—does not love it at all." Vol. ii., p. 196.

How exclusively this founds all on quantity, rather than quality of being and happiness, and derives all quality from quantity! See the application of this utilitarian arithmetic. to calculate the decrease of love to God in proportion to the temptation it surmounts. Says our author, "Perfect holiness in a moral creature consists in loving God as much as he can love him, while he is under a necessity of loving an inferior good in some degree. At the same time he has but a limited power, or capacity of loving all objects of affection. Suppose this capacity in a perfectly holy being to be the capacity of loving fifty degrees, and that being under a necessity of loving the inferior good ten degrees, he loves God with forty degrees, or with perfect love. Let us now suppose the temptation increased; in other words, the value of the inferior good increased, so that it becomes necessary to love the inferior object fifteen degrees. The consequence is, that he must love God so much the less, as he loves the inferior object more, &c." Vol. ii. p. 365. By this calculus perfect love will soon be differentiated down to zero. Is not the statement of such a system its refutation. As well might we measure fragrance by squares and triangles, as moral quality in this way. Who does not shudder at the bare suggestion of merging the holiness, righteousness, and truth of God, in mere boundless "sentient capacity," or sinking them into mere instruments for gratifying it? Does it terminate in anything short of absorbing his moral perfections, all that can be a ground of love and trust to his rational creatures, in mere physical or metaphysical

infinitude? We stop here. We will not hurl back those epithets which we might justly employ, and which Dr. Taylor applies so freely and gratuitously to the God exhibited, as he maintains, in the scheme of his adversaries. But really, is bare amount of sentient capacity irrespective of its quality, the measure of worth and claim to regard, as this scheme requires? And who would not slaughter thousands of rams, if he had them and it were necessary, to soothe the anguish of a suffering babe? And are not all bodily sufferings, however intense and protracted, less to be deplored, reprobated, and shunned, than one pang of remorse, however faint or transient? And is the agony of the Son of God no more momentous than an equal amount of agony in a sentient being of any species?

But if benevolence be the only virtue, because it is a means of happiness as the only good, should not each one seek for himself this only good? and can be be under obligation to be benevolent or anything else, on any other ground, or in any greater degree than as it is seen to be conducive to his own

happiness? Says Dr. Taylor:

"Were the agent wholly unsusceptible to happiness from the happiness of others, and as therefore he must be wholly indifferent to their happiness, he must be wholly indifferent to benevolence on his own part, as the means of their happiness. Benevolence in such a case could possess no worth or value to him, either directly or indirectly. . . The worth to him of the highest happiness of all other beings, is its fitness to give him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action; and the worth to him of benevolent action is its perfect and exclusive fitness to produce the highest happiness of all other beings, and herein its perfect fitness to secure to him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action." Vol. i., p. 32. In the same manner he proceeds to argue that, "selfishness would be no evil to the moral agent, were he entirely unsusceptible to misery from the misery of others; that the evil of this kind of action to the agent, is equal either to the evil to him of the highest misery of all other beings, or to the evil to him of his own misery from their highest misery." P. 35.

There can be no mistake as to what all this, and much more

of the like means. The only obligation to benevolence is the constraint we are under to pursue our own happiness; but does not the author maintain that men are bound to do right and avoid wrong? Assuredly. But then, what is right and what is wrong? Let us hear him. "The word right denotes the fitness of that to which it is applied, to produce or accomplish some given end; and the word wrong denotes the fitness of that to which it is applied to prevent the same given end. . . . Of course, the same general ideas of fitness to produce or prevent the end, or the great end of action on the part of moral beings (i. e. happiness,) are denoted by the words right and wrong, when applied to such action. To deny this, is to deny a fixed and universal principle in the use of words. It is to deny in the language of logic that the genus is predicable of the species, or that the same word has one and the same general meaning as applied to different things, to which it can truly be applied in that meaning. It is the same as to deny that the word black or white has the same general meaning when applied to a bird and a horse of the same colour." Pp. 63, 64. This must be the answer which, on page 135, he says he has already given to those who say that the "idea of moral rectitude or rightness is a simple idea, an idea incapable of analysis and definition." And what an answer! If this is all that Dr. Taylor's astuteness could devise, we may safely say they are unanswerable. Right as commonly understood means conformity to a standard as fitness to an end, of which Dr. Goodrich shows himself well aware in his edition of Webster's Dictionary. It means not only conformity to a standard, but, as often, the very standard idea, or law to which we ought to conform, or the characteristic element of that to which we ought to conform, i. e. moral goodness. Thus used, it denotes a simple idea. As such it may be indicated by synonyms. But it cannot be logically defined. For it is incapable of analysis into genus and differentia. It is itself the differentia of morally right action. But its own genus and differentia cannot be found, any more than those of black and white. Says Dr. Taylor, usage is "that only which gives to words what may be called their proper meaning, and their only fixed and permanent meaning so far as they have any. It is, of course, the only criterion of decid-

ing what that proper meaning is." Vol. ii. p. 213. This is just. How absurd then to attempt to settle one of the greatest questions in psychology, ethics and divinity, by erecting a partial and secondary meaning of the word right in some of its applications into a generic sense which must pervade all its applicacations, and settle all questions depending on its meaning, as a moral term! Does any thing but usage decide this meaning? When then men use the word right in reference to a moral act or state, do they, or do they not mean something else than is implied in the phrase, "a choice of the highest happiness of the sentient universe as a means of my own happiness?" This is a psychological question which each one must answer for himself, looking to it that his answer does not contradict the consciousness of the human race, as shown by their words and their deeds. What that answer must be, is not a matter of doubt. And it directly contradicts the assumption which runs not only through the above argument, but through these two volumes, that there is no good but happiness or the means of happiness.

We have seen it recently stated by an apologist of Dr. Taylor's ethical theory, that he was accustomed to say in his lectures somewhat as follows: "We hold that virtue and vice are respectively good and evil in themselves. We do not allow our opponents exclusively to appropriate this language. We attach great importance to it." The following quotation shows in what sense he adopted this phrase. "There are, generally speaking, two things and only two, each of which may properly be said to be evil in itself. The one is suffering, including unhappiness or misery, and the other is the direct means of suffering. Each is truly and properly said to be evil in itself, in distinction from being evil as the indirect means of suffering." P. 132, vol. ii. What is this but a dexterous word-play? After all, the evil of sin is not intrinsic, but lies solely in its being the means of suffering-precisely what his adversaries charge-and what the above language is not even an attempt to parry, and only a very poor attempt to disguise. In this sense destitution of food and raiment, foul air, close confinement, are evils in themselves. They are the direct means of suffering. Have they, therefore, the intrinsic evil of blasphemy, perjury, and malice, i. e. intrinsic moral turpitude?

One other evasion, which is put forward in defence of this scheme by its abettors, with all the pomp and circumstance of demonstration, whenever they find themselves in extremis, we must notice. It is shadowed forth in the passage already quoted from pages 32-35. It is there maintained, that if a moral agent were unsusceptible to happiness from the happiness of others, and to misery from the misery of others, he would be indifferent to them, would not choose or refuse them, and they could be neither good nor evil to him. In short, the familiar axiom of moral liberty, that in all free choice we choose as we please, is the virtual premise for proving that if we choose at all, we must choose our own pleasure or happiness. To which we reply,

1. This confounds the subjective impulse which impels or determines choice with the object chosen. Because I choose as I please, it by no means follows that I may not be pleased to choose goodness, truth, beauty, as such, on account of their perceived intrinsic excellency, and irrespective of any perceived relations to my own happiness. Nay, does not the possibility of delight in the highest objects to a noble mind, depend on their perceived objective intrinsic excellency? How does it appear that a man may not be pleased with other objects as well as his own happiness, or things considered as the means thereof? Does not every man's consciousness attest that he may be pleased with the noble, the beautiful, the true, irrespective of their perceived relations to his own happiness?

2. This destroys all differences in voluntary action. argument is, that virtue must consist exclusively in the pursuit of happiness, because men cannot choose objects in which they feel no interest, or which they are not pleased to choose. In this sense, and to the fullest extent, vicious and virtuous choices are alike. They are so, simply because they are choices, and it is the nature of choice to choose as we please. It is the nature of the objects chosen, and in which we find pleasure, not the mere subjective choosing as we please, that determines the moral character of the choice and of the man choosing. And he alone who loves the good as good, is a good man. Indeed, the argument now under consideration, obliterates not only all moral, but all other distinction between choices.

Another source of plausibility in many of the statements of Dr. Taylor, and the whole Epicurean and Utilitarian school, is found in the intuitive conviction of the whole human race, that there is, under the government of a holy God, an inviolable nexus between holiness and happiness, sin and misery; and, moreover, that aside from positive rewards and punishments, in their own nature, the one gives peace, no matter what present suffering it may involve; the other gives torment, no matter what transient pleasures it may procure. But though in moral beings, sin and misery, holiness and happiness, always mutually suppose each other, it does not follow that they are identical, or are so regarded, in the universal judgments of the race. Solidity supposes figure, colour, extension. These are not, therefore, identical. The rational and animal natures coexist in man. They are not, therefore, the same. practice of holiness is the sure road to happiness. Wisdom's ways are ways of pleasantness. It does not, therefore, follow that pleasantness or the pursuit of it, involves all that is implied in wisdom. Nay, the pursuit of happiness, except in subordination to holiness as a good to be sought in some measure for its own sake, is the inevitable forfeiture of it. He that seeks his life shall lose it; he that loseth his life for Christ's sake shall find it. But those who make happiness the only good, often employ the same language as those who make holiness the supreme good, and all the more readily, since happiness follows moral goodness, as the shadow the substance. In aid of this comes the petitio principii, which runs through these volumes. that nothing is good but happiness or the means of happiness. This is the very thing to be proved. It is simply assumed without proof. But when Dr. Taylor asks, in innumerable forms, as if concluding all debate on these subjects, whether that action can be virtuous which does not seek some good, he asks a self-answering question. The answer is conclusive for his purpose, if we grant his postulate, that there is no good but happiness or the means thereof. But it is wholly in a circle and irrelevant for the purpose of proving this, the spinal

principle of the happiness scheme, without which it falls help-

lessly and irremediably.

The exhibition of this theory which we have thus given at great length in the words of its author, is its refutation. On its own showing it subverts the first principles of morals, the intrinsic difference between virtue and vice; and enthrones a shifting expediency in place of eternal and immutable morality. All but seeking the highest happiness of the sentient universe, is classed among things indifferent; good or evil not in themselves, but according to circumstances. In support of this view, Dr. Taylor refers to our Saviour's doctrine in regard to the Sabbath, Matt. xii. 1-13, to prove "that the greatest good is to be done in all cases, notwithstanding the unqualified language of particular precepts." Vol. i. p. 58. The Sabbath is a positive institute as regards the time and form of its observance. Like all positive institutes, the manner of its observance is a thing in itself indifferent, and becomes good or evil according as it promotes or hinders the higher moral and immutable interests to which it is auxiliary. All this is determined and varied, and made binding by the express command of God, according to his infinite wisdom. But does all this serve to show that there is nothing intrinsically good or evil, but a benevolent or selfish purpose—that there are exceptions at the behest of expediency to the intrinsic obligation of veracity, justice, &c.? Believe this who will.

We cannot forbear adding, that if the quality of moral action lies not in its nature, but its perceived tendencies, or consequences to the highest happiness or misery of sentient being, then it must be for ever impossible for men to know the moral quality of their actions further than as they are taught it by the authority of revelation. Says Dr. Taylor: "In respect to the most momentous agency in the universe of causes, moral action, he (the agent) knows what is true, what is false, what is good, what is evil, according to the eternal and immutable nature of things. Act as he may, he acts with a just and adequate view and comprehension of all that need be known, that the great end of all being, of all existence may be accomplished or defeated." Vol. i. pp. 36, 37. Now this is true, if the moral quality of actions be intrinsic and seen to be so.

This quality may be as surely seen by the moral faculty in actions, as beauty or colours in objects by the eye, at the first dawn of intelligence or moral agency. But on the supposition that the right or wrong of actions depends upon their consequences to the happiness or misery of the sentient universe, who of men can calculate the consequences near and remote of his conduct? Or, if it were possible for any man, at what age does the intellect become sufficiently developed and comprehensive for this purpose? When, if ever, can moral agency begin on this supposition? What did Joseph's brethren or Christ's crucifiers know about the bearings of their nefarious deeds on the happiness or misery of the "sentient universe?" They meant it for evil, but God meant it for good. Gen. 1. 20. Does the child, when committing the most common sin of childhood, and conscience-smitten for it, know or think of its bearings on the happiness of the sentient universe? If he did not know that it was wrong in itself, could he ever know that it was wrong at all? And what is the testimony of the universal consciousness of men on this subject? Do they undertake to compute, if this were possible, the consequences of most actions to the happiness or misery of the sentient universe, in order to adjudge, approve or condemn them as worthy or unworthy, noble or mean, right or wrong? Are veracity, fidelity, magnanimity, self-sacrifice, piety, falsehood, treachery, sordidness, selfishness, estimated by this arithmetic? Would it ever be possible to know right or wrong, whether they were doing good or evil that good might come, on such a theory? So far as we can see, it puts moral action beyond the range of possibility.

We omit other comments which this scheme invites, except so far as they may rise collaterally in our observations upon those modifications of Christian doctrine, urged by Dr. Taylor, with which they are implicated.

Deists and Universalists, however, are not silenced, if this whole scheme be conceded; if it be granted that the Divine goodness consists exclusively in benevolence, and that benevolence requires the utmost possible punishment of the wicked, both as regards intensity and duration. The question still arises, if the one exclusive desire of the Almighty be the high-

est or the perfect happiness of the sentient universe, why does he not effect it? Dr. Taylor is not at a loss for an answer. He says, "can human ingenuity devise an answer, or even be authorized to say there can be any other reason, except that a perfect God cannot prevent all sin, even under the best conceivable system, or in other words cannot prevent all sin for ever without destroying moral agency?" Vol. ii. p. 366. He more than intimates that the denial of this inability in God leads logically to "Atheism, Infidelity and Universalism." Vol. i. p. 324. It might be rejoined, why does not God make a delighted sentient universe, without this intractable element of free-agency to destroy or impair it? Or if it be said, that free-agency is an indispensable requisite to high and rapturous enjoyment, how does it appear that God cannot control without destroying it? Says Dr. Taylor, "moral agency implies free-agency-the power of choice-the power to choose morally wrong as well as morally right, under every possible influence to prevent such choice or action." Vol. i. p. 307. "Moral beings, under this best moral system, must have power to sin, in despite of all that God can do under this system to prevent them; and to suppose that they should do what they can under this system, viz. sin, and that God should prevent their sinning, is a contradiction and an impossibility. It may be true that such beings in this respect, will do what they can do-that is, will sin-when of course it would be impossible that God, other things remaining the same, should prevent their sinning without destroying their moral agency." Vol. i. pp. 321, 322. This Dr. Taylor argues does not limit the power of God, because the accomplishment of contradictions has no relation to power. It is not within the province of power to make two and two equal to five. "No more does it imply any deficiency in power on his part, that he cannot prevent in supposable cases, beings who can sin in despite of his power, i. e. moral beings, from sinning under the best moral system." P. 322.

Probably this dogma of Taylorism has contributed to its discredit quite as much as the ethical theory we have examined. To solve the mystery of evil by investing man with a power of contrary choice, superior to divine omnipotence, is hardly more consonant with the feelings of devout Christians, than to restrict

his power of choice to happiness as its object, and self-love as its inward motive. However demonstrative Dr. Taylor's argument may be, to show that we cannot maintain God's benevolence and sincerity, unless we admit his inability to prevent sin in a moral system; Christians will yet believe that there is some flaw in the argument, whether they can detect it or not. The consequences of such a principle are too radical and subversive of the first principles of religion, to allow of its being entertained at all. These consequences are—

- 1. The annihilation of God's providential government. highest class of creature agents are above his control. No power that God can exert can prevent their acting in opposition to his decrees. There can be no certainty or stability in his administration of the government of the universe. A single uncontrollable free agent may turn all his counsels to confusion, and frustrate the plans of infinite wisdom in the realms of providence and grace. The greatest events may often be traced to the will, or even caprice of single persons, insignificant as well as great. No one knows how vast a network of providential events may be complicated with his most trivial acts. Every one can call to mind insignificant circumstances which have apparently shaped his sphere and his destiny. One of the decisive battles of the Revolution was turned in favour of the American arms, because the British commander chose to finish a game in which he was engaged before reading some dispatches sent to him. Says Dr. Taylor, "the annihilation of a single particle of matter would instantly cause some change throughout the material system; nor can it easily be told how long before the world would rush to chaos." And is not any act of a free agent more in itself and its relations than a material atom?
- 2. On this system prayer must be, to a great extent, "empty breath." All spiritual blessings, and nearly all temporal blessings require some action of free moral agents, either in their bestowment or realization. But these are endued with a power to frustrate God's will and purpose. He is dependent upon their permission, which he has no power to ensure, for the privilege of executing or conferring any good which involves their agency.

3. On this system, it is not God who makes Christians to differ from other men. They make themselves to differ. The theory is that God is doing all he can to make men good and happy, but is defeated with regard to a portion, by the exercise of a power to sin, which is an over-match for all the power he can exercise to subdue it. Others do not so frustrate the effort of God to draw them to himself. To whom then are they indebted for the difference between themselves and the ungodly? Surely, if this theory be true, to themselves; and there is an

end of the sovereignty of grace.

4. It is impossible on this scheme for God to work or implant holiness in the soul. It is for a power to act despite all God's power, to decide whether and on what conditions omnipotence itself shall induce it to be holy. There is no room nor possibility for the creation of a new heart and right spirit by the immediate exercise of a divine power upon the soul. The work of the Spirit must be essentially like that of the preacher, sunsory, by the objective presentation of truth and motives. Says Dr. Taylor, discussing this subject, "the direct prevention of sin, or which is the same thing, the direct production of holiness in moral agents by dint of omnipotence, is an absurdity." Vol. i. p. 308. This is a great deal for a Christian theologian to say, but no more than this theory requires him to say. But how does such a view quadrate with those scriptural representations which exhibit God as creating a new heart, quickening those dead in trespasses and sins, as exerting the exceeding greatness of his power upon those who believe, even according to the working of his mighty power which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead? Eph. i. ii.

5. It is obvious that this scheme involves plenary ability to obey God perfectly without divine grace. This is not disguised, but earnestly maintained by Dr. Taylor, against what the church has understood to be the plain averments of the Bible,

and every historical creed of Christendom.

6. No man's salvation is sure on this theory. Whatever may be his present strength of faith, who will dare ensure himself against apostasy, by virtue of any goodness within himself? And while he cannot ensure himself, he has a power

within him which is liable to fall, despite all that men, angels, or God can do to prevent it.

7. For the same reason, there is no security against the fall and revolt of holy angels and redeemed men in heaven.*

For these and other like reasons, this theory can never command the faith of God's people. No apparent conclusiveness of metaphysical demonstration can establish it in the face of those elementary Christian truths which it subverts. The judgment of the church will still be that there must be some flaw in the supposed demonstration, whether it can be detected or not. Even Universalists cannot be brought to believe that God cannot control the acts of moral agents. If eternal punishment can only be vindicated by such a theory, they will regard it as incapable of vindication. They will be confirmed in their soul-destroying delusion. We doubt whether a soli-

* Dr. Taylor argues on the supposition that the only alternative to his theory is, that "sin is the necessary means of the greatest good." This is the alternative adopted by Emmons and some New England theologians. It is the logical alternative, if we take for our "point of departure," the utilitarian scheme, or Dr. Taylor's form of that scheme of ethics. That "sin is the necessary means of good," is for them to maintain who avow it. This is no part of our theology, or of church theology, whatever individual polemics may have promulged. In regard to the permission of evil, we are glad to take refuge in "mystery," notwithstanding Dr. Taylor's protest that such a course will not satisfy atheists.

It is proper, however, that we should recognize what God has been pleased to reveal on this subject. It is quite certain that redemption is the grandest outshining of the perfections and glories of God: and that it was his eternal purpose, that by the redeemed church should be made known unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places the manifold wisdom of God. Eph. iii. 10. It is equally certain that redemption, and God's declarative glory therein, are impossible without sin. Redemption from sin without sin, is indeed a contradiction. The preservation of moral agents from sinning, is not a contradiction. This may throw some light upon the Divine permission of sin, not enough, however, to clear it of all mystery. However this may be, it is no proper use of language to call "sin the necessary means of the greatest good." That cannot be good, or the means of good, which is itself evil and evil only, and requires to be counteracted and frustrated in order to any good whatever. The pollution of our great cities is the occasion of much Christian and philanthropic self-sacrifice for its abatement. This is a great good, which would not otherwise exist. Is this pollution, therefore, properly the means of good, because it is the occasion of noble efforts to neutralize it, which otherwise would be impossible?

tary instance can be found of an Atheist, Deist or Universalist, reclaimed by means of this scheme.

We do not, however, for a moment admit that there is even a respectable show of even a seeming demonstration that God cannot prevent, or that it may be that he cannot prevent sin, without the destruction of moral agency. The alleged demonstration, as we have seen, is that since moral agents must have power to sin, to suppose them prevented from sinning, supposes them dispossessed of the power which makes them moral agents—which is to suppose that moral agents are not moral agents—a contradiction, the accomplishment of which is beyond

the range of power.

This could not assume even the look of a demonstration in the view of one who did not overlook distinctions which Dr. Taylor elsewhere and abundantly makes. It is one thing to have the power to sin in every sense requisite to moral agency-that is, the power to commit sin, if the agent is pleased to do it. It is quite another, that it should not be made certain that he will not exercise this power in sinning. The former by no means involves the latter. But unless it supposes the latter, it is unavailing to support the conclusion built upon it. Has not the Most High consummate powers of moral agency? Yet does not the holiness of his nature make it so certain that he will never do evil, that it is declared without hyperbole, that he cannot deny himself, and that it is impossible for him to lie? Are not the holy angels and glorified saints free moral agents? And is it not made certain that they will never sin without infringement of their moral agency? Will not the saints on earth be kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation without infringement of their moral agency? There is no contradiction then in supposing that it may be made certain that a being who has the power to sin will not sin-i. e. should be prevented from sinning without prejudice to his freedom.* What freedom can be conceived but that of

^{*} This whole conception of freedom as involving in its very nature, a state of equilibration between good and evil, and so a liability to contrary and sinful choices is a superficial, empirical induction from the phenomena of our fallen state. It is contradictory to the normal and rational idea of freedom as it is realized in the most perfect moral agents. For God, for holy angels, for man

doing or choosing as he pleases? Would it lend any new finish or grace to moral agency, to suppose him endowed with a mysterious uncontrollable property of doing or choosing the contrary of what he pleases, or would he be in any manner responsible for the actings of such a power-a whit more so, than for the beatings of his pulse? And is it a contradiction that it should be made certain what it will please a moral agent freely to choose and do? Cannot God do his pleasure among the armies of heaven and the inhabitants of earth, without impairing their moral agency? At all events, what has been done, it can be no contradiction in the nature of things to do. The contradictions which are no objects of power, are in the expressive phrase of Dr. Taylor, "mere thought-things," whose actual existence is neither possible nor conceivable. The making it certain that free-agents will use their freedom in a given way is alike conceivable, possible, and actual.

2. The ground we have taken is fully sanctioned by Dr. Taylor himself. In arguing the universality of God's purposes, (which must inevitably be subverted by the hypothesis we have been refuting,) he says, "who can doubt that physical propensities may be so strong toward a given action or course of action, and the motives or temptations so powerful, that such action will be certain? But if this may be so in one case, it may be in all... None will deny that the voluntary acts of the Divine being are certain, nor that the divine nature is the ground of such certainty. Is it not equally undeniable, that there is in the nature of things a ground or reason why a being of such a nature as God, chooses and acts in every instance as he does choose and act? If so, then the real ground or reason of the certainty of his acts is substantially

restored to heavenly perfection, evil has no attractions. There is in them no oscillation or equipoise between sin and holiness. Perfect freedom even up to the point of perfect spontaneity on the one hand, and immovable continuance in good on the other, are different phases of the same moral perfection. The very fact of a propensity to wrong, having power to act upon the will so as to produce any hesitancy in it between good and evil, or to render an evil choice practicable, is itself a symptom of an inward lapse from perfect rectitude. This view was one of the strong points made by Augustine against Pelagius.

the same with what we affirm to be the ground or reason of the certainty of human action . . . God in this respect made man in his own image." Vol. ii. p. 313. "Every one who acts voluntarily or as a free agent, knows why he acts as he does. But whatever be the reason why one acts in a given manner, is the reason of the certainty of such action. Now that this is a matter of human consciousness, supersedes the necessity of further argument." Pp. 314, 315. "If it be asked, what gives this certainty of the wrong moral action, we may, or may not be able to assign some one antecedent as the cause, ground or reason of this certainty in all cases. It may be the nearness of the inferior good, or it may be the peculiar vividness of the mind's view of it, or it may be any one of many other possible circumstances." Vol. i. p. 195. But is it not clear that all these antecedents which fix the certainty of moral action right or wrong, are within the control of the Most High? And so far as we can see, might they not have been so shaped as to prevent all sin? Is it then asked why he did not prevent it? We do not know. We can only say, "even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight!" Dr. Taylor says, "it is vain, and worse than in vain, to cry out 'mystery,' in answer to Atheists who plead the existence of evil against the being of God." Be it so. We yet deem it safer, more reverent, and more likely to benefit even Atheists, than to deny God's sovereign power over moral agents.

3. Dr. Taylor's ethical scheme is utterly inconsistent with this alleged power to act, despite all opposing power. As has been abundantly shown, it is part of this scheme that nothing can be an object of choice but happiness or the means of happiness. Nothing can be an inward spring or source of volition but self-love, or the desire of happiness. If this be so, how plain is it that those objects must be chosen which are deemed most conducive to happiness in preference to all others. Suppose two objects offered to the mind's election. One is deemed more, the other less conducive to happiness. That by which the former differs from the latter, therefore, is its tendency to happiness. According to this scheme, therefore, it must be chosen, or else choice is made without a motive. What becomes

then of this stupendous power of contrary choice, with power to act despite all opposing power?*

Our readers have, of course, already seen that the plenary ability of sinners to perfectly keep the whole law, is implied and expressed in the parts of the treatise we have already considered. But as this is a chief feature of his scheme, to which in various ways other parts are subsidiary; as the author deemed it indispensable to the due power of the gospel for parrying the cavils of sceptics and unconverted men; as he avows himself most unmistakably in the statement of his own dogma of ability, and in denunciation of the theology of the whole church on this subject, his deliverances upon it deserve more special attention. The following passage reveals his mind with emphasis.

"And here I am constrained to ask, whether in all this theology both Catholic and Protestant, theologians in maintaining the doctrines of grace, have not extensively maintained opinions—philosophical dogmas, unscriptural principles—and held them as essential doctrines of the word of God, which are palpably inconsistent with, and utterly subversive of, God's authority as a lawgiver? Without referring to more remote incongruities on this subject, may it not be said to be a prevalent doctrine of the Christian church from the time of Augus-

^{*} We find at the end of a recent volume, entitled "Evil not from God," by John Young, LL.D., of Edinburgh, and republished in this country by Mason Brothers, of New York, the following note. "While these sheets were going through the press, the Bibliotheca Sacra, for last January, was shown to me by a friend. Amongst others, there is an article on sin, containing a review of a recent work by Dr. Squiers, of America. That work it is my misfortune never to have seen. But it delights me to learn from the review that in one point, the impreventability of sin, Dr. Squiers maintains the view which is put forth in this volume." This is a book of vastly higher ability than that which it refers to as authority. The theory in question has often appeared in past ages, and has as often been repudiated by the church. It is amusing to see these sepulchred heresies unearthed from time to time, and given forth, in all simplicity, as new discoveries. Especially is it amusing to see Transatlantic writers referring to obscure authors in this country, who feebly reflect the opinions which have been alternately broached and refuted by our ablest divines for thirty years, as if they had been equally fortunate with themselves in discovering a new principle in theology, and were lending to it the weight of their authority.

tine, and emphatically in the two great divisions of the Reformed church, known as the Calvinistic and Arminian, that 'God commands what man cannot perform;' 'that man by the fall lost all ability of will to anything spiritually good;' 'that God did not lose his right to command, though man lost his power to obey?' 'The error of Pelagius is, not that he maintained man's ability to obey God without grace, but that man does actually obey God without grace." Vol. ii. p. 132.*

Before proceeding farther, we remark just here,

1. The foregoing is an explicit admission, nay, charge, that the doctrine of man's inability without grace to obey God, is and has been the settled and universal faith of the Christian church. It is, therefore, one of the fixed cardinal doctrines of Christianity, which if anything can, may be regarded and treated as past dispute among Christians, and not fairly to be called in question, except among outsiders.

2. Is it not absurd to assert that a doctrine is utterly subversive of God's authority as a lawgiver, which confessedly has been embraced by the whole Christian church, all the good and holy of earth, all who have recognized and obeyed his authority as a lawgiver? Ought not this decisive fact to suggest to a considerate inquirer that he probably misconceives the doctrine in its import and influence, before he ventures such unmitigated denunciation of it? Is not this proof that it is not so evidently monstrous and repugnant to the intuitive convictions of men, as he maintains?

3. In view of the foregoing, and other statements, we not only regret with his eulogist, Dr. Dutton, that Dr. Taylor should have spent so much of his "precious time" in trying to show his orthodoxy according to the symbols of the church. We are astounded at the courage which could have attempted it.

Dr. Taylor founds much on the statement of the divine law as given by Christ, as "measuring man's duty by his ability,"

^{*} We suspect that Pelagius would hardly have troubled himself to combat such a doctrine as this. Let any one study Neander's analysis and exposition of the Pelagian controversy, in its doctrinal issues, and the inner spirit and aim of Pelagius and Augustin, and he will find himself in little doubt as to the respective sides with which our American New and Old-Schools respectively class. See Neander's Church History, Torry's translation, vol. ii. pp. 5, 64, 626.

when it says, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbour as thyself." Vol. ii. p. 7. This argument is put in a variety of forms elsewhere. His plausible exegesis of this is that it requires man "to love God as much as he can love him." P. 137. That it means all our capacity of love absolutely considered is one thing. Our ability to direct this entire absolute capacity of love upon a particular object for which we have a dislike, is another matter. Suppose that one should command another to love a neighbour whom he abhors with all his heart, mind and strength. If he "loves him as much as he can love him," i. e. not at all, or slightly, does he come up to the meaning of the precept? Does he love him with all his heart? As we have already intimated, this command makes ability the measure of obligation, only so far as the absolute capacity of loving at all is concerned. It does not require men to love with angelic faculties. It requires that amount of love which he would be capable of, were he not disabled by his sin. But it does not recognize as the love of all the heart, mind and strength, such affection as a sinful unrenewed heart can render to God. Can the carnal mind, which is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be, love God with all the heart, mind, soul and strength? But wherein lies its disability? Simply in its condition of enmity against God, i. e. its sin. The inability of the unrenewed soul is its sin. God requires nothing which we could not perform, if our sin did not disable us. Our sinful lusts enslave us. Are they their own excuse? or do they excuse the non-performance of duties to which we should be adequate without them, or do they annul God's right to command the discharge of such duties?

This inability which all Christendom asserts in its creeds, its literature, and still more strongly in its devotions, is simply the inability of sin to conquer and extirpate itself. Of this inability every awakened man is intimately conscious. And he is no less conscious that he is culpable just in proportion to the rooted, invincible strength of his sinful lusts. Dr. Taylor is good authority for the principle that speculation weighs nothing against consciousness. But it is claimed that man is conscious

of power to will either way as he pleases. This is not denied. But sin lies deeper in the soul than these merely phenomenal acts of what is here called will, even in the covetings, the lusts, desires of the flesh and the mind—the HEART. Who does not know that he cannot expel or mortify the deceitful lusts of his soul, inordinate affection, evil concupiscence, covetousness, ambition, wordliness, ungodliness, by merely willing to do it? that when he would do good evil is present with him? Who does not know that he cannot, by a mere act of will, or by any power within himself, or by any resource short of supernatural grace, fill his soul with faith, love, hope and joy in God? But what Christian is insensible that he ought to have these feelings and affections, and that it is his sin to be partially or wholly destitute of them? That the affections and desires are not immediately under the control of the will is indeed admitted by Dr. Taylor himself. Speaking of other objects besides God, he says, "man cannot extinguish all affection in his heart for each and all of them." Vol. ii. p. 192. Indeed, his whole theory of the will implies its inability to overcome and extinguish that "self-love or desire of happiness," which he maintains prompts and determines all voluntary action. But it may be said that these affections, which it cannot suppress, are innocent. That is another matter. Still it proves none the less the impotence of the will to control the affections, and the certainty that the affections-the deeper seat of moral character, as we maintaincontrol the will. Let one whose soul cleaveth to the dust, will that his affections shall be set on things above. Does this volition set them there, propriis viribus?

Dr. Taylor, however, represents all the appetencies of the soul which are not acts or products of will in the narrow sense of a power of choosing between two objects, as "constitutional susceptibilities" to good from different objects, in themselves void of moral character. Accordingly he says, "if it be said that God in regeneration gives man the power to will morally right, or to obey, or produces some other constitutional change in the mind, called a new taste or relish, diverse from right moral action; I answer, that to create any new mental power or property, is not to produce a new moral character, nor that which necessarily ensures such a character; that such

a change in man is never taught in the Scriptures; and further, the Scriptures have not only never taught that man is unable to do his duty perfectly, i. e. to act morally right, but the contrary, in the express terms of the divine law," etc. Vol. ii. p. 21. We regret that this, and all else that we have quoted from the first thirty pages of the second volume, is from a lecture, written as the editor informs us, only six months before his death. The words taste and relish were used by Dr. Dwight and some others to denote what has been commonly indicated by disposition, principle, habit, or by affection and inclination. But they are in no sense "constitutional." It is, no doubt, a property of the human constitution to have some tastes or dispositions. But their being towards good or evil, holiness or sin, God or the world, is not "constitutional." Human nature -the human constitution-remains in its essential properties and faculties, whether any given dispositions which are accidents of it, be present or absent. And is it to be seriously maintained by a Christian theologian, that no such relish, taste, or disposition is wrought in the soul by the Holy Ghost in regeneration, disposing and empowering it to holy exercises, of affection and of choice? On what pretext can it be denied, in the face of those manifold declarations of Scripture, which speak of God's giving, creating a new heart, shedding abroad his love in the heart by the Holy Ghost, of his quickening those dead in trespasses and sins; of our being his workmanship, created anew in Christ Jesus unto good works; of our being born of God, born of the Spirit, etc.? Do not these and innumerable other passages assert a work of God's Spirit in the soul, disposing and enabling it to obey the gospel? It is to no purpose to say, as our author does, that regeneration is a moral change, and therefore must be an act of the will of the subject of it; that the love of God shed abroad in the heart is an act of the person loving, that if God works in us to will and to do, we will and do. Pp. 20, 21. That there cannot be a change in our moral state which is not an act of our own will is the very thing to be proved, not taken for granted. That we love is true; but this is in consequence of God's putting in us the disposition or heart to love. And we will and do what is pleasing to him, when he works in us that disposition

which inclines and enables us thereunto. The truth is, Dr. Taylor and his adherents persistently confound regeneration and conversion-the work of God renewing the soul with the act of man, flowing from this renovated state, in which he believes, repents, turns to God, and does works meet for repentance. Surely when men are turned they repent. When God gives faith, they believe. When he begets them unto a lively hope, they rejoice in hope. This is something far higher than Dr. Taylor represents it-"no other than a change by a sinful moral being, of his own moral character." P. 22. Nor is it, as he would have us understand, "to transform the trees of the forest, or the stones of the street, into moral agents; or to change the physical properties, or physical laws of things created-things, including man himself, pronounced by their Creator to be very good." P. 23. Such language exposes nothing but its author's ignorance of orthodox doctrine. It is not trees or stones, upon which God puts forth this "working of his mighty power," but rational, voluntary, sinful, immortal men. Nor does he make them herein moral agents. They are such already, although "corrupt according to deceitful lusts." Nor are the physical, or other laws of man's being changed. This change, though supernatural, is not a miracle contravening the laws of nature; it is wrought in harmony with the laws of our corporeal and spiritual, our rational and voluntary nature. Much less does it change aught that God pronounced very good. It simply eliminates the corruption and blight with which man's sin has degraded and deformed that which God pronounced very good. It does not create new "constitutional" faculties which did not before existfaculties of intellect, sensibility or will, in which sense Dr. Taylor often uses the word "power"-but it removes the moral vitiosity, which disorders and depraves the action of these faculties, whereby they are "indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good."

Truth is very apt to assert itself even in the thought and speech of those who impugn it. The doctrine of the church has been that sin is self-perpetuating. "He that committeth sin is the servant of sin," and can only be liberated from his bondage, even though it be a willing bondage, by Divine grace.

Dr. Taylor describes the "selfish preference," as "alike ceaseless in its activity and duration." Vol. i. p. 28. He maintains that the moral agent is called upon "to choose God, or an inferior good as his portion once for all. The transgressor does in his first act of sin become ipso facto, an eternal rebel against God." Vol. ii. pp. 230, 231. Again: "It is true indeed, that the natural man, the man enthralled by grovelling appetite and passion, discerneth not the things of the Spirit, neither can he know them. Such a man under such a mental tyranny, must be a miserable interpreter of the lively oracles of God. His very intellect, by the bad dominion of this state of mind, is not only unfurnished with the first principles, the very elements of successful interpretation, but is stupefied and cramped as to all vigorous action on such subjects. The soul's constitutional discernment is peculiarly blunted in respect to the beauty, and weight, and excellence of Divine realities, and disqualified for that perception which is necessary to give them their practical influence. In this state of sinful enthralment, the man cannot appreciate, nor apprehend, nor successfully judge of the things of God's revelation." Ib. p. 216. To our view, there is more of vital truth in this simple statement than in all the rest of his toilsome reasonings about ability. We only wonder at his life-long efforts to rear a fabric which he so unceremoniously strikes down at a single blow.

Of course, the denial of native sinfulness and of all sin, until the age of developed moral agency, when the moral agent can see the consequences of his act to the happiness or misery of sentient being, is implied in the theories we have been considering. But as this topic is not emphasised or elaborated in

these volumes, we omit specific comment upon it.

On no subject is Dr. Taylor more earnest or denunciatory of standard theologians, than atonement, justification, and connected topics. We have already seen features of his ethical system, which must of themselves undermine the doctrine of the church on this subject. If there is no good but happiness and the means thereof, no evil but misery and the means thereof; if holiness has no intrinsic desert of approbation and favour, and sin no intrinsic demerit; if God's moral government is administered solely for the purpose of accomplishing

the highest happiness of the universe, requiring obedience and prohibiting disobedience, solely as a means to this end; if the innocent, without their own consent, and the guilty might rightly be made to change places as to reward and punishment, provided this would enhance the happiness of the sentient universe; if justice is only a specific form of benevolence; of course, the very fundamental ideas on which the received doctrine in regard to Christ's atonement rest, and by which alone it can be explained, are utterly subverted.

We have no space for a minute examination of Dr. Taylor's positions on this subject. His theory, with some modifications, is the governmental scheme introduced by the younger Edwards. The distinctive characteristic of this scheme is, that it treats the atonement exclusively as a device of state, to render the pardon of penitent believers consistent with the authority of law, and the highest happiness of the universe, and not at all as a provision required by the inherent turpitude and ill-desert of sin in discharge of the demand of justice, and the threatening of the law. The scheme is reasoned out mostly on the principles which underlie human governments, between which and the government of the infinite God there is a partial analogy, and, at the same time, an immense difference. The very idea of satisfaction for sin seems abhorrent to Dr. Taylor, and he devotes pages to the denunciation of it, or rather to a figment of his own imagination than to any recognized idea which this term is employed to indicate. He reasons that the claim of the law is obedience, and that this can never be satisfied in case of disobedience. "It is inconceivable and impossible, that a perfectly benevolent lawgiver should be satisfied with sin, and with the infliction of the legal penalty on transgressors, as a substitute for their perfect obedience and consequent perfect blessedness." Vol. ii. p. 141. Is it really necessary to say, that it is no part of the doctrine of satisfaction that God is satisfied with sin? It is because he abhors it, that when it is committed the very rectitude of his nature impels him to manifest that abhorrence by visiting upon it its proper deserts of indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish. If it go unpunished, if it be treated like innocence and virtue, our intuitive judgment is that injustice is done, that there is a lesion in the moral

system, a derangement of moral relations. The criminality of sin, of course, cannot be obliterated. The only possible compensation or reparation of the evil of it is punishment. This justice demands. Without it, it is unsatisfied. So the lawthe articulate expression of eternal justice—is not satisfied with sin; but if sin be committed, it is unsatisfied without the infliction of the penalty it denounces. This punishment the sinner owes to the law and justice of God, to him and his kingdom wronged by his sin. So it is due from him. He deserves it. So it is to him. The claim of justice is satisfied with its infliction, and with nothing else, certainly not with the sin which deserves it. So it is styled a debt, i. e. a thing due. Satisfaction in this sense is rendered when this penalty is discharged, either by the offender or a satisfactory substitute. These conceptions harmonize with the representations of Scripture. It tells us of every transgression receiving its just recompense of reward, Heb. ii. 2; that it is a righteous thing in God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble his people, 2 Thess. i. 6; that he will recompense; that he will repay fury to his enemies, Isa. lix. 18; vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord, Rom. xii. 19. If such language does not import the intrinsic ill-desert of sin, and that God will visit upon it the penal recompense which is its duc, then it seems to us impossible for language to express these ideas.

Consonant with this is the constant representation in the Scriptures of the effect and intent of Christ's death. They tell us that he suffered the just for the unjust; that for the transgression of God's people he was stricken; that he bare our sins, and became sin and a curse for us; that he purchased, redeemed, ransomed us with his own blood. If these phrases do not import that he bore the punishment, and discharged the obligation to, or debt of suffering, which our sin had incurred, then how can language do it? And why did he this? "That God might be JUST, and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." Dr. Taylor allows himself to say more than once, that the punishment of sin on account of its intrinsic demerit, or for any purpose except the promotion of happiness, is "beyond the capacity of infernal malice." Vol. ii. p. 278. And is it "more than infernal malice" to render to sin its just

recompense of reward? If it be wicked to punish sin for its intrinsic demerit, can it be right to punish it for the public good—to do that which is in itself evil, that good may come?

But not only does Dr. Taylor say that God cannot be satisfied with sin, which, in the sense of approving it, we know to be impossible; he indicates that God cannot be "satisfied with such results of a moral government," as are finally developed under the present administration; that sin "impairs his blessedness," that he has been "crossed and thwarted in this highest, greatest design by sin." Ib. pp. 142, 146, 147. We shrink from this limitation of the power and blessedness of God. Our God hath done whatsoever he pleased—his counsel shall stand and he will do all his pleasure. Even the Eternal Son, after all the crying and tears of his earthly agony, shall see of the travail of his soul and be SATISFIED. He is blessed over all, for ever. Even to dwell at his right hand, is to receive the fulness of joy evermore. What! are the grasshoppers of earth, the nations that are less than nothing and vanity, to thwart the designs and impair the blessedness of their Maker? Is this the God of the Bible, and our God?

Dr. Taylor thus portrays the orthodox scheme of atonement

and justification:

"It maintains that God, in his sovereign supremacy and right, constitutes a mystical union between Christ and the elect whereby they are one moral person! That in consequence of this constituted union, God imputes the sins of the elect to Christ, and in his sufferings and death inflicts the legal penalty of their sins on him; that he also imputes the righteousness of Christ to them; that by these acts of imputation and mystical union, the sins of the elect become as really the sins of Christ as if he had committed them, and the righteousness and obedience of Christ become as really the righteousness and obedience of the elect, as had they rendered it; that thus every justified sinner is regarded, and considered and treated, not merely as if he had, but as having really and truly-in re ipsa-in his own person never sinned, but perfectly obeyed the divine law; and thus every justified sinner having in actual verity fully met and satisfied and sustained every claim of law and justice, can meritoriously claim, before God, justification

and eternal life." Vol. ii. pp. 155, 156.

Dr. Taylor is unsparing in his invectives against the scheme above misstated. He speaks of "sovereign acts of necromancy, called constituting a mystical union, imputation," p. 173; of "the mystical absurdity of imputing and thereby making the righteousness or obedience of one subject of law, which could only satisfy the claim of law on himself, the righteousness or obedience of others," p. 144; of its making "known phantasms realities, and known realities phantasms." "Can an all-perfect lawgiver by sovereign prerogative make eternal truth falsehood, and eternal falsehood truth? Can he by sheer despotic authority set at defiance, transmute, abolish every principle of eternal immutable rectitude, and substitute its opposite in the actual administration of his government? Can he by his mere sic volo make myriads of beings one being, and yet each to retain his personal individuality-make one perfeetly holy being to deserve the legal penalty due only to these sinful myriads, and make these sinful myriads perfectly righteous by the perfect righteousness of one, regard such an exploit and its effects as a reality, proceed to adjudicate the retributions of eternity on the basis of such transmutations, and yet reign in the glory of his justice and in the majesty of his authority?"

"Some may think that to ascribe such views and opinions to wise and good men requires an apology . . . I have no apology to make for these representations, except my own full conviction of their truth." Pp. 160, 161. By these weapons, and the stereotyped cavil that if the penalty of sin be discharged by Christ, there is no grace in the forgiveness of the sinner, twisted into manifold forms, and hurled with remorseless violence at the explicitly enounced doctrine of the symbols of the church, and as we think may be easily shown, of Scripture—the mystical union of believers with Christ, the imputation of his righteousness to them and of their sins to him are assailed. Our principal object is to show Dr. Taylor's attitude and animus unmistakably. While an entire article or volume might easily be written in reply to his extended arguments, our limits constrain us to the briefest possible refutation. This

will be for the most part accomplished by correcting his misrepresentations of the scheme on which he heaps such unmeasured

obloquy.

1. He says that the mystical union he opposes makes Christ and believers "one moral person." If this phrase is used literally, the word moral is a pleonasm. A person ex vi termini is a moral being. But what is charged is that "mystical union" involves the contradiction that a plurality of persons are made numerically one person. What author or authors may have represented Christ and his people to be one person we know not-although we recollect some phrases quite analogous in Crisp and other Antinomian extremists-but we do not now remember such phraseology in standard divines or confessions. If used at all, by standard theologians, it is used in a metaphorical not a literal sense-a use for which we have the authority of Dr. Taylor himself, in an analogous but much weaker case of mutual relationship. He says, "as a matter of convenience in the use of language, we may conceive of the public or a community as a moral person." Vol. ii. p. 266. Surely no Christian will deny that the union between Christ and his people is more intimate and profound than that between the members of a civil community. And suppose that the advocates of mystical union had been unfortunate in their illustrations, is this more than what often happens with regard to important truths, or does it in any manner impair the overwhelming proofs of such union? There is not merely the natural union in that he took part of our nature of flesh and blood, and is our brother; not merely the federal union whereby he stipulates for us as our surety and with us that whosoever believeth in him shall not perish but have everlasting life; there is the mystical union constituted by the Holy Spirit, which dwelt in him without measure, dwelling in and vitalizing his people with a spiritual life, common to him and them, so that he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit: Christ is our life; he liveth in us; we are quickened together with him; he is the vine, we are the branches; he the head and we his body, yea, members of his body, his flesh and his bones. One form in which it is shadowed forth, is the marvellous union of husband and wife, whereby, "they two become one flesh." Let those who will, stigmatize this mystical union between Christ and his church as a "mystical absurdity." It is the well-spring of our salvation and the life of our life. To us it is a great mystery. We

speak concerning Christ and his church. Eph. v. 32.

2. Dr. Taylor sets forth that imputation implies that the "sins of the elect become the sins of Christ as really as had he committed them," and in like manner the righteousness and obedience of Christ become those of the elect. This language may mean more or less. But it is fitted and probably designed to convey the impression that imputation implies the contradiction that the moral acts and dispositions, whether good or evil, of one person, become those of another person; or are regarded and considered as those of another person, inherently. Now is it necessary to iterate for the thousandth time, that imputation means to reckon to the account, as a ground of judgment and treatment, not the transfer or infusion of personal qualities? Let any one examine his Bible from beginning to end, and he will find that the word impute always has and must have this meaning, and the words translated impute. are sometimes translated by the equivalent terms, "count," "reckon to the account of." "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." Does not "impute" here speak its own meaning, which is not to transfer or infuse, but reckon to the account of? "The blessedness of the man unto whom the Lord imputeth righteousness without works." Does this mean the communication of inherent righteousness? Or does it not mean, most indubitably, reckon righteousness to his account as a basis of judicial treatment? Whose or what righteousness? The man's own? How then can it be without works? Is it no righteousness at all? This is the contrary of what is affirmed. What is it then but the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all, and upon all them that believe-that obedience of one by which many are made righteous? That righteousness of one which is to all men (who believe) for justification of life? This does not make his righteousness ours, morally or inherently; but ours only in its title to reward. or as a ground of justification. As well might it be said, when a surety pays the debt of his principal, either that the money with which it is discharged is the money of the principal, or

that it is not counted to him as a discharge of his debt; or that when a father pays a fine which his son has incurred by crime, and procures his discharge, the son really paid it, because it is reckoned to his account as if he had paid it; that thus "known phantasms are made realities, and known realities are made phantasms." Imputation in the above sense is plainly and undeniably taught in the Scriptures, word and thing. In this sense and no other, it is taught in our Protestant confessions, and by standard theologians. In this sense the thing enters into the faith, the spiritual life of the church, and is the foundation of her hope, whatever may become of the word. With a grief which we cannot express do we find the teachers of the teachers in Israel tasking powers worthy of a nobler ser-

vice, to impuga and defame it.

And the demonstration from Scripture in regard to the imputation of the sins of believers to Christ is no less cogent. It is certain that he bare the sins of many; that knowing no sin he became sin for us; that on him was laid the iniquity of us all. How? By becoming morally sinful, or having our sins transfused into him, so that he partook of their moral taint and pollution? This will not be said. How then, unless they were reckoned to his account as a ground of his bearing their penalty in our place? Is it said this is unjust? So it would be, unless done with his full and free consent. Is it said, as Dr. Taylor maintains, that it is even then unjust to punish him as ill deserving? So it would be, if he were punished as morally ill-deserving. But if he assumes to himself voluntarily another's just obligation to punishment, out of love to him, what then? Or if this be assailed as unjust, what shall be said of the scheme substituted in its place, wherein all this fearful anguish, at which earth shuddered and the heavens darkened, was inflicted without regard to any sin inherent or imputed? If that is injustice, is not this the climax of injustice? But we cannot follow these tortuous cavils. The controversy is not with us, but with the word of God. Thither we remand the adversaries of imputed righteousness. Besides, whoever else may offer the old Socinian objection, that in this scheme innocence and sin change places, it is not for those who maintain the doctrine of expediency; who ask, as we have already seen, and in a way which implies the absence of doubt, if "absolute and universal misery would follow, unless the innocent were to be punished, would it not be right to make innocence, now become the true and necessary cause of such results, the ground of punishment?" And are such theologians to charge the doctrine that Christ suffered penally, as voluntarily standing in the law-place of his people, and for their sins as having taken them upon himself, with confounding moral distinctions?

It will be said by some, that this explanation of imputation assimilates it essentially with the views of those who deny it, since they hold that sinners are treated as if they were righteous for Christ's sake. But the ground of the treatment is very different in the two cases. Imputed righteousness is quite different from mere putative or imaginary righteousness. It is a real righteousness reckoned to us, of which we have the eternal benefit. Trusting in this, we build on a sure foundation. On this our salvation rests secure without infringement of the law, justice, or holiness of God, but supported by these as well as by his love and mercy. In the other case, it is founded neither on our own righteousness, nor the righteousness of another imputed to us. It is in conflict with the law and justice of God which are both unsatisfied. In the one, mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other. In the other we have the mercy and the peace, but where is the truth and the righteousness? But can there be a doubt, which sets the strongest foundations of mercy and peace, or to which a trembling sinner will most joyfully commit his perishing soul?

As to the objection, that if justice is satisfied, there is no grace in the sinner's pardon, put in endless forms, it has been answered a thousand times. It was mercy that provided a ransom for him, so that he could be saved without infringement of justice. Is it any the less mercy, because at a stupendous sacrifice it saves its object, without compromising the perfections, the law, the glory of God? Although it becomes righteous and just in God, to exercise forgiving mercy towards those for whom Christ has purchased it, and to whose faith he has stipulated it; is God any the less gracious because he is just,

while he justifieth him that believeth in Jesus? Is grace any the less grace because it "reigns through righteousness?" On this subject it is enough to quote from a document once, if not now required to be subscribed by the Professor of Theology in Yale College, a passage, nearly every sentence of which expresses what is vigorously impugned in these volumes: "Christ by his obedience and death did fully discharge the debt of all those that are justified, and did by the sacrifice of himself in the blood of his cross, undergoing in their stead the penalty due unto them, make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to God's justice in their behalf; yet inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both freely, not for anything in them, their justification is only of free grace, that both the exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners." Confession of Faith of the Churches of Connecticut, adopted at Saybrook, A. D. 1708, chap. xi. 3.

Here the whole Deity is known,

Nor dares a creature guess,

Which of the glories brightest shone,

The justice or the grace.

Dr. Taylor objects to this scheme, that according to it "the sinner can meritoriously claim before God, justification and eternal life." On the strength of whose merits? His own? Never. It is the merits of Christ then. Can any but a Socinian fairly complain of this? Or will any evangelical theologian venture to do it? But it is a "claim." How, and in what sense? Is it anything else than a claim founded on the merits of Christ, and in view thereof warranted to every believer by the infallible promise of God? And may not we poor sinners "lay this humble claim" for the salvation of Christ? If we may not, then wo is us—we are for ever without hope!

And what does Dr. Taylor give us as a refuge from sin, and the curse, in place of the strong tower which he would demolish? In order to escape the judicial relations of Christ's atonement, and consequent imputation, much of the second volume is devoted to proving that the law of God is a "rule of action"

but not of judgment." What sort of a law is that which is not a rule of judgment? Is it any law at all, or mere advice? Says Dr. Taylor, "any view of God's sovereignty, of mystical union, of imputation or atonement, which separates from God's perfect law, its penal sanction in respect to a transgressor, annihilates that law for the transgressor's benefit." Vol. ii. p. 172. What hope then remains for the transgressor, unless that penalty can be discharged by an Almighty substitute and surety? This and all other merely governmental schemes say that Christ's sufferings serve the same purpose in the support of law and government, which would be answered by the eternal punishment of penitent believers; and that hence the sin of the latter can be remitted. But does not this separate "God's perfect law from its penal sanction in respect to the transgressor?" And how do Christ's sufferings sustain the violated law, unless they vicariously discharge the justified sinner's obligations to the law? The "absurdities and contradictions" of every kind, which Dr. Taylor so lavishly charges upon the church theology, find their true home and birth-place in his own.

There are various other eccentric theories advanced by Dr. Taylor, which appear to be maintained chiefly for the purpose of giving consistency to his cardinal doctrine, that benevolence as the means of promoting happiness is the only virtue; and that the penalty of endless punishment for sin is defensible, because benevolence requires the visitation of the highest possible misery upon sin as the antagonist of the greatest happiness. Nothing less would prove God's benevolence; hence his fitness to reign; hence prove his authority and establish his government. Punishment, we are taught, consists exclusively in natural evil or suffering, and the utmost possible degree of it. Vol. i. p. 160, et seq. Therefore spiritual death is not penal. Neither is temporal death, even under a legal dispensation, except as it is a beginning and constituent part of eternal wo. Vol. ii. p. 225, et seq. A long disquisition is written to show that no civil punishment except death is a legal sanction. P. 367, et seq. The robber who is punished, but not capitally, "is considered and treated as essentially an obedient subject. He is not considered as actuated by a principle hostile to the welfare and existence of the state, nor as disobedient to the supreme law of the state. P. 377. The only degrees of punishment which this system admits, result from the varying capacity of the subject, not from variations in the positive infliction of penalty proportioned to varying demerit. Vol. i. p. 163.

These and other like crudities ground out by subtle logic from one-sided premises, we must leave to dispose of themselves. It is this process of twisting familiar words and phrases, which bear an established and recognized meaning, to be the vehicles of his peculiar philosophy, which has caused much of the difficulty and embarrassment felt by so many in understanding Dr. Taylor's system. The words justice, due, right, wrong, penalty, legal sanction, good, etc., are illustrations of this, some of them being subjected to an elaborate process of this kind. The difficulty did not arise from any studied reticency, or politic reserve, or from his having an esoteric as distinguished from his exoteric system. Our quotations show, what was so evident to all who knew him, that he was perfectly frank and out-spoken in his opinions. There is no difficulty in understanding his system, for those who are capable of apprehending tenuous distinctions and abstract trains of thought.

We think the foregoing analysis of his system makes it sufficiently evident, why, since it first flowered out in a sudden promise of triumph, it has been steadily withering and dying out of the theological life of our country. As an antidote to the rationalistic revolt of Universalists, Unitarians, and unbelievers generally, against the gospel of God, it is itself too rationalistic. It concedes too much, and endorses too many of their objections to the evangelical system. Instead of disarming them, it puts weapons into their armoury. Rationalism will not yield to a lower potency of itself. It rather feels itself endorsed and largely invigorated by the new theology, and instead of conceding to it, boasts of it as a substantial victory.*

Apologetics constitute an important side of theology. Still, they are only its outworks. Their proper function is to show that the Bible is the word of God, and as such, entitled to im-

^{*} See Ellis' Half-century of the Unitarian Controversy.

plicit faith and obedience. It may also very properly be shown, that what is thus revealed, is worthy of God, and suited to man. But when we proceed as if we were bound to dispose of all philosophic and sceptical cavils, till the rationalistic mind of unbelief is satisfied, and to rationalize the gospel till this result is achieved, we attempt what is a sheer impossibility, unless we explain away the Gospel itself. We let ourselves down from the high vantage ground of speaking by divine authority, truth which commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of God, to the level of mere disputants with the sceptical understanding, which will never want the sagacity to put questions a great deal faster than any body can answer them. Instead of conquering opposition by the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, piercing the heart and conscience of adversaries, we lay aside our divine armour, and go to making terms with them in their own way. The dilutions and modifications of the clear teachings of Scripture, for the purpose of conciliating sceptics, have often emasculated it and invigorated them. When divines sink the authoritative in the apologetic aspect of Christianity, nothing is gained; much is lost. We may well ask in regard to some of these attempts, that "Christianity be defended from its defenders."

This system has been steadily losing ground among evangelical Christians, because it rationalizes some of the first moral truths and Christian doctrines into forms that antagonize with the moral and Christian consciousness. This has been all the more so, as the precise points of collision between this system and the older theology have come to be more fully developed, defined and apprehended in this consciousness. The resolving all good, all right, into happiness and the means thereof, and all our inward impulses to action ultimately into self-love, contradicts, and even nauseates, not merely the Christian, but the moral consciousness. The assertion of plenary ability, the denial of any inability which is not innocent, conflicts with the most constant and intimate experience of the Christian, and with manifold representations of the word of God, which are written, sealed, witnessed on the heart, in that experience. The notion that creatures, by virtue of moral agency are, or are liable to be an overmatch for the Almighty, shocks every reverent feeling, and unsettles the very foundations of confidence in the stability of his throne, and the security of his people and kingdom. The pillars of heaven tremble. The Christian knows that the roots of his sin and of his spiritual life strike deeper than the mere choices of the will, into the desires, covetings, affections and latent dispositions of his soul; and that all achievements of his mere power of choice are perfunctory and unreliable. And he knows that it is in a Saviour who has borne our sins, and taken their curse upon him, in whose righteousness he can stand, and in whose life, by mysterious union to him, he lives, he has peace, hope, holiness and strength, -the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting. Ingenious tirades and hair-splitting cavils against mystical union and imputation are constantly losing the respect of Christian people. We anticipate, therefore, that the publication of these lectures will accelerate and consummate the downfall of the peculiar system they advocate. We say this in no disparagement of their power, acuteness, and even eloquence. They show all these in a degree even unexpected. It is not because they lack ability fully commensurate with the author's fame, but because they reveal clearly and beyond a peradventure what his system is. That system clearly apprehended, the church never has accepted, and never will accept. These volumes will justify, confirm and invigorate the immovable opposition which has so long and decisively arrayed itself against Taylorism.

Much more it is in our hearts to say on this subject, but stern necessity forbids. We will only add, that there are many passages in these lectures in the line of practical application, which are not only highly eloquent, but just. Some of these are majestic and alluring representations of the love of God, fitted to soften hearts of stone. Even in these we miss that fulness of Christ, which wells up from the theology he rejects. They are mostly, however, passages directed to Deists, Universalists, and godless philanthropists, who feign for themselves a God too tenderly benevolent to punish sin, and who ignore or repudiate judgment and eternal retributions. Much sentimentalism and "rose-water philanthropy," are exposed with graphic power, and rebuked with indignant eloquence.

The terrors of the Lord, with other lines of moving appeal, are arrayed with power before the ungodly and thoughtless. It would give us pleasure, if we had room, to transfer some of these passages to our pages. But they are passages having no special relation to his philosophic or theological peculiarities. They would at least, be quite as fully developed from the system he impugns. They are not the new things which are not true; but the true things which are not new. To these we could wish he had devoted himself, instead of developing a new philosophy of moral government by which to explain them. Here lies the fontal source of his errors. And so must it ever be with our human excellency of speech or wisdom. One word which the Holy Ghost speaketh, one ray of divine light shot by him into our sin-darkened souls, is worth more than all that wisdom by which the world never knew God.

We have believed, therefore have we spoken; plainly indeed, but with all that respect for the dead which is consistent with fidelity to the living, and to that, in our view, inestimably precious truth which is attacked in these pages as our readers have seen, in no soft or honeyed phrase. Dr. Taylor has passed beyond these conflicts, and is not under our review. His works are now given to the public for the purpose of moulding its opinions. They are of course on the same footing as other publications, amenable to the bar of impartial and faithful criticism. They compel the defence of what they assail.

ART. V.—The General Assembly.

THE General Assembly met, agreeably to appointment, in Indianapolis, Indiana, on May 19th, and in the absence of the Rev. Dr. Scott, the Moderator of the preceding Assembly, the Rev. Nathan Rice, D. D., was, on motion of Dr. McGill, chosen to preach the opening sermon, and to preside until a Moderator be chosen. Dr. Rice preached from 2 Cor. v. 7, "We walk by faith, not by sight."

The Stated Clerk reported, that he had received official

the fourth fiscal year were scattered over thirty Synods, sixty Presbyteries, and twenty-five States and Territories, another fact ought to be mentioned, viz. that since July, 1855, the Committee have declined to make an appropriation to only five of the 280 different churches that have furnished the necessary information. Four of these five asked for sums entirely beyond the ability of the Committee, and one was a Union church.

Your Committee have continually felt it to be very important to obtain a full view of the destitution and wants of the church, in their department of labour. This information they have sought repeatedly, and in different ways. Finding all other methods inadequate, they, during the year under review, addressed a circular to all our churches with whose condition they were unacquainted. This circular contained, among others, the following inquiries, viz. Boes your church own a house of worship sufficient for its present wants, and free from debt? In building your house of worship, (if you have one,) did you obtain aid outside of your own community? If you are without a suitable church edifice, can you secure one without the aid of the church at large? The replies we have received, and the information we have derived from other reliable sources, enable us to report the condition of two thousand two hundred and sixty-seven churches, or of about two-thirds of the whole number of churches now in connection with the General Assemblv. Of these 2275 churches, five hundred and fifty-three, or nearly one in four, have no house of worship. Twenty-six churches worship in Union houses; one hundred and sixtyeight report their houses of worship as insufficient for their present wants; one hundred and ninety are in debt; seven hundred and seventy-seven had aid from abroad in building their church edifices; and three hundred and seventy-three cannot build without aid from the church at large. We have the names of all these different churches on file in our office.

These simple but startling facts show, more clearly than anything else, the magnitude of the Church Extension work, and we commend them to the earnest attention of the Assembly and the church.

Secretary Coe addressed the Assembly, asking, Will this

Committee likely be able to supply all reasonable demands of the church in the manner for which they were created? He thought it would, for there has been a constant healthful advance in the contributions of the churches—in the first year about \$10,000, the second \$23,000, the third \$25,000, and the present year about \$30,000. This work systematizes the contributions of the church, and turns them to the best account.

In four years 275 churches have been aided at an average cost of \$2,097 each. Such a work seems greatly needed, for about one hundred new churches are organized every year; and out of 2,267 edifices belonging to our church, 937 are more or less crippled by debt, or in insufficient houses. The churches aided lie about equally north and south of Indianapolis.

The Rev. H. J. Van Dyke introduced the usual series of resolutions in the commendation of the Committee, and of the important work to which their labours are devoted. These resolutions were supported by the Rev. Dr. Palmer and the Rev. W. W. McNair. Mr. Van Dyke then proposed another resolution, intended to restrict the application of feeble churches to the Committee on Church Extension, and to discountenance the solicitations of aid for special enterprises. The Presbyteries of New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Allegheny City, had sent up memorials calling the attention of the Assembly to this subject. This resolution gave rise to an animated and protracted debate, and was finally rejected. As might be expected, the pastors and churches to whom these applications are made, were in general disposed to urge the adoption of the resolution, while the representatives of the feeble churches took the opposite side. There can be no doubt that our city churches are very much annoved by the frequency and importunity of applications for aid. Nor can it be questioned that some of these applications are unreasonable. But on the other hand, there must be many cases which cannot be met by any established organization, and where the alternative is assistance or death. It is the prerogative of poverty to beg; the privilege of wealth to give, and its right to refuse. It is best to leave the door open. It is far more that weak churches should be preserved from perishing, than that strong

ones should be spared annoyance. There are many humble spires pointing heavenward through our western wilds, which never would have raised their heads, had it not been for other aid than that which comes through the regular committee.

Foreign Missions.

The Rev. Dr. Wilson, Chairman of the Committee on the Annual Report of the Board of Foreign Missions presented their report.

The Rev. Dr. Lowrie, Secretary of the Board, said that we should consider that our Boards are as much a part of the business of this Assembly as is the North-western Seminary, which, like Aaron's rod, threatens to swallow up all others. It has more than once, in times past, been asked that at least one entire day of each session should be given up to this great work of Foreign Missions. He firmly believes that such a usage would exert a most happy influence on all subsequent proceedings. A great deal of labour is expended in our Annual Report; and yet, after all, it presents very inadequately the subjects treated of. They cannot be satisfactorily disposed of in a brief notice. A missionary's sailing, new fields of labour, &c., thus briefly touched upon, often really deserve to be brought far more fully before the Assembly. He feared we were disposed to put off this great subject with a mere routine show of duty and respect. He wished to call particular attention to the cause for thanksgiving for success afforded us. The work is progressing as never before. Never have there been such indications of the favour of God's providence, and of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on missionary labour. There is India, which was in such a deplorable condition at the last meeting of this body; that country is now at peace, and the missionaries are sending loud calls for more labourers. Yet on account of the return of missionaries, ill health, &c., the number of our missionaries there is about sixteen less than one year ago. When the field is wider open than ever before, this deficiency is greatly to be lamented. Dr. Lowrie mentioned several interesting facts, indicating the operations of the Spirit of God on natives who had never seen a missionary. They had merely received the Scriptures-one had been studying the word of God for six years, and they had come to the conclusion that this was the true religion. Is not this a wonderful indication of the presence of God's Spirit preparing for a great work among that people? What an opening! What a call to the church!

Look, too, at the opening of China—the greatest event of the age. The last intelligence received before he left the Mission House brought information of the conversion of twelve of the Chinese at Ningpo. Look, too, at the opening of Japan. In our Indian missions, too, in our own land, there is much to encourage. But there are missionary brethren here who can speak of these things. He wished the members of this Assembly could be present at the meeting of their Executive Committee, to see the straits in which they are sometimes placed when new missions are called for, or reinforcements, and the state of the funds apparently forbids it. He rejoiced to say that notwithstanding the hard times, the receipts from the churches had been larger somewhat than last year. But the coming year is the year to test the question as to what our church is willing to do to meet the claims of this great object. More young men are offering themselves than ever before, and it will not do merely to give to this Board as much as heretofore; much more is needed. And is there not an imperative claim upon us to listen to the "sound of the going in the mulberry trees," in the signs of the times? He was glad to say that this cause had been steadily growing in the hearts of our people. Twenty-six years ago this Board received but about ten thousand dollars. But still, what are we even now doing compared with what we might do, and ought to do? The greatest discouragement to the Board as to the churches, is found in looking over the tables in the Appendix to the Annual Report. and seeing some of our largest and oldest churches, with able ministers, which are sometimes doing little or nothing for this cause in a whole year. This Board should at least have a hearing before God's people. He would ask, is it not reasonable that this cause should be presented at least once a year. and the opportunity given to contribute to this cause? There have been individual cases of benevolence, which in some instances have been very marked and touching. One of these

occurred lately in the contribution of twenty dollars by the poor widow of a minister. This spirit is a token for good, showing that the Lord is among his people. He hoped that even if the Assembly should dismiss this subject from the house after a short consideration, they would by no means dismiss it from their hearts.

Rev. Mr. Speer, late missionary to China, said when Jesus Christ had shed his blood on the cross, and had risen from the dead, he spake, during the forty days preceding his ascension, about the "things pertaining to the kingdom." Let us do the same. Other subjects here are important, but none more important than this. He had been twice called back from his field of labour by such ill health as he had thought would before this have taken him to the Assembly above.

How changed the aspect of the mission field in late years! When he first went to China some years ago, the first words were, "Kill him!" He never spent such a night of anguish as one of the first he spent in Canton. But that city has since reaped its recompense, and cannon balls have opened the way there for the gospel. He would remind the Assembly that the Chinese are not savages. Even in San Francisco there have been Chinese gentlemen of education and culture, who will compare favourably with any member of this house. Mr. Speer then read an extract from the paper of a Chinese merchant there, remonstrating against the effort to drive them away from California, or interfere with their rights, and protesting against their being degraded in public opinion to the level of negroes and Indians, the article evincing great intelligence and ability. He also remarked upon an appeal he held in his hand, from the Chinese of California to Congress, referring to the teachings of our religion as reason for our showing them as strangers more leniency and kindness, and reminding us that material progress is not everything. You have in this small paper evidence of the high mental character of this people.

Brethren, let us ask what response will be given by our church to the appeals of Providence in the signs of the present times. He rejoiced in the revival, because of the promise it gives of increasing the supply of missionaries, and he rejoiced in that Elders' Prayer-meeting which is held here day after day. It was cheering to see this awakening amongst our laymen.

The Rev. Mr. Gardiner said the eyes of the church, and, to some extent, of the world, are upon this Assembly, and our action on this, as well as other subjects, cannot fail of great influence. He believed there is an increasing interest in this cause, and he believed this results, in some measure, from the diffusion of more intelligence on the subject among our people. We have learned more and more to sympathize with our brethren in foreign lands. He could not refrain from bearing his testimony to the labour and zeal of our brethren who conduct this Foreign Board. The present report he considers the most interesting ever presented to this body. It brings unmistakable evidence that God is doing at least a great work of preparation among the nations for the reign of the Redeemer. He alluded to several of the different countries and stations where the Board's operations are presenting increased encouragement.

Mr. Spring said his heart had been stirred within him as he had listened to the call from our brother, the Secretary.

The Rev. Mr. Wilson, missionary from Africa, said he would read a resolution from the Presbytery of Western Africa, which, whether it was written by a negro or not, he knows there are negroes there who can write in a manner comparing favourably with the papers by Chinese read here this morning. He then read several very well written resolutions from that Presbytery, expressive of deep interest in behalf of the advancement of Christ's kingdom, giving thanks for the revival in America, hoping for its extension to Africa, &c., and calling on their white brethren beyond the waters to come over and help them. This, said Mr. Wilson, is the voice Shall we not listen to it? They appeal particuof Africa. larly for the 200,000 within the boundary of Liberia, but there are millions of heathen around them. And what are we doing? We have nine missionaries in that vast population! According to a like ratio, if carried out in this country, we should have but three ministers of the Old-school church in these entire United States! And there is the same destitution throughout the heathen world. We, as a church, have but seventy-three missionaries in all the pagan nations-about ten millions to

every missionary of our church! God has brought us into peculiar relations to Africa, and that country into a peculiar relation to us. We are bound to no other heathen land by such ties. There are sons of Africa rising up amongst us to go back with the gospel to their fatherland; but this is not enough. We cannot, as yet, leave the work entirely in their hands. There is an imperative need for white labourers, especially to take charge of the education of coloured missionaries

on the spot.

The Rev. Mr. Mattoon, from the Siam Mission, said: This work of Foreign Missions has become the great work of our church. That work is no longer to be kept up by mere sympathy with the sufferings of the missionaries, nor by reports of progress. The duty of the church does not rest upon such considerations, but upon the revealed will of God to his people. He wished he could lay before this body some of the difficulties which are to be encountered in carrying the gospel to heathen lands. Take his own place of labour as an illustration. Imagine a city of 300,000 in the midst of 4,000,000 inhabitants, and with no Christian land bordering on it, with no Christian churches, no Bibles, no Christian publications, and no people of God; but even then you will not have completed the picture. You must imagine also in that city 250 heathen temples, with their 10,000 priests, and their thousands and thousands of images. He had been in a temple containing 16,000 idols. He had seen an idol 145 feet long, surrounded by 900 smaller ones. Yet among this whole people of Siam you, as a church, have but two missionaries! That people have no proper conception even of the terms in which we attempt to convey to their minds the principles of our religion. With this great work of spreading the gospel devolving upon a few, you need not wonder that they cannot at once come back with victory perched upon their banners. A British statesman has gravely stated that you cannot induce the Chinese to give up his "tail," or the Siamese the tuft of hair on his head. How much less will they readily give up their superstitions and religion! But still we believe God's promises and purposes, and we sow in hope. With God a thousand years are as one day. But the great work is to be instrumentally done by the church.

He asks the sympathy and prayers of this Assembly and this church in behalf of the few labourers he had left behind him in the missionary field. Those brethren look with eager eyes for the doings of this Assembly, to see what is said and done here to cheer and help them in their arduous work.

The resolutions of the Committee were then unanimously adopted, and the Rev. Dr. Thornwell was called upon to lead the Assembly in prayer for the cause of Foreign Missions.

Domestic Missions.

Rev. Dr. Musgrave, Corresponding Secretary, spoke with reference to the Report. The receipts for the past year were more than \$11,000 above the average of the previous five years. The financial year was closed, exhibiting a balance of some \$26,000—being about \$8000 greater than the previous year. Under the most favourable circumstances the Board did not expect to close the year with a balance exceeding \$16,000; but, under the providence of God, the sum stated was the unprecedented amount. The appropriations were more uniformly greater than during the five previous years. The receipts were larger than anticipated, yet they were not larger than was desirable. Though God had blessed the labours of the Board, being kinder to us than our fears, let us pray for his continued and increasing favours. It had been the invariable custom of the Board to pay promptly the salaries of missionaries immediately upon their reporting themselves. It was desirable to add a little more to the salaries of missionaries, and to increase their number. In some sections of the country, on account of the failure of the crops, missionaries will need more money. and to plant new missions the resources of the Board must be strengthened. It was proposed to locate an Executive Committee of the Board at New Orleans, and a like one at some point in the North-West. In that case we shall have a Secretary at Philadelphia, to superintend the work in the East: a Secretary at Louisville; a Secretary at New Orleans, and a Secretary at Chicago, or at some other North-western pointeach superintending the work of his especial region. The Board was not in want of machinery-it was in want of men. The demand for home missionaries was greater than the supply. We must pray to the Lord of the harvest that he would send forth more labourers. The number of candidates for the ministry was increasing, for which he thanked God. He proposed that the Board pledge themselves to commission every man recommended by a Presbytery. We can only use what we have got. We cannot distribute \$200,000 when we have only \$100,000. We can only give what the churches enable us to give, and pledge ourselves to give employment to every man who comes recommended. To be sure, we could not say to A B, Go to Texas, or go to Oregon. He would reply that he would choose his own place. The Board could only offer fields of labour to those who, in the service of their Master, would avail themselves of them. But if every minister was employed, still there would not be enough. The average salaries of the missionaries during the past six years had been increased forty-three per cent. A man in ordinary business who had made this addition to his income would probably consider that he was doing very well. Besides, the Board had increased the number of missionaries, and had a heavy balance in the Treasury. The Board had been instructed by the Assembly to dispense with collecting agents. The plan inaugurated in 1854 had worked admirably. The number of contributing churches had increased fifty a year for the four years preceding the past two. The check during the last two years was certainly to be attributed to the failure of the crops and consequent financial embarrassment. In seasons of prosperity the increase will be renewed. The Board, to fulfil its mission, needs the sympathy and co-operation of the pastors of the church. Let them go practically to work, with earnest prayer to God, and next year we shall have a large advance in our funds to devote to domestic missionary purposes.

Rev. Dr. Humphrey, Chairman of the Committee on the Annual Report of the Board of Domestic Missions, presented their report. They respectfully invite the attention of the General Assembly to the topics which follow.

I .- THE PROGRESS OF THE WORK.

This has been gradual but steady. During the last six years, the number of missionaries has risen from 515 to 600, and the

annual receipts at the treasury have increased from \$81,000 to within a fraction of \$100,000. Within this period, the Board, in conformity with the prevailing doctrine of the church touching the divine ordinance of almsgiving, has dispensed with the agency system, and placed its reliance for funds wholly upon what is known among us as the Plan of Systematic Benevolence. Nothing in the history of the Board is more satisfactory than the successful conduct of its affairs through this transition period.

II .- THE LIMITATION OF ITS PROGRESS.

It must be continually borne in mind, that one of the most serious limitations imposed upon the progress of the work, is the want of labourers. It becomes us humbly and reverently to acknowledge our absolute dependence upon the Lord of the harvest, and then to give thanks to his blessed name, for the recent effusion of his Holy Spirit on our congregations and schools of learning, whereby we have good hope that the Master is about to multiply labourers for his vineyard.

III .- THE OVERTURE FROM THE SOUTH-WEST.

An overture from the Synods of Texas and Mississippi, respecting the missions in that region, laid before the last Assembly, and referred to the consideration of the Board, is on the table of the Assembly, and this Committee submits herewith a resolution on the subject.

IV .- INVESTIGATION PROPOSED.

It is now thirty-one years since the Board received its present organization. In the meantime, changes, every way remarkable, have occurred, in the state both of the country and the church. The territorial limits of the Republic have been enlarged, so as to include Texas and the Pacific coast, and the intermediate region. Many new states have been admitted into the Confederation; vast regions which in 1828 were almost unknown to our geography, have become inhabited by our people; the population of the country has more than doubled. The church also has been multiplied two-fold in all its outward elements, to wit, in the number of its Presbyteries, Synods, ministers, congregations, and communicants. The faci-

lities for the spread of the gospel, moreover, were never before so numerous, nor the fields so broad and inviting. And more than all, the repeated effusions of the Holy Spirit have imparted vigour and purity to the inward life of the church, and are so preparing it for its work.

In the judgment of the Committee, the time has now come when the General Assembly should examine thoroughly and carefully the Constitution of the Board of Domestic Missions to the end, that it may, if possible, be more closely adjusted to the present posture of our affairs, and be inaugurated and equipped for the immense work now before the church in the home field.

The Committee, therefore, submit to the consideration of the Assembly the following resolutions:

Resolved, 1. The General Assembly gratefully recognizes the blessings of the Head of the church upon its Domestic Missions, and upon the labours of the Board to which the care of these missions has been entrusted.

Resolved, 2. The Assembly finds in the history of the Board every reason to cherish the settled conviction of the church respecting the ordinance of alms-giving, and its proper administration by the office-bearers; and it exhorts all the congregations under its care to maintain this ordinance as a part of religious worship.

Resolved, 3. The Board is instructed to establish in the city of New Orleans an Advisory Committee, with a District Secretary, whose duty it shall be to set forward the work of missions in the South-west—the details to be arranged by conference between the Board and said Committee.

Resolved, 4. The Board is also empowered to make a similar arrangement at the North-west, if, after consultation with the brethren in that region, such a measure shall appear to be advisable.

Resolved, 5. The attention of the Board is particularly called to the Pacific coast as a field of missions.

Resolved, 6. A Committee of — members shall be appointed by this Assembly, with instructions to confer with the Board, and report to the next Assembly what changes in the organization and methods of the Board are necessary, in

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order to its greater efficiency and wider usefulness. This Committee is particularly charged to report on the expediency of the following measures:

The reduction of the number of members in the Board, and its organization somewhat after the form of the Committee on

"Church Extension."

The removal of the Board to some place nearer the centre of the Western missionary fields.

The establishment of several Executive Committees and Corresponding Secretaries in different parts of the church, these officers to be invested with co-ordinate powers; or,

The establishment of a single central Executive Committee, with Advisory Committees and District Secretaries, as provided herein for the South-west.

The Committee will consider the question as to how many officers will be needed in the Central Board, and the division of labour among them.

The Committee will also report upon any other matters which

they may find within the range of this inquiry.

This report led to a very protracted and interesting debate. The third resolution, directing the appointment in the city of New Orleans of an Advisory Committee, and of a District Secretary, was met by a resolution recommending, or requiring, the appointment of a similar Committee in the North-west, and of another in California. This of course brought up the whole question of the organization of the Board, and of the best method of conducting its operations. In a matter of so much importance, and involving so many interests, personal and ecclesiastical, hundreds of missionaries and their families being directly concerned in the success of the Board, and hundreds of destitute places, each having special claims in the estimation of those immediately cognizant of their wants, two things would seem to be inevitable. First, that some places should think themselves slighted, or unfairly dealt with; and, second, that new plans of operation should suggest themselves as remedies for the deficiencies or neglects which were found or felt to exist under the present system. It is wonderful, therefore, that the Board of Domestic Missions has not been pulled to pieces by these conflicting forces long ago. Our other Boards go on comparatively unobstructed. They sail in a calm and open sea. But the Board of Domestic Missions has to navigate amid a thousand islands and shoals. Every member of the Assembly has a right to be a pilot, and every one tries to get his hand on the wheel. This is natural and unavoidable. The good sense and piety of the church have hitherto, by the grace of God, preserved the Board from being shipwrecked, and from the necessity of altering its principles and modes of operation at every successive meeting. Every little while, however, there is more or less of a storm. Now California is neglected, or the South is overlooked, or the claims of the North-west inadequately met. Sometimes the Board goes too fast, and gets into difficulties, so as to be unable to meet its obligations; sometimes it goes too slow, and fails to spend even the money in its treasury. Some propose to meet all difficulties by removing the seat of the Board; others by destroying all centralization, and having independent committees, north, south, east, and west, and north-west, and south-west. Others again think the Board a nuisance, and insist that all we need is a committee. Some seem to believe that five men, if called a Board, will do nothing; but if called a Committee, will astonish the world by their efficiency. We cannot think there is so much in a name. Our missions, whether foreign or domestic, are really conducted by the executive committees of the Boards. The Boards themselves might well be dispensed with, for two-thirds or four-fifths of the time; but occasions must now and then occur, when a body larger than the committee and smaller than the Assembly is desirable or indispensable. When such occasions do occur, if you have no Board, i. e. no body capable of being called together, and devoting days, or weeks, if necessary, to investigation and deliberation, you will be forced to create one, pro re nata. It is impossible that the Assembly can discharge this service. To abolish the Boards, and commit everything to executive committees appointed by the Assembly, is in effect to make those committees in a great measure independent and irresponsible. In Scotland, they have committees, and no Boards, intervening between them and the Assembly; but they have a standing commission of the Assembly-a body not larger than one of our Boards-always ready to exercise a supervising and controlling power over these committees. If we do away with Boards, we hope we shall carry the matter

through, and have a commission.

It is very natural that brethren, living in the midst of our destitutions, should think that a committee near at hand would be more efficient, and more ready to listen to their applications, than one located a thousand miles distant. The appointment of such committees, as it appears to us, would tend to the following results: 1. To supersede the Presbyteries in their appropriate work. Those Presbyteries are on the ground; they know their own necessities, are alive to their own wants. To place over them a committee appointed either directly or indirectly by the Assembly, is to take out of their hands their proper duty, and lay the burden upon a body not so well able to bear it. 2. These committees must be either advisory or self-determining. If the former, they are unnecessary and cumbrous; if, on the other hand, they have authority to commission and locate missionaries, and determine their compensation, then it will be impossible to have a common treasury. No one committee can know what resources are at its command, or how far other committees have drawn on the common stock. All unity of action must be destroyed. A committee in one district may expend or promise five or ten times the sum to which it is entitled on a fair division of the resources at command. 3. This must inevitably lead to each committee being thrown on its own resources; and the very idea of a common life in the church, and a common obligation pressing all parts equally, must be given up. The West must depend on the West; the South on the South; and the East on the East. Instead of these committees, with their several organizations, involving a great outlay of time and money, we see not why every desirable object may not be attained by the appointment of exploring agents. Agents for the mere collection of money are unpopular and unnecessary, under the operation of an effective plan of systematic benevolence; but agents may be needed, whose duty it shall be to explore each an extended district, assist in the organization of churches, in exciting and directing efforts for the raising of funds, and especially in reporting to the executive committee of the Board the most eligible places for missionary labour. If the church is one, it must act as one; and this supposes a central administration, a common treasury, and an equalizing distribution, so that the abundance of one part may supply the deficiencies of another.

Besides these objections which had reference to the organization of the Board, there were others bearing on its mode of action and the conduct of its officers. These were urged with a great deal of warmth, not to say acrimony. Of the justice of the charges thus presented, we know nothing more than can be learned from the report of the debates on the floor of the Assembly. And we think it due to the Board and its officers to say that, judging from the data thus afforded, the charges were triumphantly met by the Secretary, Dr. Musgrave. The power of that gentleman in debate, which has so often been exhibited in our ecclesiastical bodies, as well as his energy, diligence, and skill in the discharge of his official duties, prove that he is one of the ablest men in the church. His title to be thus regarded was fully vindicated by his speech in the last Assembly.

Any man who occupies a public office in the church, whether as pastor or secretary, may easily satisfy himself what are the moral principles which should govern brethren in bringing charges against one of their own number. He has only to ask himself what would, in his estimation, justify a man in arraigning him before the public or an ecclesiastical body, for his official conduct. He would doubtless say-1. That the charges should be grave and specific. He would feel aggrieved, should any one rise in Presbytery, and charge him with want of wisdom in his dealing with this or that inquirer, or with neglect of preparation for some particular duty, or with the vague and general fault of lack of energy, diligence, zeal, &c. If a congregation is dissatisfied with a pastor on such general grounds, they can obtain redress by requesting him to resign; or if the church is convinced that one of its executive officers is deficient in ability or diligence, it is easy and proper to put a more efficient man in his place. But any pastor, professor, or secretary, would feel in his own case that charges, which are either trivial or indefinite, should not be publicly presented. 2. He would also feel that any charge thus exhibited, should

be well ascertained and authenticated. 3. That not only should all proper means be used to ascertain the truth of the charge, but to redress the evil complained of, before an appeal is made to the church, or to the public. These are not arbitrary rules; they are moral principles, and their violation must work manifold evil. So far as the accuser is concerned, it injures his character and his reputation. It is not enough that he is a member of the Assembly, having a right to call its Boards and officers to account. That is not the point. The question is, How does he exercise that right? Does he submit to be guided in the exercise of his admitted prerogative, by those moral principles which he expects and demands should be observed by others in their conduct towards himself? Nor is it enough that he disclaims all unworthy motives, and professes his attachment to the Boards, and his zeal for their purity and efficiency. All this might be said by any one who should rise in Presbytery and deliver a harangue against the inefficiency, want of zeal, or success of one of his fellow-pastors. Such professions are altogether inoperative in arresting the judgment which every fair-minded, conscientious man pronounces on him who indulges in a public assembly in trivial, uninvestigated charges against the ministers and officers of the church. is not the only evil. Such charges tend to weaken confidence, and thus to cripple the Boards in all their operations; and must tend to drive from their service men of ability and feeling. How far these principles were violated by some members of the last Assembly, every one must judge for himself.

Dr. Musgrave was not a member of the Assembly, but was permitted to speak in reply to the accusations directed against his policy and conduct. The following is the report of his remarks as found in the *Presbuterian*.

Rev. Dr. Musgrave expressed thanks to the house for the courtesy extended to him, in permitting him to address the Assembly. He had not expected to speak again, and therefore had not taken notes of the speeches that had been made, and would have to depend upon his memory; and if he had mistaken, or did not remember aright, he begged to be corrected. He was reminded of a saying of Dr. Nevins, that if Christianity had not been of God, it would long ago have been destroyed

by its friends. He could apply the same remark to the Board of Domestic Missions; if it were not of God, it had long ago perished under the attacks of its friends. He was glad, however, that the brethren had delivered themselves so freely. They doubtless feel better, and I do not feel worse. Indeed, he sympathized with much that had been said; and with those who had said it. He knew that our missionaries who have come here with complaints, and with a little disposition to find fault, are honest and earnest in all they say. They have difficulties and trials, and are apt to think that more might be done for them. But it is our grief, as well as theirs, that we are not able to do for them all that they need. We would fain increase their number in every field, and increase their allowance to their entire satisfaction; and if the Board had it in their power to do so, it would be done. But the means are not forthcoming.

He would have to pay his respects to the speakers one by one; not that he meant to be personal, but as he had taken no notes, he would have to aid his memory by associating the several persons with what they said. He had no personal feelings to gratify; he felt no resentment at the somewhat severe criticisms that had been passed upon the Board. He doubted not the brethren honestly felt that they ought to say what they did; and he should reply to them with candour and frankness. And first, as to the brother from Minnesota, (Mr. Riheldaffer,) who complained that that field had been neglected, and that a due proportion of funds had not been allowed them. He would simply state the fact, that owing to the importance and alleged expensiveness of that brother's particular field of labour, the Board had allowed six hundred dollars-just three times the usual amount to that brother-and continued all he asked till his church became self-sustaining. And in no instance that he knew of had the Board failed to do for other parts of that same general field all that, in the circumstances, and with the means at their disposal, it was possible to do.

He next paid his respects to the gentleman who sat just here (near the speaker,) the gentleman from Brooklyn (Mr. Van Dyke.) That gentleman, in a tone which the speaker could not interpret, had said that we had not granted all the

applications that had been duly made; he gave particularity to the phrase "duly made." So far as he recollected, there was no application refused which had been duly made. The brother denies this, and referred to cases to substantiate his denial. The brother took exception to the use of the phrase, "so far as I recollect." Now, he had a frank explanation of this. You will remember that we have two Executive Committees, one at Louisville, and one at Philadelphia. Applications are made for missionary aid to both, and it is difficult for the members of one Committee to have such intimate knowledge of the details of the transactions of the other, as to be at all times able with certainty to recollect, so that we had to speak with the caution used. And you will remember that we expect the Presbyteries to recommend all the appointments made within their bounds, and no application is duly made unless made through the Presbytery, and according to the rules laid down for the direction of the Board, and approved again and again by the General Assembly. So that it will be perceived the phraseology which was repeated with such mysterious peculiarity, is just such as our rules and circumstances render proper. He had met Dr. Hill, of the Louisville Committee, to-day, and inquired of him whether he recollected of any application having been rejected by that Committee, and he assured him that he believed none had been rejected. There was another thing in that speech that needs explanation. It was that we had tied up that big balance at the end of the year, and had accumulated it by refusing to appoint missionaries upon proper application, and by curtailing the allowance of missionaries. Now, he had to say that neither was true. It was impossible for such a state of the case to be true, as the books will show. Dr. Musgrave went into an explanation of the receipts of the Board, to show that at one part of the year the receipts had fallen off. During the first two months they had fallen off between \$6000 and \$7000, and during the first ten months had fallen off \$14,000 up to January. And, indeed, the balance which we are blamed with hoarding, was accumulated during the last two months of the fiscal year, and mainly during the last.

Now in this connection he wished to say another thing—that the impression was attempted to be made, that whilst we had

that large balance on hand the Board had rejected three or four applications to go to California, and had stinted the missionaries this side of the Rocky Mountains. Now, that there were so many applications was news to him. He did not know it before, and believed it not to be true. There was but one, a student in one of our Theological Seminaries, who applied to the Board to be sent to California, at the time the receipts had so fallen off as to embarrass our operations. He was not yet through his theological studies, and we said to him, If you will wait until about January, and the funds will warrant, we will send vou. Some time after we got a letter from this young man, informing us he had a prospect of settlement in New Jersey, and that he wanted to know whether he was to be sent to California, or had better accept a call in New Jersey. In view of our circumstances, and in view of some things personal to the young man, the Executive Committee advised him to stay in New Jersey; and this is the case out of which so much has been made. He adverted to the criticism upon that part of the Report which referred to the operation of the plan of Systematic Benevolence. It had been laid to the charge of this Board by the brother from Brooklyn, that there were seventeen hundred churches that had not adopted that system, and that in our report we alluded to the financial crisis as accounting for a falling off in receipts a part of the year. But is the Board of Missions to blame if the recommendations of the Assembly are not adopted by the churches in regard to Systematic Benevolence? Why single out the Board of Domestic Missions, and blame us for the fact that the plan of Systematic Benevolence has not done all that could have been desired? Why hold out the idea that the Board of Missions is unpopular because so many churches have failed to contribute to its treasury? Do not other Boards make the same complaint? Did not the Board of Publication make a similar reference to the monetary crisis? Is it candid, is it fair, to draw such an inference—that because so many churches have failed to contribute, it is because of dissatisfaction with the administration of the Board, whilst other Boards complain of the same thing? Is not the number of churches that do not contribute to the other Boards as great as that which fails to

contribute to this Board? Why not give the statistics of all the Boards in this behalf?

Let me pay my respects, said Dr. Musgrave, to the gentleman from Wisconsin, (Mr. Heckman.) There was a gentleman living in the State of New York who wished to go to Wisconsin. The Synod applied to the Board to appoint him the itinerant missionary of the Synod. They asked the Board to give \$600, and he was to gather \$200 from the field; but we were to underwrite for the whole \$800. We demurred to do the latter, but finally consented, upon being assured that we would be asked to pay only the \$600. We were obliged, however, ultimately to pay the whole amount. The Synod asked his re-appointment next year; the Board declined doing it on the same conditions; but at the request of a Presbytery, commissioned the same man as a missionary at Stevens' Point, with a liberal allowance. Dr. Musgrave gave a full detail of this matter, which the reporter could not catch entirely. He proceeded to show that, of all the States within our bounds, Wisconsin had a larger proportion of men and funds bestowed upon her than any other State. And it was hardly grateful for them to come up in such a fault-finding spirit. And yet he could not much wonder. Living out there, and seeing the destitutions around them, they were so absorbed in their own field and their own work, as to forget that there were other fields equally destitute and needing aid. They were zealous, hard working brethren; they were ardently desirous to win souls and spread the cause, and their own field seems so big that they cannot so well see any other. Such earnest asking for more men to be sent he had never heard, and such importunate beggars he had never met. He admired their zeal; but must remind them that the Board cannot give them all the men nor all the money. It is the duty of the Board to equalize, as far as possible, the distribution of the funds; and not withhold from one part of the wide field in order to give more than their share to another.

Now, he would say a word in regard to the suggestion, modestly put forth, doubtless, by brother McNair, that the action of a Presbytery should be final; and that the Board has no right to review the recommendations of the Presbyteries.

Now, it so happens that some of the Presbyteries are almost entirely composed of missionaries. He proceeded to show the practical operation of the adoption of this principle in such cases. The members of Presbytery are voting the amount of salary, not of other men, but of themselves. One brother thinks he cannot get along without so much, and another without so much; and thus they agree to fix the amount of their own allowance from the Board; and if the Board has no discretionary power, it will easily be seen, that so long as there is human nature in man, each Presbytery would be likely to demand more than their proportion of the funds, and if their request is yielded to, others must be left without any. We are willing, perfectly willing, that the committee which has been proposed may be appointed, and may suggest something that may increase the efficiency of the Board. He cared not what modifications the Assembly might make, if they were only wise and practicable. He and the other members of the Board had no selfish interests to subserve; all they wanted was to have the Lord's work in this great enterprise well done.

Let this plan of Systematic Benevolence be adhered to if you think it best. It is of the Assembly's inauguration, and if worked well, will accomplish all you wish. But we are not wedded to it; and if the Assembly can make any improvement either in the constitution or the efficiency of this Board, we shall most heartily rejoice. He had like to have forgotten an amendment offered by his beloved brother Smith, requiring the Board to appoint every suitable man that applies to go to California. If the Assembly deemed it wise and equitable to adopt it, the Board would obey; but he respectfully asked the house to calculate the results of such an order. If the Board shall be ordered to commission all that the Presbyteries in California might ask, and at the rates of allowance which they might think necessary, there would be a trying deficiency, he feared, for the missionaries on this side of the Rocky Mountains, unless vastly larger receipts can be had. Twenty or thirty thousand dollars sent to that State, would leave but a small dividend for the remaining States. To send but fifteen or twenty missionaries to California, would abstract a large sum. We all love the Board of Domestic Missions; even the brethren who have

severely criticised it. Let us show our love by telling of its good deeds, as well as of its failures—by coöperating and building it up, rather than pulling it down.

If, instead of coming here to find fault and complain of the Board for inefficiency, these missionaries had come and gratefully told us of what the Lord had done through their instrumentality; told us of their trials and successes; told us of what the Board had done for them, as well as what they had not done; if they had stirred our hearts by describing the crying wants of their field, and reciting what had already been accomplished, how they would have encouraged and strengthened us, and how much benefit might have been reflected upon them and their labours! But, doubtless, they do feel a cordial love for the Board; and if some of them have seemed to complain, it is rather to be attributed to their earnest zeal to accomplish more, than to any lack of grateful sentiment for what God has done. He thanked the Moderator and the Assembly for the courtesy extended to him, in permitting him thus to defend the Board, of which he is one of its officers; and expressed the hope that the whole discussion would result in good to the cause we all

Of the specific complaints against the Board, the two which seem to have been most strenuously urged were, first, that too large an unexpended balance was left in the treasury; and, secondly, that a young man who had applied to be sent to California, was refused. As to the former of these, it was answered, first, that the sum constituting that balance was in great part received during the closing months of the financial year, and could not safely be counted upon as the ground for enlarged operations; and, secondly, that it was already needed to meet the obligations of the Board. As to the other complaint, it was answered, that the appointment of the young man in question was only deferred at the time of application, and not refused; that it was a personal, and not a presbyterial application; and that there were, subsequently, doubts created as to his fitness for that field of labour. It is perfectly obvious that the Committee cannot be called upon to appoint every one who may offer his services for any particular field, even when such offer is sustained by the recommendation of a Presbytery, much

less when it comes only from the man himself. The Presbytery looks at its own wants; the Committee has to look at the wants of the whole church, and therefore cannot be made the organ of recording and executing the decrees of each separate Presbytery.

The recommendations of the Committee on the report of the Board were substantially adopted. One of their recommendations was, that a committee of investigation be appointed to examine into the organization and operations of the Board, and report to the next Assembly. We wait with no little solicitude for the action of that committee.

Board of Publication.

Rev. Dr. Chapman, Chairman of the Committee on the Board of Publication, presented the following resolutions, which were adopted:

Resolved, 1. The Assembly desire to record with gratitude the favour extended to this enterprise by the Great Head of the church. They would reiterate their sense of the high value of the Board in counteracting the pernicious effects of a useless, vicious, and infidel literature, by disseminating far and wide the seeds of a true theology and vital piety. In these respects the Board of Publication is a valuable arm of the church, and has proved itself to be an efficient and honoured instrumentality in the hands of God's servants.

Resolved, 2. The great object of the Board's organization and efforts is the widest possible circulation of the pure, undisguised, complete truths of God's blessed word. It would use the press as a mighty agency in sending abroad on moral wastes the pure and refreshing streams of light, knowledge, and salvation. It aims to furnish the church and the world a literature through whose pages shall gleam the great and precious doctrines of our Confession and Catechisms—doctrines which have cheered the church in the past, and which constitute the hope of the world in the future. Its publications, whilst cultivating charity, liberality, and the largest measure of love to all who bear the Master's image, still display a cordial, affectionate, tenacious adherence to the distinctive principles which have ever marked us as a church.

Resolved, 3. It gives the Assembly great pleasure to mark and record the increased evidence which God is rolling on the world, of his favour toward the colportage effort. These humble and self-denying men are doing God's work; they deserve and should receive the aid and the sympathy of God's people. With the books of the Board in their hands, and with the love of Christ and of souls warming their hearts, they often, as pioneers, go before the missionary and the minister, preparing the way of the Lord. Thus greatly do they aid in diffusing, amid regions of moral darkness, Christian light and knowledge. The Assembly would therefore earnestly urge on the churches under their care, the importance of this arm of the enterprise, exhorting them to increased liberality in their contributions, that the operations of colportage may be enlarged, and that the publications of the Board may, through their instrumentality, be more widely diffused.

Resolved, 4. The General Assembly with great pleasure notice, among other publications of the Board, "The Letters of John Calvin." They doubt not that this rich and varied correspondence will throw new light and increased brilliancy upon the labours and character of that distinguished servant of God, and his illustrious compeers; that it will be a fruitful source of delight and information to all who are interested in the history of the great Reformation.

Resolved, 5. The Assembly rejoices in the opportunity of expressing its approbation of the efforts made by the Board to meet the wants of the youth of our land, as regards Sabbathschool Libraries. These have too often and long been carelessly, sometimes ignorantly chosen. The imprint of the Board is a guaranty of their merit and character. The publications of this kind are judicious, attractive, and sound. The Assembly recommend, that in the purchase of libraries, either for gifts to feeble churches or for use at home, these books of the Board should have the preference.

Resolved, 6. The Assembly would especially commend The Home and Foreign Record to a more general patronage throughout the church; trusting that in its diligent perusal, members of the communion might catch more of the spirit of

missions and of Christian benevolence so richly pervading its columns. They also recommend *The Sabbath-school Visitor* as a most excellent publication to be circulated through our Sabbath-schools, and among the children of our charge.

Resolved, 7. That in view of the reasonable representations of the Board of Publication, in their Annual Report, the Assembly consider that the performance of the order of the last Assembly, for expunging hymn 336, and inserting some other, had best be postponed till the way may appear clear for a careful revision of the whole book of Psalms and Hymns.

The Committee recommend the approval of the Annual Report of the Board of Publication, and that a copy thereof, with these resolutions, be handed to the Executive Committee

for publication.

Rev. Mr. Schenck, Corresponding Secretary of the Board, said-The Board of Publication is engaged in a great work, though a very quiet one. Its publications go all over the country, and to other countries; yet who can adequately trace them? Probably nearly 4,000,000 souls annually are reached by the truth from the pages of this Board. In the brief period of its existence it has circulated publications enough to have given the gospel to every man, woman, and child in this country. And this truth is the sound, substantial system which we believe, as a church. We do not, indeed, teach our people to be bigots; but we do desire that our children and young people shall be taught to understand and love their own denomination and its doctrines. These publications are also doing a great work in our families. What pastor has not felt their influence in strengthening his hands? How many doubts and difficulties do they meet and remove, which can hardly with propriety be brought into the pulpit! And what an assistance do pastors themselves derive from these publications, in enriching their sermons and elevating the tone of their preaching! The work accomplished by the tracts alone, too, is a most important one. The number of these little messengers sent abroad the last year has been doubled-doubtless owing to the glorious outpouring of the Spirit throughout the land.

As to Colportage, it was reported last year that it had

become necessary to reduce the number of colporteurs, on account of the hard times. The number is now being again enlarged, and he could say the quality of the colporteurs was improved by having dropped some of the more inefficient in the reduction.

As to the receipts, there has been a diminution of sales, owing to the reduced number of colporteurs and the pressure of the times; but the receipts by donations to the Board from the churches exceed the last year nearly \$6000. A larger number of churches have contributed than ever before—the increase over the previous year being somewhat over one hundred. This is very cheering.

The Secretary then earnestly called upon the Assembly, through the churches, efficiently to co-operate in the Board's measures, through contributions, seeking out proper colporteurs, purchasing and recommending the books, and by sincere and humble prayer. Those engaged in this work feel sometimes that it does not receive that share of the prayers of God's people which it should have. How seldom do we hear prayer offered for the press! The power of God's Spirit is indispensable to the efficacy of printed truth, as well as of that which is preached.

The Rev. Drs. Smith and Anderson, and the Rev. Messrs. Graves and Banks spoke in support of the report of the committee.

Rev. Dr. Edwards said he had in his mind some things which he thought ought to be said and heard by this Assembly. We are all here to deliberate as well as to vote. He wished to say that he fully responds to the words of commendation of this Board spoken here to-day. He hopes it will be taken for granted that the Board of Publication is not only desirable, but indispensable. He loves and honours the Board of Publication. He is not a member of that Board, a fact which has some meaning when you remember that a Committee is a transparent body, whilst Boards are screens through which the public cannot always see. His knowledge, therefore, is only that of an outside observer. What he had to say would be simply in the way of suggestion. He regretted to say that some things are omitted in the Annual Report which he would like to have

seen in it. He would like to have known the number of contributing churches, compared with the whole number of churches. He would like, also, to have known the fiscal concerns of this Board in more detail. But he would take the best facts he could find, and say something upon them. Here is a Board calling for benevolent contributions. It receives from \$20,000 to \$25,000, and in disbursing this it spends about \$12,000!about sixty per cent. is thus laid out in working the machinery. Could or would any private publishing concern stand this? Look at some of these expenses. Here is the Corresponding Secretary, who receives \$1000 for general services, and \$1500 more for supervising Colportage; and yet another gentleman is reported as receiving \$1500 per annum as Superintendent of Colportage. Might not the office of Corresponding Secretary and that of Superintendent of Colportage be merged? Then there is a Treasurer at a salary of \$1000 per annum. work was formerly performed gratuitously. Now we give \$1000 for it, although the service requires but three-quarters of an hour a day. Might not this office and that of bookkeeper be also merged.

Then there is the Home and Foreign Record, which has a circulation of only eighteen thousand in our whole church. He would ask whether there may not be private interests willing to clog the wheels of this Record, on purpose the better to promote their own ends? There is also the Sabbath-School Visitor, published in one city, and edited in another-a paper whose character, as well as that of the Record, he deplores as unworthy of the church. Can we not have an editor to take charge of these papers, and make them what they should be?

But there is another point. The Report asks leave to add certain doxologies to the Hymn Book. Now there was an overture offered in the Presbytery of Philadelphia to the General Assembly, asking for this very thing; when, strange to say, the Board of Publication opposed it, and defeated it. Now that same Board comes here, and asks permission to do it themselves. What is the meaning of this? Does the Board intend to edit our book of praise? Yes, sir; they have already done that. They have tampered with the doxologies, and placed 72

them under a new arrangement. These are things which should be looked into. It should have the serious attention of this Assembly, and we should know how this great institution is managed, and how the funds of the church are used. Is this Board of Publication administered with due economy, and with that judgment and wisdom which it demands? The impression is very distinct on his own mind, that the Board of Publication claim to be the peculiar proprietors of our Hymn Book; claiming to edit and alter it at their pleasure. He referred to the several changes that had been made in the doxologies, and endeavoured to support his impressions. The Board, even when the General Assembly direct them to make an alteration in the Book, and specify the change, reply that it will cost something to do it; and instead of yielding obedience to the last General Assembly, they come up to this one with reasons why the former should not be obeyed. He thought this assumption of power and responsibility was incompatible with the control which belonged to the Assembly. He cared less for the matter to be done; the change proposed was not a thing of vital importance, but the principle involved is one of vital importance. If the Assembly is only to be obeyed when its recommendations and directions are agreeable to the Board, the control of the Assembly is at an end, and a wholesome responsibility can never be preserved.

There is another thing. The manner in which the Board manage their distributing operations is not satisfactory. While other similar institutions have a very efficient system of dispersing their books and tracts, by establishing depositories, and employing the trade, this Board concentrates upon the bookstore in Philadelphia almost all their force, so that the efforts to push the publications of the Board into the remoter cities and parts of the country are not such as the exigencies of our cause demand. We ought to spread our publications more widely and rapidly throughout the country, and use all the agencies and means which other booksellers do, to render these publications accessible, and put them before the people. Now, he would do his own summing up. He had spoken of things that had fallen under his own observation, and had not relied upon mere reports. It was with regret that he felt called upon

to say what he had; but when duty was imperative, he could not shrink from it.

1. That this Board is the costliest of our Boards in proportion to the work done and the money received and disbursed. If he understood the statistics published, the per centage was very large. At the same time it least fulfils its mission as an aggressive institution of the church. Whilst other societies are flinging their publications broadcast over the land, we were proceeding at so slow and cautious a rate as to make very little advance year by year. This may be the effect of our maladministration, or it may be attributed to other hindering circumstances; but it became the Assembly to ascertain, if possible, where the deficiency lay. 2. They ought to extend their system of colportage, so as to make it more efficient than it is. So far from doing this, the Report shows that, with increased resources, they have really been contracting this important department. 3. They ought to make a full exhibit of their accounts annually to the General Assembly. As presented, it is difficult or impossible to understand them. They should present a balance sheet, so that the Assembly could be fully satisfied in regard to receipts and expenditures. This, he thought, had not been done, and he thought the Assembly should insist upon it. 4. The Board of Domestic Missions had been blamed for having a working balance in their treasury, to meet the current exigencies of that Board; and yet this Board, with no such prospective demands upon their treasury, had a balance on hand of \$22,000; and he would ask why such a balance should be accumulated by this Board? We must instruct them to trust the Assembly with an accurate and full account of their receipts and expenditures. This only can quiet apprehension, and make the reports of the Board satisfactory. He read some resolutions which, at a proper time, he proposed to introduce, and said he would not further trespass on the patience of the House at present. Brethren had come to him, asking him to embody in his remarks the statements which he had made. He had spoken with the utmost frankness, and with a sincere desire to bring about the more efficient operation of this important arm of the church. It appears that the Board of Publication had been formally apprized that their proceedings did

not meet with universal approbation; and that some inquiries would probably be made during the sessions of this Assembly. A Committee was appointed by the Board to prepare a statement to meet these inquiries, but he had not heard what the Committee had done. He called upon Mr. Charles Macalester, a ruling elder upon the floor of the Assembly, to make some statements of facts in regard to the accounts and transactions of this Board, and he trusted he would give such information as he possessed.

Mr. Macalester said he had been called upon by Dr. Edwards unexpectedly, and at this stage of the discussion he did not design to say much. At a proper time he might go into some detail, but at present he would forbear. In regard to the appointment of a Treasurer, he could explain:-There had been a shock given to the public mind by the defalcation in the American Sunday-school Union; and the Board, in view of the large amount of funds passing through their treasury, deemed it wise to ask security of the Treasurer, and we thought it not right to ask him to give security to such an amount, and at the same time offer him no compensation. The Treasurership demanded a measure of personal attention which we could not ask gratuitously. The concern had been honestly managed, he believed; whether prudently and economically was another question. He hoped Mr. Schenck would be able to make a satisfactory explanation; and if so, he (Mr. Macalester) would have nothing more to say; but was unwilling to be held to silence, unless duty permitted it.

At a later period in the debate Rev. Dr. Edwards said, It has been the tactics of those who have occupied the floor to consume time so as to leave no opportunity for him to speak, exhausting the patience of the House, so that they will spring the previous question. (The Moderator called Dr. Edwards to order for personal reflections.) He protested against the imputation that he has made an attack on the Board of Publication. This is not true. He had merely asked for information, which, as a member of this Assembly, he had a right to. He is behind no man in his love for the Boards, nor in his determination, unflinchingly, to inquire into their faithfulness. As to giving the Board notice of the inquiries he has made here, they are

entitled to no such notice. Are we to be precluded from asking information from them when and where we choose? It has been said that he could have made these inquiries in the Board's office, where he would have been politely received. Yes, they are polite, studiously, ostentatiously polite. They answer questions, though sometimes they may intimate that their responsibility is to the Assembly. We have had a very entertaining speech here this morning by a former Secretary of this Board, (Dr. Smith) against the reduplicated hymns. What connection had all this with him? He had said nothing about these hymns. Something had been said to make the impression that this is a personal controversy. He would say that between the Corresponding Secretary and the members of that Board and himself there had been the most friendly relations. As to his requesting the Treasurer's place for a ruling elder of his church, he had made that application before he knew what he now knows about that office and its salary. For the discarding the Sabbath-School Visitor from his Sabbath-school he must not be held responsible, though he would confess he thought it an inferior paper. As to the matter of the doxologies, he had never received from the editor any such note as has been alluded to. He had received one from the Publishing Agent in the editor's behalf, asking for assistance in making up the deficient doxologies, to which he had replied that his state of health would not permit his attending to that subject, and that the editor was probably more familiar with the matter than himself. He had not entered upon these inquiries in any bad spirit. But after seeing what a flutter he has occasioned, he could not help thinking what a disturbance would be created were he to go to work in good earnest. If his approaches to it are so terrible, what will it be when he takes held of it? He wished the Assembly to assert the responsibility of these Boards.

After these remarks from Dr. Edwards the vote was taken, and the first resolution of the report, which is highly commendatory of the Board and of the manner of conducting its operations, was adopted unanimously. This vote seems to preclude the necessity of reference to the refutation of the above charges, as presented by Dr. B. M. Smith, a former

Secretary of the Board; by Mr. Schenck, its present Secretary; by Dr. Mitchell, J. B. Mitchell, Esq., and others. 1. As to the charge that the Board claimed to be proprietors of the Hymn Book, and to edit and alter it at pleasure, it was shown that all the alterations made was in the arrangement of the doxologies, and supplying some to suit the different metres; and that this matter had been specifically referred to the Board by the General Assembly. 2. As to the complaint that the Board had failed to obey the direction of the last Assembly to substitute some other hymn for the 336th of the present book. it was said that the Board did not refuse to obey that injunction, but simply represented to the present Assembly the difficulties in the way of the proposed alteration, and asked for further directions. It is enough that the Assembly, by a separate vote, approved of the action of the Board in this matter. 3. In reference to the charges of extravagance, it was shown that the salary of one thousand dollars, given to the Treasurer, was not merely in compensation of his services, but the condition of the security for the safe custody of the funds entrusted to his care—a very cheap arrangement, considering the magnitude of the trust. It was further shown that it was unjust to graduate the expense of a colporteur by that of a pedler of books, inasmuch as the former is a missionary, whose object is to instruct, exhort, and pray with the families whom he visits. Mr. Mitchell proved that out of one hundred and seventeen thousand dollars contributed for colportage, sixteen thousand dollars had been spent in the outlay of that sum-less than twelve and a half per cent., instead of sixty, as Dr. Edwards said. He further showed that the books of the Board were printed and sold at a cheaper rate than those of other establishments; that the "brown stone store" in Philadelphia was built by special contributions for that object, and was now worth more than it cost, and could be sold at a profit. The plan of uniting the offices of Corresponding Secretary and Superintendent of Colportage, to save expense, was shown to be impracticable. The latter officer had not only to keep the accounts of all the colporteurs, but to receive their reports, assign their fields, watching the balances of books left to be transferred to their successors, &c .- duties which could not be

discharged by the Corresponding Secretary. 4. The complaint that the books of the Board were not distributed in depositories, was answered by showing that such depositories had been tried and abandoned, as both useless and wasteful; and that the experience of other publishing societies corresponded with that of the Board as to the impolicy of that system.

Whatever may be thought of the propriety of thus arraigning the Boards and officers of the church before the public, on uninvestigated charges, the action of the last Assembly will

doubtless convince most men of its inexpediency.

Board of Education.

Rev. Dr. Van Rensselaer, Secretary of the Board of Education, addressed the Assembly in reference to the Annual Report of that Board, as follows:

Mr. Moderator, the Board respectfully present to the General Assembly their *fortieth* Annual Report. During this period of twice a score of years, how many scores of ministers, and of candidates for the ministry, have entered the eternal world!

The Board are happy to report, by God's blessing, a prosperous condition of their affairs. The total number of candidates on the roll is three hundred and ninety-one, which is six more than last year. The total number of new candidates recommended by the Presbyteries, is one hundred and forty-one, which is thirty-eight more than last year, and is the largest number since the division of the church. This latter increase is the true exponent of the success of the church's work in this department; because, as the sources of supply increase, the aggregate of operations must necessarily expand. This expansion will not always be in exact proportion to the supply, inasmuch as disturbing causes may exist at one time more than at another; but, as a general rule, the index of present and of future prosperity consists in the annual increase of new candidates.

1. This large increase of new candidates, amounting this year to more than a quarter above that of last year, is owing to the grace of God in the outpouring of His Spirit upon our youth. The church is indebted to infinite mercy for each, and for all, her sons. The ministry exists by the power of the

Spirit. The ministry increases by the power of the Spirit. For all these new candidates, let the church praise God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

2. This increase of candidates is, instrumentally, owing in a good degree, under God, to parental dedication and training. There is power in the family covenant and family work, which God sanctifies, has sanctified, and will sanctify, from one generation to another. Sir, I yesterday saw in this Assembly a venerable and lovely Christian matron, a mother in Israel, who has four sons in the ministry of Jesus Christ. Every one of the sons whom God gave to her she consecrated to God, and trained up for God, in the work of the ministry; and behold, the honour that God has set upon her in her maturing old age! Mr. Moderator, when I saw her, I felt like bowing reverently at her feet, and, as one of the sons of the church, exclaiming in her presence, "Mother!" Who shall ever know the covenant power of parents, and perhaps especially of mothers, in bringing their sons to Jesus, and in introducing them, as preachers of the cross, into the waste places of the earth?

3. God has so largely increased the annual supply of new candidates, in answer to the prayers of the churches. Many supplications have ascended to the Lord of the harvest. The churches have remembered this cause in their religious devotions, and have asked God in public and in private, with more than usual importunity; and He has heard their cry. O that this Assembly, and all our congregations, may be stimulated to plead for richer and richer donations of the ascension gifts of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ!

In regard to the State of the Treasury, I am thankful that the Board can make a good report to the Assembly. The total amount received in the Candidates' Fund is \$52,077.92, which is \$4974.85 more than were received last year, whilst last year was \$3730.76 in advance of the year before, making an increase in two years of nearly nine thousand dollars. And this increase has been attained during the two severest years of financial distress known to the country; and it is also worthy of remark that, during the last year, no special appeal whatever was made to the churches.

Mr. Moderator, have you never observed on a river, that,

when four or five vessels are sailing along, one of them sometimes catches the wind, whilst the others are almost becalmed? The difference is not owing to the pilot's skill, but to what some would call chance, but which we call providence. In like manner, the superior financial condition of this Board, above that of the other Boards, this year, is owing to Providence. And as we are always at liberty to interpret providence with reverence, and with an acknowledgment of our own ignorance, and a reliance upon Divine light, so I will venture to suggest some interpretations of this providence to this Assembly.

1. In the first place, it is an encouragement to the churches to continue their co-operation in the work of ministerial education. See how good it is for them to send in their donations, however small; for everything contributes to the prosperity of a good cause; and its very prosperity reflects back happiness upon those who have promoted it. If God has made so much out of the church's gifts this year, and enriched the churches with all the good done, is it not an encouragement to persevere another year, and to the end of time, in helping young men in the great work of their education?

2. In the second place, God seems to be wiping away the reproach of "unpopularity," which the Board of Education has had to contend with. He has condescended to set us in a high place. Whilst some of the other Boards, who sometimes insist upon their superior popularity, have mysteriously declined in their receipts this year, the Board of Education has made a large advance. I respectfully suggest whether this does not look as though the churches were taking a higher interest in assisting young men into the ministry. Are not the objects of the Board of Education gaining favour among the churches? I do not wish to press the interpretation too far; but I respectfully submit whether it has not the appearance of substantial truth.

3. In the third place, our financial prosperity is an encouragement to the hearts of candidates, in showing them the care of the churches in their behalf. If the funds come in slowly, and doubtfully, how many painful anxieties would be stirred up among those who have already an abundance of pecuniary solicitude! But the church, during the year, has anticipated

every want; and by a cheerful and liberal and quiet response, (for our candidates do not like the noise of too many special appeals) has verified to them all her promises of temporal aid.

4. In the fourth place, the financial prosperity of the Board, as seen not only in the increase of funds but of candidates, shows that the addition of the department of Schools, Academies, and Colleges, to the work of the Board of Education does not interfere with its old work of assisting candidates. This was an objection in some minds; but Providence does not seem to sustain it. Whilst the Board continue to make the candidates' department their chief work, their interest in institutions of learning is secondary only so far as that it must not be at the expense of their old work. It sometimes happens that an increase of labour only stimulates a workman to do better what he has already undertaken. In fact, my own personal plans for the candidates' department, during the coming year, mark out a greater amount of correspondence and of visitation, than in any year since my connection with the office. The Board of Education do not pretend to say that they have conducted either department with the efficiency that might have been put forth. But the Secretaries have done the best they could, or as nearly so as human depravity will allow; and it is their conviction that all their efforts for schools, academies, and colleges, so far from interfering with the increase of candidates and the means of sustaining them, have precisely the opposite effect. The two departments are harmonious, co-relative, and mutually contributory to each other's prosperity. At least, the operations for candidates have continued to flourish more and more. In regard to the other department, and the best way of raising funds for it, I shall say a few words when I come to that subject.

Proposed Report to the Presbyteries.—It will be seen that the Board suggest the wisdom, on the part of the Presbyteries, of requiring from the teachers and Professors of institutions of learning, a report to the Presbyteries, at least annually, on the attainments and general standing of all the candidates under their care. Such a report is designed to include all candidates, whether aided by the Board or not. The benefits of this proposed arrangement are threefold. 1. A

report to the Presbyteries will bring the candidates into more intimate relation with the Presbyteries, and thus give them the opportunity of a more parental and faithful supervision. 2. In the second place, it will call into stronger exercise the responsibilities of the instructors of candidates for the ministry, and render their knowledge of their character and qualifications more available to the church. 3. And, in the third place, it will promote a healthful sense of responsibility on the part of the young men to their Presbyteries. It will also contribute to remove among candidates for the ministry the distinction between those who are aided by the Board and those who are not aided; a distinction which is sometimes unduly magnified. The Board do not propose to the Assembly to enjoin upon the Presbyteries the adoption of this new regulation about reports, but simply to recommend the subject to the consideration of the Presbyteries, and leave each to act as may be judged best.

Hints on choosing a Profession.—At a time when so many young men are brought to the knowledge of Christ, and the world is so active with influences to claim their services, the Board have ventured to present some considerations to the youth of the church, in regard to the principles which should guide the determination of their course in life. I will barely

mention the principles brought to view.

1. A leading principle in the choice of a profession, is to follow the one best suited to a young man's gifts and endowments. 2. Another principle is that that profession is to be chosen which God seems the most to approve. 3. Consider the claims of that profession which offers the widest field of usefulness. 4. Another principle worthy of consideration in the choice of a profession, is to notice the direction in which Providence points. 5. A preference may be wisely given, other things being equal, to a profession that admits and nurtures personal improvement, and does not give a prominence to sordid temptations. 6. A young man should keep in sight the rewards of eternity.

Department of Institutions.—The Board of Education have been enabled to do much good, in sustaining feeble institutions of learning. The number of parochial schools is not large—probably about one hundred; but they are a great blessing to the

children attending them; and their influence upon other schools is important; and they assist in keeping before the community the great principles of Presbyterian education. A revival occurred in one of these schools, in which eight of the older youth were hopefully converted.

The number of *Presbyterial Academies* is fifty-eight, and these higher institutions, scattered all over the land, are accomplishing important results for Christian education. Their number ought to be largely augmented, and every opportunity embraced for establishing them which Providence may offer. A number of conversions have taken place during the year in our Academies. The greatest religious awakening of the year occurred in the Academy at Waveland, Indiana, under the care of the Presbytery of Crawfordsville. In this revival twenty-three of the students united with the church.

Colleges are great instrumentalities in advancing the kingdom of Christ. The church should not establish them too fast, but fast enough; not ahead of Providence, nor too far behind Providence; but according to the providence. In some sections of our church there are too many colleges-in others too few; in others, the number is just right. The report of the Board contains various suggestions about the collegiate policy of our church, entitled "Plain Words on Colleges." The discussion is on the following points: The number of colleges; their location; the right time for establishing them; buildings; endowment; debt; trustees and professors; standard of scholarship; discipline; religious instruction; and the relation of each college to the character of the whole church. Hints on these topics may be of some use, perhaps, to thoughtful educators. Revivals of religion occurred during the year in three of our colleges, viz. Davidson College, North Carolina; Westminster College, Missouri; and Centre College, Kentucky. The number of students converted is from thirty to fifty. To God be the praise for these and other glorious results.

Funds for this Department.—A few words more, about sustaining our operations among these institutions of learning. Many of them need help for a period, and they ought to have it. The Board of Education could advantageously spend fifteen or twenty thousand dollars a year in estab-

lishing, maintaining, and invigorating institutions of learning. But how shall we get funds? The Assembly has, as yet, taken no definite measures to secure collections. Hitherto, these important operations have been chiefly sustained by the benevolence of two of the ruling elders of the church. One of them set the department in motion by a donation of three thousand dollars, and has kept it in motion with an annual munificence transcending all just claims upon his liberality. The other elder maintained all the needy parochial schools for four or five years by similar gifts; but has latterly felt constrained to withdraw, or at least suspend, his donations. This position of things is unworthy our church. If this department ought to be sustained at all, it ought to be sustained on some general, systematic, efficient plan, in which the great body of our churches can co-operate. The plan which the Board respectfully submit to the General Assembly, is that of taking up collections on the last Thursday of February, and of uniting on that day alms with our prayers. This plan is scriptural, simple, economical, practicable and efficient. As to its efficiency, the Board have great hopes, and are willing, with God's blessing, to assume the responsibility of its working. We think that we have a right to ask the Assembly to give the Board a plan for raising funds. The present plan was first suggested to the Board in their consultations with that wise, devoted and able minister of our church, Dr. Phillips, of New York, who, with his brethren in that city, have always exhibited the deepest interest in both departments of the operations of the Board of Education. The Secretaries had often thought of a collection on the Sabbath, before or after the day of prayer; but the idea of selecting the day of prayer itself belongs, as I have said, to Dr. Phillips. It is worthy of trial, and it is believed will prove sufficient. If any pastor prefers the Sabbath before or after the day of prayer, let him by all means use his own discretion.

The Board wish to make progress in their efforts to sustain institutions. They cannot do so without some plan. They would rather resign this branch of their work to the General Assembly than remain stationary, and unable to meet the urgent demands upon their help. They would rather

ask you to choose some other agency to do this work, or if not agency, agents, than to have it falter under their care. This is not the age to lag behind. It is not the period of the world to take steps backward. "Forward," as in the days of Israel, is the true Presbyterian motto. Our standard should know no retreat. Carry it onward, carry it on! Place it in the thickest of the fight! Rally around it, men and brethren, in the name of Christ's crown and covenant; and the old banner of blue will win its victories, as in ages that are past, so now, and in ages that are to come.

Theological Seminaries.

Dr. Palmer read a report from the Committee on Theological Seminaries. It spoke of Allegheny and Danville in most favourable terms, and also of Princeton. Several slight changes were recommended and adopted.

A re-adjustment of the titles and departments of instruction, conforming them as near as possible to the distribution and arrangement which formerly existed, to wit: that Dr. Hodge shall hold his present chair without change; that Dr. McGill be styled Professor of Church History and Practical Theology—the latter to include all the functions of the ministerial office, viz. Church Government, Preaching, and the Pastoral Care; that Dr. Green be Professor of Oriental and Biblical Literature; and that Dr. Alexander be Professor of Hellenistic (or Biblical) Greek, and New Testament Literature.

Relative to Allegheny, the following resolution was adopted: Resolved, That the General Assembly change the time of closing the session to the Wednesday preceding the fourth Tuesday in April.

Dr. William L. Breckinridge was nominated to fill the vacant Chair in the Seminary at Danville, the election to be held on Saturday. The Assembly engaged in prayer for direction, according to the standing rule.

On the day appointed, Dr. W. L. Breckinridge was unanimously elected to the office for which he had been nominated. The distinguished position which that gentleman has long occupied, his many amiable and attractive qualities, and his eminent religious character, will, we doubt not, render this appointment

universally satisfactory to the church. His acceptance of the office is somewhat doubtful, as we gather from the following remarks which he made when his name was first proposed. Rising from the Moderator's Chair, he said:

"I ask the indulgence of my brethren, under the new and extremely delicate and embarrassing circumstances of this moment. If I allow the Assembly to go into this vote without saving anything, and it result in your choice of me to the vacant chair, I might be held to have consented to such result; and thus be pledged to undertake the service. On the other hand, it seems hardly becoming to express an unwillingness to take a position to which it may not be your pleasure to call me. Our brethren in immediate charge of this Seminary have thought proper to make known to me their wishes about this matter, and to assure me that these would not be unacceptable to this body, and to the church at large; but while I have not felt myself at liberty to put it absolutely from me, I have not been willing to say one word, or to take a single step, that might imply a consent to what has now been proposed. You must do what you think well, on the subject, and I must be left free in regard to it. If it shall be your pleasure to choose another, I shall be so far from regarding it as an unkindness, as to feel myself greatly relieved."

We rejoice that the Assembly so cordially assented to the change proposed in the titles and duties of the Professors in the Seminary at Princeton. The union of the departments of Church History and Polity has the sanction of usage and long experience in its favour; and the appointment of one Professor for the language and literature of the Old Testament, and another for the language and literature of the New Testament, is so obvious and natural, that it early commended itself to These departments are distinct, compregeneral approbation. hensive, and in the highest degree important. Much also, in such matters, may be wisely conceded to the taste and preferences of the Professors themselves. They can most effectually serve the church in the departments to which they have been led to pay special attention. We believe that the change above mentioned will subserve the best interests of the Seminary.

The NORTH-WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY commanded greater interest and occupied more of the time of the Assembly than any other subject brought forward for its decision. In 1830, the Synod of Indiana established a Theological School in connection with the College at South Hanover. In 1838, a convention, composed of delegates from the Synods of Indiana, Cincinnati, and Kentucky, determined to found a Seminary on a wider basis at New Albany, which went into operation under a Board of Directors appointed by the Synods of Indiana and Cincinnati, November, 1840. Subsequently, the Synods of Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Northern Indiana, and Illinois, coöperated in the enterprise. In 1853, the majority of the Synods concerned in the operations of this Seminary, united in a proposition to transfer it to the care of the General Assembly. The same year proposals were presented for the foundation of a Seminary by the Assembly, for the West, and St. Louis, New Albany, and Danville, were severally named as its location. The majority of votes were cast for Danville. This left New Albany under the care of the Synods which might choose to continue to it their patronage. In 1854, the Assembly passed a resolution, declaring that in establishing a Seminary at Danville, the Assembly had "no intention to interfere with the Theological Seminary at New Albany, nor with those Synods which shall continue to be united in the support and control of that Institution, nor with any of the churches under the care of such Synods." The Seminary, therefore, continued in operation under its former Professors. Subsequently, seven of the North-western Synods united, and appointed a Board of Directors for a North-western Seminary. The Institution at New Albany was by them transferred to Chicago, and Drs. MacMasters and Thomas, Professors in the old Seminary, were elected to corresponding chairs in the new Institution. Diversity of opinion soon manifested itself among the friends of this enterprise, and it was finally determined to transfer it to the General Assembly, leaving to that body to determine its location and organization. When this subject came up, the Rev. Dr. Palmer made the following report:

The Committee on Theological Seminaries, to which were referred certain papers touching the proposed transfer to the General Assembly, of the Presbyterian Theological Seminary of the North-west, beg leave to report, that upon examination these papers are found to be:

- 1. An overture from the Board of Directors of said Seminary, proposing a transfer of the same from the several Synods united in its control, to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in the United States.
- 2. Papers detailing the action of eight Synods, viz. the Synods of Cincinnati, Indiana, Northern Indiana, Illinois, Chicago, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Southern Iowa, authorizing the above-mentioned transfer, and instructing the Board of Directors to present the overture touching the matter to this General Assembly.
- 3. Two printed documents, being the Constitution of the North-western Theological Seminary, and the act of incorporation by the General Assembly of Illinois.
- 4. Certain papers, stating the opinions and wishes of twentynine Presbyteries in connection with these eight Synods.
- 5. A statement of the assets of the New Albany Theological Seminary, now in possession of the Board of Directors of that institution.
- 6. Papers containing proposals for the endowment of the Seminary, upon the condition of its acceptance by this Assembly, and located at Chicago or at Indianapolis respectively.
- 7. A statement of the present indebtedness of the Seminary of the North-west.

These papers have been carefully considered by the Committee, and their contents may be briefly stated: Of the eight confederated Synods, five—viz., Cincinnati, Chicago, Indiana, Northern Indiana, and Illinois—urge the transfer *simpliciter*, without any opinion or desire expressed upon any matter connected with it.

Two Synods, viz., Wisconsin and Southern Iowa, connect with this transfer, a request that professors shall not be chosen till there is a sufficient endowment secured to warrant it.

And one Synod, viz., that of Iowa, in a paper from its abridgment not perfectly clear to the committee, seems to desire that the Assembly shall exercise only a negative control over the appointments in the Seminary.

It is clear, however, that all these Synods except perhaps the last, desire the Assembly, during the present session, to accept the direction of the Seminary, and to hold and exercise

all powers at present vested in themselves.

As to the financial condition of the institution now offered to this Assembly, it claims the assets of the New Albany Theological Seminary, amounting in all to \$39,430, which the trustees of that institution seem authorized to transfer. Of this amount, however, the sum of \$25,000 is not at the disposal of the trustees, but is acknowledged to be in the control of the General Assembly, and which it is hoped the Assembly will put to the service of this institution, it having been originally contributed for theological education in the West. In the judgment of the committee, the wishes of the donor may be easily ascertained, and should be decisive upon this point.

Against the remaining \$14,430 must be placed a debt incurred by the Seminary of the North-west, of \$5,241, which the board has ordered to be paid out of the assets of the

New Albany institution in the hands of its trustees.

Should the Assembly agree to accept the donation and control of this Seminary, in accordance with the overture of these eight Synods, two distinct proposals are made, looking to its endowment. On the one hand, if Chicago shall be selected as the seat of the new institution, Mr. C. H. McCormick gives his written obligation to pay to the directors who shall be appointed, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars payable in four annual instalments, and drawing six per cent., from the opening of the Seminary, that is to say, \$25,000 for each Professor whom this Assembly shall appoint in the same. In addition to this promise of Mr. McCormick, and upon the condition that within the period of two years, buildings costing not less than \$50,000, shall be erected upon a designated site, certain persons make a grant of forty-five acres of land, definitely located, the market value of which is not stated.

On the other hand, if Indianapolis shall be selected for its location, certain persons connected with the Synods of Indiana, Northern Indiana, and a part of the Synod of Illinois, pledge the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars toward the endowment, drawing six per cent. interest, from the opening of the institu-

tion. Also \$25,000 more is subscribed by citizens of Indianapolis for the erection of suitable buildings on a site given by Rev. W. A. Holliday, which is itself valued at \$10,000.

In addition to these two amounts, there appears to be a reliable subscription of \$6,000 in another place, making a total of money subscribed, and grants of land, of about \$66,000.

Upon a deliberate survey of all the facts thus comprehensively stated, and in view of the promise given of an early endowment of the institution, and especially in view of the unanimity and earnestness with which so large a portion of the church as that represented by eight distinct Synods, express their conviction of the need of a Theological Seminary of high order in the North-west; your committee unanimously concur in recommending the two following resolutions to the General Assembly:

Resolved, That in accordance with the overture emanating from the above named eight Synods, this Assembly does now accept the direction and control of the Seminary known by the corporate name and style of "The Presbyterian Seminary of the North-west."

Resolved, That the present Assembly, during the present session, will decide by a majority of the votes of its members, what place within the limits of these eight Synods shall be selected as the site of said Seminary.

The matters of detail, as to the organization and equipment of the Seminary, the committee are of opinion, can not well be considered, until these preliminary points shall be decided,

and they make, therefore, no report upon the same.

A protracted debate ensued in relation to the location of the new Seminary. Chicago and Indianapolis were the places nominated. In favour of the former it was urged that it was remote from existing Seminaries of our church, and geographically central to the vast region whose wants the new institution was intended to supply; whereas Indianapolis was so far south as to render certain the call for another Seminary further northwest in a few years, if that place were fixed upon as the location. This seems to have been admitted by the friends of Indianapolis, as they advocated the propriety of numerous theological seminaries. They assumed that no such institution ought to have more than one hundred students. On the other hand, it was urged that this multiplication of seminaries was likely to become a crying evil in the church and country, scarcely less burdensome and impolitic than the multiplication of universities, colleges, and banks, which now crowd the land. This geographical consideration, together with the liberal pecuniary offers in behalf of Chicago, seems to have had most weight with the Assembly. The vote was two hundred and forty-two for Chicago and sixty-four for Indianapolis. The Rev. Dr. Palmer then presented, from the Committee on Theological Seminaries, the following resolutions:

- 1. Resolved, That this General Assembly do hereby accept the donation of \$100,000, made by Mr. McCormick to them for the endowment of four Professorships in the Presbyterian Theological Seminary of the North-west, about to be established by this Assembly, and upon the terms and conditions therein mentioned.
- 2. Resolved, That the thanks of this General Assembly be tendered to Mr. C. H. McCormick for his munificent donation, and that a copy of these resolutions be transmitted to Mr. C. H. McCormick by the Stated Clerk.
- 3. Resolved, That the offer of forty-five acres of land from other gentlemen of Chicago, under certain specified conditions, together with similar offers, be referred to the Board of Directors, to be accepted or not, at their discretion.

The following constitution is submitted by the Committee for the government of the Seminary, based as much as possible upon the old constitution, with only such changes as are necessitated by the transfer of the control of said Seminary from the Synods to the Assembly. (The constitution is somewhat long, and will probably be published in another way. It is understood to be very similar to those of Princeton, Danville and Allegheny. We omit, at least for the present, its publication.)

With a view to secure such amendments to the charter as may be required by this change in the direction and control of this Seminary, and to provide for the legal transfer of the property, the committee submit to the Assembly the following resolution:

4. Resolved, That the Board of Directors of the said Semi-

nary, for whose appointment provision is made in the Constitution herewith submitted, be, and they hereby are directed to take such measures as may be found proper and expedient to procure the legal transfer and safe investment of all the property of said Seminary; and for that purpose to procure from the Legislature of Illinois such legislation as may be necessary to effect this object.

Should the foregoing recommendations of the committee be approved by the General Assembly, the way will be open for the election of Professors of the new Seminary, in relation to

which, the following resolutions are proposed:

5. Resolved, That it be made the first special order for Monday next to elect Professors to fill the four following chairs, viz.

The Chair of Exegetic and Didactic Theology.

The Chair of Polemic and Pastoral Theology.

The Chair of Church History and Government.

The Chair of Biblical and Oriental Literature.

Resolved, That nominations for the above Chairs be now received.

6. Resolved, That immediately after the election of Professors on Monday next, the Assembly proceed to elect Directors for this institution.

Some objection was made to the proposed arrangement of the Professorships, and that subject was referred to a special Committee, consisting of Drs. Smith, Humphrey, Thornwell, McGill, and Professor Wilson. The departments were subsequently arranged in the following manner. 1. Didactic and Polemic Theology. 2. Biblical and Ecclesiastical History. 3. Historical and Pastoral Theology and Church Government.

4. Biblical Literature and Exegesis.

When the Assembly were about to proceed to the election of Professors, Dr. E. D. MacMaster moved that the order of the day be postponed, in order to take up a motion to defer the election till next year. Dr. MacMaster delivered a long and earnest speech in support of his motion, of which we find the following brief abstract in the Presbyterian Banner and Advocate.

He had been ten years a Professor in the Seminary under

Synodical control, and felt it a duty to present the subject fairly to the understanding of the Assembly. His position was delicate. He had hitherto declined participating in the discussions, but now felt it a duty to speak. Providence called him to it, though painful. Justice to a public interest of the church, required the house to have patience, and give attention. He had committed to writing what he had to say, and would read it. He would make three preliminary remarks.

1. He did not appear as a party to a scramble for place. No one could point to any act of his, by himself or by his friends on his authority, seeking an appointment. He had three times vacated his place, with a view to changes, supposed to be beneficial. He never had been, and never would be, an aspirant for an office in the gift of the Assembly. He appeared here but as a member.

2. He had not been, and would not be a party to any personal controversy—unless as he had been pursued, for these last ten years. He had ever refused to reply to any of the attacks made upon him. His refusal to be drawn into anything personal heretofore, was a guaranty for the present.

3. He would speak, with reference to himself, only so far as it would be needful in discussing the subject. He would discuss this for the peace and edification of the church, and with

all plainness and fidelity.

There was a great division in the churches on the subject. Since 1856, the whole movement toward the Seminary, had been distinguished by accusations, specially against the Professors. The accusations had reference to alleged opinions and designs on the subject of slavery. He did not intend to discuss the merits of the subject of slavery, only so far as an answer to wrongful charges made this necessary. No matter of accusation has been alleged against him, except what resolves itself into this. It has been alleged that it was the design of himself and Dr. Thomas to found an abolition Seminary, and divide the church—that they had attempted to accomplish this design, by concealment, fraud, trick, &c. To these, in the terms in which they are made, he would make no reply. would treat them, as he had hitherto done, with silence. would not attempt to prove that the charges were wrong; untrue as they are.

Some may have been deceived by the representations made. He would try to disabuse the Assembly. He would speak historically, quoting records.

1. The Seminary at first was established by the Synods in Ohio and Indiana. They sought the coöperation of those of Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri. A union was formed; and the Seminary desired a cordial union.

The proposal in 1856 to extend the interest in the Seminary to other Synods, was not made to Missouri. This was because Missouri had withdrawn from the connection, years previously. Such was the general understanding, and there was abundant evidence of the fact of withdrawal. (Dr. MacMaster quoted from the Digest, prepared by S. J. Baird, and from sundry papers and documents, to sustain his position.) He gave these reasons to show the ground on which he and the Directors concluded that the Synod of Missouri did not desire an invitation to unite in the Seminary, and hence was not invited, when other Synods were invited.

The connection of the Synods of Kentucky and Tennessee with New Albany was dissolved in 1853, when the Seminary at Danville was instituted. And Missouri withdrew in the same year, and for four years appointed no Directors.

The Seminary had formerly sought a union with the Synods in the slave States on true principles, consistent with the safety and benefit of both parties. He believed that the free States will not be driven from their true conservative ground. The attempt to excite the odium of Abolitionism against the friends of the New Albany Seminary, is unjust, and to be deprecated. He had endeavoured to preserve the union of the Synods north and south of the Ohio, and yet he is stigmatized as an Abolitionist! It was not he, but others, who sought and effected division.

In August 1856, a circular was addressed to ministers and elders in the seven North-western Synods. In October, a constitution was proposed and adopted. It was adopted by all the seven Synods, with only one negative voice, in one of them. There was nothing about slavery in the circular, nor in the constitution, nor in the Synods, on the adoption of the Constitution. He was accused of plotting, because a constitution

had been offered to the Synods, and not to a Convention. But they, the Synods, had the right to act, and they exercised that

right.

In 1857 he addressed a letter to the Directors of the new Seminary, stating his views on the subject of slavery, in which he declared his adhesion fully to the doctrines of the Assembly on the subject. (The speaker here read this letter. It is very long. We published it once.)

To the answer given to the question sent up to the Assembly in 1845, relative to fellowship with slaveholders, in any circumstances, he had always accorded. It was substantially right. Still, he thought the paper then adopted by the Assembly was liable to be misunderstood, both by slaveholders and abolitionists, and also by many good persons in our own church and in other churches. He considered that paper ill-advised, crude, and inconsistent.

Two private letters of one of the Professors (Dr. MacMaster himself,) had been discovered and brought forth as proof against him, of plots and intrigues. Of these he would say that they were his own. The other Professor, and the Directors, had no responsibility in relation to them. These letters, however, sufficiently explain themselves to the candid. He would print them in an Appendix to his present remarks. They maintain that slavery is a great evil; and this is sustained by the Assembly's action of 1818; and they speak in condemnation of the new doctrine, that slavery is a great good. They speak of certain persons who are endeavouring to introduce among us this new doctrine, and of the duty of resisting the encroachments of the slave power.

Taking slavery as defined—that is, as a system which makes human beings "chattels," "tools"-it should not come into the church, and should not be there tolerated. The pro-slavery power had come into this region to interfere with the peaceful efforts to establish a Seminary. It was not to be endured. The war had been waged to maintain the pro-slavery power. He had been proscribed, because he could not bow down to it.

An important question is to be decided. The eyes of the church and of the world are upon this Assembly. If the Assembly should decide wrong, he would still not forsake the

Church, but would yet contend for her purity and glory. Truth will prevail, but error will die and perish. He had discharged a present duty, one which he could not evade. He would print fifty thousand copies of his speech, and send them all over the church.

Dr. MacMaster has carried into effect his purpose to print his speech, and we have had the opportunity of reading it in pamphlet form. The perusal has impressed us deeply with the conviction of the author's ability and courage. It is an open and manly avowal of opinions which he knew to be unpopular, and which he must have been aware would place him out of sympathy with the body which he addressed. While we cannot help feeling respect for the man, and sympathy with him in the frustration of his cherished plans, we regard the speech as unsound in doctrine, and eminently inappropriate for the occasion. Dr. MacMaster was not called upon to defend himself. He had not forfeited the confidence of any part of the church, North or South. He had been accused of abolitionism, as Dr. Rice had been accused of being the advocate of slavery and the tool of a pro-slavery party. Neither needed any vindication. They had for years been arrayed on opposite sides on many questions of policy. Both had been assailed, with equal injustice it may be, with having ulterior and unavowed objects, and with prosecuting those objects by unfair means. Into the merits of these controversies the Assembly was not called upon to enter; and, as far as we can learn, was not disposed to take sides with either party. If we may confide in the statements of those who had the best opportunities of knowing, the Assembly was prepared to do full justice to Dr. MacMaster. Some of his best friends have publicly asserted that sixty members of the Assembly from the South had avowed their purpose to vote for him as Professor in the new Seminary, which would doubtless have secured his election. His claims were peculiarly strong. His long and faithful service as Professor at New Albany; his election to a chair in the Northwestern Seminary by the representatives of the seven Synods before its transfer to the Assembly; his having voluntarily resigned that chair in order that the Assembly might be unembarrassed in the selection of its officers, should they decide to assume the charge of

the institution; and his own eminent qualifications for the office, were considerations which no body of generous, rightminded men, would think of resisting. His speech, however, put his election out of the question, for two reasons. First, it could not fail to be considered as an avowal of opinions, feelings, and purposes in reference to slavery, which the Assembly could not sanction; and, secondly, it made it evident that he could not, and would not coöperate with Dr. Rice, whose claims, in the opinion of a large class of his brethren, were equal to his own. When the votes therefore were counted, it was found that two hundred and fourteen had been cast for Dr. Rice, and only forty-five for Dr. MacMaster. In saying that we regard Dr. MacMaster's doctrine on slavery to be unsound, we have reference to the form in which he has presented it in his speech. It is probable that he differs from the mass of his brethren on this subject, more in words and feeling than he does in principle. He insists on making a distinction between slavery and slaveholding, which is in the nature of the case untenable. If slavery be what he defines it to be, all slaveholding, under all conceivable circumstances, must be a crime. There can, according to his definition, no more be justifiable slaveholding, than there can be justifiable murder. He represents slavery to be a system which makes a man a chattel; a thing which denies to him the rights of a husband and father; which debars him from instruction and means of improvement. Slavery, however, is nothing but involuntary servitude—that is, the obligation to render service not conditioned on the will of the servant. There may be most unjust laws enacted by the State to enforce that obligation, and most unrighteous means adopted to perpetuate and render safe and profitable the condition of bondage, but these laws and means are not slavery. They do not enter into its definition; they are not essential to its existence. To approve of slavery in that sense of the word, is to approve of denying humanity to man; it is to approve of his degradation, and of the adoption of means designed and adapted to perpetuate that degradation; it is to approve of concubinage in place of marriage; it is to approve of denying to parents rights guarantied to them by the law of God. To do all this is as palpably to renounce Christianity as it would be to approve

of Mormonism or Mohammedanism. It is equally obvious, that no Christian can voluntarily assist in making or enforcing laws which give to involuntary servitude this character. It is this aspect or idea of slavery that the earlier declarations of our church evidently contemplated. The famous minute of 1818 is true of slavery in this sense, but it is not true according to the subsequent deliverances and uniform practice of the church, of slavery in the sense of involuntary servitude. Now as this latter is the sense in which the word is used in all the recent acts of our Assembly, and as it is the sense which is put upon it by probably nine-tenths of our brethren, the denunciations of Dr. MacMaster's speech directed against slavery will inevitably be understood of involuntary servitude. They in their apparent meaning bear against that great body of ministers and members of our church who are owners of slaves. They hold up those brethren as the advocates of a system which is at war with the plainest dictates of natural justice, and the clearest revelations of the divine will. His speech is mainly directed against slavery, against a slave party in the state, and a slave power in the church. Dr. Rice (by implication at least) is held up as a pro-slavery man. The inference, therefore, is unavoidable, that the slavery denounced is the slavery which Presbyterian ministers and members defend as not incompatible with the word of God. Although, therefore, no man in our church, so far as we know, has ever defended slavery as defined by Dr. MacMaster, yet as he denounces a class of men in the church as pro-slavery men, they cannot avoid considering his denunciations as reaching beyond his definition, and touching them and their avowed opinions. It is in this way that his speech placed him in a position antagonistic to the mass of the Assembly. The fact, also, that he represented himself as the object of persecution by the slave-power, and claimed that the true question which the Assembly were called upon to decide, was, whether that power should control the church or not, evinced a state of mind which boded no good. His own most intimate and constant friends regarded this as altogether a mistake, and refer to the readiness of sixty southern members of the Assembly, including some of the most influential men on the floor, to vote for him as a Professor in the new Seminary, as a

proof of the correctness of their opinion. Into the merits of the controversy, which has attended the origin of the institution at Chicago, we do not pretend to enter. As journalists, we candidly express our views of the action of the Assembly as exhibited in the reports of its debates. High as we estimate the gifts and claims of Dr. MacMaster, we cannot be surprised at the result of the ballot, after reading his speech.

The election of Dr. Rice to the Chair of Theology was the great point of interest. The Rev. Dr. Willis Lord, of Brooklyn, was chosen Professor of Biblical and Ecclesiastical History; the Rev. Dr. Halsey of Louisville, was elected to the Chair of Historical and Pastoral Theology and Church Government; and the Rev. W. M. Scott, D.D. of Cincinnati, to that of Biblical Literature and Exegesis. For the first time in the history of our church a Theological Seminary begins its career with a full corps of Professors, a competent endowment, and an excellent geographical position.

Revised Book of Discipline.

The revision of the Book of Discipline has not met with the favour which its authors confidently anticipated. The reasons of the coldness with which the new book has been received, seem to be the strong aversion to change, in the minds of many of the brethren; the fact that a few unpalatable changes had been introduced which created a prejudice against the whole thing; and the pre-occupation of the minds of the members of the Assembly by things of more immediate and pressing interest. We flatter ourselves that the time is not distant when a verdict will be rendered with great unanimity in favour of the majority of the alterations proposed by the Committee of Revision. Dr. Thornwell, Chairman of that Committee, delivered, when the subject was under consideration, an able speech in support of its report.

Rev. Dr. Thornwell, Chairman of the Committee appointed for the purpose, presented as their report a Revision of the Book of Discipline. Dr. Thornwell said he would not go over the report in detail. That report has been printed, and is in the hands of the members. He intended at present only to state a few general principles. Some of the changes proposed

are important; he would say radical. The committee have endeavoured to improve the old Book by striking out redundancies, by carrying out principles already implied or acted upon, and by, as far as possible, harmonizing the whole upon the three great principles which he would now state.

1. All our courts are regarded simply as courts, and not as parties at the bar. They are judges called upon in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and they are not counsel, or pleaders, or parties. According to the old Book the lower court is a party, and, as such, is invariably ruled out when it comes to the higher court. This he regarded as implying what is false in fact. The mere fact that a lower court has tried a case is no evidence of prejudice. It moreover contradicts the great principles of our government. Ours is a representative government. Such are our courts, and in these courts you ascend from a representative body covering a smaller space, to a representative body covering a larger space, until in this Assembly you meet the parliament of the whole church. The lower court often has important information, which is due to the larger one to which the case is carried. According to the old Book, you are not appealing from a smaller portion of the church to a larger part of it, but from one part of it to another part. The true principle is from a part to a larger part, or to the whole. In regarding your lower courts as parties, you actually do all you can to make them parties. Knowing they are regarded as such, they will naturally so consider themselves, and naturally act accordingly. But by right they should be placed in no such category. They come here as your equals; you exchange counsels with them, and thus mutually reach a just decision.

It has been objected, that by this means you give too much influence to the court below. You certainly do give an influence, but still not an unrighteous one. By the present mode you really bar a portion of the church from arriving at a just conclusion. For instance, in the Pittsburgh Assembly of 1836, in an important trial for heresy, the Synod of Philadelphia was excluded, and a decision secured which was not the true sense of the church, because the large Synod of Philadelphia was out of the house. And at the same Assembly a case

of the sort came up, which was decided just the other way, because the Synod of Cincinnati, a smaller body, was out, and the large Synod of Philadelphia was in the house. But it is also said, that sometimes one Presbytery in a Synod is so large as to make them a majority of the Synod. The very fact that they are so numerous is a presumption that they are right.

This proposed change simply goes upon the principle that each court, whether Session, Presbytery, or Synod, is always a court, and that superior courts, to be complete, must include

their entire membership.

As to the influence of prejudice, said to be thus introduced, you really have more prejudice by excluding the lower court than by admitting it; for it is still on the ground. Indeed, we all know that every Assembly is composed of two classes of members, those in the house and those out of it—lobby members—the latter often more influential than the former. You must, after all, trust your judges, and take it for granted that they will be faithful and do their duty.

He came now to a point clear as the noonday sun, though one in which the committee has been severely criticised-he means the relation of baptized children to the church. He admits that it is a radical principle—the principle is, that the indispensable condition on which a man becomes subject to discipline, is the profession of his faith. It is objected that the committee are wanting in logic, in contending for the membership of baptized children, and yet not discipline them. brethren take the ground that church-membership necessarily involves subjection to discipline. You might, with equal propriety, say it is inconsistent to admit that they are members, and yet not admit them to all the privileges and offices of the church-to the Lord's table, the eldership, &c. You debar them simply because they do not believe professedly in Christ. Carry out the remorseless logic of these brethren, and you seat at the Lord's table all baptized worldlings and hypocrites. you have two classes of church members-professing and nonprofessing; and herein is the reason for a difference of treatment. Want of faith incapacitates the non-professing from the sacrament of the Supper. The same thing incapacitates for subjection to judicial process. It is important that we understand the true idea of discipline. Discipline is not penal; the purpose of it is not to indicate the magnitude of the offence, or as a vindication of justice; it is rather to produce repentance. These provisions are all penitential; it is to bring back and restore an erring brother. It is a healing remedy. And these censures are, of course, as utterly absurd in regard to a man who has never heard the voice of the Lord in his soul, as for him to sit at the Lord's Supper. In order to receive any benefit from discipline, it is absolutely necessary that he recognize the claims of the Lord upon him. You see, therefore, that this view necessitates the distinction between professing and non-professing members. He would say, therefore, that in the whole word of God you cannot find a single case where discipline does not depend on brotherhood in the faith. There is another aspect of the subject of great moment. What is the ground of the membership of baptized members? Shall we take the ground that they are members by profession? Why, sir, this would be the doctrine of sponsors. Our doctrine is, that they are members through their parents. We take them in organically by families. Do you not see, then, that the first step in discipline is through the parents? You act on this principle when you require parents to train them in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. The parents, then, are the tie between the children and the church. The church governs them through their parents. Here is the discipline. What, then, is the precise position into which baptism brings a child? It makes him a child of the covenant. Baptism makes the broad separation as to the covenant of grace between the church and the world. It brings the child into such a relation that it can plead that covenant, and plead it with a power and a pathos that unbaptized children cannot. It gives the peculiar right of inheritance in these promises, and puts the baptized child in a near and blessed relation to God. It at the same time places the child under new and heavier responsibilities than rest on the world. And the parents' duty is to train up the children, pressing this obligation and privilege upon them.

But suppose they grow up and do not come to the Lord's table, what are you to do with them? Excommunicate them? as some suggest. No. Do as the Master would. If they turn

their back upon their birthright, still do not cast them out; but follow them with remonstrance, exhortation, prayers, &c. Bear with them. They bring no reproach. They are not professors. They are simply children who do not know their birthright, and we are continually persuading them to come up to their privileges.

But suppose you take the other course, and discipline them. What then? Why you are using your spiritual remedies on men who have no adaptation to receive them; or you fill your communion tables with worldlings and hypocrites. It is this which has filled the church of Scotland with moderatism, and other churches with formalists. The system proposed in the Revision is really that on which our church has always acted.

Our church may be compared to the temple. We see there, first, the sanctum sanctorum, all really spiritual persons; then second, the sanctum, separating all professedly spiritual persons from all without; then third, is the outer court, equally separate from the second. He recognizes in the church—
1. True followers of the Redeemer. 2. Professors without true piety. 3. That vast congregation whom God has brought into the church by baptism, who are there to be trained, that they may be led at last into the sanctum sanctorum.

But why do not brethren carry out their principles? They go for confining discipline to baptized persons. What then will they do with that part of your Book which gives all children of believing parents a right to church membership? Will they not be required to discipline the children of believers,

whether baptized or not? Certainly, if consistent.

The other point which has been objected to is allowing deceived church members to withdraw from the church, or, as it has been called, opening the back-door. For himself, so that we could get thieves and robbers out of our houses, provided they carry nothing with them, we were glad to have any door opened, whether it be a back or a front-door. It has been said that it assumes the right of members of the church to withdraw at pleasure, and that it thus renders the church a voluntary society. But what is a voluntary society? A mere thing of human invention and contrivance. Surely brethren will not say that we have made these truths on which the church is

built. But in another sense the church is a voluntary organization. We claim that all who come into the church from the world must come voluntarily. To those whose hearts are not with us, we say, Withdraw. But how shall we get them out? These brethren say, If a man gets into your house, who ought not to be there, you cannot let him out in any other way than by kicking him out. But, after all, though the revision proposes to open a mode of retirement for a church member, under certain circumstances, we still say the seal of baptism is on him, and never can be removed. We only pronounce him unfit for the communion of the sanctum, according to his own confession. We open the door, and put them back in their own outer court, where, by their own statements, their proper place is. We do not arraign young men and young women before the session, and prosecute them for not being converted.

The Revised Book of the Committee has been pronounced a failure. It may possibly not meet the concurrence of this Assembly, but he believes before God, it embodies the true principles of a spiritual church. What we are aiming at, and what we want, is a pure body. Our baptized children, our non-professing members, occupy a curious position. In heart they belong to the world, in covenant relation they belong to God; because of the latter, the church operates first upon these. Hence God comes with his blessing to you first, then to your children, and lastly to as many as are afar off, whom the Lord shall call.

Rev. Dr. Humphrey said he wished to refer to the history of our present Book of Discipline, in order to convince the Assembly that we should do the work of revision, if at all, only cautiously and carefully. It appears that when it was determined, in the old Synod of Philadelphia and New York, to form a General Assembly, a committee was appointed to prepare a Book of Discipline. That was composed of such men as John Rodgers, Robert Smith, Allison, Woodhull, Latta, Duffield—all known names. Two years afterwards, we find that this Committee reported "A Plan of Government and Discipline." The Synod of New York and Philadelphia, composed of only one hundred members, against three hundred in this house, were not then ready to adopt it. On the contrary, after thirteen

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sessions, extending through eight days, their discussions only resulted in printing it and sending it down to the Presbyteries. The next year these Presbyteries reported; and then again, not until after six sessions, extending through four days, was it referred to the Presbyteries for adoption. So careful were our fathers in adopting this Book. Now, shall we change in a few hours what they have so carefully done, and make changes too, which our brethren themselves avow to be "radical"? Dr. Humphrey would here express his regret that he is compelled to differ from a Committee of names so honoured as the present

one, but duty constrains him.

Well, this Book of Discipline, prepared with so much care, went into effect, and was used till 1816, when another revision was called for. Then Drs. Romeyn, Alexander, and Miller, (names he delights to speak,) were appointed to examine it, and report next year. The next year the Committee asked that Dr. Nott should be added to their number; and in 1818 they reported that they had "made some progress in the business." And at last, in 1819, after three years, the proposed revision was reported, and one thousand copies were sent to the Presbyteries for "examination and suggestions." He wished special notice to be taken of the extreme caution of these movements; and their changes, too, were not "radical," as at present. In 1820, this Committee reported that the number and contrariety of opinions had greatly perplexed them, but that they had endeavoured to harmonize them so as to make a proper and acceptable Book of Discipline. The Assembly, after six sessions, extending through four days, adopted it. Thus, after all this caution and care had this Book been adopted, which now, after forty years, we propose to alter in a few hours.

In the Committee's revision, we are asked to say that baptized children are not to be subject to discipline. Let us be cautious how we agree to this. In the year 1789, it was decided that baptized children are subjects of discipline. In 1821, see how the language is changed, so that instead of saying, "Inasmuch as all baptized children are members of the church," they say, simply, "All baptized persons are members of the church, and are subject to its forms and discipline." Now he believes that words are things. Some of the greatest heresies have turned

upon little words; and the words now proposed would, in his view, be replete with danger.

Let us take warning, too, from the obvious tendencies in this matter. In the year 1811, according to the statistics, there were one hundred and ninety-eight infant baptisms to one thousand communicants; but according to these same statistical tables, the proportion has been running down, till you now have but fifty-one to one thousand, and this has been a constant and gradual diminution. Now, he would ask, Is this a time to give up your principles, and take down the bars? No, sir, no! He was aware that it has been objected that these statistics are inaccurate; but you will perceive that the current has all the time been running in the same direction, which is surely significant. If we go on in this way, the next proposition will be, by 1889, to resolve that inasmuch as baptized children are not members of the church at all. A French philosopher has explained the method by which dogmas die out-the kernel is gradually extracted, and then any passer-by with his foot can crush the Take care how you touch these rights which are so important. An article appeared, some two years since, in the Princeton Review, presenting startling statistics as to the decline of Infant Baptism, which it might be well just now to ponder. He differed from the brother (Dr. Thornwell) as to the ground of administering baptism. It is not descent from parents, but the covenant; and just in proportion as you lose your hold on the covenant, you will drift away until you become an Anti-pedo-Baptist church.

In conclusion, he would beg pardon, if he has been betrayed into intemperate warmth. He came from a cold clime in the old home of the Puritans; but he has been living so long in Kentucky, that he has perhaps acquired the habit of sometimes expressing himself with what may seem to some an undue warmth.

Rev. Dr. Thornwell said he concurred in the motion of Dr. Humphrey, and hoped that as part of the Theological Seminaries had been represented in the Committee, the others should also have a representation. He wished also to explain, that by radical changes, he by no means meant to apply that term to the essential principles of our system, but only to certain

usages which he deemed contradictory and illogical. He also placed the ground of infant membership through their connection with the parents most certainly on the covenant. He must say, too, that Dr. Humphrey's argument shows conclusively that a revision is imperatively demanded. For some years past we have had these stringent notions about infant baptism, and hence the decline. Let these notions continue to prevail, and in ten years we should have, perhaps, no baptisms at all.

Rev. Dr. Lowrie moved that the Revision be referred to the next Assembly. Let it be discussed, in the meantime, in our periodicals and newspapers. As to withdrawing from the church, the Assembly decided adverse to such withdrawal. And in the Assembly at Baltimore, under a judicial case, the same decision was come to, on the ground that the covenant of the church member is made, not with the church, but with his God; that you have no right to release him, but that you must.

As to the lower courts being parties, brethren forget that our present system is indispensable to the very idea of our government. In a session you do not allow the members of it to be challenged, because of prejudice. No, that is not your remedy. You allow the members of the court to sit, and if he feels injustice is done, you allow him to carry it up; and, to secure him the more fully, you do not allow those who have been liable to prejudice to interfere with an unbiassed and important decision; thus you have the pure court our brother so much desires.

Sir, let us steer clear of these radical changes. This Book has served us for forty years; it may probably do for forty more; and then let the Assembly appoint a new committee—perhaps consisting chiefly of pastors, with some legal gentlemen.

Rev. Mr. Platt said he thought this was the time and the place to discuss this report in detail. This should be done before sending it to the Presbytcries or to the next Assembly. We need light on these important subjects. We do not want merely anonymous publications. We wish to know who the men are that address the public, whose views are presented to us.

We fully agree with Dr. Thornwell in all he said about our ecclesiastical courts and other points in the new book which had been the subjects of criticism, except the relation of baptized persons to the church. As to this point, there were three views presented in the Committee of Revision. First, that which favoured the form in which the subject is exhibited in the old Book. It is there said: "All baptized persons are members of the church, are under its care, and subject to its government and discipline; and when they have arrived at the years of discretion, they are bound to perform all the duties of church members." This undoubtedly expresses the general conviction of the Christian world. It has been embodied in the principles, and carried out in the practice of all historical churches from the beginning, until the rise of the Independents. It undoubtedly expresses the faith and practice of our own church, from its organization until the present time. Some of the Committee were very strenuous that it should be allowed to retain its place in the Revised Book, without alteration. A second view, while admitting that baptized persons were in some sense members of the church, seemed to regard them as only under its fostering care, but not subject to its government or discipline. Third, as a compromise, it was proposed to say, as in the Revised Book, that while all baptized persons are members of the church, and under its care and government, yet the proper subjects of judicial process are those who have professed their faith in Christ.* In this form it was passed, but not unanimously-Dr. McGill not being willing to give up the clear statement of the old Book. In the new form, a distinction is made between government and judicial process; that is, between discipline in its wide and its narrow sense. And as the paragraph, in its revised form, asserts that baptized persons are subject to the government of the church, it was

^{*} It is not to be expected that all the members of a large committee who may agree to its report are of the same mind as to all the principles which the report may contain. It is the report of the committee, because the act of the majority, and the minority agree to it as a whole, while they reserve their right to their own judgment as to its details. There is no breach of confidence, therefore, in any member of such committee, avowing his preference for some other form of expression than that which the majority of his brethren decided to adopt.

thought that the great principle involved remained intact. We are free to confess that the old form is, in our view, greatly to be preferred; and we are not surprised at the opposition which the change has elicited, although we voted for it, as a compromise. Dr. Thornwell's argument assumes that the indispensable condition under which a man becomes the subject of discipline, is his own personal and voluntary profession of faith in Christ. This is perfectly intelligible and inevitable, if a personal and voluntary confession of faith is the indispensable condition of church membership. If it is not, the principle is out of its place. It does not belong to the theory of infant church membership. One syllogism is, Members of the church are the proper subjects of discipline: All baptized persons are members of the church: Therefore, all baptized persons are the proper subjects of discipline. This is the old and common doctrine. The Independent frames his argument thus: Members of the church are the proper subjects of discipline: Only those who voluntarily profess their faith in Christ are members of the church: Therefore, only those who thus profess their faith are the proper subjects of discipline. Dr. Thornwell adopts neither of these syllogisms. He objects to the major proposition in the former of the two. He denies that all members of the church are the proper subjects of discipline. He distinguishes between professing and non-professing members, and makes voluntary profession indispensable to that relation to the church, which is the foundation of discipline. But this is contrary to all analogy. A Hebrew child was a member of the Theocracy by birth, and subject to all its laws, independently of all profession. So every Englishman or American is a member of the state, and subject to its laws, without any personal and voluntary profession of allegiance. We see not how this principle can be denied, in its application to the church, without giving up our whole doctrine, and abandoning the ground to the Independents and Anabaptists. If, as we all hold, the children of believing parents are, by the ordinance of God, to be regarded and treated as members of the church, this of necessity involves their right to its privileges and their subjection to its laws. Dr. Thornwell objects that, according to this principle, all baptized persons must be admitted to the Lord's table, and that we should have our churches filled with hypocrites. This, however, is a non-sequitur. A person being a citizen of England, or America, subject to the laws of the state, does not give him the right of suffrage. That right is limited by the laws of the state. In England, and in some of the states of this Union, it depends on the possession of a given amount of property; in other states, on the attainment of the age of twenty-one; as to females, they never acquire the privilege. In every case the right is limited by what the state deems the possession of the requisite qualifications. So in the church, admission to the Lord's table, or to church offices, is limited by the possession of the qualifications which the word of God prescribes. It by no means therefore follows, that because baptized persons are subject to discipline, they are entitled to admission to the Lord's Supper.

The Doctor further objects, that as the object of discipline is not the vindication of justice, but to produce repentance, it is utterly absurd in regard to "a man who has never heard the voice of the Lord in his soul." This is surely a strange idea. Cannot the means of repentance be used in reference to the unconverted? Dr. Thornwell himself says, that baptized persons who do not act in accordance with their obligations, should be "followed with exhortation, remonstrance, and prayers." But are not exhortation and remonstrance means of repentance? Do they not as much suppose a recognition of the claims of God as the subjection to discipline? They are indeed forms of discipline; and we cannot help thinking that it is a contradiction in terms, to say that a man is a member of the church and not subject to its discipline. Whether he shall be subject to that particular form of discipline implied in "judicial process," might be a question. But as his amenability to such process is denied on grounds which, as it seems to us, involve the denial of his true relation to the church, we are decidedly in favour of the paragraph as it stands in our present Book.

Dr. Humphrey's argument is imperfectly reported. It seems to be directed to prove that our present Book is good enough; that having been prepared by eminent men, and long used in our judicatories, it does not require revision. The same ground was taken in a very elaborate paper published in the Southern

Presbyterian Review. It is evident that the church does not agree with Dr. Humphrey and the writer in the Southern Review on this subject. For if the Book does not, in the judgment of the church, need revision, why appoint a committee to do the work, at no small expense of time and labour. We think that Dr. Humphrey, when he found himself on the floor of the last Assembly, differing from Dr. MacMaster on the simple conduct of a judicial case, must have felt that if the Book was plain enough for him, it is not plain enough for other people. It appears that when the appeal of Alexander Fraser against the Synod of Buffalo came up, after reading the records, &c., "the not unusual embarrassment," says the Presbyterian, "arose in regard to the order of proceeding." The Moderator decided that the Synod was not a party; that there were no parties before the court except Mr. Fraser. Dr. Humphrey's doctrine, as we understand, is that every appeal is of the nature of a charge against the court appealed from, of having made a wrong decision, and makes it a party in the court above. This is the doctrine of the present Book. Moderator, guided apparently by his good sense, decided otherwise, and the Synod was permitted to be heard. Then came a discussion how it was to be heard; whether by the members of Synod who happened to be members of the Assembly, or by the committee appointed for that purpose. When that was decided, then there was another discussion, whether the other members of the Synod present had a right to be heard. This caused great debate. The Moderator decided that they had the right. From this decision an appeal was taken. This did not end the matter-Mr. Towle, a ruling elder from a church within the bounds of the Synod, but not a member of the Synod at the time of the decision appealed from, wanted to know whether he was to be regarded as a member of Synod or not. Judge Kennedy moved that he be not regarded as a member of the Synod appealed from. Dr. Humphrey said, "If Mr. Towle is not a member of the Synod, then he is a judge in the case here. See, then, what a predicament you place yourselves in." Dr. MacMaster said, "But he is not a member of the court below." Dr. Humphrey-"That is new doctrine in the General Assembly." Dr. MacMaster-"But it is good doctrine," Dr.

Thornwell insisted that Mr. Towle was to be regarded as a member of the court below, and moved to lay Judge Kennedy's motion on the table. This was not all. When Judicial Case No. 2 came up, there was a renewal of the same trouble. Now, if this is not a lamentable, not to say disgraceful exhibition, we know not what can be so regarded. The fault is not in the Assembly, it is in the Book, which certainly is not understood, or is inconsistent with itself.

Colonization and Theory of the Church.

R. R. Read, M. D., (ruling elder,) offered a paper, commending the African Colonization enterprise.

It was moved to lay the paper on the table; but the Assembly refused to do so by a vote of 83 ayes to 160 noes. The question then being on the adoption of Dr. Read's paper. Rev. Dr. Thornwell said, That the ground upon which he voted to lay these resolutions on the table, was the conservation of a great principle upon which he had acted, and which he deemed of immense importance to the church of Christ. The church of God, said he, is exclusively a spiritual organization, and possesses none but spiritual power. It was her mission to promote the glory of God and the salvation of men from the curse of the law. She had nothing to do with the voluntary associations of men for various civil and social purposes that were outside of her pale. Ever since he had been a member of the church, he had believed this, and contended for this, and had steadily resisted associating this church with outside organizations. The Lord Jesus Christ had never given his church a commission to be identified with them. It was the church's great aim to deliver men from sin, and death, and hell. She had no mission to care for the things, and to become entangled with the kingdoms and the policy of this world. The question of colonization is a question of worldly policy. It is a question upon the merits of which he wished not to speak. But no man will say that Jesus Christ has given to his ministry a commission to attend to the colonization of races, or to attend to the arrest of the slave trade, nor to the mere physical comforts of man. It is not the business of the church to build asylums for the insane and the blind. The church deals with men as men,

as fallen sinners, standing in need of salvation; not as citizens of the commonwealth, or philanthropists, or members of society. Her mission is to bring men to the cross, to reconcile them to God through the blood of the Lamb, to imbue them with the spirit of the divine Master, and thence send them forth to perform their social duties, to manage society, and perform the functions that pertain to their social and civil relations. The church has no right, no authority, to league herself with any of the institutions of the state, or such as have for their object mere secular enterprises. "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's;" but let the church of God lend her energies directly to the accomplishment of her own high and glorious mission. She deals with the great interests of immortality! The blessings she sheds upon the earth and upon the temporal interests of men are incidental: and, although incalculable, are subsidiary to the higher aims of the church. He was willing that church members should coöperate with this Colonization Society, and other societies for philanthropic objects, if they see proper to do so. He was willing that they should try to do good through any agencies that their consciences may approve; but he wished the church, as such, to keep herself to her specific work. As a church of Christ, he desired her to know neither rich nor poor, high nor low, bond nor free-to know neither East nor West, North nor South. "Let the dead bury their dead, but follow thou me," was the mandate of our Lord to his church; and the very moment you undertake to implicate this church with any of the powers of the earth, you endanger her efficiency. At this very General Assembly, we have declined identifying ourselves even with the American Presbyterian Historical Society. We had voted it out; we had voted out the temperance societies, and he would have the Assembly vote out all the societies of this world, and keep to her proper sphere, and let the societies keep to theirs, and do good in their own way, without asking the church's coöperation. It is this principle that he deemed absolutely indispensable to the church's purity and success in her peculiar mission.

To this view the church has been steadily coming up; and in consequence, what a spectacle does she this hour present to the country and to the world! She stands preëminent the great conservative power of this land; the great bond of union and witness for the truth—directly interfering with no temporal interests, but blessing and protecting all, whilst she aims only at the glory of her God in the salvation of the souls of the people. And why does our beloved Zion stand thus "the beauty of the land"? It is because the only voice she utters is the word of God; because no voice is heard in her councils but his; and because her only guide is the pillar of cloud by day, and of fire by night. He gloried in the position of this church.

He was once once attended by a young gentleman, a native of Great Britain, through the Tower of London; and we passed through the long apartments and corridors, in which were deposited the trophies which England's prowess had won in her many wars. As my companion pointed me, with becoming patriotic pride, to these trophies that attested his country's triumphs, said Dr. Thornwell, I raised myself to the fullest height my stature would permit, and replied, "Your country has carried on two wars with mine, but I see no trophies here won from American valour." Let our church lend herself, in the name of her Lord, and in his strength, and in her own proper sphere, to her own mission, and her enemies will never rejoice over trophies won from her. Sir, the salt that is to save this country is the church of Christ-a church that does not mix up with any political party, or any issues aside from her direct mission.

It was, on motion, resolved to refer the paper of Dr. Read to the Committee on Bills and Overtures, to report thereon.

On motion of Rev. Mr. Mann, Overture No. 28, on the subject of Colonization, was taken up. On the motion to adopt it,

Rev. Dr. A. S. MacMaster said he felt disposed to meet the question on its merits, and could not let this overture pass in its present shape without comment. If the Colonization Society be a good thing, or if it be a bad thing, let us say the one or the other. He considered the plea, that had been so eloquently made, that the church should never commend anything good because it was not strictly spiritual or ecclesiastical, as both preposterous and restrictive of the church's legitimate duties.

He referred to the fact that for four-score years the Presbyterian church had always borne testimony in favour of good enterprises, even when not strictly spiritual. He alluded to the part borne by our church in the Revolutionary struggle of our country, and to her frequent testimonies in favour of the liberties and independence of our country. He cited cases to prove that it had been the uniform practice of this church to commend philanthropic enterprises; and contended that one so strictly missionary as this, was peculiarly entitled to her sympathy and encouragement.

Rev. Dr. McGill offered as an amendment, "That it is sufficient to refer to the past action of the General Assembly, in her frequent recommendations of the Colonization Society."

Rev. Dr. Thornwell said all he wished to do was to set his opinions in a true light. He thought it would hardly be denied that—1st. The church is a kingdom not of this world. 2d. That her authority is only ministerial and declarative. 3d. That the power which is given to the church is to be exercised for spiritual ends only. If the church will keep within her own bounds, she will be an agency that will purify and bless the world; but if she goes beyond her proper sphere, she will not only fail to accomplish her mission, but will do mischief. Like the ocean, she purifies even by her agitation, whilst acting within her bounds and banks; but like the ocean, too, if she break beyond them, nothing can be more destructive or desolating. Let the church work on at the very foundations of moral and spiritual influences, which are the foundations of society; let her do her appropriate and appointed work, and she will sanctify the world. But let her go out of her sphere, and affect interference with the temporalities of men, and she will fail. Whenever she forgets that her mission is to bring men to the cross, and to salvation, she comes down from her high vantage ground. Whenever the church speaks at all, she must speak in the name of the Lord; and she must speak what the Lord bids her. Show me, said he, that the Lord Jesus Christ has commanded the church to engage in the business of transferring men from one place to another and I will yield, and unite in the effort. But until you convince me that this is the business that the Head of the church has committed to her, I must earnestly resist any proposal to identify her with such business. Dr. Thornwell concluded by moving to lay the report of the Committee on Bills and Overtures on the table, to take up a paper which he read. The motion of Dr. Thornwell prevailed by a count of sixty-four to fifty-four.

Dr. B. M. Smith moved to lay Dr. Thornwell's paper on the

table, which was done.

We all know and admit that a vote of the Assembly does not always express even the settled conviction of that body itself. Such votes are often given hastily, without due consideration, or from motives not affecting the principle involved in the case decided. At the end of the session, to avoid discussion, or to save time, things are often passed, or passed over, which, under other circumstances, would have met a different fate. It is also to be considered that all who vote for a particular measure, do not commonly do so for the same reasons. A vote to lay a resolution on the table is not decisive evidence that those who joined it, sanctioned the arguments of the speakers by whom the measure was advocated. The sixtyfour members who voted to lay the overture on Colonization on the table, are not to be presumed, for example, all to agree with Dr. Thornwell. And if they did, sixty-four is a small portion of an Assembly counting some three hundred members. These remarks are made with the obvious purpose to prevent the hasty assumption that the General Assembly gave its sanction to the new and startling doctrine on the church, which Dr. Thornwell so eloquently advocated.

The world is governed by ideas. The triteness of this remark is only a proof of its importance. It is wonderful also how ideas percolate; how they silently diffuse themselves, as heat, or electricity, until they animate the mass of society, and manifest themselves in the most unexpected quarters. They often lie dormant, as it were, in the public mind, until some practical measure, some foregone conclusion or purpose as to a definite mode of action, calls them into notice. If they suit the occasion, if they answer a cherished purpose, and give to the intellect a satisfactory reason for what the will has determined upon, they are adopted with avidity. The history of

every community will suggest abundant illustrations to every reader of the truth of this remark.

Great evils were long experienced in England from Erastianism. The intimate union of the church and state, and the consequent subjection of the former to the latter, led to all manner of corruptions and oppressions. To escape these evils, one class of the Puritans went to the opposite extreme. They represented the visible church as a purely spiritual body, consisting of the regenerated, united by special covenant for the worship of God, and mutual watch and care. This is Owen's idea. He says, believers are the matter of the church, and the covenant is the form. No one, therefore, is a member of the church but one, who giving satisfactory evidence of regeneration, voluntarily and personally professes his faith, and enters into a church covenant with a number of fellow-believers. else are of the world, in no way amenable to the church or subject to its control. The sole object of church organization is the worship of God and the exercise of discipline; and consequently its sole prerogative is to provide for divine worship and to receive and exclude members. This leads to the distinction between the church and the parish. The former is the covenanted body of believers; the latter, the whole body of the community united in the maintenance of the ordinances of religion. There are two principles involved in this theory, the one, that each body of believers united by covenant for worship and discipline is a complete church, and independent of all others; and the other, that the church is a purely spiritual body having for its sole object the worship of God and the fellowship and purity of believers. The effects of this theory we see in the progress of development in New England. The church, there, is what Napoleon's army would be were it disbanded into independent companies, each acting by, and for itself; this is the effect of Independency; or what these countries would be, if every village were a separate sovereignty. The effect of the other principle, relating to the nature and design of the church, is utter inefficiency. Who ever heard of the church saying or doing anything in New England. It is muzzled, manacled and fettered. It exists there in spite of the theory, in the spiritual union and fellowship of the people of God, but

they have no means of organic action, and according to the prevalent notion, no right to act as an organic whole, nor to act even in its disjoint members, except for the purposes indicated above. If they have even to ordain a man to the ministry, found a seminary, send out missionaries, or do anything however intimately connected with Christ's kingdom, they must go out of the church organization to do it. The most desperate evils may prevail in the form of heresies or immoralities, the church as such can do nothing, and does nothing. We give full credit to the devotion of individual Christians in New England, and to the energy of their combined action in their voluntary associations of different kinds. But these are very poor substitutes for the natural and divinely appointed organs of church action. Experience is teaching a sad lesson on this subject.

Of the two principles involved in this form of Puritanism, the Independent element has had no access to our church. There is no susceptibility in our system of impression from that source. The two systems are antagonistic and repellent. They are incapable of combination. With regard to the other element, however, relating to the nature and prerogatives of the church, the case is far different. That element has long been silently diffusing itself through our whole body. It affects our modes of thought, our expressions, and our ecclesiastical action. With us, in common parlance, the church is the body of those who profess to be regenerated; to join the church is to come to the Lord's table. Our Book declares that all baptized persons are members of the church, and yet we constantly talk of such persons joining the church when they come to the Lord's Supper. Personal and voluntary profession of saving faith is regarded as the condition of church membership. The church has no right of discipline except over such professors. And now the doctrine is advanced by one of the very foremost men of our whole communion, that the church is in such sense a spiritual body that she has no right even to recommend a benevolent society. She must confine herself to a purely spiritual vocation. She cannot denounce evil or patronize good out of her pale. It is not her business to attend "to the colonization of races, or to the arrest of the slave trade," or to any thing else but the immediate spiritual affairs of men.

There is always a half truth in every error. It is true that the church is not of this world; that it is not as such concerned in the affairs of the world; that it has nothing to do with politics, commerce, or agriculture, or any secular enterprise as such. All this follows from our theory of the church, as logically and freely as from the Puritan doctrine. There is no necessity to manacle the church to keep her hands off of politics.

In strong contrast with this whole Puritan doctrine is that idea of the church which is the life of our system, which has revealed itself in act in every period of our history. It is, that while the true church, or body of Christ, the Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ πνεῦμα, consists of the true people of God, yet by divine ordinance the children of believers are to be regarded and treated as included within its pale, and consecrated to God in baptism, and therefore, in the sight of men, all baptized persons, in the language of our Book, are members of the church, and under its watch and care.

This, of course, as remarked above, does not imply that they are all to be admitted to the Lord's table, any more than that they are all to be admitted to the ministry or eldership. God has prescribed the qualifications which the church is to require of those whom she receives to full communion or to office. Still, baptized persons are members of the visible church, until they renounce their birthright or are excommunicated, and consequently subject to its government or discipline. body constitutes one whole, so that one part is subject to a larger, and the larger to the whole. To the church, in this sense, is committed not merely the work of public worship and exercising discipline, not simply or exclusively to exhort men to repentance and faith, but to assert, maintain, and propagate the truth. And by the truth, is to be understood the word of God, and all it contains, as the rule of faith and practice. This is the great prerogative and duty of the church. Her divine commission is, "Go, teach all nations." From this it follows: 1. That she has the right to preach the gospel. This is the first, most important, and pressing of her duties; and in the discharge of this duty, she ordains ministers and sends forth missionaries. Hence your Boards of Foreign and Domestic Missions, and of Church Extension. 2. She has the right to administer discipline, which is one of the divinely appointed means of preserving the truth. 3. The right to educate. If she is to teach all nations, she must train up teachers; she must prepare the minds of men to receive the truth, and she must communicate that truth by all the means at her command. Hence your schools, colleges, and theological seminaries; hence also your educational institutions among the heathen, and your establishments for printing and distributing Bibles, tracts, and religious books. On this foundation rest your Boards of Education and Publication. 4. It follows from the great commission of the church, that it is her prerogative and duty to testify for the truth and law of God, wherever she can make her voice heard; not only to her own people, but to kings and rulers, to Jews and Gentiles. It is her duty not only to announce the truth, but to apply it to particular cases and persons; that is, she is bound to instruct, rebuke, and exhort, with all longsuffering. She is called of God to set forth and enjoin upon the consciences of men the relative duties of parents and children, of magistrates and people, of masters and slaves. If parents neglect their duties, she is called upon by her Divine commission to instruct and exhort them. If magistrates transcend the limits of their authority, and trespass on the Divine law, she is bound to raise her voice in remonstrance and warning. She has nothing to do with the state, in the exercise of its discretion within its own sphere; and therefore has no right to meddle with questions of policy, foreign or domestic. She has nothing to do with tariffs, or banks, or internal improvements. We say, with Dr. Thornwell, "Let the dead bury the dead." Let Cæsar attend to his own affairs. But if Cæsar undertakes to meddle with the affairs of God; if the state pass any laws contrary to the law of God, then it is the duty of the church, to whom God has committed the great work of asserting and maintaining his truth and will, to protect and remonstrate. If the state not only violates the Sabbath, but makes it a condition to holding office, that others should violate it; or if it legalizes piracy, or concubinage, or polygamy; if it prohibits the worship of God, or the free use of the means of salvation; if, in short, it does anything directly contrary to the law of God, the church is bound to make that law known, and set it home upon the conscience of all concerned.

In many of our states, there are in force laws relating to marriage and divorce, in open conflict with the word of God. We hold that it is the duty of the church of every denominasion, in those states, to tell their legislators, that while they have the right to legislate about matters of property and civil rights at their discretion, under the constitution, they have no right to separate those whom God has joined together, or make that lawful which God has declared to be unlawful.

A few years since, Dr. Thornwell preached an elaborate sermon, setting forth what he believed to be the true teaching of the word of God on the subject of slavery. What he had a right to do, and was bound to do as a minister of the gospel. the church has the right and obligation to do. If, on the one hand, Northern brethren would abstain from teaching, on that and other subjects, what God does not teach; and if, on the other hand, Southern brethren would clearly assert, in their capacity of ministers and a church, what they fully believe God does teach, great good and God's blessing, we doubt not, would be the result. They are as much bound to teach the truth on this subject, as a church, as they are bound to do it as ministers; and they are surely as much bound to teach the law of God respecting the duties of masters and slaves, as they are to teach what God says of the duty of parents and children, of saints and sinners. There is a great temptation to adopt theories which free us from painful responsibilities; but we are satisfied that the brethren must, on reflection, be convinced that the duty to testify to the truth, to make it known, and to press it upon the hearts and consciences of men, is as much obligatory on the church, in her aggregate capacity, as on her individual pastors. Her Confession and Catechisms are an admirable summary of that testimony; but she is no more to be satisfied with them, than the ministry is to be satisfied with reading the Confession of Faith, Sabbath after Sabbath, to the people.

The principle which defines and limits the prerogative and duty of the church in all such cases, seems to us perfectly

plain. She has nothing to do as a church with secular affairs, with questions of politics or state policy. Her duty is to announce and enforce by moral means the law of God. If at any time, as may well happen, a given question assumes both a moral and political bearing, as for example, the slave-trade, then the duty of the church is limited to setting forth the law of God on the subject. It is not her office to argue the question in its bearing on the civil or secular interests of the community, but simply to declare in her official capacity what God has said on the subject. To adopt any theory which would stop the mouth of the church, and prevent her bearing her testimony to kings and rulers, magistrates and people, in behalf of the truth and law of God, is like administering chloroform to a man to prevent his doing mischief. We pray God that this poison may be dashed away, before it has reduced the church to a state of inanition, and delivered her bound hand and foot into the power of the world. It is obvious that the same principle is applicable to ministers. They profane the pulpit when they preach politics, or turn the sacred desk into a rostrum for lectures on secular affairs. But they are only faithful to their vows when they proclaim the truth of God and apply his law to all matters whether of private manners or laws of the state. The whole history of the Presbyterian church in Europe and America is instinct with this spirit. The Presbyterians of Scotland told the government that it had no right to establish Popery or Prelacy, and that they would not submit to it. Our fathers of the Revolution took sides with the country in the struggle for independence, and protested against the acts of the British Government tending to the introduction of Episcopacy. Before the Revolution the old Synod remonstrated with the authorities in Virginia, for their persecuting laws. In 1830 the General Assembly raised its voice against the persecution of Christians in Switzerland. It has, over and over, remonstrated with the Government of this country on the laws enjoining the carrying and distribution of the mails on Sunday. While admitting that the Bible does not forbid slaveholding, it has borne its testimony in the most explicit terms against the iniquity of many slave laws. It has many times enjoined on the conscience of the people the duty of instruct-

ing the coloured population of our land, and patronized the establishment of schools for that purpose. It has never been afraid to denounce what God forbids, or to proclaim in all ears what God commands. This is her prerogative and this is her duty. With the Colonization Society, as a commercial enterprize, or as a mere benevolent institution she has nothing to do; but as a means designed and adapted to promote the progress of the gospel in Africa, she has over and over commended it to the favour of the people. It is only on the assumption that Presbyterians, neither in this country nor in Europe, have ever understood their own system, that the principle advocated by Dr. Thornwell can be admitted. Presbyterians have always held that the church is bound to hold forth in the face of all men the truth and law of God, to testify against all infractions of that law by rulers or people, to lend her countenance and support to all means, within and without her jurisdiction, which she believes to be designed and wisely adapted to promote the glory and kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ. This our church has always done, and we pray God, she may continue to do even to the end.

SHORT NOTICES.

Lectures on Metaphysics. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Edited by the Rev. H. L. Mansel, D. D., Oxford, and John Veitch, M. A., Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. MDCCCLIX. 2 vols. 8vo.

It has long been heralded over the civilized world that Sir William Hamilton was as marvellous a man in the academical chair teaching orally, as he was in the closet instructing by the instrumentality of written thought. This, from the peculiarly compact, concise and eminently logical style of his writings, we could not well understand. But the lectures before us have made manifest to us that Sir William was a great master in the art of teaching. As a scheme of discourse to teach young men to philosophize, the lectures seem to us to be devised with consummate skill. They are a series of mirrors exhibiting to the

self-conscious mind of the hearer the successive phenomena of his own consciousness, with a distinctness never before, we feel assured, even approached by prelections in philosophy. In estimating the sagacity and wisdom with which the course of lectures is adapted to the end to be accomplished, the peculiar nature of the subject to be discussed must be carefully considered. The subject from beginning to end is a grand antithesis. The knowing mind and the thing known-and that thing peculiarly the mind itself-in all the phases of psychological phenomena, present never-ceasing antitheses that are to be shown to the self-conscious mind of the hearer, both as unities and as contrasts. The dual character of psychological phenomena must never be lost sight of in the greatest subtlety of discussion. The scheme of discourse must be planned, and the language must be formed so as to exhibit this duality in unity. This peculiarity of his science Sir William had thoroughly considered; and in these lectures he has as completely overmastered its difficulties as an academic lesson. The gradual opening of the subject, the increase of distinctness at each step of progress, the exhibition of the successive phenomena without any commingling of phases, the different orders of discussion, determined by the diverse orders of the subjects considered, the judicious recapitulations at the beginnings of the successive lectures whenever the subject in hand is embarrassed with special difficulties, the apt introduction of the history and polemics in regard to cardinal doctrines, and other facilities in the great art of instruction, all presented in a flexible, idiomatic and masculine diction, which these lectures evince, prove that the author's faculties had retained their free and natural play under the severe rule of his disciplined logic. As a teacher, Sir William was not near so brilliant as Abelard or Cousin. But in this is one element of his vast superiority. Philosophical instruction should be addressed to the notions of the understanding, and not to the images of the fancy. The cognitive faculties should be evolved, instructed, and disciplined. To know, and not to imagine, is the legitimate end of philosophy. But it must not be supposed that Sir William Hamilton never employs ornate diction. It is far otherwise. No finer pictures of metaphorical language can be found in all literature than Sir William has employed in some of these lectures, when the use was best to exhibit the contrasts of negative thought. But, of course, the pictures are severely chaste and concise. And we need hardly tell our readers that in the hostile criticisms of cardinal errors, like that of representative perception, Sir William's diction

seems to burn with intellectual fire. The burning weapon of his

logic gleams as the trenchant thrusts are given.

But to appreciate these lectures, as the instruments of that academical instruction which has opened a new era in British philosophy, it will be necessary for our readers to know something of Sir William as a man, both in his natural powers and his educational accomplishments. We propose, therefore, what our engagements forbid now, to consider, in a future article, Sir William as a man and as a teacher. The article will be the complement of what we have heretofore said of Sir William and his philosophy.

We must not omit to signalize the learning, faithfulness, and ability with which the lectures are edited. Mr. Mansel, of Oxford, had already attained the foremost rank as a philosopher by his published works; and Mr. Veitch, of Edinburgh, who was a first prize man, and also class-assistant to Sir William Hamilton, though a very young man, and who had already, by his life of Dugald Stewart, and his edition with notes of some of Des Cartes' works translated by himself, attained much eminence, is only on the threshold of the high career which his talents fit him to pursue.

On Civil Liberty and Self-Government. By Francis Lieber, LL D., Corresponding member of the Institute of France, etc; author of "Political Ethics," "Principles of Legal and Political Interpretation," etc., etc. Enlarged edition in one volume. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. London: Trübner & Co. MDCCCLIX. 8vo. pp. 624.

We heartily rejoice to see an enlarged edition, in such excellent type and such beautiful form, of this work, which we took occasion in our last October number to consider so fully in connection with the writings of De Tocqueville. In the judgment of the great merits of the work then expressed by us, we have since seen the most general concurrence both in Europe and America. This new edition is so great an improvement on the first, that it cannot fail to raise still higher the already unrivalled reputation of the author as a writer on politics. Besides improvement in the fuller discussion of many topics, every political experience, which the history of the world has furnished, since the first edition in 1853, is carefully considered, even to the fact that Michigan proposed in her Legislature, a few weeks ago, to abolish the Grand Jury. It would seem, from the intimate connection of Dr. Lieber's writings with the daily transactions of the world, that nothing, however small or out of the way, bearing in the least degree on the political life of society, occurs anywhere from whence knowledge ever comes at all, which does not come within his vigilant observation. Though

abounding in all the wealth of learning that history has gathered for the political philosopher, the writings of Lieber are instinct with the life of the very moment in which they are written. Lieber is no cloistered Academic, neither is he a stranger in our land: but born to an European education, in association with the greatest men of this century, and in the midst of the most instructive experiences of European political life, he lives in the midst of us, realizing all that is American with a native's zest; and with a discreet love of freedom, that, perhaps, nothing but his early experiences could have inspired. The book before us has the wisdom of a two-fold experience—the experience of despotism in Europe, and the experience of freedom in America. It has too, the wisdom which has known what political life is, when tried by the most terrible war that ever desolated nations, as well as what it is in peace. This wisdom founded on contrasts in the condition of society, and of the same society, is especially important in political science. We welcome the book as the most opportune, as well as valuable, political present which literature has ever given to our country. If the rising generation will but learn the great political truths it teaches, our country may become greater than any in past history. It is only our politics that we have to fear as the destroyer of our country. In these times, when it seems to be universally felt, that the greatest of all our political institutions -the judiciary-is sunk so low, that even the able bar which is still left, cannot give respectability to the administration of the law, our science, our literature, and our arts, are attracting the admiration of Europe. Where the nation thinks itself invulnerable, just there is its weakness. It thinks its political life possesses such vigour, such democratic immortality, that it must necessarily develope its energies into a nobler freedom in all the trials of future history. But this is a dangerous mistake, and may become a fatal one. We have no fear for the religion, the science, the literature, the art, and the material interests of the nation. In all these-if sinful man dare express any satisfaction about the first, his religion-we fearlessly assert, that our nation is more advanced than the past history of the human race had authorized any to hope. But of our political life, at this time, we surely cannot venture to utter much praise. If we disappoint the high expectations of our national instinct, it will be by the failure of our political institutions, the thing which we least fear. The father of human history has given us, with an unerring pencil, a sketch of the first act in the drama of nations in the antediluvian world. The mystery of that act, and which closed the scene with

universal desolation, is still the grand mystery of the dramathe mystery of the wickedness of the actors. In this awful mystery, the unity of the drama of nations is to be found. And while philosophy pronounces the mystery insoluble, it is still a practical reality, giving birth to the great polities which have been devised by man for protective and retributive justice. The polity of the antediluvian world wholly failed, and vengeance had the closing up of human affairs. On this side of that solemn gulf which divides us from the world before the flood, polity after polity has perished, until history is, for the most part, the grave-yard of nations; and it is a serious question, whether man has yet devised institutions which can secure the world from the catastrophe which closed the first epoch of human history. The book before us examines with great sagacity the principles on which these institutions are based; and it must be an incurious and ignoble mind which does not feel a desire to read its pages. It is in politics that the selfish ambition of man finds scope for its exercise-for gratifying its thirst for power and dominion. Hence it is through politics that nations march to the grave.

Eloquence a Virtue; or Outlines of Systematic Rhetoric. Translated from the German of Dr. Francis Theremin. By William G. T. Shedd. With an Introductory Essay. Revised edition. Andover: Warren F. Draper. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

Professor Shedd, at present the able and accomplished incumbent of the Chair of Ecclesiastical History in Andover Theological Seminary, ten years ago was Professor of Rhetoric in Burlington College, Vermont. At this period he published this translation of Theremin's work on Rhetoric, prefaced by an extended and elaborate introductory essay from himself. The doctrine of the treatise is, that eloquence is distinguished from philosophy, poetry, and all other forms of expressed thought, in having for its object to move men to action, and that this is accomplished by exciting their active, i. e., moral faculties: while in turn these are awakened by appeals to their moral ideas and sensibilities. For this purpose it impresses into its service philosophy, poetry, all forms of knowledge and thought, which can be made tributary to its great end. Hence the differentia of eloquence, as distinguished from other kinds of expressed thought, lie in its ethical element. From this fontal principle all the details of Rhetoric, as a science and an art, flow. The subject is ably unfolded according to this method in this compact yet thorough treatise of Theremin's.

What, however, is exhibited by him in a dry light in the form of naked philosophic statement, is displayed by Professor

Shedd, in his introductory essay, with that glow of life, beauty and force, which distinguishes his writings. Theremin gives a philosophic analysis of eloquence—Professor Shedd both analyzes and exemplifies it. His prolegomena let in a flood of intense light upon the subject, and are themselves worth the price of the volume.

The Great Concern: or Man's Relation to God and a Future State. By Nehemiah Adams, D.D., Pastor of the Essex street church, Boston. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

This volume is made up of discourses delivered by the author during the great awakening of 1857-8, and published at the request of his hearers, under the title of "Truths for the Times." They are mainly designed to parry the objections and cavils, which, at such seasons, must needs be rife, in communities largely made up of Unitarians and Universalists. The topics mainly treated are, Regeneration and Conversion, Atonement and Justification, Endless Punishment, Plenary Inspiration of the Scriptures, and the Love of God. The orthodox view of these subjects is defended against the current objections of such sceptics, by decisive arguments skilfully and kindly presented. The book is admirably adapted to circulation in refined and intelligent communities tainted with the scepticism which has long infested eastern Massachusetts. There is a mingled fidelity and benignity, a calm earnestness and spiritual unction in this volume, which much enhance its value.

Anna Clayton: or the Inquirer after Truth. By Rev. Francis Marion Dimmick, A. M. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1859.

From the preface we learn that a sister of the author had been rendered uneasy on the subject of infant baptism, by the proselyting arts of some Baptist friends. He was led to task himself in relieving her mind of the difficulties in which it had thus become entangled. He found many of these difficulties presenting themselves in forms which no extant manual on the subject sufficiently meets. Although, for substance, the answers may be found in different books, yet they are not so collected, arranged, and adapted to the present devices of Baptist proselytism, as to be available for the protection of many persons who are exposed to their influence. Hence the author has wrought into shape, in this book, the reasonings which he found effective in the case with which he had to deal. It is in the form of a narrative dialogue, purporting to give the successive conversations between the parties on both sides

involved in an adroit and persistent attempt to proselyte a pedo-baptist, which at first promised success, but was ultimately thwarted. The colloquial form adds to the vivacity and interest of the work. The argument is, on the whole, conducted with skill and effect. We observe an occasional expression which we cannot endorse. It is, however, a valuable addition to our means of resisting that annoying proselytism, for which it is designed to be an antidote.

First Things: or the Development of Church Life. By Baron Stow, author of "Christian Brotherhood," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The "First Things" here treated in a series of brief and lucid essays, are some of the principal events connected with the first planting of the church recorded in the Acts of the Apostles-such as the first prayer-meeting, first election, first sermon, &c. Of course, there is no logical method in the mutual relation of the subjects treated. Each is treated, not because of its relation to what precedes or follows it, but because it happens to be the first instance of the kind in the order of time. Of course too, each is, in its own way, an illustration of the earliest development of church life in that respect. And so far forth, Dr. Stow has expounded and applied it for our guidance and admonition. His observations are generally judicious and edifying. We observe a slight propensity occasionally to give a version to some of the facts with which he deals demanded by the Baptist theory of the sacraments and of church government. There is, however, as little of this as could reasonably be expected.

Promise of the Father: or a Neglected Specialty of the Last Days. Addressed to the Clergy and Laity of all Christian Communities. By the author of "The Way of Holiness," etc. Boston: Henry V. Degen. 1859.

The author of this work, Mrs. Palmer, has already published a number of books, which have been received with considerable favour by the public. The "Neglected Specialty," for which she pleads at great length, and with great earnestness in this volume, is that women be permitted and encouraged to seek and exercise the gift of praying, teaching and exhorting in the public assemblies of the church. Whatever may be admissible in an unsettled and abnormal condition of the church, the Apostle has decided the question as respects its ordinary permanent state. "Let your women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak . . . for it is a shame for women to speak in the church." 1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35. Mrs.

Palmer strives in vain to empty these declarations of their obvious meaning. The passage 1 Cor. xi. 5, may refer to occasions very different from promiscuous public assemblies of the church; or, even if it forbid a gross impropriety in the manner of public prophesying, this does not conflict with subsequent entire prohibition of it, and of all public speaking by females in the church, which he gives in words too plain for the most desperate ingenuity to wrench into any other meaning.

Popular Geology. A series of Lectures read before the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh. With descriptive sketches from a Geologist's Port-folio. By Hugh Miller. With an Introductory Résumé of the Progress of Geological Science within the last two years. By Mrs. Miller. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1859.

This work comprises much of the matter which the author had prepared for the great work, intense devotion to which doubtless hastened his untimely death. This work was to have been "the Geology of Scotland." The present volume has the incompleteness incident to posthumous publications. Still it has those characteristics, in an eminent degree, which have made Hugh Miller the most popular of scientific writers. Along with immense information, great speculative and scientific ardour, it is animated by that vivacity and freshness of style which lend to dry scientific details the charm of cloquence and poetry. Some of the opinions advanced in this volume we are by no means ready to accept. This does not, however, destroy its value or attractiveness; nor will it lessen the wide circle of readers it is sure to command.

Theology in Romance: or the Catechism and the Dermott Family. By Mrs. Madeline Leslie, author of "Home Life," and Rev. A. R. Baker, author of "The Catechism Tested by the Bible," &c. Boston: John P. Jewett and Company. Philadelphia: Wm. S. & Alfred Martien. 1859.

Mr. Baker's former works on the Catechism have done much to promote the intelligent study of it among the children of our country, especially of New England. We are glad to learn from the preface to these little volumes, that they have reached the enormous sale of two hundred thousand copies. They have been translated into several languages. "In the Sandwich Islands they are used, by government authority, as national text books, assisting to confirm those who were so lately idolaters in the faith which was once delivered to the saints." Is not here a lesson to some of our own constitution-makers, who sedulously rule all recognition of God out of our fundamental laws?

These volumes aim to further the influence of the Catechism

upon young children, by associating with each proposition an interesting tale, or anecdote, or conversation in illustration of it. We wish it all success, although we do not quite fancy the title, "Theology in Romance."

Igdrasil: or the Tree of Existence. By James Challen, author of "The Cave of Machpelah," and other Poems. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1859.

Our readers will doubtless wonder what this strange title means. The author explains it by a prefatory extract from Carlyle, in which he finds the word Igdrasil and its interpretation,—at least after Carlyle's manner of elucidating—which in the present case seems very like lucus a non lucendo. "Igdrasil—the Ash Tree of Existence—has its roots down in the kingdoms of Hela, or death... At the foot of it in the death-kingdom sit three Normas,—Fates—the Past, Present, Future, watering its roots from the sacred well... What was done: what is doing: what will be done. The Infinite conjugation of the verb 'to do.'" This heathenish jargon doubtless has some esoteric meaning which is all luminous to the initiated. For us outsiders it is worse than worthless.

We are sorry that Mr. Challen should have chosen this wild conceit, as a thread on which to string many pearls of Christian thought and feeling, of fancy and imagination. Delivered from this dark association, the book contains much that is, at least, respectable. The publishers have done their part admirably. The heavy, clean paper, the clear, bright, broad typography, remind us of the best style of British publishing houses.

Frank Elliot; or Wells in the Desert. By James Challen, author of "The Cave of Machpelah." Philadelphia: James Challen & Son.

Another book by the same prolific author, which, through the medium of an entertaining story, aims to accomplish two objects: 1. To promote healthful zeal and activity in the cause of Christ among private Christians. 2. To advocate that portentous delusion, known as Campbellism, which has proved so formidable and disastrous to the interests of truth and godliness in the West. For this purpose it is plausible and adroit, and well adapted to poison the popular mind. We therefore desire to put our readers on their guard, lest they take for a harmless religious tale, what is really designed and fitted to unsettle the faith of the unstable and unwary.

Agnes Hopetoun's Schools and Holidays. By Mrs. Oliphant, author of "Katie Stewart," &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

This is a well written story, adapted to interest young per-

sons, and insinuate into their minds wholesome moral and religious impressions.

Spontaneous Generation: An article from the "American Journal of Science and Arts," for March, 1859. By James D. Dana.

Anticipations of Man in Nature. By James D. Dana, Yale College. From the "New Englander," for May, 1859.

We are glad to see our distinguished Christian physicists directing their attention to the points of contact between science and religion. In the first of these pamphlets, Professor Dana brings to view new scientific proofs of the absurdity of the atheistic fiction of the spontaneous generation of living from

lifeless objects.

In the second, he examines the theory propounded by Dr. Bushnell, in his late work on "Nature and the Supernatural," that the earth, in its geological structure, and its various adjustments before the creation of man, was formed in anticipation of and in special retributive adaptation to his sin. We think that Professor Dana disproves this, and shows that before the fall the globe was probably adapted to the uses of man as a holy being. This, however, does not prove that it suffered no change on account of man's sin, when it was cursed for his sake. Nor do we understand Professor Dana to maintain this. But we do not quite understand him, when he seems to deny that "pain and death are the wages of sin." So far as man is concerned, the Scriptures leave no room for doubt on this subject. Indeed, Professor Dana says, "The thousand ills that are ever near to prey upon his vitals, proclaim that he has left his first estate, and incurred the frown of his Maker." This is the plain scriptural truth. There are other points treated in this very able pamphlet, which we should be glad to notice, if we had room, especially his refutation of the pantheistic notion caught up by Dr. Bushnell, that sin and evil are necessary and unavoidable in the development of all created moral beings.

Mosaics. By the author of "Salad for the Solitary," etc. "We have been at a great feast of languages, and have stolen all the scraps." Shakspeare. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. London: Richard Bentley, 1859.

The enterprising publisher deserves well for the uncommonly beautiful style in which this volume is issued. The work itself is true to its title. It is on a great variety of subjects, which are skilfully and beautifully wrought into a harmonious whole. The author has gathered from a great variety of writers of the present and former days, and himself writes gracefully in combining his gems together, although there is hardly

a continuous page of his own writing in the entire book. Shakspeare, Sydney Smith, Shelly, Charles Lamb, Dr. Guthrie, Spurgeon, Bishop Ken, Pascal, Byron, Carlyle, Dickens, Goldsmith, Dr. Bethune, Milton, Humboldt, Longfellow, etc., are made to contribute to these pages. And we are happy to say that we have observed nothing but the purest moral tone in them all. We heartily commend the volume.

The Convalescent. By N. Parker Willis. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1859.

A republication of Mr. Willis's letters to the Journal of which he is one of the editors. His advice to the invalid is that after paying reasonable attention to the symptoms and treatment of his disease, he "should ignore and outhappy it." He had been pronounced by many physicians an incurable case of consumption, but now finds himself in as fair health as may reasonably be expected, at the beginning of one's fifties. Judging from his letters, he was certainly a very joyous invalid. There is a dashing freedom in the style, which we believe characterizes all of Mr. W's prose writings. It is a volume of pleasant reading.

Sight and Hearing; How Preserved and how Lost. By J. Henry Clark, M. D. "Obsta principiis." Fifth thousand, carefully revised, with an Index. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1859.

This is designed as a popular hand-book. It is the work of a thoroughly educated physician, and contains suggestions and cautions which, if duly heeded, would tend to preserve those important organs on which the usefulness and happiness of men so greatly depend.

Rambles among Words: Their Poetry, History and Wisdom. By William Swinton. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. London: Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1859.

This work is somewhat in the same vein as Mr. Trench's "Study of Words." The chapters are entitled "Rambles," of which there are twelve. We could wish that the author's rambles had led him to discover the beauty of greater simplicity in the expression of his thoughts. The stilted, inflated style is not to our taste; it is, however, a curious and important department of study, in which every contributor deserves well of the public.

The Life of General H. Havelock, K. C. B. By J. T. Headley. Illustrated. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1859.

The late mutiny in India made us acquainted with one of the bravest and best of men in General Havelock. The attention of the world was concentrated for weeks on his movements and daring exploits, and then was saddened by the intelligence of his death. In him we have another proof that there is nothing in a truly religious character incompatible with the highest personal bravery, nor between a military and Christian profession. Mr. Headley has evidently laboured to prepare a faithful history; and on a subject so congenial to his taste, it will not be too much to say that his work sustains his former reputation.

The Pasha Papers. Epistles of Mohammed Pasha, Rear-Admiral of the Turkish Navy; written from New York, to his friend Abel Ben Hassen. Translated into Anglo-American, from the original manuscripts. To which are added sundry other Letters, critical and explanatory, laudatory and objurgatory, from gratified or injured individuals in various parts of the planet. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. London: Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1859.

These are satirical papers on society and affairs in New York, Boston, and Washington. Sarcasm is a difficult and dangerous weapon. It requires the highest justice and the purest morality, in order to be effective in the cause of virtue. Mere ridicule and contempt, of which we think we see too many traces in this volume, do not belong to successful examples in this species of writing.

Hours with my Pupils; or, Educational Addresses, &c. The Young Lady's Guide and Parent's and Teacher's Assistant. By Mrs. Lincoln Phelps, late Principal of the Patapsco Institute, Maryland, author of "Lincoln's Botany," &c. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1859.

This book is made up of the addresses of a pious teacher—a lady of varied accomplishments—to her pupils, from the year 1841 to 1856. They are on a great variety of important subjects. The volume is fitted to be highly useful to young ladies, parents, and teachers.

Science and Art of Chess. By J. Monroe, B. C. L. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. London: Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1859.

So far as we can judge, this appears to be a thorough treatise. The powers of the pieces, nomenclature, laws of the game, checkmate, its theory and examples, resemblance in the results of the action of unlike pieces, &c. &c., appear to be fully discussed.

Paul Morphy's great achievements have awakened just now new interest in chess-playing, and disposed those who are devoted to the game, to attach undue importance to it. To be an adept in it, is claimed as a proof of intellectual superiority. But we greatly doubt whether devotion to it tends to improve the tempers, or the characters, or to repress the natural selfishness of men. We have no reason to question the justice of the following estimate of the game from the *Boston Courier*:

"The game of Chess is certainly an intellectual game; so is whist, with, to be sure, an element of chance superadded; so is checkers. But it is but a game, after all; and the best thing you can say of it is, that it is a very excellent contrivance to enable idle men to get through the lazy-pacing hours without damage to the pocket, the conscience, or the constitution. It is, for an amusement, the nearest possible approach to real intellectual work. But it is a barren tree; it bears the blossoms of entertainment, but no fruit of utility-'the rest of mankind' are very little benefitted, mentally, morally, or materially, by the diligent study of the game of chess by a limited circle. our taste, the spectacle of two men, especially young men, crooking their spines for hours, and tying knots in their brains, over a parcel of figures cut in white and red ivory, is a little dreary; but this is merely a matter of taste, and we are far from insisting that others shall square their conduct by the line of our tastes."

Commentary on the Gospel of John. By Dr. August Tholuck. Translated from the German, by Charles P. Krauth, D. D. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: Blakeman & Mason. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1859. Pp. 440.

Tholuck's Commentary on John was published in 1826. As first printed, it was rather a slight and hastily prepared work. It has since passed through seven editions, and has been gradually enlarged and improved, until it has assumed its present elaborate form. Every production of Dr. Tholuck's pen wears the impress of his genius, learning, and piety; and perhaps his Commentary on John, as it now appears, may be regarded as the most generally acceptable of all his works. He has happily, so far as we can judge, met with a competent translator in Dr. Krauth, of Pittsburgh. The name of Tholuck, so dear in Europe and America, will secure to this Commentary a wide circulation.

Notes, Critical and Explanatory, on the Acts of the Apostles. By Melancthon W. Jacobus, Professor of Biblical Literature, &c., in the Western Theological Seminary at Allegheny City, Pa. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 430.

Popular commentaries on the Scriptures, written by learned men, seem to be one of the great necessities of our age. The demand seems to be in a fair way of being supplied. This is the third or fourth work on the Acts, which within a year or two have appeared in this country, from the pens of distinguished scholars. This volume is constructed on the same general plan with the Notes on the Gospels, by the same author. It strikes us, however, as being more thoroughly elaborated, and more replete with useful information, than the previous volumes. It must serve to elevate the deservedly high reputation of Dr. Jacobus, and prove a very valuable aid in the study of one of the most important books of the New Testament.

India and its People: Ancient and Modern. With a view of the Sepoy Mutiny: embracing an account of the Conquests in India by the English, their Policy and its Results, also the Moral, Religious, and Political condition of the People; their Superstitions, Rites and Customs. By Rev. Hollis Read, American Missionary to India. Illustrated with numerous Engravings. Columbus: H. Miller. 1859. 8vo. pp. 384.

To Mr. Read's residence in India, are to be referred his special interest in that great country, and in no small measure, his special fitness for the task here undertaken. Few parts of the world, at the present time, are the object of such general and deep interest as Hindostan. It is the theatre of missionary enterprise as well as great political events. Statesmen and Christians are alike concerned in its past history and its present state. Such a work as the above extended title describes, ceming from an author already so favourably known by his work entitled "God in History," written with the design of tracing the dealings of Providence in the fate of nations, and in command of adequate sources of information, cannot fail to attract general attention. It may be safely recommended as furnishing a great amount of important and seasonable information.

History of the Presbyterian Church in Trenton, N. J. From the first Settlement of the Town. By John Hall, D.D., member of the Presbyterian Historical Society, and of the Historical Societies of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 683 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 453.

This is a model work of its kind. It is the fruit of wide and diligent research, intelligently conducted and wisely used. The reader who takes up this work, expecting nothing more than its title indicates, will find himself most agreeably disappointed. Instead of a simple history of the Presbyterian

church in Trenton, it is not only a history of the town and of its principal inhabitants, but also of the early settlement of the whole of the central portion of New Jersey. As no part of the United States was the theatre of more important events in the history of the country, as well as of our church, than central New Jersey, the reader, whether his interests be secular or religious, will find here more to reward his attention than the modesty of the title would lead him to anticipate.

The Art of Extempore Speaking. Hints for the Pulpit, the Senate, and the Bar. By M. Bautain, Vicar General and Professor at the Sorbonne, &c. With additions by a Member of the New York Bar. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1859. Pp. 364.

Extempore speaking, in the sense of speaking without preparation, and in the sense of speaking without having written what is to be said, are two very different things. The former is unhappily the general idea attached to the term as illustrated in practice. It is the easiest and the poorest of all kinds of public speaking. It requires nothing but confidence, either natural or acquired; but to speak without having previously written out the discourse, but after having thoroughly mastered the subject and arranged a plan, is a high art. It is doubtless the most effective of all modes of public address. The danger is that when the labour of writing is dispensed with, the speaker will content himself with inadequate preparation, and pour upon his hearers a stream of crude thoughts or empty declamation. As this book is written by one of the greatest living orators in France, who unfolds the methods which have led to his own eminent success, it may be received as authority. The translation is free and idiomatic. The reader seems to himself to be reading an original book.

A Commentary, Critical, Expository, and Practical, on the Gospel of Luke, for the use of Ministers, Theological Students, Private Christians, Bible Classes and Sabbath schools. By John J. Owen, D.D. New York: Leavitt & Allen, 379 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 400.

The commentaries of Dr. Owen on Matthew and Mark have been some time before the public, and have met with a favourable reception. He has in an advanced state of preparation, a commentary on John, which with the present volume will complete his exposition of the four Gospels. Dr. Owen is a ripe scholar and a devout Christian, his writings therefore are imbued with learning and piety.

Lectures on the First Two Visions of the Book of Daniel. By William Newton, Rector of the church of the Holy Trinity, West Chester, Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: William S. and Alfred Martien, 606 Chesnut street. London: James Nesbit & Co. 1859. Pp. 250.

This book contains twelve lectures printed very much as they were delivered, in which the doctrines of the new prophetic school, as to the kingdom of Christ, are popularly unfolded.

Memoir of Robert Haldane and James Alexander Haldane. With sketches of their Friends and of the Progress of Religion in Scotland and in the Continent of Europe in the former half of the Nineteenth Century. American Tract Society. Pp. 278.

This is not an abridgment of the formerly published Memoirs of the Messrs. Haldane, but a work written for the Tract Society, from materials derived from various sources. It is a valuable contribution to the modern history of evangelical religion.

The Mother's Mission. Sketches from Real Life. By the author of "The Object of Life." New York: Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. Pp. 311.

The design of this work is to make "good mothers."

The Poet Preacher. A brief Memorial of Charles Wesley, the eminent Preacher and Poet. By Charles Adams. New York; Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. Pp. 234.

The Lord's Supper. By Rev. Samuel Luckey, D.D. With an Introduction. By Rev. Bishop Janes. New York: Carlton & Porter. Pp. 284.

Bishop Janes characterizes this work as a "plain, practical, spiritual treatise on the Lord's Supper." The sacred ordinance is considered as a memorial, as a passover, as a communion, and as a sacrament.

Christian Brotherhood. A Letter to the Hon. Heman Lincoln. By Baron Stow, D.D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 208.

In this letter the pious author treats, 1. Of the union which is desirable; 2. Of the considerations which render Christian union desirable; and 3. Of the means of promoting such union. As the union contemplated is one of faith and feeling, the means recommended are all of a corresponding character. We

doubt not the perusal of this work will tend to promote brotherly love among Christians of different denominations.

History of the Old Covenant. From the German of J. H. Kurtz, D.D. Vol. II. Translated by James Martin, B. A. Edinburgh; T. & T. Clark. 1859. Pp. 429.

We have noticed repeatedly the works of Dr. Kurtz, who stands in the first rank of the orthodox theological writers of Germany. His book on the Old Testament is one of the most valuable of his productions.

Esther; the Hebrew-Persian Queen. By Rev. W. A. Scott, D.D. San Francisco: H. H. Bancroft & Co. 1859. Pp. 353.

Dr. Scott has an evident partiality for Old Testament personages and history, which he has the talent to present in a manner adapted to interest and instruct his readers. Those who are familiar with his "Daniel," his "Achan in El Dorado," and his "Giant Judge," will be prepared to receive with favour his "Hebrew Persian Queen."

PRINCETON REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1859.

No. IV.

ART. I.—Lectures on Metaphysics. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Edited by the Rev. H. L. Mansel, D. D., Oxford, and John Veitch, M. A., Edinburgh. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. MDCCCLIX. 2 vols, 8vo.

It seems to us, that no other man in the history of letters lived so exclusively in the pursuit of truth for its own sake, and strove with such untiring energy, and such vast designs, to elevate the intellectual dignity of his country, as Sir William Hamilton. His whole life, from his earliest years, was governed by intellectual ambition. It will afford us an instructive lesson, to review the life of a man of such lofty aims.

Sir William was born in Glasgow, Scotland, on the 8th of March, in the year 1788. He was of aristocratic lineage; being the twenty-fourth male representative of the second son of Sir Gilbert, the founder of the noble house of Hamilton in Scotland. The ancestor, from whom he inherited his baronetcy, received his title in the year 1763, for the services of his father at the battles of Dunbar and Worcester. There is still to be seen, at Prestonpans, a noble ruin of the feudal residence of the family, which, by its massive towers and projecting battlements, serves to show, that the Hamiltons of Preston took their part in the fierce struggles, political and religious, that, for a

century, rendered the seats of the Scottish nebility only posts of watch and ward. Sir William's father, Dr. William Hamilton, was professor of Anatomy and Botany in the university of Glasgow, and died at the age of thirty-two, leaving behind him a high reputation. His grandfather, Dr. Thomas Hamilton, had occupied the same chair, and with Dr. Cullen founded the medical school of Glasgow. Both the father and grandfather inherited the high qualities, physical and mental, which their ancestors had displayed, rendering the house of Hamilton so conspicuous in Scottish history. They were distinguished, like their ancestors, for a commanding form, prompt and fearless intellect, perfect self-reliance, and a hearty manly nature. The baronetcy had lain dormant for some time, when Sir William, in the year 1816, formally established his right to the title.

From his boyhood Sir William manifested a great intellect, a fine sense of honour, and a frank and manly bearing. When only twelve years of age, he attended the junior classes at the University of Glasgow. But it seems, to his great mortification, he was turned to a mere schoolboy again, by being sent to the school of Dr. Dean, at Bromley. After remaining a year or two at Dr. Dean's, he returned to the University of Glasgow, taking a high position in the senior classes, and carrying off the first prizes in philosophy. The Rev. Dr. Summers, who for several years had the oversight of Sir William's early education, in a letter a few years afterwards, said, "For perseverance and depth of research into any subject that has occupied his mind, as well as for ingenuity of conception, I have perhaps never met with any one that equalled, and certainly have never known any one that excelled him. Respecting his moral and religious character, it has uniformly been such, even from his earliest years, as would do honour to the purest heart, and such as the most scrupulous could not fail to approve."

From Glasgow Sir William proceeded, on the Snell foundation, to Balliol College, Oxford, in the year 1809, just after the introduction of a new system, by which a powerful stimulus had been given to the whole course of study, and great rivalry excited amongst the colleges. The degree examinations had,

therefore, become more severe. The candidates for honours were required to profess a certain number of books in history, poetry, and science. But Sir William in going up for his degree, took with him into the schools, not only far more than the usual average of books in poetry and history—in fact, every classic author of mark, whether poet, orator, or historian; but in science he professed all the works extant in Greek and Roman philosophy—including not only the whole of Aristotle, but also the works of his earlier commentators; and not only all of Plato, but the Neo-Platonists, Proclus, and Plotinus, and the fragments of the earlier and later philosophical doctrines, preserved by Laertius, Stobaeus, and the other collectors. Sir William's examination in philosophy occupied two days running through six hours each day. "He was examined," (says an eye-witness, the Rev. A. Nicol,) "in more than four times the number of philosophical and didactic books ever wont to be taken up even for the highest honours, and those likewise authors far more abstruse than had previously been attempted in the schools." A fellow-collegian, another eye-witness, the Rev. Mr. Villers, says: "In the department, however, of science, his examination stood, and I believe still stands alone; and it certainly argued no common enthusiasm and ability for philosophical pursuits, that in a university like Oxford his examination should not only remain unequalled for the number but likewise for the difficulty of the authors. It contained every original work of antiquity difficult or important in logic, on the philosophy of the human mind, on ethics, politics, and other branches of practical philosophy, on rhetoric, and poetical criticism; and after a trial of many hours, beside the honours of the university, he received the thanks and public acknowledgments of the examiners, that he had never been surpassed either in the minute or comprehensive knowledge of the systems on which he had been examined. . . . In fourteen of his books on Greek philosophy he was not questioned, the greater part of these being declared by the masters to be too abstrusely metaphysical for examination." There are other testimonies to the same effect, and perhaps stronger, from persons who were present at the examination.

At this early age, Sir William had not only carefully studied

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the leading Greek commentators on Aristotle-Themistius, Alexander, Ammonius, Simplicius, and Philoponus; and the works of his Arabian expositors, Averroes, and Avicenna; but also the more philosophic of the Latin fathers, especially St. Augustine, of whom he always retained a high admiration; and the chief of the schoolmen, St. Thomas and Scotus in particular. He had also, at this time, formed an acquaintance with the less known authors of the Revival-Cardan, the elder Scaliger, Agricola, Valla, and Vives; and had studied diligently the earlier modern philosophers, Des Cartes and Leibnitz, both in their own writings and those of their followers; and was deeply interested in the new speculations on the continent of Europe, which had, as yet, not found their way into Britain. Sir William had, in fact, before he left the University of Oxford, gone over those vast researches into philosophical opinions, which he afterwards made so complete. It is marvellous how, even with his powerful intellect, resolute will, and iron constitution, he had accomplished so much.

In the year 1812, he left Oxford, and went to Edinburgh to pursue the profession of the law, and in the following year was admitted a member of the Scottish bar. He at once began practice as an advocate. But besides, that the business of a young lawyer is not generally very engrossing, and, therefore, Sir William had leisure for his literary pursuits, he, like Bacon, could not confine his great powers within the narrow limits of a profession, but explored the amplitudes of science, especially searching into the hidden mysteries of the intellectual world. So ardent a student was he, searching into libraries for forgotten learning; and often perplexing bibliographers and scholars by his inquiries about unobserved first editions of books, and his ready and extensive knowledge of rare manuscripts, that he was looked upon as a prodigy of erudition in the circles of Edinburgh. Mr. De Quincey visited Edinburgh in the year 1814, and there, for the first time, met Sir William. The impression made upon him by the polyhistor as he called Sir William, was given by him a few years since. in a flashy article in a Scottish journal.

"In the year 1814 it was (says De Quincey,) that I became acquainted with Sir William Hamilton, the present Professor

of Logic in the University of Edinburgh. I was then in Edinburgh for the first time, on a visit to Mrs. Wilson, the mother of Professor Wilson. Him who, at that time, neither was a professor, nor dreamed of becoming one, (his intention being to pursue his profession of advocate at the Scottish bar,) I had known, for a little more than five years. Wordsworth it was, then living at Allan Bank, in Grasmere, who had introduced me to John Wilson; and ever afterwards I was a frequent visitor at his beautiful place of Elleray, on the Windermere, not above nine miles distant from my own cottage in Grasmere. In those days, Wilson sometimes spoke to me of his friend Hamilton, as one specially distinguished by manliness and elevation of character, and occasionally gazed at as a monster of erudition. Indeed, the extent of his reading was said to be portentous-in fact, frightful, and to some extent even suspicious; so that certain ladies thought him 'no canny;' if arithmetic could demonstrate that all the days of his life ground down and pulverized into 'wee wee' globules of five or eight minutes each, and strung upon threads, would not furnish a rosary anything like corresponding, in its separate beads or counters, to the books he was known to have studied and familiarly used, then it became clear that he must have had extra aid in some way or other, must have read by proxy. Now, in that case, we all know in what direction a man turns for help, and who it is that he applies to when he wishes, like Dr. Faustus, to read more books than belonged to his allowance in this life."

Mr. De Quincey gives also the following picture of Sir William's appearance and manners:—"I was sitting alone after breakfast, when Wilson suddenly walked in with his friend Hamilton. So exquisitely free was Sir William from all ostentation of learning, that unless the accidents of conversation made a natural opening for display, such as it would have been affectation to evade, you might have failed altogether to suspect that an extraordinary scholar was present. On this first interview with him I saw nothing to challege any special attention beyond an unusual expression of kindness and cordiality in his abord. There was also an air of dignity and massy self-dependence diffused over his deportment, too calm and

unaffected to leave a doubt that it exhaled spontaneously from his nature; yet too unassuming to mortify the pretensions of others. Men of genius I had seen before, and men distinguished for their attainments, who shocked everybody, and upon me, in particular, nervously susceptible, inflicted horror as well as distress, by striving restlessly and almost angrily, for the chief share in conversation. Some I had known, who possessed themselves in effect pretty nearly of the whole, without being distinctly aware of what they were about. . . . In Sir William on the other hand, was an apparent carelessness whether he took any conspicuous share, or none at all in the conversation. It is possible that, as representative of an ancient family, he may secretly have felt his position in life; far less, however, in the sense of its advantages than of its obligations and restraints. And in general my conclusion was that I had rarely seen a person who manifested less of selfesteem, under any of the forms by which ordinarily it reveals itself-whether of pride, or vanity, or full-blown arrogance, or heart-chilling reserve."

Sir William, about this time, became acquainted with Dugald Stewart. Mr. Stewart always welcomed him to his house; and listened with admiration, as Sir William descanted of systems of speculation of which he had scarcely even heard. Mr. Stewart, in a letter, a few years after this, took occasion to say that he was "indebted to Sir William for much curious and valuable information about later philosophers of Germany," and that he regretted, "that he had not an earlier opportunity of forming his acquaintance, as he has no doubt that he would have profited greatly by his assistance in the pursuit of his favourite studies." At Mr. Stewart's, Sir William met Dr. Parr, and is said to have astonished him with the range and accuracy of his scholarship. The erudite Doctor, at first, perhaps, because he was in the house of a philosopher, discoursed of Greek philosophy, his knowledge of which was extensive: but finding that in this walk, he was no marvel to his young auditor, he went into some less known field of learning-the later and less read Latin poets, with their imitators at the revival of letters, and in still more recent times, but still his unknown companion was at home; in fact, turn as he would in

the diverse paths of erudition, the young advocate could not only keep pace with him, but could continue his quotations and correct his references, until the Doctor was startled into the abrupt inquiry, "Why, who are you then, sir?"

In the year 1820, the chair of Moral Philosophy, in the University of Edinburgh became vacant by the death of Dr. Brown. Sir William became a candidate for the place. John Wilson, his friend and fellow-advocate, was his competitor. Sir William's superior qualifications were urged in testimonials of the greatest weight; even Dugald Stewart wrote, "I look forward with peculiar satisfaction to my future connection with him, if, fortunately for the University, he should succeed in attaining the object of his present ambition." Political feeling ran high at this time; and, therefore, every one was counted a Whig or Tory, whether he meddled in politics or not. Wilson was a Tory; and, as a majority of the electors were Tories, Wilson was, of course, elected to the vacant chair. He proved to be an able professor; but, with all his genius for letters, astonishing us in his criticisms, and transporting and bewitching us in the "Noctes," he was, as a philosopher, far in the distance behind his friend Hamilton.

There was a chair of Universal History in the University of Edinburgh, with a small salary. The Faculty of Advocates had the control of it; and in the year 1821 they offered the chair to Sir William. He delivered a short course of lectures, to a small class, on the character and history of the classic nations of antiquity, with the influence of their literature, philosophy, and laws on modern civilization. The lectures were distinguished for sagacity, learning, eloquence, and philosophical spirit.

At this time, Phrenology, by the endeavours of George Combe, was exciting especial interest in Edinburgh. The claims of this spurious science, like all charlatanry, were supremely presumptuous. It claimed to be at once a system of philosophy furnishing a sure index of mental endowment, and indicating a course of education infallible in its efficiency, while it gave a new clew to the moral nature of man, and even furnished new sorts of evidence in the administration of criminal law. Cranial topography had come to be put in the place

of consciousness as the source of mental philosophy. Sir William Hamilton had inherited, from his father and grandfather, a predilection for anatomy and physiology, besides being naturally led, as something cognate, to these studies as furnishing an insight into the material organs of the mind, and showing, if any, the relations between physiology and psychology. "Already in 1814 (says De Quincey in the account before quoted from) I conceive he must have been studying physiology on principles of investigation suggested by himself." For the purpose of testing, on its own ground of physiological facts, the pretensions of this intruder into the field of science, Sir William went through a laborious course of comparative anatomy, dissecting with his own hand several hundred different brains. He also sawed open a series of sculls of different nations, of both sexes and all ages, to ascertain the facts in regard to the frontal sinus on which the phrenologists had founded so much. He also instituted a series of most sagacious experiments for ascertaining the relative size and weight of brains. The results of these investigations were embodied in two papers by Sir William, and read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh, in the year 1826. They proved the assertions of fact, by the phrenologists, to be utterly false in every fundamental particular. And some traditionary errors in physiology, which the medical profession itself had credited and taught in their writings, were rectified by some of Sir William's experiments. The points, in which Sir William had convicted the phrenologists of fatal errors, were reproduced by others both in Britain and on the continent of Europe, and contributed to arrest the progress of this demoralizing charlatanry.

But there were errors of a more intellectual cast, than this offspring of sensualism, to engage the attention of Sir William. Schelling and Hegel had propounded in Germany, each differing a little from the other, a scheme of human omniscience as a system of philosophy. A doctrine so extraordinary and of such high pretensions, upheld as it was by powerful talents, could not but arrest the attention of speculative minds. Victor Cousin, disciplined in the school of Des Cartes, where the supremacy of consciousness is the fundamental tenet, could only admit the omniscient doctrine of the German philosophers

as modified by the fundamental dogma of his own school. And this he did; and proclaimed it to the world in a course of lectures distinguished for rare eloquence, and great speculative genius well nurtured in the literature of philosophy. But a doctrine of human omniscience, however modified, can never escape being challenged by the common sense of man. And of all countries in Europe, Britain is the one least likely, from the course of its speculation for centuries, to let such a scheme , of thought elude its criticism. Accordingly, in the year 1829, on the retirement of Lord Jeffrey from the editorship of the Edinburgh Review, his successor, Professor Napier, a personal friend of Sir William Hamilton, being desirous of signalizing his first number, induced Sir William to give him a philosophical article. While at Oxford, Sir William had, even then, scrutinized this portentous continental doctrine, with profound interest, and now determined to weigh it in the scales of criticism, and show to the world its real worth, both in its French modification and its native German originality. Adopting, therefore, the lectures of Cousin, then lately published, as the basis of his criticism, he put forth, in the Edinburgh Review, the most powerful, subtle, and effective polemic ever urged against a doctrine, since man began to speculate. The exhaustive statement of the necessary conditions of the problem supposed to have been solved, and of all the possible forms of its solution, enabled him, by the use of the dilemma of which he was such a master, to expose the utter baselessness of a doctrine of human omniscience. His analysis of the notions of the absolute, the infinite, and the unconditioned, opened up a new vista in the province of speculation, and led to a more comprehensive, and, at the same time, more accurate apprehension of the limits of the knowable. His own countrymen had so long crawled on the lower level of physics that they could not understand this masterly article, either in the doctrine exposed, or the criticism by which it was dissected. Indeed, Sir William himself was hardly known to any of them. In the sublime solitude of the serene heights of speculation, he had lived above the busy world of mere action, and now for the first time, at the age of forty-one, he came forth into the arena of science with a doctrine, more potent than the fire of

Prometheus, to inspire the philosophical genius of his country. Victor Cousin was notified, by a correspondent from England, that he had been hewed to pieces, in the Edinburgh Review, by some unknown writer. It was, therefore, with eagerness that he received and read, at first, only an extract from the article, contained in his correspondent's letter. "An extract from it (said Cousin) which I have received has singularly struck me. I did not believe that there was an individual beyond the channel capable of interesting himself so deeply in metaphysics. • and I regard this article as an excellent augury for philosophy in England. I am, therefore, thankful to the author and wish he knew it. You will please me by information as to his true name." When Cousin had read the whole article, and had learned the author's name, in a second letter, he wrote: "Sir William Hamilton's article has arrived, and I have read it. It is a masterpiece. Mr. Brougham has good reason to speak highly of it. For my part I have done the same here: and I affirm that the article is so excellent that there cannot be fifty persons in England competent to understand it. It is truly to be regretted that such talents have not produced more." He subsequently adds: "The information you are to send me regarding Sir William Hamilton, is expected with so much the more impatience, as I wish to push my chivalry towards him to the point of having his article translated." And this Cousin did accordingly; thereby showing the generosity of this great philosopher, who has done so much to drive sensualism out of France, for which we praise him, while we dissent from his fundamental doctrine of human omniscience.

Now that Sir William had appeared before the world as a writer, he contributed two or three articles a year to the Edinburgh Review, for the next seven years. In his philosophical articles, during this time, he examined all the central problems in metaphysics, psychology, and logic, and showed that he was master of all the literature of philosophy, as well as possessed of a powerful genius for original speculation. He made it manifest that he had, after examining the doctrines of his predecessors, laid speculative science on broader and securer foundations. In another of these articles, Sir William showed, that he had carefully studied the various systems of tuition.

both in ancient and modern times; and indicated a scheme of educational reform. He proposed to release the national education from the trammels of sects and professions, and enlarge it to the broad culture, in which there is a harmonious development of man's whole nature. After examining more particularly the mere organizations of schools, in a subsequent paper, he attacked with tremendous force of dialectic, backed by overwhelming authorities, a cardinal heresy in education, then lately put forth at Cambridge, by Dr. Whewell, that mathemutics is a better logical discipline than logic itself. This is another error resulting from too exclusive thought on physics. But even in the field of physics, mathematics is only an assistant to logical induction, and not, in the truest sense, an instrument of discovery. It was the regulæ philosophandi of Newton, and not his mathematics, which led to the grand induction of universal gravity. Mathematics calculated the forces, and weighed and measured the magnitudes necessary to prove the induction. Mathematics was only a wheel within the broader reasoning, all moving under those laws of thought which it is the business of logic to expound, and by examples to discipline us to a mental dexterity. Dr. Whewell's doctrine seems to us little less absurd, than it would be to recommend the tread-wheel as better than the open plain to train the courser for the race. At all events, Sir William's polemic is unanswered to this day; although when he republished it in the Discussions, he taunted Dr. Whewell that he had not fulfilled his promised refutation of it, notwithstanding he had had seventeen years to do it. And Sir William dealt not in generalities, but, as he always did, threw out special propositions to test his general doctrine. He gave the mathematicians to understand, that he was ready to maintain, that, as a mental discipline, it was better to have mastered the Minerva of Sanctius, a Latin grammar by a Spanish Jesuit, than the Principia of Newton.

In 1836 Dr. Ritchee, the professor of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, resigned his chair, and Sir William at once declared himself a candidate for the post. It seems difficult to suppose that it was possible for any, who might have the choice of a professor for the chair in question, to be otherwise than enthusiastic in desire to place Sir William in a

post for which he had such pre-eminent qualifications. But in the workings of social and political machinery, reason, justice, and truth are not the only motive powers. Ignorance, prejudice, passion, selfishness, jealousy, and all those impulses which scandalize our natures, enter more or less into all human transactions. Sir William's pretensions were more than challenged, so that even George Combe, the phrenologist, was actually one of the candidates for the philosophy chair against Sir William Hamilton. And, indeed, it was for some time very doubtful whether Sir William could be elected at all to the chair. M. Cousin, who was sick in bed at the time, on hearing, with surprise, that there was a difficulty about Sir William's election, wrote a letter of mingled surprise and urgency to Professor Pillans, in which amongst other remarks, he says: "Sir William Hamilton is the man who, before all Europe, has, in the Edinburgh Review, defended the Scottish Philosophy, and posted himself its representative. In this relation the different articles which he has written in that journal are of infinite value, and it is not I who ought to solicit Scotland for Sir William Hamilton; it is Scotland herself who ought to honour, by her suffrage, him who, since Dugald Stewart, is her sole representative in Europe." Again, "He is above all, eminent in logic. I would speak here as a philosopher by profession. Be assured that Sir William Hamilton is the one of all your countrymen who knows Aristotle best; and were there in all the three kingdoms of his Britannic Majesty a chair of logic vacant, do not hesitate-make haste-give it to Sir William Hamilton." He concludes, "In short, my dear Mr. Pillans, were there not too much pretension and arrogance in the request, I would entreat of you to say, in my name, to the person or persons on whom depends this nomination, that they hold, perhaps, in their hands, the philosophical future of Scotland; and that a foreigner, exempt from all spirit of party or coterie, conjures them to recollect that what they are now engaged in is to give a successor to Reid and Dugald Stewart. Let them consult the opinion of Europe." Professor Brandis, the great authority in ancient philosophy, writes from Bonn: "I am happy in having an opportunity of acknowledging the high respect and admiration which I have long felt for Sir William

Hamilton's great talents. Possessed with uncommon acuteness, penetration, and real philosophical genius, Sir William Hamilton, according to my opinion, is almost unparalleled in the profound knowledge of ancient and modern philosophy, and enjoys the advantage of great clearness in explaining the most difficult and abstruse subjects of philosophical discussion. Every University in Europe certainly would be proud to possess a professor of such high and acknowledged reputation; and no man in Great Britain, as far as I can judge, could venture to enter into competition with Sir William Hamilton for a professorship of logic and metaphysics in any British University." Other testimonies to Sir William's wide fame were laid before the electors.

Sir William's chief competitor was Mr. Isaac Taylor, who was urged with great zeal by his friends, believing, it seems, that the University would gain as much in religion by electing Mr. Taylor, as it would lose in philosophy by rejecting Sir William Hamilton. The sole ground for doubting Sir William's orthodoxy in religion, was his known familiarity with German speculation; not taking into consideration, that he had already assailed this very German speculation, and vindicated, on the highest and unassailable grounds, the essential harmony of philosophical and revealed truth. But Sir William was allied with no party either in church or state. He was above sect in his religion and above party in his politics; the being simply a Christian and a patriot, was narrow enough for his great ends as a philosopher. Sir William was elected by a majority of four votes; and his country was saved from the disgrace of rejecting the best qualified man in the whole world, for the vacant chair in her leading University.

Now begins a new era in Sir William's life, and in the academical life of Scotland. The great champion of Scottish philosophy, who had with a resistless dialectic dealt destruction to the proud system of speculation that had, for a time, overshadowed the humble doctrine of his own country, and which his own country itself had repudiated, is installed as a teacher of philosophy in the leading University of Scotland. Sir William entered upon his professorship with the very highest qualifications. His personal appearance was the very finest.

Above the middle heigth, of a sinewy and well-compacted frame, with a massive head, decisive and finely cut features, a dark, calm, piercing eye, perfect self-possession and reliance, and finished courtesy of manner, and a voice remarkably distinct, silvery and melodious, he stood before you the perfection of a man in every physical endowment. "Never shall we forget the day of his inauguration (says an eye-witness) as Professor, and his opening lecture. His ancient and successful rival, John Wilson, had volunteered, as a mark of respect, to 'keep the door' of the class-room, which was overcrowded, many boys and men standing impatiently outside. Sir William was personally unknown to almost all his hearers, who evidently were not prepared to see such a distinguished face and head; for when he entered, the applause was unacademically uproarious, and was renewed again and again for several minutes. Wilson had placed his back against the inside of the door, waiting for the first sentence of the lecture, when a terrible pressure from without pushed in the door and drove Wilson violently against the crowd in the passage. He turned like a roused lion, rushed out, and for a few seconds pursued an elderly man whom he considered to be the offender. But his good-humour quickly checked him; and to a band of humanity boys, who had gathered around him in a circle, he addressed a few jocular words about the inability of "Cerberus himself" to have held the door against such a siege. He then placed himself within hearing of the lecturer, who proceeded to give an exposition of the aim and end of philosophy equally profound and brilliant." Such was the inauguration of Sir William Hamilton as professor of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh.

Though Sir William had already methodized all his views on logic and metaphysics into a system, still he had now to put them into a form suited to academical instruction, and that for very young persons. The difficulty of doing this cannot be easily estimated. Consciousness with all its riddles has to be explained; the phenomena of which are not clustered like constellations in the firmament of thought, as those imagine who think of the mind as a congeries of faculties; but the phenomena are confluent in all exercises of thought. Even

intuition and reflection are not separate elements, but combine in the acts of consciousness. Neither is there pure passivity or pure activity in any operation of mind; but the passive and the active combine in all mental life. Then again, the subject presents from beginning to end a grand antithesis. The knowing mind and the thing known-and that thing especially the mind itself—in all the phases of psychological phenomena, present never-ceasing antitheses that are to be made known to the self-conscious mind of the pupil, both as contrasts and as unities. This dual character of the phenomena must never be lost sight of in the greatest subtlety of discussion; both the subjective and the objective must ever be realized in the pupil's self-consciousness as he reproduces the thinking of the teacher. To effect all this, not only must the language be so fashioned as to exhibit this duality in separation and in unity, but the whole scheme and order of the lectures must be planned so as to exhibit what in actual thinking is confluent and inseparable, as though they were distinct, and yet realizing at the same time their inseparable character. These syntheses and antitheses must ever be realized in the self-consciousness of the pupil. All these requirements Sir William has accomplished in the lectures now before us. The gradual opening of the subject, the increase of distinctness at each step, the exhibition of the successive phenomena without any commingling of phases, the different orders of discussion determined by the diverse orders of the topics considered, the judicious recapitulations at the beginning of the successive lectures, whenever the subject in hand is embarrassed with special difficulties, the apt introduction of the history and polemics in regard to cardinal doctrines, all presented in a flexible, idiomatic, masculine diction as clear as light, constitute these lectures a masterly academical lesson in philosophy. As a scheme of discourse to teach young men to philosophize, they seem to us to be devised with consummate skill. These lectures were written during the session of 1836 and 1837. "The author (say his editors) was in the habit of delivering three lectures each week; and each lecture was usually written on the day, or more properly, on the evening or night preceding its delivery. The course of metaphysics, as it is now given to the world, is the result of this nightly toil unremittingly sustained for a period of five months."

But let us turn from the printed lectures, to Sir William in the class-room. We will borrow, from the Edinburgh Essays for the year 1856, the description of Sir William in the classroom, given by Mr. Thomas Spencer Baynes, for seven years his class-assistant. "On looking around the class-room, several things strike one as rather peculiar. In the first place, the benches are all lettered in alphabetical order; the thinly-peopled letters such as U, V, having a bench between them, while the more populous, such as M (from the number of Macs) require two. Then in front, over the chair, and just below the ceiling, the eye is arrested by a large board painted green with a gold border, bearing two inscriptions, one in Greek, the other in English (in gold letters on a green ground), the latter being the well-known motto prefixed by Sir William to his edition of Reid's works-'On Earth there is nothing great but Man, in Man there is nothing great but Mind.' Below this are a number of long narrow boards ranged in order on a line, with dates of different sessions, and lists of from twelve to twenty names in gold letters on a green ground as before. These are names of students who have taken class prizes in successive sessions since Sir William has occupied the chair. On the wall opposite are other boards of the same kind, only not so numerous and with fewer names-lists of those who have gained the summer prizes offered by the professor for extra study and special essays.

"Sir William's manner naturally struck one, on his first entrance, by its native dignity, perfect self-possession and genuine courtesy; but soon the attention was irresistibly attracted to his person. It was impossible, indeed, not to be impressed with the commanding expression of that fine countenance and noble bust; the massive well-proportioned head, square and perfectly developed towards the front; the brows arched, full and firmly bound together, with short dints of concentrated energy between; the nose pure aquiline, but for its Roman strength, and a mouth beautifully cut, of great firmness and precision, with latent sarcastic power in its decisive curve. But the most striking feature of all to a stranger, was Sir

William's eye; though not even dark hazel, it appeared from its rare brilliancy absolutely black, and expressed beyond any feature I have ever seen, calm, piercing, sleepless intelligence. It was in a peculiar degree the self-authenticating symbol of an intellect that has read the history, traversed the unknown realms, grasped the innermost secrets, and swept with searching gaze the entire hemisphere of the intelligible world. Though naturally most struck with this at first, one soon found that it but harmonized with the perfect strength and finish of every feature, nothing being weak, nothing undeveloped in any. Whatever the previous expectations of Sir William's appearance might be, they were certainly realized if not surpassed; and however familiar one might afterwards become with the play of thought and feeling on that noble countenance, the first impression remained the strongest and the last -that it was perhaps altogether the finest head and face you had ever seen, strikingly handsome and full of intelligence and power.* When he began to read, Sir William's voice confirmed the impression his appearance and manner had produced. It was full, clear, and resolute, with a swell of intellectual ardour in the more measured cadences, and a tone that grew deep and resonant in reading any striking extracts from a favourite author, whether in prose or poetry-from Plato or Pascal, Lucretius or Virgil, Scaliger or Sir John Davies, whose quaint and nervous lines Sir William was fond of quoting.

"The new comer naturally listened to the lecturer with interest and some curiosity, knowing perhaps little or nothing of the subject, and having his own misgivings, notwithstanding Sir William's fame, whether anything could be made of it or not. After hearing a few lectures, the impression produced was probably one of mingled surprise and admiration, wonder and delight. The subject had been described as abstruse. He

^{*} The writer of this article has a portrait of Sir William Hamilton, presented to him by Lady Hamilton, as "not only a very beautiful but a very faithful likeness." It represents the lineaments of the finest head and face we have ever seen. The engraved portraits of Sir William, circulated in this country, have not the least resemblance whatever to the original. They are not even caricatures. 83

fancied it must be dark, mysterious and uncertain, and that perhaps it would be impossible to understand the lecturer at all. On the contrary, the exposition was found to be clear, forcible, and even vivid in its distinctness-the thought striking the intellect as sharply as near objects the eye on a bright day; and the style a perfect mirror of the thought-exact to a nicety, every word the right one, and each in its place, giving in fact quite a new idea of the precision of which language is capable. This naturally excited surprise, and awakened unexpected admiration. The lecturer's whole tone and manner, too, at once, powerfully stimulated curiosity, and inspired confidence. The pupil was conscious of breathing a fresh intellectual atmosphere, as bracing to the mind as sea air to the body, and already began to feel a new and vivifying sense of elasticity and power. The appetite for knowledge was suddenly sharpened, and he felt at the same time that he had found one who could satisfy it to the full. It is difficult to say exactly how this feeling of exhilarating confidence, of glad but undefined expectation was produced; partly, no doubt, by what was said, but chiefly from the manner of the speaker. There was much in it strictly personal; the instinctive feeling naturally awakened in listening to one who spoke with the serene insight and authority of a master, both in history and science. When, for example, he referred to the older philosophers, the sages who walked with their disciples in the Lyceum and the grove, who taught in the marble stillness of the porch, or amongst the green shadows of the garden, it was at once perceived that the lecturer was speaking of thinkers he had held familiar intercourse with as an equal, even in their abstrusest walks; nay, and that having accompanied them to the furthest point in the fields of speculation, and looked with clear intellectual vision from the last Pisgah height, where their eye grew dim and their strength began to fail, he could at once recognize and complete the imperfect description they have left us of objects whose form and outline fell obscurely on their failing sight. The same effect was produced in dealing with the phenomena of the science. While expounding the mental faculties, their order, laws, and development, it was felt that the speaker had verified for himself every fact referred to;

that he spoke but of what he knew, and testified of what he had personally seen. Not, of course, that the listener understood and recognized at once everything spoken of, but this was obviously not from want of clearness in the description, but simply because the right point for seeing the object had not yet been gained, while, at the same time, there was the clear conviction, that by following the prescribed course, he would soon be able to see and judge for himself. Thus the first effect produced in listening to Sir William Hamilton, was a feeling of mingled confidence, admiration and delight."

Mr. Baynes next shows how the attention of the student became fixed upon the matter of the lectures, realizing that there is "a world within as full of wonder and mystery, of secret activities and unknown powers, as the material earth and heaven around and above us." This intellectual world was gradually unfolded to the student after the manner we have indicated in our analysis of the lectures just now given. Mr. Baynes continues: "Such teaching naturally produced in the pupil the most vigorous and intense intellectual activity. A desire to pursue the new paths opened, seized him with the force of a passion, and no effort that contributed to this end seemed wearisome. Books that might fairly be considered hard and dry, flavoured by the appetite brought, were read with avidity and positive enjoyment. Preparation for the class examination scarcely seemed an effort. Conscious of new powers, he delighted in the exercise; and learning the use of new weapons, it became a pleasure to test their value, and at the same time increase his own skill by constant practice."

Besides lectures, the class was severely disciplined by examinations, on Tuesday and Thursday—Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, being lecture days. This twofold mode of tuition, Sir William had, in his letter offering himself as a candidate for the chair, foreshadowed in these words: "I have only further to repeat in general, what I have formerly more articulately stated, that in the event of my appointment to this chair, I am determined to follow out my convictions of the proper mode of academical tuition; that is, I shall not only endeavour to instruct, by communicating on my part the requisite information, but to educate, by determining through every means in

my power, a vigorous and independent activity on the part of my pupils." At these examinations the class sat in alphabetical order. There was placed on the table before the professor a vase containing the letters of the alphabet printed on millboard. Sir William mixed the letters together in the vase, and taking out the uppermost one, say W., held it before the class, inquiring whether any gentleman in W. was prepared to undertake an examination. Some one of that initial then rose, bowed to the class, and began where the last examination left off. There were always three or four or more lectures in arrear, any part of which the student must be prepared to take up at a moment's notice. The students took full notes of the lectures; and were thereby aided in preparing for the examinations. The professor cross-examined the student on the most difficult points. And besides the examination on the lectures, the student was examined on subjects connected with them. The pupil might give the views of any writer on questions directly or indirectly discussed in the lectures; or might give the biography of any philosopher, poet, critic, or historian who had been mentioned. Sir William, in conclusion, asked of the student what books he was reading, gave hints as to the best course of study, and information out of his own vast erudition in regard to the matter in hand. The examinations thus acted as a powerful stimulus and guide during the whole course of

The class also wrote essays on subjects connected with the lectures. Parts of the essays were read by the pupil before the class, and criticised by the professor. Special essays on particular subjects were also prescribed to competitors for prizes. And as all these exercises were before the whole class, at the end of each session, the honours of the class were awarded by their fellow-students to the successful candidates.

Sir William's personal intercourse with his pupils is thus depicted by Mr. Baynes: "Always accessible to his students, none ever found him pre-occupied or engaged when they entered his private room to submit a doubt, ask a question, or make a request. He listened not only with patient courtesy, but with real interest to the detail of their elementary difficulties, adapted his explanation to their point of view, encouraged

and guided their inquiries, and freely offered them any assistance in his power—the use of his invaluable library even to those wishing to pursue an extended course of private reading; so that the admiration which the peerless intellectual qualities of the Professor, as thinker and critic, had excited, was soon blended with feelings of personal reverence and regard for his noble simplicity of character, high moral worth, and true kindness of heart. These feelings became stronger and deeper with the opportunity of knowing him more intimately. Sir William Hamilton, indeed, appeared to the greatest advantage in the unrestrained intercourse of social and domestic life. Devoted to severely abstract pursuits during the hours of study, he enjoyed the fullest relaxation amidst his family and friends, entering with hearty relish into all home pleasures and pursuits, keenly appreciating a good story or capital joke, interesting himself in the occupations of the young people about him, nay, even sympathizing with the children, delighting in their toys and books, and not unfrequently sharing with them their games, tales, and fireside amusements."

Before Sir William's death, we had, from the mouth of one of his pupils, just such an account of him as we have quoted

from Mr. Baynes.

In the year 1846, ten years after his election to the chair of philosophy, Sir William published his edition of Reid's works. The work was undertaken immediately upon his election, as a book for the use of his class. The foot-notes were written in the years 1837 and 1838, as the text passed through the press; and the supplementary dissertations were written between the years 1841 and 1842. The impression which this edition of Reid produced in Scotland, may be inferred from the following extract from a letter of Lord Jeffrey's to Mr. Empson, the then editor of the Edinburgh Review: - "I have been looking into Sir William Hamilton's edition of Reid, or rather into one of his own annexed dissertations, 'On the Philosophy of Common Sense;' which though it frightens one with the immensity of its erudition, has struck me very much by its vigour, completeness, and inexorable march of ratiocination. He is a wonderful fellow, and I hope may yet be spared to astonish and overawe us for years to come." These supplementary dissertations,

together with his previous writings, at once placed Sir William on the highest elevation, as a man preëminent amongst philosophers, for the exercise, on the most magnificent scale, of an intellect the most comprehensive, acute, subtle, vigorous, elastic, and pure, combined with the greatest mastery over all the resources of learning in philosophy, science, and literature, all exercised through the medium of a style for force, precision, elegance, and expressiveness, perhaps as perfect as can ever be formed by man.

Sir William, in his admiration of Victor Cousin, dedicated to him his edition of Reid's works, as appropriately and preëminently due to the first philosopher of France, who, as Minister of Public Instruction, had made them the basis of academical instruction in philosophy throughout the central nation of Europe.

The last of Sir William's literary labours was his edition of the complete works of Dugald Stewart. After Sir William was far advanced in this work, we saw a private letter from him, in which he said incidentally, that it was more an amusement than a labour to him. Sir William completed the task, with the exception of a life of Stewart, which has been supplied, in an able manner, by Mr. John Veitch, one of Sir William's pupils, and a cöeditor of his Lectures.

For ten years Sir William had been enfeebled by a severe paralysis, but yet had never relaxed his labours as a teacher, and only lessened them as an author. He finished his lectures of the session of 1855 and 1856, and distributed the prizes to his class; and after an illness of ten days, Sir William died at his residence in Great King Street, Edinburgh, at seven o'clock in the morning, on Tuesday the sixth of May, in the year 1856. "Notwithstanding (says a private letter,) the gradual increase of his physical infirmities, he suffered no pain; and the mind retained its acuteness, though not its energy, almost to the last."

In the year 1829, Sir William married a daughter of Hubert Marshall, Esq., an advocate at the Scottish bar. This lady's rare intellectual accomplishments and womanly virtues gave to Sir William's home the grace of courtesy and the warmth of love. And the affection, which gave a balm to the philoso-

pher's life, now regards, with an intelligent discernment and careful solicitude, the fame which has cast so much lustre on his family. Sir William and Lady Hamilton had four children: William, now Sir William, an officer in the Bengal artillery, born in 1830; Hubert, a student of law, born in 1834; Elizabeth; and James, a youth of sixteen. By the world, Sir William was only thought of as the learned man and profound philosopher, but one of his family has written to us, "We rarely or never thought of him in these characters, living as he did, so simply and quietly in the midst of his family, accepting thankfully our trivial services, and taking a share and interest in all our little domestic pleasures and troubles."

The death of Sir William Hamilton cast a shadow, from the firmament of thought, over the civilized world. It was seen that a great light had gone down beneath the horizon. And men began to think more earnestly about him, as one of recognized superiority. It is under the common influence that we have now sketched an outline of the life of this great man. The facts, which we have stated, show that he was actuated, through life, by the noblest motives, and the loftiest aims; and his performances seem almost incredible. Neither Alexander, Cæsar, nor Napoleon, pushed their conquests with a more insatiable ambition: but theirs were the conquests of brute force, ending in despotic sway over their fellow-men; his, the conquests of thought, releasing men from the bondage of ignorance, to the liberty of intelligence. Hamilton, perhaps, died a martyr to his ambition: but it is far nobler to die upon the battle fields of thought, than upon those of slaughter. When he gave to his country his first lesson in philosophy, we have seen that there was hardly one to understand it. But, by his labours as a teacher and writer, his philosophy is not only understood by thousands, but is influencing all the thoughtful literature of those who speak the English language. As the inventor and framer of logic, in its true sense, he stands next to Aristotle himself; and as the philosopher of logic, elevating it to the dignity of the science of the laws of thought as thought, he must be placed far above Aristotle and the logicians of all ages. When his academical lectures on logic are published, they, together with what he published on logic during his life, must sooner or later degrade to their proper level such corruptions of logic as the ponderous and muddy treatise of Mr. J. S. Mill, and banish from the schools such shallow treatises as Whately's, and the still shallower treatises to be found on our college catalogues. As a critic of systems, as a master of the older schools, and of the classic sources of speculation; and as a tactician in philosophical polemics, Sir William stands without a compeer in the great historical assembly of philosophers.

But Sir William's influence upon the age must not be estimated by his philosophy alone. His vast erudition, while it furnished a model for imitation, has quickened the scholarship of the world, by hints which will elicit investigation in the same directions; and in his admirable disquisition on the "Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum" he has given an example which even the Germans stared at.

Neither must we overlook Sir William's physiological labours. His polemic against phrenology in the several papers appended to the first volume of his Lectures, rivals in experimental sagacity any inquiry in human physiology from John Hunter to Richard Owen. His paper in the Edinburgh Review, reprinted in the Discussions, on the life of his grandfather's friend, Dr. Cullen, deserves notice as evidence how thoughtfully he had read the history of medical doctrine.

But the most important of his writings, next to those on philosophy, were his papers on educational reform. The stunning power with which, in the Edinburgh Review, he attacked the abuses which had destroyed the true character of Oxford, and damaged all the other schools of Britain, accompanied as it was by such comprehensive views of what education ought to be, together with such erudite researches into the history of the educational institutions which had nurtured the civilization of Europe, opened the eyes of the British public to their ignoble condition, and has led to the University Commissions, which are reforming the education of the United There are no papers upon public matters within the whole compass of British history, that for fierceness of hostility, fulness of information, profound intelligence and resistless dialectic, can be favourably compared with them. Other political papers were directed against matters of shifting policy; but these were about the greatest of all institutions, except the family—the schools where men are educated to truth or error, to a noble and catholic spirit, or to the bigotry of sect and party.

We must not close this statement of the influence which Sir William Hamilton has bequeathed to the world, without a few remarks on the relation of his philosophical doctrine to theology. We have met with criticisms, both American and British, which imply, if they do not explicitly state, that the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton in its relation to theology is, at best, only negative. And since the publication of Mr. Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought," the valuable first fruits of Hamilton's philosophical doctrine, we have seen the same criticism reiterated, somewhat envenomed by the odium theologicum. We propose, therefore, to examine the validity of this criticism.

David Hume it was, who by the most subtle, lucid and potent skepticism of modern times, strove to show that the fundamental notions on which theology is based are mere negations-not notions at all-but fictions of the imagination conjured up to support a vain credulity. This artful skepticism startled the powerful and systematizing speculative genius of Emanuel Kant from its credulous confidence in what was the current doctrine. Kant pondered over Hume's criticism of the prevalent doctrine, and saw that a new version of these notions must be given. Clinging, however, to the fatal dogma then universally received, that the mind can know nothing but modifications of itself; that in fact all knowledge is subjective; he adopted the fallacious method, called the critical, which is confined in its scope to testing truth by a criticism of the mind itself, finding truth in the harmony of its notions, and error in their contradictious relations. Kant wholly ignored objective knowledge; and maintained that the mind has a faculty of pure reason which hypostatizes its fictitious products as objective ideas, which serve as poles on which legitimate reasonings turn, but are in themselves wholly null. The logical understanding, Kant further maintained, was regulated by these illusive ideas, and takes cognizance of phenomena that are merely appearances wholly different from the realities. Thus

the skepticism of Hume was displaced by a system of negations in which appearances are declared to be all we know, and that these are utterly different from the reality of which we can know nothing. It is true, Kant tried to save theology and morals, by endeavoring to prop them up by the mere feelings of the heart in what he calls the practical reason. But this was a sheer evasion of the speculative difficulties. Kant's speculative perplexity arose from the contradictions which his criticism of reason elicited. These contradictions seemed to him to be affirmative deliverances of human reason, therefore showing human reason, in its normal exercise, to be speculatively a liar. Fichte developed Kant's doctrine of hypothetical idealism into absolute idealism; and maintained that there is no objective world at all. There could not but be a recoil in speculation against this absurdity. Schelling and Hegel therefore strove to regain the objective world in speculation, and to know something more than illusive appearances. They claimed, though in different ways, to have a direct knowledge of the absolute or infinite. And all the contradictions in thought were reconciled by Hegel in his consummate paradox, that contradictories are one; and being and nothing are the same; consequently God and nothing are the same. This monstrous paradox was not, by any means, meant for skepticism, but for a positive doctrine of human omniscience.

It was in this condition of the metaphysical problem of theology, that Sir William Hamilton undertook its solution. The prominent feature—the special phenomenon—which had to be dealt with, was the contradictions in all our thinking about the problem of God. These had to be reconciled so as to save human mental veracity, and also objective truth. For if in attempting to think legitimately about God, we necessarily contradict ourselves, then, either there is no God, or else our minds lie in affirming, indirectly through its contradictions, that there is none. But Sir William clearly seeing that the laws of thought, the forms of the understanding, must be of supreme authority in all human speculation, discerned that all these contradictions, the Hegelian paradox included, result from attempting to think from under or away from these laws, and thereby transgressing the limits of the understanding.

These attempts were therefore mere impotencies resulting in no thinking at all—mere negations; and the making these negations positive, necessarily involved a contradiction. These negations, therefore, only showed that the human mind is limited, but not mendacious. The mind never contradicts itself within its legitimate sphere, except by mistake—never necessarily.

It results from this doctrine, that the human mind thinks between limits. What then, comes up the inquiry, is the character of these limits? Sir William, by attempting to think either of them, found it incomprehensible—that is, unthinkable: if it were thinkable it would not, of course, be a limit. Now this doctrine is only a fuller development of the doctrine of opposites, which has a distinct recognition in Aristotle, and must have manifested itself to all thinkers, with more or less distinctness, from the earliest speculation, as it does in Plato, in its least developed form, of contraries. If we think of time, it is between time infinitely great and time infinitely small, either being incomprehensible. The omniscience and omnipotence of God, and the free agency and moral responsibility of man, are opposites in attempting to solve the problem of God's justice in his dealings with man. Think as we may, we always find two truths staring at us as opposites, each claiming from us special consideration. These truths have very lately, in a private letter to us from Dr. Francis Lieber, of great force and originality, been called anti-current or binomial truths. We will borrow this appellation.

Anti-current truths result from the limitation of our mind which necessitates us to think between two opposites. Relativity, the universal condition of our thinking, necessarily implies two terms or opposites. This results from the fact, that we can comprehend a notion or thing, only under the relations of identity and of difference, as being that which it is, and as distinguished from that which it is not. These opposites, when considered as absolutes, are incomprehensible; and it is only partially, and in their relation to each other, and their mutual relation to our understanding, that we can comprehend them. We can never comprehend the absolute harmony of anti-current truths until we can think from under

the relations of identity and of difference, and can comprehend the absolute—the all. It is only when we attempt to comprehend these opposites absolutely, that they present themselves to us as contradictories and nullify our thinking; otherwise

they are not mutually exclusive, but relatively true.

Now, it can be demonstratively shown, that the doctrine of anti-current truths does not impugn the doctrine of God; but that with a partial knowledge of God, we are necessitated to believe of him as incomprehensible, but yet existing as the supreme moral Governor of the universe, whose ways are not as our ways, but yet sufficiently like our ways for us to know to some extent his ways, and to believe of his ways, still further than we know. To circumscribe belief within the limits of knowledge, or to extend knowledge to the compass of belief, is to violate the constant experience of consciousness; and therefore nullifies itself. Is then a man an atheist because he cannot know God absolutely, when the very condition of all his knowledge is, that he cannot know anything, not even himself, absolutely? And because this is also the condition of our moral thinking, and man cannot, therefore, harmonize omnipotence and free agency in a knowledge of absolute justice, must he, on that account, pronounce what he cannot know-God a tyrant and man his victim? Or are we not left, as Hamilton maintains, to our partial or relative knowledges and our beliefs, for a valid theology, recognizing the limits of the human understanding? Indeed, as for ourselves, our knowledges and beliefs are so much more satisfactory than our religious practice, that we do not feel the need so much of light as of strength. And in our weakness we cannot curse God, but only condemn ourselves. Our wickedness we feel to be our own. This much we know, and what we know we know as well as if we knew all. For absolute knowledge cannot convert our partial or relative knowledge into a lie.

Let it not be objected to a demonstrative proof of a God, that only mathematics, which invents itself by its own definitions, and has no facts to account for, is a demonstrative science, because the demonstration of which we speak rests upon the fundamental data of consciousness, which cannot be denied as facts, without involving a contradiction of the denial.

and therefore indirectly affirming the data. These data, by legitimate ratiocination, lead to theism by the necessitation of the laws of thought.

It only remains, in showing that Hamilton's philosophy is net negative, to inquire briefly into the doctrine of relativity. Some of his critics, who have hit at him over the shoulders of Mr. Mansel, have said, by way of showing the negative character of Hamilton's philosophy, that he should rather be called the great relativist, than a natural realist, as Hamilton calls himself. Now, this criticism mistakes the import of the relative. It is not the opposite of the real, as the criticism implies, but of the absolute. The relative is as real as far as it goes, as the absolute. So also is the phenomenal as real as far as it goes, as the absolute. The relative and the phenomenal mean the same, but from different points of view. Now, the doctrine of Kant, as we have shown, was that the phenomenal or relative was different from the real; but this is not the doctrine of Hamilton and the Scottish School, who not only believe in the reality of the objective, but that it is immediately known, and are therefore called natural realists. The philosophy of Reid originated in the attempt to demonstrate this very doctrine-to regain the worlds of matter and of mind which Hume showed had no existence on the doctrine which denied the immediate knowledge of the external world. This doctrine Hamilton laboured all his life to expound and supplement, making it the central doctrine of all philosophy. The supposition that his doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, impugns this doctrine, needs not a serious refutation.

From the foregoing considerations, it is sufficiently manifest, that the philosophy of the conditioned, as maintained by Hamilton, only relegates theology to our partial or relative knowledges and our beliefs, circumscribed by those limits to human knowledge which the laws of identity and contradiction impose upon us. And there can be no alternative to this doctrine, but that of Hegel which ignores these two laws, and makes affirmative and negative, identity and difference one and the same. The critics of Hamilton are necessitated, as it would be easy to show, to choose either the doctrine, that God is

nothing, and nothing is God, or that, we know only in part. There is no middle between the Hegelian and the Hamiltonian creed.

We hope our sketch of Hamilton will enable our readers to peruse his lectures with more interest, and that our criticism will vindicate the validity of his metaphysics. The editors of the Lectures deserve all praise for the judgment and learning with which they have executed their task.

ART. II .- A Nation's Right to Worship God.*

WE propose, in this article, to discuss some of the principles and laws of social progress, in the endeavour to elucidate the relations between civil government and religion, under American institutions. There are grave questions connected with this subject, which, we are persuaded, must soon be re-opened in this country, and come to engage the most earnest thinking of our time.

To prevent misunderstanding, however, we would observe at the outset, that we are firm believers in human progress; the faith and hope of which are interwoven with the very fibres of parental affection. We find it easy to persuade ourselves that our children will reflect honour upon us; and that we shall be comforted, with respect to our own errors and failures in life, by their successes and happiness. On a certain occasion, a good and wise father called his son into his presence, on the day he came of age, and said, "My son, you are no longer a child; you are now a man. From this time you have no master but God. God and your country now call you to liberty

^{*} The substance of this article is taken from an address before the Cliosophic and American Whig Societies of the College of New Jersey, at the last Annual Commencement. This will explain some of the peculiarities of style.

and to duty. I wish you to remember, my son, that it was ever the aim of your father to be a man, to act a man's part in life; and that his honour is now committed into your hands. You will not betray, nor tarnish it." That was all he said to the young man, but as he turned away, with a tear of parental hope and pride, he softly added, "It is an honest lad; the boy will not discredit his name; he will do better than his father has done."

A single generalization from this fact gives us the faith and hope of the human heart in that physical, mental, and moral development of the race, which we call by the name of social or historical progress. This faith we hold to be indestructible. It is true, indeed, as every thinking man must be well aware, that much of what is called by the name of progress is miscalled. If the destinies of humanity were in the hands of many who vociferate this word, but who are only camp-followers to the army, intent on plunder, no victory could ever be gained, organized society would soon be dissolved, and the world engulfed in perdition. Notwithstanding, from the times of the Hebrew prophets, in whose glowing predictions it finds its most sublime utterances, this has ever been the faith and hope of all the great and good of mankind. It is, indeed, the light of human life, without which life itself would be intolerable. We cannot believe in a permanently retrograde movement. No, the deep and fervent aspirations of our hearts, and the faithful striving of our hands, are not doomed to end in disappointment. The succeeding do enter into the labours, and profit by the experience, of preceding generations. Human reason is a nobler endowment than the instinct of the beaver.

A little attention, however, to the phenomena of history reveals the striking fact, that this progress is never in a direct line, but in a zig-zag movement, like that of a ship beating to windward: which may well illustrate the actual condition of our fallen humanity. From the social evils of a given system of philosophy, or prevailing solution of the great problems of life, a reaction sets in, under the influence of which the course of human thought shoots far over into the opposite extreme. When the evils of this extreme begin to make themselves exten-

sively felt, and others, more grievous, are threatening us, like "breakers ahead," a similar reaction takes place; again the word is passed, "About ship! helm hard down!" when we come up into the wind, and if we do not miss stays, and fall off upon rocks or quicksands, we go about, and lie over on the other tack. But head as close to the wind as we possibly can, we soon find ourselves, not indeed in the same, but in a similar extreme to the first. In the meantime a certain progress has been achieved, yet by no means so great as he imagines, who watches only the motion of the vessel through the water, but does not lift his eyes to the guiding constellations of heaven.

Sometimes, where the wind is dead ahead, and the channel very narrow, as in France for the last hundred years, these courses are very short. There we have the apotheosis of despotism under Louis XIV., the experience of the evils of that extreme, the subsequent reaction, and the subversion of that ancient and renowned monarchy. Next the opposite extreme of Jacobinism, the Reign of Terror, the reaction, and the consequent overthrow of the first Republic. Following this we have the military throne of the first Napoleon, under whom the course of national thought ran on in the same direction, through the sorrows of France depopulated by incessant wars, and of Paris occupied by the allied armies, reaching at length the extreme point of the restoration of the ancient dynasty, with most of its obsolete traditions. Hence, again, a similar reaction towards republicanism, stretching through the second expulsion of the Bourbons, and the reign of the Citizen King, to the provisional government, and the second Republic. And yet, again, a reaction set in against this movement, not so much, as it would seem, because of any extremes which it had actually reached, nor from evils actually experienced, but from those which were apprehended as impending and inevitable. For during the brief continuance of the second Republic, the socialistic ideas had made such rapid advances as to threaten the rights of property, the integrity of the nation, and civilization itself. This was well understood at the time by the first minds in France. Cavaignae himself, that staunch republican and most incorruptible of Frenchmen, is known to have declared, that, although he would not forfeit his own consistency, yet, if Louis Napoleon, or any other capable man, chose to put himself at the head of a reactionary movement, he would not draw his sword in defence of republican ideas. This was the secret of that great man's virtual acquiescence in the coup d' Etat which established the present order of things. He could not disguise from himself that a change was indispensable to save society from dissolution. And now, if we compare the second Republic with the first, and the present condition of the French people with that under the first Napoleon, and still farther, with that under the legitimate despotism of the old monarchy, it becomes quite evident that the result of all these conflicts has been a true and living progress.

Thus it has always been in the history of the human race. For if, to the generalization of this construction of particular facts, it be objected, as we sometimes hear it said, that French nature is not human nature, and such proceedings are never seen but in France, we are not to attribute the least force to this expression. Its wit is the chief element of its life and currency. Human nature everywhere is numerically one, and identically the same. We meet similar phenomena in Greek, Roman, and, as we shall see hereafter, even in Jewish history. In fact, throughout all past time, wherever any life and movement at all have been manifested, this progress by reaction from extremes has been going on, in more or less striking forms, through longer or shorter reaches of thought, according to the peculiarities of each several people.

The reason of this is obvious to reflection. For the life of humanity consists, in great part, of the development under logical forms, and of the realization in action, of intellectual conceptions, principles, ideas. Facts, res gestae, are the phenomena and the body of which thought is the law and the soul. History is crystalized thought. Not that principles in their abstract forms, are first apprehended by the mind; on the contrary, facts are first in the field. Some leader of human activities becomes conscious of a common want, and therefore immediately takes action. In order to justify such action, to induce others to unite with him in sharing its responsibility and

its benefits, reflection is brought to bear upon it, and the principle which it contains is abstracted from it and defined. This principle now enters into a course of logical development; its contents are drawn out of it, and applied in various directions, according to their capabilities; and thus it passes into history. In so far as any such given principle or idea is both true and fruitful, the nation or people over whose history it presides for the time, is animated with a vigorous and flourishing life. The time during which it supplies impulse and energy, norm and corrective, to the human activities, is marked as an historic period: which is of longer or shorter duration, and more or less rich in grave and important events, according to the fulness and truth of the ideas by which it is inspired and governed.

Thus it is that all great movements of mankind are movements of thought in course of evolution and application to the affairs of life. And wonderful it is, to see with what vigorous, logical procedure such developments march. For although each individual be capable of but little thought, and that little may often wander, and load itself with inconsequent deductions, yet, as in orchestral music, the discords of the various instruments are assimilated and absorbed in the full tide of the harmony, so the errors in the reasoning of individual minds are either neutralized by each other, or taken up and borne along in the vast sweep and volume of national thought, so that the mass movement follows, in the main, a logical direction. Of this our own history, as we shall presently see, affords many striking illustrations.

In order now to comprehend why such movements cannot run on for ever in the same direction, we must here take into consideration the infinite nature of the truth, and the finite capacities of the human mind. Consequently these ideas which are developed in history, are never absolute. In so far as they are true, they are but glimpses into the infinite of truth, which are liable, in the course of time, to be exhausted of their contents, so that, torture them as we may, they will yield no more consequences capable of being realized in act; whence they cease to inspire the life and energies of the people, and give place to other ideas which turn the current of history. Human

life, moreover, is manifold and many-sided. No one idea, however great and fruitful, can be adequate at any time, to fill out its whole circumference. The life of each individual, much more that of a nation or race of mankind, consists in the development and realization of many different and often conflicting ideas, which have relations to each other, and will yield consequences which never can be foreseen or predicted. For it is only in life, through actual historical development, that the logical contents of any great principle can ever come to be fully known. Hence it follows that when such principles continue to be fruitful, they are liable to be pushed on to unforeseen results, which not only clash with each other, but are pernicious in themselves. For there is no principle which is capable of definition, development and realization, that is to say, there is no historical principle which will not yield, by perfectly legitimate processes, extreme results, which practical wisdom will steadfastly refuse to adopt and act upon. Every such principle is necessarily, to a certain extent, contingent upon circumstances, in some of which its legitimate consequences are true and valid, in others, false and pernicious. However incontrovertible it may be when abstractly stated, however beneficial its consequences when realized up to a certain point, others are sure to be evolved out of it in the course of time, with respect to which it will require to be severely limited in its application to the affairs of life.

Now where this is ill understood or neglected, where a people do not stop to apply these necessary limitations, but push on the great ideas, which animate and inspire their energies, to the remotest results of which they are capable, these extreme consequences, as they are unfolded and realized, become productive of intolerable social evils. Then it is that reaction sets in; the ship goes about, and lies over on the other tack.

The most sharply defined and typical forms of this whole procedure we have found in French history. The reason of this lies in the obvious truth, that the most striking characteristic of the Gallic national mind is logic. The French are eminently a people of ideas, in this sense, that they carry out their social theories, as if they were absolute, to the most extreme logical results of which they are capable. Your true

Gaul follows his logic "down Niagara." Hence the rapidity with which they run through their historic periods: hence the frequency, and strength, and violence of their reactionary movements. The English, on the contrary, are not a people of ideas, that is to say, of theories. The grand trait of their national mind is common sense. Above all men whom we know, whether of ancient or modern times, the English are clothed with the power of arresting extreme consequences, of limiting the development of one idea by that of another. They understand the necessity of checks and balances in every human arrangement. Hence those long reaches of thought through which their historic periods run, and the permanency of their social institutions.

In such views as these we may find ample justification of that maxim of the people's wisdom, which we take to be essentially of English origin, "It is very good in theory, but will not hold in practice"—a maxim, however ridiculed by sciolists, both sound in itself, and of extensive application. For here we see that the wisdom and safety of any act, or course of action, do not wholly rest upon its being a legitimate consequence of some received, and, in the main, sound principle. In order to demonstrate a safe practical judgment, each separate result of our guiding principles must be brought to the test of other ideas, as also of experience, and of common sense.

In the light of these principles and laws of social progress, we may now endeavour to understand ourselves, and to determine through what stage, whether of healthful action, or of extreme results, we, as a nation, are now moving in the development and realization of the grand ideas which inspire and govern our history.

And here it is necessary to ascend to the fountain head of that which only, as we think, can properly be called modern history. The historic period through which we are now moving, begins—in so far as any part of what is necessarily an organic whole, can be said to have a beginning—in Luther's first act of rebellion against the authority of the church of Rome. The principle which was contained in that act, we take to be this, that the mind and conscience of the individual are responsible to the truth and to God alone—the principle of INDIVIDUAL

LIBERTY, AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY. The history of the Protestant nations, from the sixteenth century to the present time, chiefly consists of the progressive development, the further and more widely extended realization, of this idea. This mighty truth, this vast and fruitful principle, according to the strength with which it actuated Martin Luther, and according to his agency and influence in opening to it a career of development in the world, is that which constituted him, truly and properly, an epoch-making man. With all our known reverence for the other great Reformers, especially for Calvin and Melancthon, it seems no way unjust to them to say, that the relation which they bear to Luther is like that of La Place to Newton.

Now this principle of individual liberty and responsibility, as all other ideas which have exerted a regenerating and transforming influence upon the world, had its birth in a fact of religion. Consequently, it was first applied to doctrinal and church reforms. Hence we have the Reformation, the Reformed Religion, with all that is signified by these words. But it was selfevident that this principle could not be limited to the sphere of the religious life. Immediately, therefore, it began to be applied to literature, science, and art, in all other directions, and to all other human affairs. Hence came Oliver Cromwell, Puritanism, the English, American, and even the French revolutions, together with all their fruits and consequences in modern history. Hence the freedom of the press, universal education, and all free institutions. Hence all freedom of scientific inquiry, experiment, and publication, and that riches and bloom of Protestant literature, science and philosophy, especially that stupendous growth of the physical sciences, in their application to the industrial arts, in the midst of which it is our happiness to live. The immeasurable superiority, with respect to all these things, of the Protestant over the Papal nations-except France alone, emancipated, to a great extent, from Papal influence by the revolution—is proof that they belong to the germinal principle of the Protestant Reformation.

But it was on this continent, in this new and vast country, and by reason of the character, antecedents, and objects of our forefathers, that this great religious, political, and social prin-

ciple found a wider and more favourable sphere, than it had ever before enjoyed—its true and proper home. Consequently our history, as no other in the world, consists of its more and more extended development and realization. This we now proceed to trace.

Taken as the right of private judgment, it is this principle of individual liberty and responsibility which has given us much of that intense individualism, self-reliance, directness of thought, abounding energy, restless activity, and daring enterprise, which in religion, politics and business, are so strikingly characteristic of the American mind. Hence, also, we derive our prevailing mode, to question, examine, discuss and criticise, rather than to believe. In all the departments of thought and life-in science, art and philosophy; in theology, morals and religion; in the church, the state, and the family-there is nothing too great or too small, too high or too low, too sacred or too profane, for individual criticism. This also places us in constant and powerful resistance to the authority of the past, the deliverances of tradition, prescriptive right. But since fashions always tend to extremes, and no less, as we have seen, in philosophy than in dress, it would not be surprising if those who come after us, should reject much that we have retained. It is certain, that if the habit of mind should continue to grow upon us, it must in time lead to the rejection of many just and true ideas; of many sound maxims and wholesome customs. The principle from which it springs, therefore, requires to be checked or limited, at least to some extent, by reverence for the past, the experience of the human race, and common sense.

The application of this idea to civil affairs, has given us the right of self-government, with all its priceless advantages over all other forms of government ever known to mankind. Hence we have our central, state, county, township, and municipal organizations; the whole country being divided and subdivided again and again, that the idea of self-government may be the more perfectly realized. But it is evident that the principle admits of a still further development, in the entire separation of the North from the South, of the East from the West, and of each state from all the others, into so many disconnected and absolute sovereignties. Nay, its remote consequences would

displace the very idea of a state or sovereignty, and constitute each individual the supreme law, and sole arbiter of his own life and conduct. Here, therefore, the principle requires to be limited by that of national unity, of which we shall have more to say hereafter.

Nor is there anything in this idea to restrain any man from marrying as many women as he can persuade to become his wives. Hence we have lived to see United States officials exercising, in a perfectly valid and recognized form, all the functions of territorial government, with harems of women around them, more numerous than that of the Grand Turk. This is a significant fact, and well worthy of being understood in connection with the principle from which it springs, and by which it is justified. Hence, also, our communities of free lovers, and the impunities they enjoy; together with the enormous multiplication of divorces among us. For where all parties freely consent to such arrangements, the idea of individual liberty is the more perfectly realized, without violation of the civil rights of any. Here again the principle requires to be limited by that of the Christian character of our nation, of which also we shall have more to say.

The right of self-government, moreover, admits of an easy and perfectly sound translation into the received formula. All the powers of government are derived from the consent or concessions of the governed. But it is evident that a man cannot alienate from himself a right which he does not possess; and no man is possessed of the right to take away his own life, for any purpose, or in any circumstances. Consequently no man can surrender to government this right to take away his life. Government, under this formula, has no right to inflict the death penalty; and capital punishment becomes murder. Here we find the true explanation of those popular agitations against the death penalty which we experience from time to time; which have already excluded it from the penal code of some of the States; and which must ultimately abolish it altogether, if the idea from which they spring be not limited by the Divine right of civil government, and of society to protect itself.

In fine, the principle of individual liberty, carried out to its utmost consequences in civil affairs, is, of course, simply anar-

chy. And such was the actual condition of the Jewish people at the close of that historic period which is covered by the Book of Judges; when there was no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes. For what state of social disorganization those words were intended to describe, is plain from that horrid affair of the Benjamite's wife, in which a whole tribe of Israel were almost exterminated by their brethren, and which closes in that stormy period. Hence the uncontrolable reaction that followed, and the establishment of the monarchy to save society. Nor is there any other way, as it would appear, to escape precisely similar results in our own history, but by the limitation of the idea of individual liberty by the correlative principles of national unity, and of the reli-

gious character of the nation.

The application of this principle to matters of religion, has given us all our individual religious liberties, with all their unspeakable blessings. From it also we derive that vast multitude of different religious sects, with their advantages and disadvantages, by which Protestant Christianity is distinguished from the outward and formal unity of Romanism. And here it would seem that we have already reached extreme results in the development of the idea, which exert no little influence to undermine and weaken the faith of the people. The church, the body of Christ, appears to exist among us in a dismembered state, its mangled limbs violently torn from each other, and the life-blood, which is faith, pouring forth from its wounds in fatal streams. We cannot but think that the inward and spiritual unity of the church demands some outward and visible sign, in order first, that it should be a living unity, and secondly, that it should be so manifested as to convince the world that Jesus Christ is the Sent of God. This seems to be included in that repeated prayer of our blessed Lord, interceding for his people, in the words: That they all may be one: as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they all may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. For how can the world, who cannot discern spiritual things, be aware that there is any spiritual unity in the church, so as to be convinced by it that Christ is sent of God, otherwise than

by its going forth, and expressing itself, in some outward manifestation and visible sign?

But not to insist upon this interpretation, it is evident that in the idea which has given birth to all these different denominations, there is nothing to restrain it from continuing to multiply them to an indefinite extent. Accordingly, we find it in full career of development and realization, up to the present time. Within the present generation it has given us Mormonism, the so-called Spiritualist Circles, and a number of new Christian sects; and it has rent in twain the Methodist Episcopal Church, North and South, the Presbyterian Church, and twice again, the New-school branch of it. Still it threatens other communions. Where will it naturally stop? Let it run on to the last extremes of which it is capable in logic, and it must subvert all creeds and confessions of faith, displace the very idea of church unity, and make each individual his own church, and thence, practically, his own Saviour and his own God. All that is needed to ensure this result, is that the very same mental processes and acts, which have broken up the Christian church among us into the existing number of different sects, should continue to repeat themselves without let or restraint. Here therefore the principle from which they spring requires, and it must find, limitation in catholic unity, experience and common sense. The last, and now the only hope of Romanism in the world, lies in the possibility that Protestantism, in this country, may not have the wisdom to apply these limitations in time to save the faith of the people.

We come now to consider the influence of this idea, of individual religious liberty, in moulding our governmental institutions. For in order that every individual might be not only absolutely free, but wholly unbiased by the influence of the government, in his religious opinions, the Constitution of the United States has rigorously abstained from all recognition of, and allusion to, Christianity, or to the being of a God; and all* our Constitutions prescribe and ordain "that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification for any office

^{*} The constitution of North Carolina, unchanged since its adoption in 1776, is an exception to this. 86

or public trust." Consequently they cannot require an oath in the name of God. What is called the oath of the President elect, which is the model of all others, whether of the general or state governments, is prescribed in these words: "I do solemnly swear or affirm," &c.; in which the officer elect is left free to swear by nothing at all, and thus to leave out not only all recognition of God, but therein also the very essence of an oath. Whenever the name of God is introduced in such cases. whether under the Constitution of the United States, or of any particular state, in any department of the government, executive, legislative, judicial, educational, or military, it is purely optional.* The practical effect, whether or not the original object, of all this, is the neutrality of the government with respect to all religions, so that no possible governmental influence can be constitutionally exerted for or against any form of religious belief.

This absolute neutrality in religion of the Constitution of the United States, is admitted and defended by the commentators. Says one of them: "It has been objected by some against the Constitution, that it makes no mention of religion, contains no recognition of the existence and providence of God. . . . But there were reasons why the introduction of religion would have been unseasonable if not improper. The Constitution was intended exclusively for civil purposes, and religion could not be regularly mentioned. The difference among the various sects of Christians is such that, in an instrument where all are entitled to equal consideration, it would be difficult to use words in which all could cordially join. . . . The purity of religion is best preserved by keeping it separate from government." For these and other reasons, he adds: "It was impossible to introduce into the Constitution even an expression of gratitude to the Almighty for the formation of the present government." Such are the views of the commentators upon the Constitution of the United States, in which they manifest a cordial zeal for the purity of religion "by keeping it separate

^{*} In some of the States, the form of the oath is in some cases prescribed by law so as to make a direct appeal to God, but this can always be evaded by substituting the affirmation.

[†] Bayard on the Constitution of the United States.

from government;" but unfortunately they do not inform us what is to preserve the purity of government after it has become sequestered from religion—has thus solemnly excommunicated itself. It were "devoutly to be wished" that some eminent statist of that school would speak to this point.

The same principle substantially rules in our state Constitutions. It is true that in some of the earlier of these there is still a faint recognition of God, and even of the Christian religion. In that of North Carolina there is even a Protestant clause. But from most of those which have come into existence under the further development of the idea of individual religious liberty, either all trace of religion has disappeared, or, as in those of Missouri and Texas, there are provisions of positive, though, no doubt, of unconscious hostility to Christianity. The Constitution of New Jersey is an honourable exception to this statement. As revised two years ago, under the influence of the eminent Christian statesmen of that Commonwealth, it exhibits a decided tendency to return to the idea of a Christian state. But the Constitution of New York is an admirable example of this perfect religious neutrality, the more significant in so far as the inhabitants of the Empire State are a typical people. For it guaranties the largest liberty to all mankind, with respect to all religions, in the words, "without discrimination or preference." That the true intent of that clause is to place all the religions, and all the infidelities of the world, upon exact level with Christianity before the government, we have the best possible evidence. For being well acquainted with the truly eminent and accomplished gentleman to whom chiefly that Constitution owes its present form, and happening to meet him soon after its adoption, we took occasion to say, "You, sir, have done what surely no other man in the state could have accomplished. Having yourself been born, and brought up, and moulded under the influence of the Christian church, you have given us a Constitution for the government of a great Christian people, which covers a vast extent and variety of topics, and yet which carries out one idea with such perfect logical rigour, that from no single word, or form of expression, could it ever be inferred that such a fact as the Christian religion ever existed." "Ah!" he replied, with manifest delight, "how well you have understood it! That was just what we intended to do." Yet was he anything but an irreligious person. He was a regular attendant, and liberal supporter of the Presbyterian church, and, indeed, formerly a parishioner of the writer of this article. But this was his theory of civil government. A Christian person, even a Christian family, he could understand; but a Christian state was an idea totally inconsistent, in his mind, with that of the religious liberty of the individual.

Thus far we have actually realized this principle in our Constitutions. Its further development in the same direction, leads, by necessary sequence, to the abrogation of all our laws for the protection of the Sabbath, the punishment of blasphemy, and the like; also to the banishment of all observance of the Sabbath, chaplaincies, and religious services, from our legislative bodies, our army, and navy; and of all recognition of God, and of the Christian religion, from the messages of our presidents, and other executive officers, and from all other public documents, and governmental acts. Even the executive appointment of our thanksgiving days is contrary to the spirit, and many of the things mentioned, to the express letter of our Constitutions, because they are governmental acts with "discrimination and preference" in matters of religious belief, which is constitutionally repudiated. They exert a governmental influence to bias the minds of individuals in favour of Christianity against infidelity, and against all non-Christian religions; consequently against every man's position and success in public life, who is an enemy to the national faith. They are, in fact, the lingering remains of an obsolete system of ideas, with respect to which our governmental institutions are, as yet, but imperfectly purified from religion. Hence the agitation which, from time to time, calls for their abolition. They have been allowed to remain-the laws for the protection of the Sabbath, and the punishment of blasphemy, being merely a dead letter. often violated by the government itself-only because their religious influence is so ill defined, and ineffectual.

The influence of this jealous neutrality, with respect to all religions, of our supreme and state governments, upon our public men, political parties, and political life in general, is very

striking. For no government can be administered and carried on, according to its true intents and aims, but by men who are personally in sympathy with its character. And since our Constitutions do thus exclude from themselves all influences which could bias the minds of individuals either for or against any religious belief, they cannot but act, in a most subtle and powerful manner, to repel from their offices of trust, and from the political organizations under them, all men who have any religious character, and to attract those who have as few religious and conscientious scruples as possible. Accordingly, we observe, that our chief magistrates have hardly ever been professed Christians. Even when favourably disposed towards the Christian religion, commonly they have held themselves aloof from formal church-membership until their retirement from office. The like is true, with noble exceptions, of our legislators, judges, aspirants to office, leaders of political parties, and public men in general. And here we find the true and all-sufficient explanation of that almost total banishment of religious ideas and restraints from politics, and of that portentous, everincreasing political corruption, which already perplexes and appals the nation. For it is manifestly impossible thus to shut out all religious aims and objects from any sphere of human life, without weakening, and ultimately destroying, the power of religious principle within that sphere. The inevitable result, in time, of this rigorous exclusion of religion from politics, is the irretrievable demoralization of the whole sphere of public The idea is yet indeed but imperfectly realized. But it can hardly be denied that we have been of late, and are daily making good progress. The principle is in full career of development up to the present hour. When it has reached its last terms, all appeal to religious motives in politics, will be held to be as much out of place, and illegitimate, as is now the appeal to political motives in religion. This idea is a two-edged sword, which cuts with equal keenness both ways.

It were possible, however, to bear all this, if it were not for still another consequence of this governmental neutrality in religion, which seems to us of deeper, and farther reaching significance, than all others put together. This is its influence

upon our whole educational system.

For inasmuch as our public schools are strictly governmental institutions, organized and maintained under Constitutions from which all religious objects have been sedulously excluded, from these schools must also be excluded all religious objects, worship, instruction, and influence. Accordingly, it is one of the fundamental laws of this department of the government, that "no religious test shall ever be required of the teachers of our public schools; and no teacher shall be deemed unqualified for giving instruction in them on account of his opinions in matters of religious belief." One of the most eminent of American jurists* has officially decided, that "it is no part of the object of our public school system to give religious instruction." How otherwise could he honestly interpret our Constitutions and laws? Even the reading of the Bible in these schools, although in some of the states the school laws do specify that it shall not be prohibited, is in palpable conflict with this idea of governmental neutrality in religion: under which it is the constitutional right of the Romanist to object against the common version of the Scriptures, of the Jew against the New Testament, and of the heathen and infidel against the whole. Each and every religionist can rise up and say, You have no constitutional right to tax me for the instruction of my children in a religion which I do not believe. Nor at the point where we now stand in the development of the idea of individual religious liberty, is it possible to answer them. The logic of the case they have all their own way. And the carrying out, in good faith, of these provisions must ultimately banish the Bible, prayer, every vestige of religious worship and influence, and all teaching of morality which is peculiar to the Christian religion, from our vast and all-moulding systems of public education. This is the inevitable logical consequence of the principle, as it is already, to a great extent, the actual result. Who that has reflected upon the subject at all, can fail to see it?

What must be the effect of this extrusion of religion from the public schools, both upon education itself, and upon the national character, it is not difficult to foresee. For the three great ends of education are, to communicate the most important information, to train the mind, and to form the

^{*} The late John C. Spencer.

character; and these three are one. It is not possible to attain any one of them apart from both the others. Consequently all sound education, whatever is worthy of the name, must needs be an organic process. For the knowledge which is of paramount importance is, of course, just that which pertains to the moral and spiritual world; the communication of this by right methods is the most effectual way to discipline and impart strength and steadiness to the mind; whilst these two, right knowledge and right discipline, with respect to the facts and truths of the moral and spiritual world, are the fundamental elements of a right character. By the knowledge of the facts and truths of the moral and spiritual world, and of the relations which these bear to each other, the mind is fed. and nourished, and invigorated, as the body by its appropriate food, and by healthful exercise. Ignorance is the want of intellectual food, the famine and starvation of the mind. If that which is communicated in education be of trivial importance, the mind is dwarfed, as the body by insufficient nourishishment. If the relations between the facts and truths communicated be not traced out, the mind is surfeited, as the body with an overloaded stomach, and without exercise. If in the tracing of these relations unsound processes be followed, the mind is warped, as the body by unnatural exercises and contortions. If that be given for fact or truth, which is neither, the mind is poisoned, as the body by unwholesome food. It is only when the matter of instruction in education is of the deepest significance, i. e., when it is just that which pertains to the moral and spiritual world, that which is revealed in the word of God, and when the relations of the things taught to each other, are traced out by sound processes, that the mind is adequately fed, and nourished, and invigorated, is broadly developed, and attains to the full growth and maturity of all its faculties and powers. In other words, the intellect of man is grafted in, so to speak, upon a moral and spiritual, that is to say, upon an infinite, exhaustless root, by which supported and replenished, it is rendered capable, as distinguished from the brute mind, of culture, development, and growth, from generation to generation, and from age to age. And it is necessary that it should be trained with special reference to this idea, in order that it

should uphold its highest and most plentiful blossoms, and should bear its golden fruit of true wisdom. This moral and religious training is indispensable from the beginning to the end of the whole educational process. To interest the minds and hearts of children at the dawning of their intellectual and moral life; to acquaint them with all things most necessary to be known, both for this world and that which is to come; to accomplish them in the most profound, abstruse, and infallibly correct processes and methods of reasoning; to imbue them with the knowledge of history, eloquence, and poetry; to quicken their perceptions of the true, the beautiful, and the good; to inform them with sound principles of right and justice; to purify their affections, and fix them upon the most exalted objects; to make of our sons, men, and of our daughters, women, in the highest sense of these words; in fine, to ennoble, transfigure, and glorify their whole humanity-to accomplish these sublime objects the Holy Scripture alone is adequate, and indispensable, throughout the whole course, as matter of instruction and principle of education.

All this, of necessity, is lost to the education of the masses by excluding the Bible and religious instruction from the public schools. Nor is it possible to provide a sufficient remedy by placing our children in private or select academies. For this great public school system is an all-moulding power upon the ideas themselves which are entertained of education, among all classes of society. The views of education which prevail in the public schools soon come to prevail in the nation. Religious instruction and influence driven from these, soon cease to form any part of the idea of education in the community at large.

Accordingly we find that the loss of this idea is working a revolution in the whole department of education, as also in the character of the teachers and instructors themselves. For the system, being without aims and objects, naturally attracts to its service a class of men who are personally in sympathy with it; in other words, who have as little of the religious character as possible; consequently, unconscientious, unscrupulous people, whose chief end of life is a piece of bread. Such teachers, themselves intellectually incompetent, and in order to flatter

both parents and children, are easily tempted to pass rapidly over elementary exercises, and to increase the number of studies beyond all rational limits, crowding one upon another, and hurrying on with such reckless speed, that learning, in any true sense of the word, becomes impossible. Hence it is already one of the most difficult things to find an instructor under whom a child can be placed, with any rational expectation that he will obtain such a knowledge of language as will enable him to read the classics, in after life, with any facility, pleasure, or profit. The same ineffectual methods, and abortive results, are equally apparent in other branches of education. In this way, children of the brightest intellect are soon discouraged. Thoroughly instructed in what they pass over, when it is light behind, they are easily interested in study, and learn to face, without shrinking, the darkness which lies before them. But when it becomes dark behind as well as before, they are utterly confused and disgusted; their minds are stupefied and enfeebled, instead of being educated. This evil is already enormous, and no less, perhaps even greater, in private than in public education. It is one of the greatest calamities that can befall any people. Hence the almost universal outcry from parents and guardians, What shall we do with our children? Send them where we will, they do not learn. They seem to feel no interest in study; and we cannot persuade our boys to go to college. For this is one of the chief causes of that relative decline in the number of our youth who aspire to collegiate, and the higher forms of education-they have no genial interest awakened in study, they are discouraged and disgusted with its blind and fruitless toil, in the lower departments.

The further influence of this whole system of education divorced from religion, upon the character of the young, surely cannot be misunderstood. It is already but too evident in that early loss of the simplicity and innocence of childhood, in that precocious development of subtlety and forbidden knowledge, in that disgusting manishness, which dwarfs the stature, enfeebles the mind, and, like the worm in the first ripe fruits, causes the premature decay and death of so many of our American youth. Some one has bitterly said, "There are no children in America; they are all pigmy men and women; and half of them

never grow up to full size." For how is it possible that the humanity in them should continue to grow through the ordinary length of time, and attain to the full stature of men and women, when it is deprived of that religious instruction in education which is its most necessary food.

The influence of this change in education we have begun to feel in every department of life. It extends even to the fundamental relation between parents and children. Formerly, as is well known, a certain religious character and dignity belonged to the father of the family, a certain prophetic, priestly, and kingly authority, was vested in the head of the household, in virtue of which he felt obliged to assert for himself, and for the mother of his children, a Divine right to their reverence and obedience; and to set apart some portion of the week to instruct them in their relations and duties, "as inferiors, superiors and equals." How little of all this is found among us now! How indeed could it remain after it had ceased to be a self-evident truth, that education is essentially a religious training!

In a few generations this influence must extend to the whole population of our country, and recast in its own likeness, our national character, which already tends to the merging of its original Anglo-Saxon depth and seriousness in a certain French levity and frivolity. There is no less of truth than of wit in the saying that, "Good Americans, when they die, go to Paris." For it may be safely affirmed that all other influences which go to determine our national character and destiny, are scarcely superior to that of our all-comprehending, all-moulding systems of governmental education. As are the public schools of this land, such will be the great and governing masses of the people. If they are Christian, the nation will be Christian. If the Bible shall be driven from them, it can never maintain the place it has hitherto occupied in the nation.

These are some of the extreme consequences, logically derived, already extensively realized, and in full course of realization up to the present hour, of the principle of individual liberty, taken in its widest sense. This is the course we are steering with full sails. Is it not plain to reason that if we pursue it long enough, we must find ourselves in perilous

waters? And when the mast-head watch shall call out, "breakers ahead-and close under the lee bow!" there will be no time to trim the vessel. Then a sudden and violent change in our course will be our only and doubtful possibility of escape from disastrous shipwreck. If the principle, by which we are now guided, be not limited, and its extreme consequences arrested in time, by some other principle of historical development, of equal validity, fruitfulness and power, a violent reaction against it is inevitable. And the longer this is delayed, the greater the lengths to which the now dominant idea shall yet go, the more sudden and violent that reaction must be, and the greater will be those evils of the opposite extreme. into which the American mind is as sure to run, as that it has not escaped from under the laws which have governed all preceding history. It seems plain that there is no other way to save and perpetuate the innumerable and priceless blessings which we owe to this great principle of individual liberty, but faithfully to apply these limitations in time.

And now what is that other principle of historical development, no less valid and true, no less fruitful, and no less evident, than this of individual liberty, by which it can and ought to be limited, and restrained from rushing on to these, and even greater, extremes. It is of this only that we have yet to speak; and we answer, it is the principle of NATIONAL UNITY, NATIONAL LIBERTY, AND NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. It

remains to develope this idea.

Let us observe, then, that what we call a nation, is not to be conceived of as a mere aggregate of individuals, a bare collection or collocation of men, women and children, having no other than personal relations to each other, and to God. A nation is properly an organism, with a unity of existence and life, distinct from all others, and from the individuals of which it is composed. Such an organism is a tree which, though capable of being grafted with the buds and branches of other stocks, has yet a life of its own, distinct from others, and from all the different parts of which it is composed. In like manner ethnic life must needs be conceived of as a unity, else it could not be life at all; for life is one. As the vital force in the human body is one, and not many, so that if you wound the

feet it is felt in the head, and if you kill the head the feet also die, so every body politic has a distinct life of its own, which is not many, but numerically one and the same in all its members. Hence it is that nations follow, to a certain extent, the analogy of individuals in the phenomena of infancy, childhood, youth, growth, and maturity—of decline, old age, decay and dissolution.

But it is worthy of observation, that this oneness of ethnic life does not wholly depend upon unity of race or tribal descent. For God hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth; (i. e., of one life: for the blood is the life.) So that in other combinations than those of tribal descent they are capable of forming new organisms or states, which soon become as conscious of their own separate unity and identity as if they were all derived from one subordinate branch of the great family of man. There is no doubt, however, but that, even in such cases, there must be one predominant race, to which all the others are as grafts to the original stock of a tree, by whose life both the native and grafted branches are alike supported and nourished. Of this we, as a people, are now giving to the world a remarkable proof and illustration. For there is hardly any country in which the national life is more unique, or the national character more distinct and sharply defined, than in our own. The word American is altogether as precise in signification as the word French, or Spanish, or English, and far more distinct than the word German. Our nation, made up of all heterogeneous varieties of mankind, already, whilst yet in its infancy, manifests an organic life so different from all others, so full and strong, that, as a vast galvanic battery, it easily disintegrates, assimilates, and Americanizes those dense masses of alien populations, which, like the ocean waves that bear them, are incessantly rolling in upon us, and losing all separate form and identity in breaking upon our shores.

This principle of ethnic unity is fully recognized by nations themselves, in all their dealings with each other, and in all their sovereign acts. For the national sovereignty resides in the nation as such. It is a pernicious fallacy to speak of each American citizen as a sovereign. Individual sovereignty is

anarchy. The nation as such, and that alone, is vested with sovereign authority and power. And this national sovereignty manifests itself in constitutions, laws, the coining of money, in matters of peace and war, in governments, and in all governmental acts. In these the nation acts as a unit, and expresses its nationality, in distinction from the individuals of which it is composed. These are the acts of the nation as such, in which no distinction of individuals is, or can be, made; by the wisdom and justice of which the bad, no less than the good, are benefitted; for the sin and folly of which those who dissent and those who assent, the guilty and the innocent, suffer together; for which the people as a whole are responsible. Thus England and America, and all other nations, deal with each other. A declaration of war between any two of them affects alike those who approve and those who disapprove of it; a treaty of peace binds every individual of both nations. In all this the unity of national life is fully recognized by the nations themselves.

Nor is it less evident that God deals with nations as distinct moral entities, than that they so regard and treat each other. There is a national character and conduct of which He takes account in the moral government of the world. For he is the God of nations no less than of families and of individuals. He creates them, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitations. He governs them with supreme sovereignty. Hence he reveals himself as the Governor among the nations, as the King of nations, the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings and Lord of lords. All government, of whatever form, exists, and derives its essence and authority, from God alone. For there is no power but of God. The powers that be are ordained of God. The civil magistrate is the minister of God; and he beareth not the sword in vain. And here it is another great fallacy to say that all the powers of government are derived from the people. Not one of them is thence derived. All the powers of government, its authority and very essence, are from God alone. As to its form only, it is from the people. It belongs to the people simply to determine and prescribe, according to the light given them, what those powers are which God has vested in civil

government. They have no more right either to take from, or add to, these, than they have to increase or diminish the powers of the Christian church. The church and the state are equally Divine institutions. God is no less the head of the one than of the other. Consequently, and as a matter of fact and observation, God deals with nations no less obviously than with individuals, by a system of rewards and punishments. With blessings and prosperity he seeks to quicken the national gratitude; with afflictions and chastisement he calls to national humiliation and repentance. In the distribution of these national rewards and punishments he makes no distinction of individuals, whether they as such be innocent or guilty, precisely as nations themselves, in dealing with each other, must ignore such personal distinctions. In times of peace, health and plenty, these blessings are not confined to the good; nor are the wicked alone cut off by war, pestilence and famine. In all this God himself fully recognizes the distinct entity, and moral unity, of nations.

From these truths it follows of necessity, that nations, as such, have a moral character, and are clothed with a moral responsibility, of their own. In other words, nations, in distinction from the individuals of which they are composed, have relations and duties to the God of nations and Supreme Ruler of the world, no less than individuals themselves. And it is evident of itself, that these duties, and this moral responsibility, if they exist at all, cannot be conceived of as requiring anything less than some national acknowledgment of themselves. For as our individual responsibility requires recognition and acknowledgment from each individual, by his own act, so the valid acknowledgment of national responsibility must be the act of the nation. In other words, our national responsibility requires, and cannot be conceived of as being satisfied without some national acknowledgment of the being, providence, and government of God, in those acts which are the most solemn and significant, the highest, not to say, the only acts of the nation itself-the acts of government. But moral responsibility implies moral freedom. Whatever a nation is morally obliged to do, that, as a nation, it is of right free to do. Consequently, it is an inalienable right of nations to acknowledge the being and government of God, to worship, honour, and obey him, in

their national and governmental acts. Such is the idea of national unity, liberty, and responsibility.

In applying this general principle to our own case, we may assume what surely does not need proof, that, in our moral and religious character, we are not a heathen, nor a Mohammedan, nor an infidel, but a Christian nation. For the emigrants from the Old World, in whom our national existence was first constituted, were, as a body, eminently religious and Christian people. It was chiefly a religious and Christian movement which brought them to this continent. Driven from their country and wealth, from their kindred, homes, and churches, they brought with them hardly anything but their religion. They sought and found in these western wilds a refuge for their persecuted faith, where they might worship God in freedom, and freely educate their children in the saving truths of the gospel. And they were not only the founders of our nation, but also of the national character. Even so far as mere numbers can have any bearing on such a question as this, it is safe to say, that a vast preponderance of our population has always been on the side of Christianity. The great mass of our people have always been, as they still are, at least speculative believers, carrying with them into all their new settlements, as a sacred palladium, or rather as the ark of their national covenant and safety, the word of God, the preaching of the gospel, and the Christian church.

Here we would gladly arrest this argument, without any discrimination among all those who call themselves Christians. But the plain truth of the case carries us further. For our national character is no less Protestant than it is Christian. Our civil and religious liberty, all our free institutions, even our civilization itself, are, as we have seen, an outbirth and growth of Protestant Christianity. We are eminently a Protestant nation. Nor is this truth even limited by the fact that Romanism is found among us. For this is nothing properly American. It it an exotic, a purely foreign growth, not yet assimilated or Americanized. The members of that communion, in a vast proportion, are foreign born. Its head, whom both priest and people are sworn to obey in all things, both temporal and spiritual, as lord paramount, with full power to

absolve them from their allegiance to the governments under which they live—a power which he has actually exercised again and again-is a foreign prince. Whilst they remain subjects to him, they cannot enter into our American and Protestant nationality. As they become Americanized they cease to be Romanists. And this is a process which is continually going on. For incredible numbers of their children, in spite of the perfection of their organization, and of all they can do to prevent it, cease to be Papists. They can no more escape from the all-transforming influence of our American institutions, the enormous assimilating power of our Protestant nationality, than from the effects of the American atmosphere and climate. Accordingly, as we learn from the statistics of the Propaganda, the Papists who have emigrated to this country, have lost thereby full one-half of their numbers; that is to say, they would have been twice as numerous as they now are, if all the emigrants, with their children, had remained in their own communion. But inasmuch as they are now grafted into the stock of a Protestant nationality, the life which nourishes them, and circulates in all their veins and thoughts, is a Protestant life: which ensures that they shall cease to be Romanists in becoming Americans.

If then we are indeed a Christian and a Protestant nation, in the name of the people, in the name of the truth, in the name of God, we have the right to say so in our Constitutions and laws, in our national and governmental acts. It is the chief element of our national religious liberty, that we should be allowed, and we are bound by the most solemn of all moral obligations, to acknowledge, worship, and obey our God, not only as individuals, but also as a free Christian and Protestant nation. For no moral creature of God, no creature which is subject to his moral government, such as we have seen a nation is, can refuse or decline to honour its Creator by public and solemn worship, with impunity. As the individual, and the family, so the nation that neglects this, must bring upon itself His sovereign displeasure, and a grievous punishment. And since all our national institutions and blessings, yea, our civilization itself, are the fruits of Protestant Christianity, in the name of the people, in the name of the truth, in the name

of God, we have the right, and we are morally bound, to recognize and honour, in our national acts, the source from which, and the channel through which, they have been derived to us. For it is contrary to the constitution and order of nature, it is evidence of a base mind, and can never come to good, when the child, for any reason, or to gain any object, refuses to own its parentage. And we are bound to vindicate this right at all hazards. To yield it up, is to renounce our national parentage, birthright, and character; it is to dishonour our national religion, and the God of our fathers; yea, it is to betray ourselves, blindfold and manacled, as our children will find to their sorrow, in the very citadel of our religious liberties.

But does not all this imply some form of Erastianism, or at least some modified union of church and state, which American institutions have repudiated bodily? We answer, that it implies nothing of the kind. For Erastianism makes the church the creature of the state, which is abomination in the sight of God and man. The union of church and state, in any right acceptation of the words, either gives the state some sort of control over the church, and makes the church, to some extent, dependent upon the state, as in England; or reverses the relation, and gives the church some control over the state. making the state, in some degree, dependent upon the church, according to the Papist theory. Both of these ideas we cordially repudiate, not only for ourselves, but also in the name of every branch of the Protestant church in this country. We do not believe there are any Protestants among us who can tolerate either of them. The doctrine here advocated is, that as the different branches of our national government, the executive, legislative, and judicial, are coordinate, each supreme within its own sphere, and independent of the others, but all alike responsible directly to the people, so the church and the state are coordinate institutions, totally independent of each other, each, in its own sphere, supreme with respect to the other, but both alike of Divine appointment, having one and the same head and fountain of all their powers, which is God. Whence both alike are bound to acknowledge, worship, and obey him. It is as great a solecism for the state to neglect this, as it would be for the church. Many

seem to think that the complete separation of church and state, implies that the state, as such, has no duties to God, and no religious character. As logically it could be inferred from the family's independence of the church, that the family has no religious character, and no duties to God. The family, the church, and the state, these are all coordinate institutions, severally independent of each other, yet all alike having one and the same Head, which they are equally bound in solemn form to acknowledge, worship, and obey. When the state, for any reason, declines to do this, it falls into a gross anomaly, and exemplifies that which is described in the second Psalm: Why do the nations rage, and the peoples imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against Jehovah, and against his Anointed, saying, Let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; Jehovah shall have them in derision.

But even if this doctrine of church and state could be refuted, we ought not to forget that there are two extremes to this question, no less than to every other, both of which are equally removed from the only practical truth. For one of these extremes king Charles lost his throne and his head; and we lose what is dearer than life, our national religious liberty, while we rush to the other. In medio tutissimus ibis: the golden mean is ever the path of safety.

All that for which we here contend, requires but the least possible change in the words of our Constitutions; which, moreover, would express nothing but an obvious truth: "We, avowing ourselves to be a Christian and a Protestant nation, do ordain and establish this Constitution." That change would leave all denominations calling themselves Protestant Christians, whatever liberty they now enjoy, to follow their natural developments, and to exert all the influence of which they are now capable; it would complicate no question between them severally; and it would give them all a great advantage in prosecuting that glorious work in which they are all co-labourers with the fathers of the Reformation, and of all civil and religious liberty. That constitutional change would open its true channel to the current of our national life and history,

and allow it to flow with perfect freedom in its natural course. And it would give us the constitutional right to worship the God of our fathers, in our legislative bodies, army and navy; to require an oath in the name of God in our courts of justice, and of our officers elect; to observe, as a nation, and to protect by law, our Christian Sabbath; to punish blasphemy, adultery and polygamy, and to protect the unity of marriage; to inflict the death penalty for murder; and to make the word of God the matter of instruction, and the principle of education, in our all-moulding public school system.

Whatever in the idea of individual religious liberty is inconsistent with such an avowal of the Christian character of our nationality, and inconsistent with these its immediate logical results, is to be regarded as an extreme and baleful consequence of the principle from which it flows. Not long ago a California judge—and we happen to know this to be a fact—undertook to elicit the truth from a Chinaman by swearing him on a cock's head, instead of the Bible. The foolish magistrate had been instructed by some wag that this was the idolatrous sanction of witness-bearing among the Chinese, although the whole procedure must have been as incomprehensible and absurd to the witness as it was to the spectators. But the idea of the court was that the government having no religious character or preference of its own, could easily accommodate itself to those of the individual, whatever they might be*—a perfectly sound inference

^{*} It is objected to this illustration, that it is an old English law maxim, and a plain dictate of common sense, that the witness must be sworn upon what he holds sacred. But the writer of this article is constrained to adhere to it. In a Christian state the principle of the objection must have its limitations. For example, the worshippers of Sheitan, or Satan, visited by Mr. Layard, could take no other oath than one by appeal to the devil himself. Could a Christian court accept such an oath? And the Scriptural view of all idolatry is, that it partakes more or less of the nature of devil worship. Whilst the theory of a Christian state recognizes God as the Supreme Judge, and invisibly present in all its courts of justice, it implies that justice is administered in his name and by his authority. It is his justice which is dispensed. In such a court none but those forms of witness-bearing which are agreeable to his mind are admissible; and nothing can be valid which does not acknowledge his authority. Surely, now it is not possible to conceive of Him, the Supreme Judge, administering an oath in which there is an appeal to the devil, or to any heathen god, or which is accompanied with any idolatrous rite. In such an oath the witness

from the principle. Upon the same ground the Mormon denies our authority to punish him for his loathsome polygamy, and insists upon his constitutional right to sit in our legislative bodies, and to fill our highest judicial and military offices, in the very eye of the nation, with all his harem around him. Upon the same ground the Papist denies our right to the reading of the Bible, to religious instruction and worship, in our public schools; and the Jew, our right to observe as a nation, and to protect by law, our Christian Sabbath. Upon the same ground, and with equal reason, the infidels, of every name, deny our right to require an oath by the name of God, in our courts of justice, and of our officers elect; our right to the appointment of chaplains in our legislative bodies, army and navy; and our right to worship or acknowledge the God of our fathers in any of our governmental or national acts. If we yield to this brazen cry of a very few in every thousand of our Christian population, we accept all those evil results to religion, morals, education, politics, and liberty itself, from which we now suffer, and which unchecked are certain, in the end, to overthrow all our free institutions, and even our national existence. If we admit these extreme consequences of the idea of individual religious liberty, we give the death-blow to national unity, liberty, and responsibility. The nation, as distinguished from the individuals of which it is composed, is deprived of every vestige of religious liberty. Yea, the first principles of national existence itself are subverted.

The doctrine for which we here contend, will give us an answer to these brazen demands. Children of the Papacy, do we not know you, in all your historical antecedents, as the sworn enemies of both civil and religious liberty? When did you ever concede, where you had the power to withhold, either the one or the other? Who can number the martyrs of both you have slain? Having fled from your own countries, where,

would insult and repudiate the authority of the court itself. The difficulties which would grow out of this theory of a Christian state, in such a government as that of the English in India, exhibit only one of the many anomalies which are inseparable from the subjection of a conquered people to the rule of foreign masters, and render more certain the ultimate triumph over the whole world of the great "cause of the nationalities."

ground to the earth by the despotism of your priests and princes, you had neither liberty, nor bread, nor hope, you have taken refuge in the protecting arms, and fostering bosom, of a free Protestant nation. We have received you to liberty, plenty, and a new life, the fruits to us of two centuries of a Christian and Protestant education in all our institutions of learning. And now you demand, in the name of religious freedom, as a right of your consciences, that we banish the word and the worship of God from all our public schools, which, as you yourselves avow, through your highest authorities, must inevitably result in making us a nation of infidels. If this, indeed, is the freedom of conscience which only will content you, once for all, you cannot be gratified. Set your hearts at rest. And if without this you cannot be contented, return to your own nationalities, to the Italian priest who is your temporal prince, and ask him for rights and liberties, and see what

he will give you.

Enemies of Christianity, by whatsoever name, Jew, Pagan, Mormon, Mohammedan, or infidel, you are called, we did not receive our free institutions, nor any of the priceless blessings which distinguish us above all other nations, from you, but from our God, and through the channel of the Christian religion. We are a Christian nation. As such, we are one, free, and responsible to God. You dwell among us. Whatsoever rights, liberties, and blessings you can enjoy in consistency with this our Christian character as a nation, are freely yours. We will defend them with our blood, as promptly for you as for ourselves. But you demand in the name of religious freedom, as a right of your consciences, not only that we banish the word and the worship of God from our public schools, but also from our legislative bodies, army, and navy; that we abolish all legal protection of our Sabbaths, and of marriage; that we expunge all acknowledgment of our Christian nationality, and even the name of our God, from the sacred roll of our Constitutions and laws; and that we thus repudiate the source from which, and the channel through which, we have derived all our national institutions and blessings. This, as you are well aware, would soon bring us to your ground, and make of us an infidel nation. Now, if this be the liberty of

conscience which only will content you, it is time you were given to understand, that we also have a conscience, which binds us by the most sacred of all obligations, to worship our God in our most solemn and significant national acts, and to educate our children in our Christian faith. We will defend and maintain our sovereign right to do this against the world in arms. Beware how you touch it. You cannot be gratified in this thing. Set your hearts at rest. And if you cannot rest, go form a nation and a state where you can find a place, and see if infidelity will do for you what the Christian religion has done for us.

Such answer the great palpitating heart of our nation already feels to be most just and right; it needs only to be interpreted and justified to the intellect of the people. Even now it begins to make itself heard in no uncertain sounds. We hear it in the popular determination expressed from time to time, as of late in Boston, and later still in the city of New York itself, that no quack theories of government shall be permitted to drive the word and the worship of God from our public schools; and it speaks in that mighty reaction which has taken place all over this country, in the last fifteen years, in favour of religious education. We hear it in the throes of our great cities, whose governments are clutched and held by obscene harpies, that eat up the property of the citizen, whilst they afford no protection to life. We hear it in the muttering of national perplexity over corruption in political life, which is already prodigious. Inarticulate, as yet, but full of a vast meaning, like the thundrous tramp of armed squadrons, like the ground swell of the ocean, or the heavings of the earthquake -it is the indignation of a mighty people, awaking to the conviction that they have been deceived by political quackery, into the surrender of the most precious rights of a free, Christian, and Protestant nation.

The immediate practical duty, which devolves from this great principle of national unity, liberty, and responsibility, upon all good men and true patriots, is plain. In whatever situation of life they may be-in the workshop, on the farm, in the counting-house, on the mart, in the walks of literature, science, and art, in the professor's chair, in the pulpit, at the bar, on the bench, in our state and national councils, as members of conventions to form and revise Constitutions, in our highest executive and military offices, and in all the places of trust and influence in this land—it is their duty to cherish this principle in their hearts, and to advocate such constitutional reforms as may be necessary to realize it in our national life.

The motives to faithfulness and energy in the fulfilment of this sovereign obligation, are all-constraining. It opens the path of honour to the greatest abilities. For the time is not far distant, as we are persuaded, when some capable man, putting himself at the head of a movement which is already making itself felt, to vindicate our national religious liberty, our inalienable right to worship God as a nation, will become the most popular candidate for the presidential chair. A Christian and Protestant people, whose patience has become exhausted by intolerable political corruption, and indignant at the demoralization of its educational interests, will stand by him. Raising his voice in behalf of a nation's right to worship God, his words will speak into clear consciousness their own struggling thoughts; and they will hasten to crown him with their highest honours. But if this motive were wanting, the worldliness and mockery of the age have not been able to quench the sacred flame of patriotism in the national heart. For this is the true Promethean fire which cannot be extinguished, whilst an honest and brave man, or a virtuous woman, continues to exist. My fatherland, let me honour thee with my life: my mother country, I will defend thee with my blood-there is no true heart which does not thrill with the power of this great mystery. And the Christian religion, the Protestant church, which has made us what we are for good-by this faith we live; for this faith we are ready to die. It is more to every one of us than husband or wife, father and mother, than kindred, home, and country. We will not betray our religion. In the strength of these all-powerful motives, we will defend and maintain, on all occasions, against all opponents, our inalienable right to avow ourselves, in our Constitutions and laws, in our national and governmental acts, a free, Christian, and Protestant nation. And the ages to come will bless us, the preservers, as we now bless the authors, of all civil and religious liberty.

ART. III.—The Old Testament Idea of a Prophet.

THE books of the prophets form a large and most important part of the Old Testament. They contain a revelation of the Divine will made to Israel, during a succession of centuries, which is still in its essence universally obligatory; they exhibit to us in the spirit which they embody, and the duties which they inculcate, the religion of the former dispensation, and in the doctrines which they unfold, the theology of that dispensation in its most advanced stage; particularly they contain the clearest and fullest disclosures, made prior to his appearance, of the coming and work of the great Redeemer. thus holding him up as the object of faith and hope to their own generation, carrying forward the work of preparation for his advent, and furnishing the materials for his recognition when he did appear; and they further supply us with a most powerful argument for the divinity and truth of our religion. by the evidence of supernatural foresight afforded by the fulfilment of their predictions.

In order to a just appreciation of the labours of the prophets, and a correct understanding of their writings, it will be necessary to institute a preliminary inquiry as to their proper character and functions. What then is the true idea of a prophet under the Old Testament?

This may be learned, 1. from the formal definition furnished by Deut. xviii. 9-22, which is the classic passage upon this subject. The terms, in which the promise of the prophet is made, indicate with sufficient explicitness, the nature of that which is promised. The application of the language of this passage to Christ by the Apostle Peter, in Acts iii. 22, 23, does not prove that it was spoken exclusively of him. It rather embraces all the prophets whom God would successively raise up for his people, including Him who was the last and greatest of the series, the seal of the prophets, the prophet by way of eminence, in whom the promise finds its highest and most complete fulfilment. In fact the ministries of the prophets who preceded the advent, form, in a sense, part of Christ's own

prophetic work. It was his word that they spake. It was his Spirit that was in them, (1 Pet. i. 11.) that inspired them, and spake through them. And a prediction of Christ as a prophet, to be complete, must naturally comprehend all that he was to do in this character under both dispensations. Whatever interpretation be given to this passage, however, it is equally adapted to our present purpose. Whether it be understood generically of all the prophets, or specifically and individually of Christ as the prophet in the highest sense, it in either case teaches what a prophet is. And this it does both positively and negatively.

The positive definition is found, verse 18, "I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth; and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him." It hence appears (1) that he must be one of the chosen people. It was from among their brethren that the prophet was to be raised up. Immediate communications of the Divine will, made directly by God himself, had so much of terror about them, that, at the people's request, the Lord promised henceforth to speak to them through the instrumentality of men. . And as one of the principal objects for which Israel was selected to be the Lord's people was that they might be for the time the theatre of Divine revelation, it was quite in accordance with this design that the revelations of God to them should come through an Israelitish channel. Balaam is no exception to this rule; though, if he were, his would be an isolated case. He is called a prophet. 2 Peter ii. 16, but in a connection which shows that it was given to him only in an improper sense. He is nowhere so called in the Old Testament. He was a soothsayer, Josh. xiii. 22; he used enchantments, Num. xxiv. 1; and it was in this capacity that his aid was sought by Balak, for his messengers departed to fetch him, having the rewards of divination in their hand, Num. xxii. 7. It was hoped that his potent influence could charm away Jehovah's protection from Israel. The Lord made use of him to serve a purpose of his own, by making the chosen refuge of his people's foes speak their own discomfiture, just as he afterwards made use of the witch of Endor, to foretell the ruin of the apostate king by whom she was consulted. But in so doing he neither sanctioned their wicked

arts, nor constituted them his prophets. Divine communications were also made to Abimelech, Gen. xx. 3; to Pharaoh, Gen. xli. 1; to a man in the host of Midian, Judges vii. 13, 14; to Nebuchadnezzar, Dan. ii. 1; but these, like the prophecies of Balaam, delivered to the king of Midian, were designed to accomplish some end on behalf of the chosen race, and were confined to the extraordinary circumstances which called them forth. None of these were prophets.

The prophet is further (2) made such by direct Divine agency. The Lord says, "I will raise them up a prophet." He is not to intrude into this office at his own will, therefore, nor to receive it by lineal descent, nor by human appointment, but by the sovereign choice of God, who raises him up when and where he will, guided solely by his good pleasure, and the exigencies of that scheme of grace which he is conducting. The expression, "I will raise them up," however, probably includes more than the simple investiture with the office. It is not as though the Lord found men ready to his hand, so to speak, and simply designated them to this work. God raises up the men, as well as makes them prophets, and both their original needful endowments, and the preparatory providential training by which they were severally fitted for their respective tasks, are promised here. And so he says to Jeremiah, i. 5, that he was set apart and ordained before his birth to be a prophet. Comp. Isa. xlix. 1, 5. The Lord first prepared, on each occasion, an instrument suited to the end he had in view, and then engaged him in his proper work. The supernatural agency of God, it must be borne in mind, did not eradicate nor supersede, but guided and employed, the natural capacities and characteristics of the prophets. (3) "I will put my words in his mouth." The prophet was inspired of God, and this not merely in the sense of elevating, clearing, and assisting his native powers, so that he could see the truth himself, but in the sense of a direct impartation of definite instructions. (4) He was charged with the authoritative communication of Divine messages to others, which they were bound, under the severest penalties, to receive and to obey. "He shall speak unto them all that I shall command him; and it shall come to pass that whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require

it of him." One other characteristic remains, viz., (5) likeness to Moses. It should be as if the great lawgiver were revived or perpetuated in the persons of these his successors, who would carry forward the work which he had begun, and in the same spirit. The prophets were consequently not to be isolated phenomena, springing sporadically, so to speak, from the supernatural soil of the old economy, but having no vital connection with each other, or with the revelations that preceded them. They belong to one closely related scheme, initiated by Moses, and continued by them in likeness to him. Their teachings must accordingly not only harmonize with, but be built unon his, containing the same essential principles further unfolded, and with fresh applications. Combining these particulars, a prophet is defined to be one from among the chosen people, who, raised up by God for the purpose, and acting under his inspiration, delivers his messages to the people, his work being engrafted upon or unfolded from that of Moses, and of like tenor with it.

The prophet is in this passage further described negatively, by being set in opposition to two classes who profess somewhat similar functions to this, but with a total contrariety of character. (1) Heathen diviners and prophets of idols. These, of which several varieties are here enumerated, sought to prognosticate the future, or to discover the unknown by their respective arts based upon the observation of omens, or by the pretended inspiration of false deities, after the manner of the responses of the ancient oracles. This mode of prying into secrets and of consulting the Divine will, is denounced as heathenish, and strictly prohibited to the covenant people as an abomination to the Lord. (2) False prophets, professing to speak in the name of the Lord, but who have not been commanded so to speak, who in the language of other Scriptures prophesy out of their own heart, Ezek. xiii. 2, Jer. xiv. 14, xxiii. 16, 21, 26. The two tests proposed here and elsewhere for distinguishing false prophets from the true, are first, the non-fulfilment of their predictions, Deut. xviii. 22, 1 Sam. iii. 19, 20, Jer. xxviii. 9; and, secondly, teaching idolatry or error, Deut. xiii. 1-3: so in 1 Kings xiii. 18, the falsehood of the old prophet in Bethel to the man of God from Judah was sufficiently evidenced by its

contrariety with the charge already received by the latter, verse 9. In like manner the test of false teachers given in the New Testament was inconsistency of doctrine with that already received upon Divine authority. Gal. i. 8, 9; 1 John iv. 6; 2 John verse 10.

Idolatrous diviners were of heathen origin and were introduced into Israel from abroad, from the ungodly nations by which they were surrounded. False prophets were of native growth, the caricatures or apes of the true. The former are met with more frequently in the earlier stages of the people's history, before the Canaanites were quite extirpated, or while the influence of contiguous pagans was powerfully felt in the life and spirit of Israel. The latter sprang up, or at least were most prominent, at a later period, enticed by the consideration and influence, which the true prophets enjoyed, and courted by a degenerate people and their rulers as prophesying "smooth things."

2. The Old Testament idea of a prophet of the Lord may be gathered from the names and epithets applied to them, and by which they are characterized. These are of three sorts, viz. such as describe them (1) absolutely, (2) relatively to God, and (3) relatively to the people. The first class comprises the names נברא prophet, and האה or הוה seer, and הרדת spiritual man. Their most common designation is בָּבראּ, to whose root בכא the best authorities attribute the same radical signification with its cognate נבע to bubble out or pour forth as a spring or fountain pours forth water. Then if the noun be taken in the active sense of the root, as most Hebraists prefer, it will signify one who pours forth or utters (נבע in this sense, Ps. lxxviii. 2, cxix. 171, cxlv. 7); or if it be taken in a passive sense, it will signify one upon whom is poured i. e. the Spirit of God (בבע in this sense, Prov. i. 23); or both may may be virtually combined by adhering to the strict force of the figure of the root, one who pours forth under the influence of an inward excitation, as a spring impelled by a hidden internal force pours forth water. The proper signification of the word is particularly evident from Exod. vii. 1, where the Lord says to Moses, "See, I have made thee a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron, thy brother, shall be thy prophet." Here it plainly means one who speaks on behalf of another, or utters what is communicated to him by another. In its emphatic and technical sense it must therefore mean, one who is the mouth-piece of God to men.* It seems most probable that this is also the original import of its Greek equivalent προσήτης as employed both in the Septuagint and in the New Testament. This, it is true, is commonly explained as though $\pi\rho\dot{\phi}$ in composition meant beforehand, and πρόσχια were simply to predict; but the primary sense of $\pi \rho \dot{\rho}$ appears to be not temporal but local, and this may be retained here, as it certainly is in some other compounds, one who speaks before or in the presence of another, as his messenger and interpreter. "In this sense it is applied by classic authors to the official expounders of the oracles, and to poets as the prophets of the muses, i. e. as speaking in their name, at their suggestion, or by their inspiration." Alexander on Isaiah, p. ix.

Seer, and or min, designates not the mode of the Divine communications to him who was so called, as though he were a recipient of visions, for this was not always, perhaps not usually the case; put it implies the possession of the faculty of sight in a higher degree than belongs to ordinary men. The seer had an inspiration which enabled him to see what lay hid to others. This name, descriptive of the Divine illumination of the messengers of God, is said, 1 Sam. ix. 9, to have yielded to "prophet" in current usage, when the function of the public utterance of the will of God came to assume a new regularity and prominence.

The spiritual man הַּבְּיבֵּי , lit., man of the Spirit, used as a synonym of prophet, Hos. ix. 7, designates one who is characterized by his possession of the Spirit of God, who is controlled by this indwelling Divine agent, and acts and speaks under his influence. These names are applied to false as well as true prophets, inasmuch as the former claim to be what the latter truly are. Micah iii. 5, 7; Hosea ix. 7.

The second series of names describes the relation of the prophets to God. They are men of God אָרִשׁ אֱבֹּהֶרֶם, 1 Samuel ii. 27, servants of the Lord, נַבְּהֵר יְהוֹהָם, 2 Kings xvii. 23, the Lord's

^{*} So Virgil Æn. iii. 358, 359 uses interpres Divûm as the equivalent of vates.

messengers, מלאבר יהוה 2 Chron. xxxvi. 15, 16, since they wait upon God ready to be employed as he may require them, are engaged in doing his work, and in bearing his messages. These titles, unlike the preceding, are from their nature inapplicable to those acting in the service of false gods, or to mere pretenders to an agency on behalf of Jehovah with which they have not been entrusted. They have, however, in their generic sense a much wider extent of meaning, and are consequently not restricted in their application to the specific form of service discharged by the prophets, but may be used of those who are employed by God to do any work relating to his earthly kingdom, or even who do his bidding in his providential administration of the universe. Thus Nebuchadnezzar, Jer. xxv. 9, and the material universe, Ps. exix. 91, are called God's servants; and the angels are his messengers; this is in fact their common name in both Hebrew and Greek.

The third class of epithets describes the functions of the prophets relatively to men. They are watchmen. This is the English equivalent of different Hebrew words, which vary somewhat in their primary signification, מְצַפֶּה, בַּפָּה, Isa. xxi. 6, lii. 8, those who are set upon a lookout to descry distant objects, and שמר, Isa. lxii. 6, guardians stationed upon the walls, or going about the streets of a city, to detect and give warning of existing or impending evils. The prophets are thus set to watch for the earliest indications of the Divine will, Hab. ii. 1, or to sound the alarm to the wicked of the threatened penalty of their sins, Ez. iii. 17. They are shepherds, רֹצָה Jer. xvii. 16, appointed to protect, guide, and feed the flock of God, a designation which they share with the rulers and the priests, Jer. xxiii. 1; Zech. xi. 8. They are the people's interpreters, מַלֵּדְץ, Isa. xliii. 27, the medium of communication to explain to them the otherwise unknown or unintelligible will of God. Combining these various names we arrive again at the definition of the prophet, as one who, possessed of the Spirit of God, sees and utters what is undiscoverable by others, under a commission received from God, for the welfare and instruction of men.

3. The true idea of a prophet under the Old Testament may still further be gathered from the expressions currently em-

ployed respecting them. (1) Their Divine call and commission is declared when it is said that God raised them up, Amos ii. 11, took them from other occupations and bid them prophesy, Amos vii. 15, sent them, Jer. vii. 25, and that not barely in the general, but on special errands, 2 Kings ii. 2, 4, 6, and commanded them, Jer. xxiii. 32. (2) Their inspiration is taught by such statements as that the Spirit of God came upon them, 2 Chron. xv. 1, xxiv. 20 (lit. the Spirit of God clothed Zechariah,) fell upon them, Ezek. xi. 5, rested upon them, 2 Kings ii. 15, the pouring out of God's Spirit upon men makes them prophets, Joel ii. 28; and the powerful nature of this Divine influence appears from such language as the hand of the Lord was upon them, Ezra i. 3; fell upon them, Ezra viii. 1; was strong upon them, Ezra iii. 14; Isa. viii. 11; the spirit within them constrains them, Job xxxii. 18; they are full of power by the Spirit of the Lord, Micah iii. 8. (3) Divine communications are made to them; the Lord speaks to them, Isa. viii. 1, 5; 1 Sam. xvi. 7; answers them, Hab. ii. 1; shows them what to do, 1 Sam. xvi. 3, and what will happen, 2 Kings viii. 10; makes himself known to them in visions, and speaks to them in dreams, Numb. xii. 6; wakens their ear to hear, Isa. l. 4; reveals himself to them, 1 Sam. iii. 21; reveals things in their ears, Isa. v. 9, xxii. 14; reveals his secret to them, whatever he designs to do, Amos iii. 7; his word comes to them, Hos. i. 1; is in them, Hosea i. 2 (word of the Lord guing lit. in Hosea); they hear God's speech, Hab. iii. 2; hear hin speaking to them, Ezek. ii. 2; hear a rumour from the Lord, Ob. ver. 1; hear the word at God's mouth, Ezek. iii. 17; have understanding in the visions of God (lit. in seeing God,) 2 Chron. xxvi. 5; find visions from the Lord, Lam. ii. 9. (4) They are God's agents in making known his will; they stand before God, i. e., are in an attitude of readiness to do his pleasure, 1 Kings xvii. 1; speak in the word of the Lord, 1 Kings xiii. 2; in the Lord's message, Hag. i. 13, i. e., as commanded and sent by him; they are as the mouth of the Lord, Jer. xv. 19; he speaks by (lit. by the hand of) them, Isa. xx. 2; uses similitudes by their ministry, Hosea xii. 10; gives them a tongue to speak, Isa. l. 4; they prophesy in the name of the Lord, Jer xxvi. 20, i. e., by his authority and as his representatives, and are contrasted

with the false prophets who speak a vision of their own heart and not out of the mouth of the Lord, Jer. xxiii. 16; they declare what they have heard from the Lord of Hosts, Isa. xxi. 10; give warnings from him, Ezek. iii, 17; inquire of the Lord for others, Jer. xxi. 2; in consulting a prophet the people inquire of God, 1 Sam. ix. 9, Ezek. xiv. 7, xx. 1, 3; their utterances are the word of God, 1 Sam. ix. 27, the voice of the Lord, Jer. xxxviii. 20, the answer of God, Micah iii. 7; and are constantly prefaced or followed by such phrases as "thus saith (אמַר) the Lord," Amos i. 3, etc., saith (מאמר) the Lord, Isa. xiv. 22, the Lord hath spoken it, Isa. xxii. 25, the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it, Isaiah i. 20: what they say the Lord speaks, Isa. vii. 10; not hearkening to them the people are charged with not hearkening to God, Jer. xxv. 7, and not hearing his words, Jer. xxv. 8. In the light then of these constantly recurring expressions which grow out of and interpret for us the radical idea of an Old Testament prophet, he is a man who, raised up and commissioned of God and inspired by him, receives revelations of his will and authoritatively declares it to others. And with this agree the current representations as well as the explicit statements of the New Testament, e. g., 2 Peter i. 21. "For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

It will be perceived that the three several definitions reached by these different methods are essentially identical. A prophet is an inspired revealer of the will of God; and in so far as he belongs to the scheme of Old Testament revelation he must, as we are taught by Deut. xviii., be one from among the chosen people, and build upon the foundation which Moses has laid.

We are now prepared to estimate aright the various erroneous conceptions which have been entertained upon this subject.

1. The inspiration of the prophets was not the mere product of native genius, or of exalted holiness. It will not satisfy these repeated scriptural statements which have been recited, to regard them simply as enlightened and holy men, who were so far lifted above the mass of their contemporaries, and of mankind generally, as to discern truths which lay hid to others, and to make their views and apprehensions a standard authority for the rest of men. They had a direct Divine commission. received immediate communications from heaven, were the mouth of God speaking to men, and their words the very words of God. Their teachings are not simply an approximation to the will of God, as those of any human teacher, however excellent, must be; they are the absolute expression of that will. They deliver not what they have had the ability to discern, but what has been supernaturally imparted to them. The prophets were indeed holy men, and many of them highly gifted; for it would have been incongruous had the immediate messengers of heaven been otherwise. But their inspiration was a thing entirely distinct from their sanctification. There was no necessary connection between them, and neither had any inherent tendency to beget the other, as is shown by the case of Balaam, who, though a heathen seer, and a godless man, was inspired for a particular occasion, Numb. xxiii. 16, xxiv. 2; by the case of Saul also, and his messengers, sent to take David, who prophesied, 1 Sam. xix. 20-24; though the character of the former was such as to give rise to the proverb, "Is Saul also among the prophets?" and by the analogy of miraculous powers, which is another form of the direct supernatural agency of the Spirit of God, and may be possessed by unsanctified men, Matt. vii. 22, 23. Such, at least, is the conception which the prophets themselves had of their own inspiration, and which is perpetually presented throughout the sacred writings. This cannot be evaded without bringing against them the charge of enthusiasm, if not fanaticism, in fancying themselves to have a Divine commission, which they really did not possess. But this charge would be in the face of all the evidences of the supernatural character of the Old Testament revelation, and is contradicted by the nature of many of the prophetic disclosures of the future, and their exact fulfilment.

2. The prophets were not a power in the state, nor were their aims political and patriotic. Their acts and words are not to be viewed as having simply a political aspect, nor can they be estimated at all from this point of view. It is true, that we find them at times confronting kings and rulers, haranguing them or the people touching public affairs, opposing contem-

plated measures, and pointing out the ruin which would ensue upon their adoption. Elijah came into repeated conflict with Ahab. Elisha sent a young man of the prophets to anoint Jehu for the overthrow of his ungodly house. Hosea and Isaiah denounced the entangling and dangerous alliances with Assyria and Egypt. Jeremiah opposed the fatal policy of Zedekiah and his princes. But in all this they were acting the part not of politicians, but of religious teachers and ambassadors of God. They never sought to build up a political party; they neither possessed nor desired official power or station; they were not demagogues in a bad nor in a good sense. What they opposed was not on the ground of impolicy, but sin; what they maintained was for the sake of the honour and the law of God. It must here be borne in mind, that the government of Israel differed from that of any other people which ever existed. It was, in the true sense of the word, a theocracy. God was their king, and governed them, not indirectly merely, but by direct and constant manifestations of his will. God gave them laws. appointed their rulers, who were simply his vicegerents, while he reserved the supreme jurisdiction to himself. This gave a religious complexion to all their national affairs. The idolatry of Ahab's house was a violation of the fundamental constitution of Israel as the covenant people of God, and called for the interference of the prophets as the immediate representatives of the Most High. Alliances with the heathen, and a dependence upon them which should be reposed in the Lord alone, were crimes against God, and are dealt with as such by the prophets; and the evils which they predict as following them, were not held up as inevitable political consequences, but as the just judgment of God. And when they were consulted by rulers in difficult circumstances, and their advice solicited touching public affairs, their response is not directed by political wisdom and forecast, but by the direct revelation of the will of God.

3. The prophets were not reformers, much less antagonists to the Mosaic law. The only colour to this misrepresentation is derived from their opposition to false glosses put upon the law, and to prevailing evils whose advocates sheltered them-

selves behind perversions of its language. Just as our Lord, who came not to destroy the law but to fulfil, swept away in his discourses the accumulated pharisaical traditions without touching the substance of the law itself. When Ezekiel says, xviii. 20, that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, he does not contradict the declaration of the law, Exod. xx. 5, that God visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children. He is opposing the false interpretation put upon it by his contemporaries as though descendants suffer for the crimes of their ancestors, irrespective of their own character and conduct, whereas the law expressly says that this imputation occurs only in the case of them that hate him. Those who perpetuate from generation to generation an organized rebellion against God, justify the evil deeds of their predecessors and are rightfully answerable for their crimes. But the righteous children of ungodly parents enter into no such combination, and are not answerable in the true intent of the law, as the prophet shows by appealing to and partially quoting Deut. xxiv. 16: "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin."

Again when the prophets, as Isaiah i. 11-14, Jeremiah vi. 20, vii. 21, 22, declare the worthlessness of the ceremonial observances of the people, and assert in spite of their outward conformity to the statute that they are wholly unacceptable in the sight of God, they are not aiming at an abolition of the ritual and seeking to substitute a more spiritual form of worship. It is the profane spirit of heartless formality, joined with ungodly living, which they rebuke. Sacrifices which were acceptable when expressing true devotion and accompanying lives of obedience, became insufferable when offered as the price of lives of sin, and in a spirit at variance with all that the law required.

The prophets were divinely commissioned reformers of the people, but the law needed no correction. With a uniform voice they recall their hearers, like Isaiah viii. 20, to the law and to the testimony: and bid them, like Malachi iv. 4, remember the law of Moses which was commanded him in Horeb for

all Israel. They, throughout, base their instructions upon the law, and incorporate its language in their discourse to an extent which will astonish those who have not made this point a subject of distinct and careful study.

An opposition on the part of the prophets to the divinely revealed laws of Moses, which was fundamental to the covenant character of the people, and to their existence as the people of God, is entirely insupposable and impossible. The prophets, as has already been seen, were contemplated in the law, and one of the prime qualities of a true prophet, as there defined, is his likeness to the great lawgiver in spirit and in work. The revelation of God, conducted by Moses and the prophets, was one self-consistent, closely related scheme.

4. The prophets were not mere predicters of the future. This incorrect or partial notion has been and is much more prevalent than any of those before referred to. The Fathers* define a prophet to be one who forctells future events; and this is an idea very generally entertained upon the subject. Its error consists in mistaking a part for the whole, and a means for the end. Their disclosures of the future form so remarkable and important a part of their communications, that they have come to overshadow the rest, and the constant aim of these disclosures has been lost sight of beside their own inherent grandeur. But (1) it is observable that the foretelling of the future does not enter into the definition of a prophet, as that is furnished by the Old Testament in the various ways above exhibited. However conspicuous a place this may hold in their work, therefore, it cannot be essential to it. They were inspired to reveal the will of God, and bear his messages

^{*} Basil Comment. on Isa. ch. 8, Προφήτης μέν ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ ἀποκάρυψιν τοῦ πνεύματος προαγορείων τὸ μέκλου; a more comprehensive, but still a defective statement, is made in the preface to this commentary: 'Ορῶσι δὲ οἱ προφήται οὐ τὰ μέκλοντα μύνον, ἀκλὰ καὶ τῶν παρίντων τὰ κανθάνοντα. Chrysostom, Hom. 2, on Is οἱ Οἰδε γὰρ ἄκλο τί ποτέ ἐστι προφητεία, ἀκλὶ ἢ τῶν μεκλόντων πραγμάτων προαναφώνησιε. Synopsis Scrip. Sacr. ἄσπερ γὰρ τὰ μπθέπω γενίμενα καὶ ἀφανῆ ἔτι τυγχάνοντα, προφητείας ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, οὐτω τὰ γενίμενα μὲν, κεκρυμμένα δὲ τῷ χρονῶ, ταὕτα ἀνακακύψα καὶ εἰς μέσον ἀγαγαῖν τῆς ἰσης χάριτὸς ἐστιν. Ambrose de Benedict. Patriarch. II. 7, Prophetia enim annuntiatio futurorum est. Isidore Hispalensis, Etymolog. vii. 8, 1, Quos gentilitas vates appellat, hos nostri prophetas vocant, quasi præfatores, quia porro fantur et de futuris vera prædicant.

to men, whatever the substance of the communications made to them might be, and whether they had relation to the present, past, or future. (2) The revelations of the prophets do not in fact concern the future exclusively. Disclosures of things past or present, beyond the reach of their natural faculties, furnished an equally clear evidence of prophetic power. So when Samuel spoke to Saul of the loss and the discovery of his father's asses, 1 Sam. ix. 20; and blind old Ahijah detected the disguise of the wife of Jeroboam, 1 Kings xiv. 6; and Elisha told Gehazi where he had been, 2 Kings v. 26; or told the king of Israel words spoken in the king of Syria's bedchamber, 2 Kings vi. 12; and Ezekiel in Babylon announced the siege of Jerusalem upon the very day that it began, Ezek. xxiv. 2; and Daniel repeated to Nebuchadnezzar his dream, Dan. ii. 28, etc. Such an uncovering of secrets, however, present, past or future, as was falsely pretended to by heathen diviners, and really possessed by the Hebrew prophets, does not comprise the whole of the functions of the latter; it does not even include that which was the main and characteristic feature of their work. They were divine guides and instructors of the people. It was not to satisfy the curiosity, promote the material interests, or excite the wonder of men that they brought to light what was unknown, but to further moral and religious aims. When they gave responses about inferior matters, it was for the sake of higher ends to be answered by so doing, or to give proof of their possession of the spirit of prophecy. Their great function was to maintain in its integrity the covenant relation of the people to God, and to conduct them towards the end for which that relation was established, the coming of Christ, and his great salvation. Accordingly, their writings are chiefly occupied with the duties which the people owe to God, and the ultimate blessing which it was his design to bring upon them, and upon the world by means of them. The prospective nature of their work, as of the dispensation to which they belonged, gave prominence naturally to the predictive element in their discourses. But all that their inspiration taught them of the future was blended with lessons drawn from the present and the past, and brought to bear upon the religious training of the people.* (3) To regard the prophecies simply in the light of predictions designed to authenticate the Divine commission of those who uttered them, by affording evidence of supernatural foresight, would be to exalt a subordinate and incidental at the expense of the direct and principal end. Many of them would thus lose their meaning and value for the prophets' contemporaries, inasmuch as the evidence was not complete until after their fulfilment; others would be of doubtful weight, in consequence of their obscure and enigmatical character; and this aim would be frustrated entirely in the case of others still, by the failure of God's providence to preserve any authentic record of the events.

It will serve to define still more precisely the idea of the Old Testament prophets, if we consider them not only absolutely and by themselves, but relatively to their position both in the theocracy and in the general scheme of Divine revelation. We shall thus have to inquire how they stand related, in the first place, to other contemporaneous sacred orders, and, secondly, to antecedent and subsequent forms of Divine communication.

The priests, like the prophets, were by virtue of their office mediators, acting between God and men. But the priests acted on men's behalf before God, while the prophets were employed on God's behalf with men. And from this radical diversity spring their several peculiarities of functions and character. The priests became such by hereditary descent from a particular tribe and family selected as representatives of the rest; they constituted an organized body with gradations of rank, carrying the representative principle to its highest extent in the high priest, the head of their order; and they were supported by a legal income from those on whose behalf they acted. The prophets were without regular succession, organization or stipend; they were called to their office by the immediate agency of the Spirit of God, who selected them by no other rule than his sovereign pleasure. They might accordingly be taken from any tribe, and any part of the land, even Galilee, as appears

^{*} The word prophesy is in the New Testament used in the triple sense of predicting the future, John xi. 51, revealing what had already occurred but was unknown, Matt. xxvi. 68, and inspired discourse irrespective of its relation to time, Luke i. 67.

from the case of Nahum and Jonah, notwithstanding the taunt of the Pharisees (John vii. 52,) from any rank and from either sex. Miriam (Exod. xv. 20,) Deborah (Judg. iv. 4) and Huldah, (2 Chron. xxxiv. 22,) were prophetesses. Comp. in the New Testament, Anna (Luke ii. 36) and the daughters of Philip, Acts xxi. 9. Descent from a prophet, while it was not essential, was, however, no disqualification, as appears from the case of Azariah, the son of Oded, the prophet, 2 Chron. xv. 1, 8, and Jehu, the son of Hanani, the seer. 2 Chron. xvi. 7, xix. 2. The main function of the prophets was to declare to the people the will of God; that of the priests, to obtain for the people the remission of their sins. And yet through their common mediatorial character it came to pass that each exercised to a certain extent both functions. It was, in a subsidiary sense, the province of the priest to teach the people the law (Mal. ii. 7,) and to declare the will of God in doubtful cases (Deut. xvii. 8, 12;) and it would appear from John xi. 51, that the gift of prophecy was a permanent prerogative of the high priest's office. It was also a subsidiary province of the prophet, in virtue of that familiar access to God with which he was favoured, to intercede with him on behalf of others (Gen. xx. 7; 1 Sam. vii. 5, 6; Isa. xxxvii. 4; Jer. vii. 16;) only they did this by the free offering of prayer, and the priests by the regularly prescribed symbolical ritual.

The judges were like the prophets the immediate representatives of God: and hence they too were called by the direct agency of the Spirit and were limited to no tribe, family, rank or occupation, and to neither sex. Judges vi. 4. The functions with which they were invested, however, were executive and administrative. They were extraordinary leaders or magistrates, possessed of unlimited powers, raised up in cases of special need for the deliverance and the defence or for the government of the people. They may be called divinely appointed dictators. The prophets on the other hand were teachers and expositors of the will of God, and for the most part exercised none of the powers

or functions of the magistracy.

But while the prophets thus stood side by side with other divinely constituted classes of men in the theocracy, both ordinary and extraordinary, and had their own proper work distinct from the rest, their office might be so extended as to comprehend all others. Inasmuch as they were the immediate representatives of God, their powers were limited only by their particular commission received from Him. The position which they occupied before the people implicitly involved from its very nature the right to perform any function or exercise any authority which the occasion might demand. Whenever the emergency required it, prophets might therefore act as priests and judges. This was the case, for example, in the degeneracy of all orders which marked the days of Samuel, and in the separation of the ten tribes from the true sanctuary and their open heathenism during the ministries of Elijah and Elisha. The ordinary officers of the theocracy, the priesthood and the magistracy, abdicated their trust or were virtually suspended from its legitimate exercise, and the prophets assumed their functions by right of the extraordinary powers with which they were clothed. Sacrifices were offered by Samuel, 1 Sam. vii. 9, 17, x. 8, xiii. 8, etc., and by Elijah, 1 Kings xviii. 30, etc.; the first fruits were brought to Elisha, 2 Kings iv. 42, comp. Deut. xviii. 4; and he was resorted to on Sabbaths and new moons, 2 Kings iv. 23. Samuel took the supreme direction of the affairs of the commonwealth, acted as judge, 1 Sam. vii. 15; anointed Saul and made him king, 1 Sam. x. 1, etc; then deposed him, 1 Sam. xv. 28; and anointed David, 1 Sam. xvi. 13. Abijah gave Jeroboam authority to become the ruler of the ten tribes, 1 Kings xi. 29, etc. Direction was given to Elijah, 1 Kings xix. 15, 16, to anoint Hazael to be king over Syria, and Jehu to be king over Israel. This was subsequently performed by Elisha, 2 Kings viii. 13, ix. 1, etc.; thus not only deposing and setting up rulers of the theocracy, but of heathen states likewise, as ambassadors of that God who is the supreme Governor of the whole world.

It only remains to consider the position occupied by the prophets among the methods of Divine communication. There is a growing fulness and nearness in the modes by which God reveals himself to men, just as there is in the extent to which his successive revelations are made, and in the contents of those revelations. The first method employed was the theophany, which is characteristic of the patriarchal period. God then personally and directly made known his will to such as he

designed to have informed of it. He spake by audible voice from heaven, as to Abraham at the offering up of Isaac; he spake in dreams, as to Jacob, Abimelech and Laban; or face to face in human form, as to Abraham under the oaks of Mamre. When the flood was to be sent on a guilty world, or a storm of destruction to overwhelm the cities of the plain, no human messenger was sent as God's herald, commissioned in his name to announce them, and to take a visible part in their production. God declared and sent them himself without the

employment of any human agency.

When the seed of the patriarchs had swelled into a nation, and the will of God was no longer to be made known to individuals merely, but to a numerous people, a new mode of Divine revelation was needed and was afforded, viz., through the medium of prophets. The Spirit of God descended upon particular individuals, and made them the depositaries of Divine power and knowledge for the benefit of others. God no longer stood aloof and out of connection with men, so to speak, except as he appeared to them in the occasional visits of the preceding period. Divine virtue is now made resident in men; God no longer acts directly by himself; but if miracles are to be wrought or revelations made, it is through the instrumentality of these his accredited agents and messengers. In the language of Amos iii. 7: "The Lord God will do nothing, but he revealeth his secret unto his servants the prophets." In the solemn transactions of Sinai, when the fundamental covenant was to be ratified between himself and Israel, God spake once, more by his own voice from heaven in the audience of all the people. But all his farther communications with them were made through Moses, and through prophets raised up like unto him. And so with the mighty works; the plagues of Egypt were sent and removed at the bidding of Moses, the Red Sea was divided at the lifting of his rod, at his word manna was sent and water given from the rock. The drought in the time of Ahab came and went at the word of Elijah. The host of Sennacherib was destroyed, but not until Isaiah had first foretold it.

This second or prophetic stage of revelation, while it is an advance upon the theophany, is not, however, the ultimate

and highest form of Divine communication. 1 Cor. xiii. 8-10. Like the economy of which it formed a part, it was preparatory to and emblematic of the future. All the gifts and offices of the theocracy were, as respects their outward form, temporary, but in their essence they were types and pledges of better things to come. The ideas, which they embodied, were destined to have a more complete realization, and that in a two-fold form, the one individual, the other universal.

The prophetic idea found its consummation in the first place in Christ. He is the Prophet of God in the highest sense. Deut. xviii. 18; Isa. xlii. 1, etc., xlix. 1, etc., lxi. 1. etc. In him God reveals himself to men by becoming himself a man and dwelling amongst us. He now acts no longer remotely in heaven, nor merely selects ordinary men as the depositaries of heavenly gifts, to be through them dispensed to others, but comes himself in human nature, as a man amongst men, with all the plenitude of his infinite power, wisdom, and grace, to instruct and bless mankind. The infinite distance, which in the patriarchal period appeared in all its awfulness, and in the Mosaic dispensation was but partially closed up, is thus completely bridged; the ladder of Jacob is realized. The prophets were thus prognostic or typical of Him, who was to succeed them, and who would do perfectly that of which they might suggest the idea, and awaken the expectation, but which they could not adequately accomplish.

Again, the idea embodied in the prophets was destined to an universal realization in the entire body of the people of God. The prophetic office was not the inherent and original prerogative of those invested with it, to the exclusion of others, nor was it given to them, or exercised by them, for their own sakes. The prophets were taken from amongst their brethren; they belonged to the people; they possessed no inherent superiority over them. The office was established for the good of the people at large, though for the advantage of the whole its exercise was temporarily confined to a few. The Spirit belonged not to the prophets alone, but to all Israel. And when Moses devoutly wished, Numb. xi. 29, that all the Lord's people were prophets, and that the Lord would put his Spirit upon them, his wish was directed to a result of which he already

beheld the type and the pledge; and its fulfilment is the second form in which the idea of the prophets reaches its final consummation. The ultimate form of Divine communication is, when God not merely speaks to individuals, as in the case of the patriarchs, nor to his people through the medium of a few, whom his Spirit has made his organs to the rest, but when he shall come and abide as a teacher, no less than a sanctifier, in all of a regenerated world. Joel, ii. 28, predicts the day when God's Spirit shall be poured out upon all flesh, and sons and daughters, old men and young men, servants and handmaids, shall alike prophesy. And Jeremiah, xxxi. 34, declares that the time is coming when they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord; for they shall all know him from the least of them unto the greatest of them. Then the necessity of all prophetic instruction shall be superseded, and the prophetic order itself be swallowed up in the indwelling of the Spirit in all believers.

Several causes have conspired of late to fix attention on the Presbyterian church in Ireland. The great awakening of the present year, though not confined to that communion, seems to have originated in it, and to be still instrumentally promoted chiefly by the labours of its ministers and members. But

ART. IV.—1. History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland.
By James Seaton Reid, D.D., M. R. I. A., Professor of
Ecclesiastical and Civil History in the University of Glasgow. Continued to the present time by W.D. Killen, D.D.,
Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Pastoral Theology
for the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in
Ireland. London, 1853. 3 vols. 8vo.

^{2.} Historical Sketch of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. By Rev. Thomas Witherow, Maghera. Belfast, 1858. pp. 48. 12mo.

^{3.} Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, held at Dublin, 1859. Belfast, 8vo.

before the outbreak of this memorable movement, a new interest in that church had been here awakened by the casual visit of two eminent ministers a year ago, on their way home from the British Provinces, to which they had been commissioned by the Irish Assembly. The sympathy excited by their presence and addresses before several of our Synods, and in large promiscuous assemblies elsewhere, has not yet subsided, when we learn that another deputation, sent directly to this country, has already landed on our shores. Although Dr. Edgar and his colleagues would be sure of a cordial welcome to America in any case, it may add to the interest of their visit, in the minds of many readers, if we take a brief survey of the vicissitudes through which our mother church has passed. For such a statement an appropriate occasion is afforded by the circumstances just referred to, and abundant materials by the publications named at the beginning of this article. The first of these works was originally published in two volumes, five and twenty years ago, and was reviewed in this journal for the month of April 1844, by the late Dr. Archibald Alexander, who remarks in the beginning of that paper, that the immediate mother of our own church was not the church of Scotland, but the Synod of Ulster. This historical fact, together with a certain family likeness flowing from it, may afford another and a stronger reason for regarding that branch of the Presbyterian body with peculiar sympathy and friendly interest. Dr. Reid, the author of this history, began it, we believe, when pastor of the church at Carrickfergus, and continued it, in still more favourable circumstances, as Professor of Church History at Belfast, from which position he was afterwards removed by a government appointment to be Regius Professor of History at Glasgow, a situation which he still held at the time of his death in 1851. His papers passed into the hands of his successor at Belfast, by whom the additional volume has been brought down to the period of the Union in 1840, and edited together with a new impression of the previous volumes, which had long been out of print. A little more than half of the third volume is the work of the original author, his successor taking up the pen in the middle of the word "ministerial," on page 272. The former part is printed, without any change

whatever, from the autograph of Dr. Reid himself; and probably no manuscript was ever left in better preparation for the press. We can readily believe what is said of his orderly and punctual habits, especially as Clerk of the Synod while still resident in Ireland, from the scholarlike finish of the work before us, which in structure, style, and even in some minor points of order and arrangement, is a model of precision and completeness. This literary value of the work not only reflects credit on the author and his church, but will undoubtedly exert a highly salutary influence upon the taste and studies of a vounger generation, by setting the example of laborious research, minute exactness, and elaborate working up, without a tinge of affectation or ambitious effort, or the least approach to that declamatory tone, which vitiates the form, if not the substance, of some kindred works, in other respects highly meritorious. In mentioning laborious research as one great merit of this writer, we refer not merely to the compilation of derivative or second-hand materials, however skilfully performed, but to the discovery and exhibition of unpublished facts from manuscript authorities, which constitute a large part of the matter, more particularly in the first two volumes. There was less occasion for this kind of labour in the third, and none at all in Dr. Killen's part of it, which, however, though on this account less learned and laborious, is in all respects worthy of what goes before it, and entirely homogeneous with it, the only difference perceptible consisting in a slight superiority in point of ornate diction, and a slight excess in warmth and strength of language, which could hardly be avoided in the record of events so recent, and so interesting to the writer's feelings.

We desire it to be clearly understood that the favourable judgment which we have just passed upon this history, is not founded on a hasty and perfunctory inspection, such as an uncharitable public often charges, either truly or falsely, on professional reviewers, but results from a deliberate and thorough study of the work in its connection and in all its parts, including texts, notes, and appendices. Another result of the same process is a feeling of regret, that a production so intrinsically valuable, and so full of interest to American as

well as Irish Presbyterians, should be placed, by its necessary bulk, and the minuteness which is one of its chief merits. entirely beyond the possibility or hope of an extensive circulation in this country, even if reprinted in a cheaper form. While, therefore, we should not desire to see it in the least reduced as an original and standard work, we do think that a readable abridgment, in a single duodecimo or thin octavo. would command a ready and continued sale among us, and contribute to preserve the memory of our Irish mother in the hearts, not only of her Irish children, but of her American descendants. In the meantime, public curiosity may at least be whetted by the circulation in this country of an admirable sketch by Mr. Witherow of Maghera, the materials of which are chiefly drawn from Drs. Reid and Killen, but selected, put together, and expressed, with a clearness and vivacity, not often found in mere abridgments or in condensations of so much matter in so small a compass. This interesting tract is one of a series on the form and order of the Christian church, by ministers of the Presbyterian church in Ireland. The only other specimen which we have read is a striking summary of "Presbyterian Privilege and Duty," by the Rev. Dr. Edgar, Professor at Belfast, and one of the three deputies now visiting this country. But we have before us also tracts on the Church of Christ, by the Rev. W. B. Kirkpatrick, D. D.; on the leading doctrines of the Presbyterian church, by the Rev. John Barnett, D. D.; on the Teaching Elder, by the Rev. William McClure; on the Ruling Elder, by the Rev. John Macnaughtan; on the Presbytery, by the Rev. J. G. Murphy, LL.D.; on Ordination, by the Rev. J. F. Porter; on the Sacraments, by the Rev. James Morgan, D. D.; and on Public Worship, by the Rev. John Moran. In addition to these, we see announced, as parts of the same series, a tract on the Advantages of Presbyterian Government, by the Rev. Richard Dill, and another on the Statistics of the Presbyterian Church throughout the world, by the Rev. William Gibson, Professor at Belfast, and Moderator of the last General Assembly. This gentleman, with Mr. McClure previously mentioned, has some particular connection, we believe, with the continental and colonial missions of the church, in consequence of which they

were last year commissioned to the Provinces, and thus enabled to visit the United States en passant. One other, if no more, of the authors just enumerated, has been seen among us, the Rev. John Macnaughtan, formerly of Paisley, now of Rosemary street church, Belfast, whose eloquent ministrations are still well remembered in New York, where he preached once, during a short visit to the city, for the late Dr. Alexander, and perhaps in other pulpits also. Before we leave the subject of the Irish Presbyterian tracts, we venture to suggest that if, as we have no doubt, those which we have read are fair samples of the whole, they well deserve a circulation in this country, either by the Board of Publication, or by being republished in the ordinary manner, or by simple importation of the original edition, sold in Ireland for a penny, excepting Mr. Witherow's tract, which, though uniformly printed (in a very handsome style,) is larger than the rest, and sells for threepence. Of this sketch, and the larger work from which its matter is derived, as well as of the minutes of Assembly, we shall now avail ourselves, without formal reference or quotation, in a few remarks upon the origin and progress of the Irish Presbyterian church. We shall not attempt anything approaching to a full chronological detail, nor even a direct continuation of the abstract given in our former notice of the larger work, but simply such an exhibition of the prominent features in the history, as may serve to give our readers some correct idea of its countenance or physiognomy, and far from satisfying their desire of information on the subject, may rather lead them to seek more, either in Mr. Witherow's masterly epitome, or in the ample stores of Doctors Reid and Killen.

Before proceeding further, we may add, however, that while the larger work before us is simply divided into chapters, (thirty-one in all) with accompanying dates and copious tables of contents, the smaller tract is made up of twelve paragraphs or sections, with descriptive titles, which considerably aid the memory in retaining the chronological specifications also added. As the best way of presenting the whole subject in its outlines to those previously unacquainted with it, we subjoin these titles, and shall afterwards comment upon them.

I. The Plantation (1603-1630.)

II. The Black Oath (1631-1640.)

III. Sir Phelim O'Neill (1641-1642.)

IV. The Confession and the Covenant (1643-1648.)

V. The Commonwealth (1649-1660.)

VI. The Restoration (1661–1684.)

VII. The Revolution (1685-1690.)

VIII. Struggles for Toleration (1691-1704.)

IX. The Test Act (1705-1719.)

X. The Non-subscribers (1720-1726.)

XI. The Seceders (1727-1769.)

XII. The Volunteers (1770-1800.)

XIII. The New Light (1801-1830.)

XIV. The Union (1831–1840.)

XV. Since the Union (1841-1857.)

XVI. Present Circumstances (1858.)

These divisions, it will be observed, are not arranged upon the principle of equal chronological dimensions, since in this respect, they vary from a single year to more than half a century, but rather upon that of choosing salient points or critical conjunctures, around which may then be grouped the incidents of the adjacent period, whether few or many. As we have not room for the entire tract, which we would gladly copy in extenso, we propose to give a brief explanation of the titles and divisions just recited. This will necessarily involve at least a slight and rapid presentation of the points and features, which determine the expression or the character of each successive period.

By the "Plantation," our historians mean the settlement of Ulster, in the reign of James the First, with colonists from England, and especially from Scotland, on the confiscated lands of those who had been outlawed in the great rebellion under Queen Elizabeth. The civil or secular effect of this great movement, was the gradual conversion of a terrible and wide-spread desolation into a scene of plenty and prosperity. The religious effect was an anomalous one, namely, the introduction of devoted Scottish ministers, not only into Ulster, but into the church of Ireland, by law established, without any dereliction of the strictest Presbyterian principles and practice. Their submission to re-ordination is only an apparent exception, having been attended by a formal disclaimer of what-

ever is offensive in that way, on the part, not only of the candidates, but also of the bishop. This strange admission of unbending Presbyterians into an episcopal establishment, with Presbyterian discipline, and even organization, as a sort of imperium in imperio, is perfectly unique in history, and could only have been practicable under the moderate and even lax administration of Archbishop Usher. It was overruled, however, as the providential means of introducing into Ulster such men as Blair, Brice, Hamilton, Livingston, and Welsh, under whose devoted labours, aided by the monthly meetings at Antrim, unless these were rather an effect than an occasion or a cause, began the first great awakening or revival, which adorns the annals of this highly favoured church, and which began before the close of the first quarter of the seventeenth century.

We have thus far spoken of a Presbyterian church in Ireland only by prolepsis; for the instruments and agents in this great awakening were, as we have seen, Presbyterian members of an Episcopal establishment, allowed to partake of its advantages, and wield its influence for a time, but liable at any moment to be silenced or ousted by a change of counsels. Such a change began with Laud's ascendency in England, and that of his co-adjutor, Wentworth, (afterwards Earl of Strafford) in Ireland, with accompanying changes in the policy and spirit of the Irish bishops, leading to the deposition of the Presbyterian ministers, and culminating in the "Black Oath," by which Wentworth forced the laity to promise unconditional submission to the king's commands.

The second beginning of a Presbyterian church in Ireland was scarcely less extraordinary than the first, the Episcopal organization in the one case being followed by a military one in the other. The detection of the Popish Plot, headed by Phelim O'Neill in 1641, led to the occupation of Ulster by a number of regiments from Scotland, then rejoicing in its second Reformation. Each of these regiments became a Presbyterian church, with its chaplain for a pastor, and regular kirk-session of godly officers, and forming in conjunction the first Irish Presbytery, that of Bangor (June 10, 1642,) by which Down and Antrim were soon organized and furnished with relays of

preachers from the church of Scotland. Such effects of military occupation and invasion look like a realization of Samson's proverb: "Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness."

The hardy exotic thus replanted, both by physical and moral force, in Ireland, went on gaining strength through all the troubles of King Charles's reign, ending with his execution (1649,) until the Presbyterian ascendency in Ulster was checked by the rise of Independency in England. In the meantime, the standards of the Westminster Assembly, together with the Solemn League and Covenant between England and Scotland,

had been formally extended to the sister kingdom.

During the first year of the English Commonwealth, the Irish Presbyterians, as determined Royalists, and equally opposed to the Papists and the Sectaries (or Independents,) were in every way discountenanced by government, and sometimes so severely treated that the greater number left the country, and the rest were in concealment. On the rise of Cromwell to supreme power, they were encouraged to return or reappear, and their ministers assisted by the State, but only in conjunction with the Baptists, Independents, and Episcopalians. In 1654 the Presbytery was divided into three, and three years later into five, a sufficient indication of returning strength under the wise and liberal government of Henry Cromwell, prematurely interrupted by the death of his father, and soon followed by the restoration of Charles II., in which the Presbyterians of the three kingdoms took an active part (1660.)

During the first part of this reign, the Irish Presbyterian church experienced another occultation or eclipse, only one-tenth of its ministers conforming to the state-church, and no less than thirty-six being ejected by Jeremy Taylor in a single day. But in spite of the prelates who opposed all toleration, this rigour was relaxed toward the middle of the reign, the imprisoned nonconformists were released, and a royal grant of six hundred pounds was paid for several years, as an unsolicited expression of the king's thanks for their former sufferings in his cause. With the usual recuperative power of the system, it began again to flourish, but was once more checked by a suspi-

cion of sympathy with Scotland, leading to oppression so intolerable, that a whole Presbytery (that of Lagan) formed the purpose of removing to America; and although this design was not accomplished, it is a fact to be remembered, that from this very Presbytery went forth about this time the very man who was to be the founder of our own beloved and now highly favoured church.*

The main facts in the history of the English Revolution, as connected with the progress of the church in Ireland, are King James's measures on his first accession, for excluding Protestants from public office; his subsequent deeper policy of general toleration, with its natural effect upon the spiritual freedom of the Presbyterians; their prompt and hearty acquiescence in the national appeal to the Prince of Orange; the famous siege of Derry, one of the most noted in all history; the landing of the Duke of Schomberg and the promise of protection from King William; his actual arrival and the first Regium Donum

* "From the minutes of the Lagan Presbytery, I find a Captain Archibald Johnston applying to them, in August 1678, to assist him in procuring a minister for Barbadoes; and, in December 1680, a 'Colonel Stevens from Maryland, beside Virginia,' wrote to the same presbytery for a minister to settle in that colony. It appears that, not long after, the Rev. Francis Mackeny or Mackamie, who had been licensed by them in 1681, was ordained on this call of Colonel Stevens; but, as their minutes are deficient at this period during several years, for the reason mentioned in a previous note, the precise date of his ordination and removal to America cannot be ascertained. Mr. Mackamie was from the neighbourhood of Ramelton in Donegal, and was first introduced to the presbytery in January 1680, by his minister, the Rev. T. Drummond. He settled in Accomac county, on the eastern shore of Virginia, where he died in 1708. He was the first Presbyterian minister who settled in North America, and with a few other brethren from Ulster, constituted the first regular presbytery that was organized in the New World. It is an interesting circumstance in the history of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, that it was the parent stock of the American Presbyterian Church, which now comprises nearly three thousand congregations." Reid, ii. 329. In a note upon this note the author adds, "I find Mr. Francis McKemy preaching for Mr. Hempton in Burt, April 2, 1682, from Luke xiii. 3, forenoon and afternoon. In the year 1675, he was enrolled as student in the University of Glasgow, as 'Franciscus MaKemius, Scoto-Hybernus." These two facts, and the two italicized in the preceding extract, are additional to any biographical account which we remember to have seen before. We regret, not only that the information still remains so scanty, but that our worthy founder's name assumes almost as many forms as those of Mani and Mahomet.

of twelve hundred pounds per annum to the ministers of Ulster; the decisive battle of the Boyne between the two kings, and the permanent establishment of William's power (July 1, 1690.)

But instead of the unchecked and undisturbed prosperity which might have been expected from this signal revolution, we find the Irish Presbyterians, for more than twenty years, involved in a series of "struggles for toleration," giving name to the next period of their history. The secret of this singular anomaly is furnished by the fact, that while they had the favour of the government, the letter of the law continued to proscribe their worship, and thus left them at the mercy of the bishops and clergy, who, provoked by the increase of this dissenting body to a general Synod (1691,) and excited by a controversy between two champions upon either side, not only defeated all attempts to change the law, but began a course of petty persecution by enforcing its most obsolete provisions, and finally succeeded in enacting a Sacramental Test (1704,) which had been hitherto unknown in Ireland; but all without effect upon the fixed predilections of the Ulster people. oppression continued unabated for the space of fourteen years, during which the efforts of successive Lords Lieutenant (Pembroke, Wharton, and Shrewsbury) to put an end to it, were constantly defeated by the opposition of the High Church party, kept alive by the excitement of another paper war, in which the two sides of the question were defended, among others, by the author of Robinson Crusoe and the author of Gulliver's Travels! Encouraged by the accession of the Tories to power, (1711,) the clergy began to represent the dissenters as positively hurtful to the church-establishment, in consequence of which the Regium Donum was withdrawn, Presbyterian marriages were called in question as unlawful, and a whole Presbytery on one occasion was arrested for assembling to organize a church.

A change for the better was occasioned by the death of Queen Anne and the accession of George the First (1714,) who immediately restored the Regium Donum and promised other measures of relief, which were hastened by the conduct of the

Presbyterians in the rebellion of 1715, when they served in the army in defiance of the Test Act, and were afterwards indemnified by yearly acts of parliament, until the Test Act was itself repealed sixty years later; during all which time dissenters were excluded by it from the public service, though their worship received legal toleration as early as 1719. But, as if to show its native vigour and vitality, the church grew under all these disadvantages, so that in 1717 it consisted of eleven Presbyteries, and began a mission to the native Irish.

Thus far the troubles of the church had been ab extra, and soon after the beginning of the eighteenth century the doctrinal soundness of the body had been proved by the prompt condemnation of a preacher who avowed himself an Arian. within a few years, a latitudinarian tendency began to show itself, promoted by the Belfast Society for mutual improvement, and its leader, Abernethy, whose discourse on Personal Persuasion as the basis of Religious Obedience (1719) opened a controversy on the binding force of creeds and confessions, which agitated seven successive Synods, and produced no less than fifty books and pamphlets which have never been reprinted. The practical question of subscription to the Westminster Confession was decided by a large majority against the latitudinarians, who were now called Non-subscribers, and after several vain efforts at conciliation, were first put into a Presbytery by themselves (1725,) and the next year withdrew and formed a new denomination, still existing as the "Non-subscribing Presbytery of Antrim."

This purgation of the body, being only partial, was followed not by a revival but an obvious declension, an increase of doctrinal laxity, and a loss of spiritual life. The ruinous effects of this defection were prevented by what seemed to be a very severe remedy, the introduction into Ulster of a rival body, the Seceders, or Associate Presbyterians from Scotland, who began to operate in 1742, and even after the Burgher schism, five years later, still continued organizing churches, Presbyteries, and ultimately Synods, in the North of Ireland. This is now regarded by the Irish Presbyterians as the providential means by which a pure religion was preserved amidst a general

defection, so that though their fathers counted it a sore affliction, they can now "thank God for the Secession."*

The next phase of the history is again a military one, but very different from that connected with the second introduction of Presbytery into Ireland. The extensive and formidable organization of the Irish Volunteers, which began in 1778, and lasted fifteen years, was occasioned by the dread of insurrection during our Revolutionary war, and continued by the threatened French invasion, but became a species of political association, under whose dictation the independence of the Irish Parliament was granted, Presbyterian marriages were legalized between Presbyterian parties, and the Seceders were allowed to swear with the uplifted hand. But the moral effects of the political and military mania were seen in the frequent desecration of the Sabbath and the church by public meetings, some of which expressed their sympathy with French revolutionary principles and movements; and at length the popular excitement reached maturity in the famous insurrection of the "United Irishmen," (1798.) In this rebellion all denominations were concerned; but the historians before us represent the leaders as connected with the Established Church and the University of Dublin, although both those bodies, as well as the Synod of Ulster, and the other Presbyterian sects, denounced the project as insane and ruinous. No seceding minister is known to have taken any active part in the rebellion; but some of the Non-subscribers, of the Covenanters, and of the General Synod, were more or less implicated. At the annual meeting of 1799 it was found that one minister had suffered death, two were still in prison, and three had been obliged to leave the country. +

^{*} The Covenanters, or Reformed Presbyterians, made their first appearance in Ulster a few years after the Seceders, i. e., just before the middle of the century.

^{† &}quot;The Rev. William Gibson escaped arrest, and fled to America. Messrs. Black and Wylie, two young men who had now completed their education for the ministry of the Covenanting church, found it necessary to remove to America. Dr. Wylie died in the autumn of 1852, in the eightieth year of his age, and fifty-third of his ministry. At the time of his death, he was pastor of the First Reformed Presbyterian church, Philadelphia, and Professor emeritus of ancient languages in the University of Pennsylvania." Reid, iii. 424. "The Rev. James Porter, of Grey Abbey, was condemned by the sentence of a

In the meantime an addition had been made to the Regium Donum, first of eight hundred pounds (1718,) and then of a thousand, with a similar but smaller grant to the Seceders (1783.) On the union of the kingdoms (1801) a much larger annual addition, of above eight thousand pounds, was offered, in connection with a scheme of classified instead of equal distribution, which was reluctantly accepted by the Synod of Ulster, and a few years later by the two Seceding bodies (1809.) These financial measures led to the increase of the Covenanters, or Reformed Presbyterians, but also to the fusion of the Burghers and the Antiburghers as the "Presbyterian Synod of Ireland, distinguished by the name Seceders," and numbering at that time (1818) not quite a hundred ministers.

But while the rival bodies were thus gaining strength, the Synod of Ulster began to show symptoms of revival, in the increase of sound ministers; participation in the great missionary movements of the day; and improvement in the means of theological instruction, by appointing a Professor of Divinity in connection with the new Belfast Academy, a step which the Seceders had already taken; a decrease of ministerial communion with the non-subscribing Presbytery of Antrim; and a growing distrust of the kindred party in the church itself, which in the course of a hundred years had now become avowedly Arian. After several preliminary conflicts, and a public declaration by the Rev. Henry Cooke, that the Synod contained thirty-five Arians, its Clerk included, the crisis was at length brought about by a proposal of the same distinguished person,

court-martial held at Newtownards, and executed in his own meeting-house green, on the 2d of July, 1798. He possessed considerable ability as a writer, particularly as a wit and a satirist. The Hon. Alexander Porter, who died at Oaklawn, in the State of Louisiana, in 1844, and who was then the only Irishman in the Senate of the United States, was the son of this minister. Another of his sons was Attorney General for the State of Louisiana." Reid, iii. 428. "The Rev. James Simpson of Newtownards, the Rev. John Glendy of Maghera, and the Rev. Thomas Ledlie Birch of Saintfield, were permitted to emigrate to America." Of the gentlemen here named, Mr. Birch appeared before our General Assembly several successive years as an appellant from the judgment of one or more Presbyteries, which had refused to receive him as a foreign minister. Dr. Glendy was settled for some time in Augusta county, Virginia, and afterwards for many years as pastor of the second Presbyterian church in Baltimore.

(1827) that the members of the Synod should publicly profess their faith in the divinity of Christ, which was by a vote of nearly one hundred and sixty ministers to a little more than twenty, only six of whom, however, openly avowed their unbelief. After two divided and agitated Synods, in which Messrs. Cooke and Montgomery were recognized as leaders of the several parties, the Arians finally withdrew (1829) to the number of seventeen ministers, precisely the same number that had gone out as non-subscribers a little more than a century before (1726.) The new secession afterwards organized themselves as the "Remonstrant Synod of Ulster."

This happy expurgation was immediately followed by a new and healthful impetus in all directions; church extension, home and foreign missions, temperance, and education, general and theological. This last was promoted by the institution of two new chairs at Belfast, the biblical, first occupied by Samuel Davidson, and the historical, by James Seaton Reid, the author of the standard work before us. The requisition of unqualified subscription to the standards (1835,) and a new arrangement of the Regium Donum satisfactory to all concerned (1838,) removed the only obstacle remaining to the union of the Ulster and Secession Synods, one containing two hundred and ninety-two, the other one hundred and forty-one churches, which were at length happily united under the common designation of the "General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland," (July 10th, 1840.*)

The first twelve years after the Union were distinguished by important movements, both belligerent and peaceful. An adverse decision in the House of Lords, respecting Presbyterian marriages, led to a long-continued agitation and discussion, which resulted in an Act of Parliament recognizing the validity of all such marriages when either party is a Presbyterian (1835.) An internal controversy as to education, after several years' continuance, ended in the institution of two Presbyterian Colleges, one at Derry for general as well as theological instruction, founded on a princely testamentary endowment,

^{*} Both bodies, we believe, retain their corporate existence for the management of trust-funds previously committed to them.

and the other at Belfast for theology alone, the other branches of instruction being furnished by the new Qucen's College, at that place, and the government supporting both the faculties. But even while these controversies were in progress, their unfortunate effects were in a great measure neutralized and counteracted by the spiritual and organic growth of the whole body. as evinced by its devotion to the work of missions, its aggressive movements in all suitable directions, and the systematic organization of these movements on a somewhat novel and peculiar plan, but one which seems to be fully justified by its results. A Board elected by the Presbyteries has a general supervision of the schemes or enterprises of the church; but over each great field of operation is a single minister, who makes that field his province and his study, and is looked to for information and for counsel with respect to its affairs. Thus Dr. Morgan has charge of the Foreign Mission, Mr. Hamilton of the Jewish, Mr. McClure of the Colonial, Dr. Edgar of the Home Department, and especially the Romish Mission, in behalf of which he is now visiting this country.

The last six years are described by Mr. Witherow as years of undisturbed peace, and of steady growth, distinguished by the energetic working of the old schemes, and the starting of some new ones, such as that for building manses, and another for increasing the salaries of ill-paid ministers; increased attention to the state of practical religion, the observance of the Sabbath, the reformation of manners, and the education of the people. With a pardonable pride, if we may use the term in this connection, the historian looks back, through the vista of two hundred and fifty years, to the time of the Plantation, and the military organization, and contrasts those weak beginnings, not only with the intervening lapses and recoveries, but with the present spectacle of one united Presbyterian body, made up of five Synods, six and thirty Presbyteries, and above five hundred churches, with an average income of one hundred and seventeen pounds to every minister, besides its representatives in many a home and foreign field of labour. "Never, at any period of the past, has the Presbyterian church of Ireland been more united in doctrine, more efficient in her ministrations, or more prosperous, socially and spiritually, than at present;

ready to enter on, and, with God's blessing, to carry to a successful issue any great and good work that lies fairly in her way. And even yet she scarcely knows her own strength." A striking comment on these last words is afforded by the great awakening which has taken place since they were written, and in which the voice of God still says to his people in that suffering yet highly favoured island, "THE JOY OF THE LORD IS YOUR STRENGTH." We purposely abstain from all particular remark upon that wonderful event, as well as all statistical detail about the actual condition of the Irish church, and all prognostication of its future, because these are points on which the public mind is eagerly awaiting information from the delegates now visiting this country. If our hurried and jejune sketch of the past should serve to draw additional attention to the subject, and stimulate the appetite for more exact and ample knowledge, its most important end will be accomplished.

We must not conclude, however, without adding that the standard history of Dr. Reid, besides exhibiting the progress of his own church in minute detail, incidentally throws light upon some very obscure periods of our own. In addition to the facts already quoted in our abstract, with respect to the founder of our church, and several of its later foreign members, we have here a welcome explanation of a circumstance which our own historians have unavoidably left in the dark. We refer to the extraordinary Irish emigration to this country, in the second and third quarters of the eighteenth century, a movement which imparted both an Irish and a Presbyterian character to some extensive portions of the Union, and contributed immensely to the strength and increase of our own church. It has been the practice of most American writers either to leave the causes of this emigration unexplored, or to confound it with the earlier but smaller currents setting in from Scotland, and produced directly by religious persecution. But we here learn that the two things, although similar in kind and in effect, were quite distinct and independent of each other, and that although the Irish Presbyterians did, as such, sometimes suffer persecution, and did more than once resolve to leave the country in large numbers, these designs were never fully carried out; and the emigrations which did really take

place, within the period above defined, would seem to have been chiefly caused by physical and social rather than religious sufferings; such as hard winters, failure of the crops, unreasonable rents, and taxes, and oppressive landlords. These were often actuated, no doubt, by intolerant and party zeal; but this is something very different from the treatment which depleted Scotland in the reign of Charles the Second, and would probably have drawn its best blood from its veins, if the oppressors had not crowned their other arbitrary acts by finally and forcibly arresting emigration. We have no room to exemplify or verify this statement by detailed proofs, or even to indulge in any speculation as to the effects of the difference in question on the character and spirit of our own communion; but we hope that even these remarks may draw a still more general attention to the work by which they were suggested, and in which the most inquisitive curiosity will find abundant satisfaction.

ART. V.—History of the Institution of the Sabbath Day, its Uses and Abuses; with notices of the Puritans, Quakers, &c. By WILLIAM LOGAN FISHER. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Philadelphia: T. B. Pugh, No. 615 Chestnut Street. 1859. pp. 248.

In a population embracing so many elements as go to make up the American people, it is to be expected that there should be great diversity of opinion on all religious subjects, and more or less opposition to laws which recognize the obligation of any form of religious truth. This opposition is directed specially against the laws for the proper observance of the Sabbath. It is in our cities that the most conspicuous demonstrations have been made, which, in some cases, threaten to give rise to serious difficulties. In some instances our magistrates, influenced by public sentiment, or rather by popular clamour, have allowed the public desecration of the Lord's day to pass with impunity. But in other instances, both magistrates and courts, recogniz-

ing their obligation to act, not according to their private judgment or outside demands, but according to the laws of the land, have interfered to suppress such desecration. The consequence has been that the public papers teem with remonstrances and denunciations; conventions have been held; exciting addresses delivered, and strings of formidable resolutions passed. It is important to notice the sources whence this opposition to our Sunday laws proceeds. It is admitted that there are men among these opponents highly respectable, both for intelligence and character. Some of our own church, and even ministers of high-standing, who not only believe in the Divine authority of the Scriptures, but in the perpetual obligation of the Sabbath, are so infected with the radical and infidel theory of civil government, as to throw all their weight against the laws for the proper observance of the Lord's day. There are others, who, in their own minds, have no objections to such laws, and who would be glad to see the community quietly submit to them; who, nevertheless, join in the opposition because they think that such laws are out of keeping with the spirit of the age. Others again are men of the world, whose convictions and conduct are not governed by religious principle, and whose interests are more or less enlisted in the abrogation of all restrictions placed on Sunday travelling and amusements. But with all these concessions it remains true that the opposition is, as a whole, an anti-Christian and irreligious movement. It is an outbreak of hostility to Christianity, and to all its institutions. We have just said that we do not pronounce every opponent of the Sunday laws, simply on the ground of that opposition, to be an infidel or an irreligious man. We cannot, however, resist the conviction that the movement itself is anti-Christian in its character and purpose. This is made manifest by the reasons commonly assigned for opposition to the Sunday laws-reasons which avowedly apply to all the institutions of Christianity; by the character of those who have rendered themselves most prominent in this movement, among whom the German emigrants are the most vociferous and violent; and by the character of the addresses made in anti-Sabbath conventions, and of the resolutions adopted in those assemblies.

In the New York Spectator, for September 13th, we find a

partial report of such a meeting, at which one of the speakers declared, that the purpose of himself and of his associates was, that "the free thoughts which they had brought with them from Germany should be established here." That is, that the laws and usages of this Christian and Protestant country, the convictions and principles of the great mass of its inhabitants, are to be disregarded and revolutionized, to make way for the "free thoughts" of Germany. A Dr. Gillot is represented as exclaiming: "Free Germans and citizens of America, let us join hand in hand with all other free citizens around us, to oppose a law which is unjust, and an infringement on our sacred liberty. The Sunday laws are only the tools used by cliques of politicians to further their own ambitious ends, in opposition to the interests of mankind. They are upheld in the sacred name of religion. We all have our own views about religion, and we mean to keep them without infringement, or being forced to adopt those of other men. We honour all days, and consider what is right to be done on one day is right to be done on another. Men should be left to the exercise of their own judgment in regard to the way they spend their time. If they wish pleasure, let them have it; if they wish social enjoyment and enlivening music, let them have it. This is freedom." At this meeting it was "Resolved, That the liberty to worship what we please, implies the liberty to worship nothing we please; and that those professing what are called infidel and atheistic sentiments, have a right to the same recognition and protection from the civil powers, as those professing Jewish, Christian, or any other doctrine; and that any attempt, direct or indirect, to exact a virtual confession of faith in the inspiration of the Old or New Testament writings as a qualification for a legal oath, or the keeping of some holy day enjoined, or supposed to be enjoined, by the Jewish or Christian Scriptures as the first or seventh day of the week, is alike defiant of natural right and constitutional law." Another resolution declares, that the attempt to enforce the observance of the first day of the week as a Sabbath, is "actuated by the same sectarian and proselyting spirit which has at the same time inspired the effort to enforce the reading of the Protestant Scriptures in our public schools." "This effort to proselyte the youth of our public schools to Protestant Christianity," is looked upon "as no less flagrant a violation of natural right and constitutional law, than if, instead of King James's, the Douay or Roman Catholic version were required to be used; or instead of the Christian Bible the Mormon Bible, the Koran of Mahomet, or the Vedas and Shastas of the Hindoos." We make these quotations not for the purpose of exposing the shallowness and confusion of thought by which they are characterized, but simply to exhibit the animus of the opposition to our Sunday laws. For the same purpose we translate a few sentences from the New Yorker Demokrat, vom 30, mai d. j. Under the caption "The Day of the Lord," the editor of that representative journal says:

"As frogs in the swamp from time to time raise their heads, and fill the air with their melodious croaking, and then sink back into their slimy element, so the Sunday-saints raise their heads up and down out of the swamp of their church-creeds, and croak, 'Sanctify the Sabbath! Desecrate not the day of the Lord!' Such a frog-concert was held on Friday afternoon before the Commissioners of Police, to whom a delegation of frog-heads presented a memorandum, in which an earnest protest was made against the sale of intoxicating liquors on Sunday, and the faithful execution of the Sunday laws was demanded."

It is well for people to understand each other. It is well, on the one hand, that those Christians and Christian ministers, and other respectable men, who lend their influence to this anti-Sabbath movement, should know their associates, and understand the real spirit and design of the enterprise in which they coöperate. It is well, on the other hand, that the friends of the Sabbath, and of the laws of the land enacted for its due observance, and that magistrates and judges charged with the exposition and execution of those laws, should understand the origin and aim of the opposition which they have to encounter. We pass no judgment on individuals, but we are fully convinced that if the anti-Christian, irreligious, and foreign element were abstracted from this anti-Sabbath crusade, it would lose all its significance and power. It is but another outbreak of the

spirit of evil; and one may almost hear Lucifer, as in Long-fellow's Golden Legend, crying out to these assailants,

"Aim your lightnings
At the oaken
Massive, iron studded portals!
Sack the house of God, and scatter
Wide the ashes of the dead!"

Quite as distinctly, however, comes back the answer,

"O we cannot!
The apostles
And the martyrs, wrapped in mantles,
Stand as warders at the entrance,
Stand as sentinels o'erhead!"

We do not want such a leader, or such associates. In ninetynine cases out of a hundred, when the religious men of a community are on one side, and the irreligious, as a class, upon the other, the contest between them is a contest between light and darkness, between God and Satan, and, therefore, the stake at issue is the best interests of man. Good men, indeed, neither individually nor collectively, are infallible; and, therefore, we do not set up their judgment in any given case, as the ultimate standard of decision. But it is nevertheless true as a matter of history, that the intelligence and religion of a country go for what is true and good, ignorance and irreligion for what is false and evil. We know that there are cases in which the mariner cannot trust the needle, but must look for guidance to the unchanging star in the heavens; and there are cases in which even the mass of religious men swerve from the right course, and we have to look away from earth to heaven for direction. Nevertheless, the sailor who throws his compass overboard is sure to be shipwrecked; and the man, whether minister or magistrate, who sets himself against the religious convictions of the mass of good men, is sure to be ruined. This reference to the irreligious character of this movement against the Sunday laws is not made ad invidiam. It is intended as an appeal to a rational and well established principle of action. It is wise and right (except in extraordinary cases,) for public men to follow the enlightened religious sentiment of the community; it is unwise, disastrous, and wrong for them to go counter to that sentiment, or to take side with the irreligious and the vicious. All history is filled with illustrations and proofs of this truth. It is, therefore, a presumptive argument against this anti-Sabbath movement, that the religious sentiment of the country is against it, and the irreligious in its favour. No right-minded man can hesitate which side to take in such a controversy, unless his own convictions are singularly clear and strong, so that his allegiance to God

forces him to array himself against God's people.

We propose briefly to examine the leading arguments of the anti-Sabbatarians, and see whether they are of such cogency as to constrain a conscientious man to take part with the anti-Christian and irreligious portion of the community against the great body of enlightened and religious men. It is plain that this is a very serious question. There is far more at stake than simply the laws for the due observance of the Lord's day. The principle on which those laws are assailed, would, as its advocates avow, exclude the Bible from our public schools, banish chaplains from all our legislative halls, and from the army and navy, from hospitals and almshouses, from our penitentiaries and state institutions of every kind. It would, as we shall see, do far more than this. It would forbid the exaction of an oath of office, or for confirmation of testimony. It would obliterate from our statute-books all laws for preserving the sanctity of marriage, for punishment of polygamy or adultery; and, in short, of all enactments which assume that we are a Christian people, bound by the revealed will of God. We should, therefore, approach this subject with a due impression of the magnitude of the interests at stake, and of the radical character of the revolution which it is now sought to introduce into our laws and customs.

The first argument urged, by many at least, in opposition to Sunday laws, is that the Bible is not the word of God; it is not a revelation of his truth and will, to which we owe faith and obedience. This is substantially the ground taken by the author of the work at the head of this article. On page 18, he says, "In this account of creation nature speaks one language, the Bible another; shall we put aside those unchangeable marks

of a creation long anterior to that recorded, in order to be guided by records written when, or by whom, no one knows. The account in the book of Genesis can only be considered an allegory calculated to please children and ignorant men." We happen to have heard one of the first scientific men of the age, the friend and peer of Agassiz, lecture on the Mosaic account of the creation, and saw him overawed by the stupendous exhibition of Divine wisdom therein contained. To his mind and to his auditors, as unfolded by a true philosopher, it was shown to be a summation of all the results to which modern science had arrived. We can imagine how such a man would regard the flippant ignorance displayed in the sentence just quoted. Speaking of the Bible, the author asks on page 176, "Can any believe that this book, ambiguous in its language, uncertain in its conjectures, is designed by the Almighty to be the rule of life for man?" On page 180, after stating what he calls certain philosophical truths, he adds, "They put an end to the popular delusion that the Scriptures are the rule of life, and establish in its place that sublime idea of the constant omnipresence of God, comforting us in our affliction, and guiding us according to his own purposes through all the intricate scenes of our existence." It is the special design of one of his chapters, and apparently of the whole work, to overthrow the idea of a "book religion," and to show that the doctrine of "the authority of the Scriptures," "is of incalculable evil to the morals and welfare of society." His substitute for the Scriptures is, "every man's own perceptions of truth and justice," which, in accordance with the language, but not with the doctrine, of Friends, he calls "the inner light." The only use we propose to make of Mr. Fisher's book, is to select the heads of the common objections against the Sabbath, and the laws enacted in regard to its observance. The first in the order of importance is the one above stated, viz., that the Bible is not authoritative; is not derived from God, and ought not to be regarded as the rule of our faith or practice. This objection is not peculiar to Mr. Fisher, nor to the very inconsiderable class to which he belongs. It is the objection either openly avowed or tacitly admitted by a very large portion of those most active in their opposition to the Sunday laws. These men are not atheists,

but deists. They admit the existence of a personal God, but deny that he has made a supernatural revelation recorded in the Christian Scriptures. They say that the only guide for the individual or for governments, is reason, the light of nature, as some express it; or, as Mr. Fisher would say, "a divine principle in the mind of man;" which he tells us is sufficient for "the governing principle of the individual man," and "for

the governing principle of nations."

The first remark it occurs to us to make on this objection is, that it proves too much. If we must not make laws in obedience to the commands of God recorded in the Bible, because some men say the Bible is not true; neither can we make laws in obedience to the Divine principle or voice of God within us, because some men say there is no God. Mr. Fisher says to the Christian, "Your Scriptures are not divine as to their origin or authority. The assumption that they are a rule of life is the source of incalculable evils. Any laws founded on their commands are both unjust and injurious." The atheist says to Mr. Fisher, "Your doctrine of a God has been and is the greatest of all curses to the human race. It is the fountainhead of all superstition, and of the countless crimes perpetrated in the name of religion. It degrades man from his true position, converts him from a freeman into a slave; brings his inward life under the lash of a perverted conscience, and makes his soul a nest of scorpions." Let Mr. Fisher call an anti-Sabbath convention, and although the atheists may not outnumber the combined elements on the other side, we answer for it, they will be immensely superior in knowledge and power. Should our author fall into the hands of some of these "Free Germans," he would soon find himself crumpled into very small dimensions, and trodden under foot. If, then, he will not admit Christianity as the governing principle for the nation, he will have to submit to atheism, and then we shall soon have a strumpet for a goddess, and the guillotine for the chief source of public are sement. Mr. Fisher admits that we must principle" not only for the "individual have some "gov" man," but for ons. He says the Scriptures must not be that princ; cause they are not the word of God. We must, b substitute for them natural religion, "the inner

light," "the omnipresence of God," every man's "perceptions of truth and justice." But with the same right that he tells us to put out the sun, and follow the farthing candle of his "inner light," the atheist says to him, "Put out your smoking taper, it has ever led man into swamps and quicksands." If, therefore, we must give up our Christianity, he must give up his Theism.

Our second remark is, that this objection is unreasonable, not only because it is unfounded, but also because it is entertained only by an insignificant minority of the people. The objection that the Scriptures are not an authoritative rule of life is an unreasonable objection, because their Divine origin is a well authenticated fact. It is unreasonable to deny what by sufficient, and even superabundant evidence is proved to be true.

The Christian Scriptures, the Old and New Testaments, have been subjected to the scrutiny of men for thousands of years. They have been exposed to all kinds of assault. The greatest and the worst of men have united to overthrow their authority. Philosophy, science, and history, have been marshalled against them; yet at this day the conviction of their Divine authority, is more deeply rooted in the minds of men than at any former period. At this moment a larger portion of the enlightened and virtuous of the human race believe the Scriptures to be the word of God, than ever before bowed to their authority. They are luminous with Divine knowledge; knowledge of the past and of the future, of the visible and of the invisible, of God and of man; knowledge such as God only could reveal. They are resplendent with holiness. They are instinct with power over the heart, the reason, and the conscience. They meet our necessities, explain the mystery of our origin, of our nature, and of our destiny. We believe in them for the same reason that we believe in the sun, or in the moral law, or that the Madonna of Raphael is a miracle of beauty. We believe in the Bible for the same reason that Mr. Fisher believes in God. And if he would know how his denial of its authority affects us, he has only to ask himself how the denial of the being of God affects him. Such denial would not, in the least degree, weaken his own convictions. He would only feel indignant that a truth so evident, which addresses itself with such controlling power to his higher nature, should be called in question on grounds which to him must appear trivial. He would regard the demand that he should not make his Theism a rule of life, an outrage on his humanity. He could not fail to answer that it was impossible for him not to regulate his conduct, whether as a citizen or magistrate, by his "own perceptions of truth and justice;" that to throw away his sense of moral obligation and responsibility to God, would be to brutalize himself. The assertion of the atheist that truth and justice are bugbears to frighten "children and ignorant men;" that moral distinctions are merely subjective; that there is no sin and no virtue; that might makes right; that the actual is the only possible; that all who succeed, whether robber or murderer, ought to succeed, would doubtless appear to him very absurd and very shocking. Well, Mr. Fisher, if you cannot give up God, we cannot give up Christ, who is God in his clearest manifestation. If the will of God, as revealed in your own soul, takes such hold of your conscience, that you cannot disregard the demands of truth and justice, we must tell you that the will of God, as revealed in his word, takes such hold of our inward nature, that we cannot disregard its authority. Nay, as God is greater than man, if your own "perceptions of truth and justice" have such authority and power over you, you may believe that what God declares to be truth and justice, has a proportionately greater power over us. If you must follow your farthing candle, we must follow the blazing sun, let owls and bats do what they may. If, then, you would regard the demand of the atheist, that you should give up your sense of truth and justice, as the rule of individual and national life as unreasonable, you must permit Christians to regard as still more unreasonable, your demand that they should give up the more distinct revelation of the Divine will in his word, as the rule of their conduct, whether as individuals or as a nation.

The unreasonableness of this demand is the more glaring, because it is made by a very small minority of the community. It is conceded, for the present, at least as between us and Mr. Fisher, that nations as well as individuals must have some rule or principle to regulate their conduct. Christians say, that

principle should be the will of God as revealed in the Bible. Deists, such as our author, say, it should be the will of God as revealed in the soul; or, in other words, the inward sense of truth and justice. The atheist says, as there is no God, there is no right or wrong; there are only force and happiness. Therefore the only rule of action for the individual is power and a regard to his own happiness; and for the nation, the greatest happiness for the greatest number. If murdering all the Indians would promote the happiness of the nation, then let them be murdered. If poisoning the wells in Canada would promote the enjoyment of Americans, let the wells be poisoned. If taking the wealth of the rich and giving it to the poor would make the people happy, let the rich be despoiled. Leaving out of view the truth or falsehood of these different theories, and assuming for the moment, that questions of duty and of allegiance to God can be settled by the ballot-box, it is certainly preposterous for the atheists, who in this country number only a few thousands, to say to the deists, who probably amount to some millions, You must give up your principle and adopt ours; there is no such thing as truth and justice, and therefore you shall not act in a national capacity on the assumption that there is. Mr. Fisher could not stand this. With what face then can a million or two of deists say to twenty millions of Christians, You must give up your principle and follow ours. Let it be remembered we are speaking on the concession of Mr. Fisher, that there must be some principle to regulate a nation's acts. If this be so, then as the vast majority of the people of this country profess to be Christians, it follows that the Bible, which they believe to be the word of God, must be the rule of their conduct; and it must, even on the low principle of relative numbers, be unreasonable that the few should control the many.

There is still another remark to be made on this objection. To argue that Sunday laws should be abolished, because the Bible is not a rule of life, is altogether irrelevant. It matters not, as to this point, whether the Bible is the word of God or not. It is enough that the people believe it to be his word. It is perfectly competent to Mr. Fisher or any body else, to endeavour to convince them that they are labouring under a

delusion, and should emancipate themselves from an illegitimate authority. But it is preposterous to require them to abolish laws which the Bible enjoins, so long as their faith in the Bible is unchanged. Mr. Fisher must act according to his "inner light," so long as he believes it to be Divine. Our telling him that it is an ignis fatuus, may be a reason for his re-examining the matter, but it is no reason why he should alter his conduct before he alters his opinion. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Any man has the right to endeavour to persuade the people to alter its provisions; but so long as it is in force, it must be obeyed. If a Christian goes to a Mohammedan country, it would be very absurd for him to call for the abrogation of a particular law enjoined in the Koran, on the ground that Mohammed was an impostor, and his book a tissue of absurdities. So long as the people regard Mohammed as a prophet, and the Koran a revelation, it is most unreasonable to require them to disregard their authority. So in a Christian country it is absurd to require that the people should act as if the Bible was not the word of God. It is one thing to try and change their conviction of its Divine authority, but another thing to persuade those who believe it to be Divine, to disregard its injunctions.

The second great objection urged in the book before us, and often elsewhere, is, that admitting the Bible to be the word of God, and the fourth commandment of the Decalogue to be yet in force, the Bible itself does not require such an observance of the Sabbath as our Sunday laws assume. On this objection little need be said. We may repeat the remark just made. The real question is, not what the Bible as interpreted by the objectors means, but how do the mass of Christian people in this country understand it. Mr. Fisher says that the Sabbath, even as enjoined in the Old Testament, was a day of recreation. The people were commanded to rest from their ordinary labours, and to amuse themselves. The mass of Christians say that the Sabbath was a day separated from worldly avocations, and set apart for the service of God; a day to be devoted to learning his will, and worshipping in his presence. It matters not, so far as the question about our Sunday laws is concerned, which of these views of the design of the day is correct. If the law-making power is in the hands of Christians, and the responsibility for the laws enacted rests on them, they must act according to their convictions. If that power and responsibility rest on Mr. Fisher and those who agree with him, they must act according to their views. So long, therefore, as Christians believe that the Sabbath as instituted by God was to be a day of rest from ordinary labour, and of devotion to religious duty, anything inconsistent with that design they are bound, within the limits of their legitimate authority,

to prohibit.

In another point of view, however, the question as to the design of the institution of the Sabbath is a matter of vital importance. Its hold on the religious feelings will of course be destroyed, if it could be shown that it was intended by God himself, to be a day of recreation. It is impossible, in an article like this, that we should enter on all these disputed points. Mr. Fisher denies the Divine origin and authority of the Bible. Must we write a new book on the evidences of revealed religion? So he denies that the Jewish Sabbath had a religious design; he denies that the institution, such as it was, was designed to be perpetual, that the early Christian church recognized the Divine authority of the institution, &c. These are points which have been discussed and settled to the satisfaction of the church, generations before Mr. Fisher or ourselves were born. It would require more space than his work occupies, and more time than its composition cost him, for us to go over the ground which has already been so often traversed. This cannot be expected, and is altogether unnecessary, as works in abundance can be had discussing all these subjects. Our object in this review is simply to point out the inconclusiveness of the arguments presented in this work, and so often repeated elsewhere, in favour of the abrogation of our Sunday laws. We might therefore properly content ourselves with the remark, that so long as the Christian people of this Christian country believe that the Sabbath as instituted by God, was a day, not for amusement, but for religious service, the Sunday laws cannot be dispensed with, without a violation of the public conscience. That Christians are right in their view of this subject might indeed be easily demonstrated to the satisfaction

of all who believe the Scriptures. The avowed and often repeated purpose of its original institution was to keep in mind the creation of the world. If the world was created, then there is a personal God, to whom, as to the author of their being, all rational creatures owe allegiance and worship. If the world was not created, then there is no God; and men are left to choose between Atheism and Pantheism-a distinction without a difference. So far, therefore, from the Sabbath being designed primarily as a day of relaxation from the ordinary labours of life, this was a very subordinate object of its institution. It was designed to be a periodical and often recurring arrest of the course of worldly life; to make men aware that there is a God to whom they are responsible, and on whom they are dependent, from whom come all their mercies, and to whom they must answer for all their sins. It was designed to prevent men sinking into the material and present, by keeping God in remembrance, and letting in upon the darkness of this outward and fleeting state the light of the spiritual and eternal world. The Sabbath was, therefore, the corner-stone of religion. Its neglect was sure to lead to forgetfulness of the true God, and then to idolatry, and the dominion of all evil. True religion, that is, what even a deist would call true religion, the knowledge and worship of the true God, has never, since the apostasy of man, been preserved where the Sabbath was unknown. or its religious character denied or neglected. It is to reduce the Old Testament from the sublimity of a revelation of God, and of the mode by which he is to be worshipped, and of the means by which the knowledge of Him is to be preserved and promoted, to make its most characteristic institution a mere day for worldly amusement. If the Old Testament be viewed as simply a collection of historical records and human compositions, having no higher reference than the temporal affairs of the Jews, then the Sabbath, in keeping with such view, may be regarded as a day of recreation. But if the Bible be a religious book, if its design be to reveal God, his works and will, and to prepare man for a higher state of being, then the Sabbath is a religious institution, having for its object to wean man from the seen and temporal, and prepare him for the unseen and eternal. It is therefore called a holy day; that is, a day set apart to

the service of God, just as the temple and its appurtenances, the priests and the people were holy as consecrated to God. The command to sanctify or hallow the Sabbath is a command to devote it to a religious use. The word to sanctify always means, in such connections, to separate from a common to a sacred use. In Lev. xxiii. 3, it is said, "Six days shall work be done; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of rest, a holy convocation: ye shall do no work therein; it is the Sabbath of the Lord (or, the Sabbath to Jehovah, i. e., devoted to his service) in all your dwellings." It was the day on which the people were to be convoked for holy purposes. The sacrifices in the temple were multiplied—the people resorted thither to worship, they rejoiced, as the Psalmist said, in the courts of the Lord. He preferred to be a door-keeper in the house of God, rather than to dwell in the tents of wickedness. He was glad when they said to him, "Let us go unto the house of the Lord." The book of Psalms is a collection of devotional exercises for the worship of God, specially on the Sabbath. That day was, therefore, a day set apart for religious services, according to the command, "Ye shall keep my Sabbaths, and reverence my sanctuary: I am Jehovah." Lev. xix. 30. And the prophet said, "The people of the land shall worship at the door of this gate before the Lord in the Sabbaths." Ezek. xlvi. 3. Isaiah said, "From one Sabbath to another shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord." lxvi. 23. In chapter lviii. 13, he says, the blessing of God shall rest on those who shall abstain from doing their pleasure, or seeking mere amusement on God's holy day; and shall call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, (or the day holy to the Lord,) honourable; and shall honour him, not doing their own pleasure, nor speaking their own words. The Jews ever understood the Sabbath to be a day consecrated to religious worship. Philo, as quoted by Eusebius, says, Moses commanded the people "on the seventh day to assemble together, and to listen to the recital of the law." Josephus says, (Contra Apion. Lib. i. § 22,) the Jews were accustomed on every seventh day not only to abstain from the ordinary affairs of life, "but spread out their hands in their holy places, and pray till the evening." We have, however, higher authority than this. It

is said in Acts xv. 21, "Moses of old times [literally from ancient generations,] hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the synagogues every Sabbath day." Such was the usage of the Jews in the time of Christ, as we learn from many passages in the New Testament. Mark vi. 2, "When the Sabbath was come, he [Christ] began to teach in the synagogue." Luke iv. 16, "He came to Nazareth-and, as his custom was, he went into the synagogue on the Sabbath day, and stood up to read;" xiii. 10, "He was teaching in one of the synagogues on the Sabbath." The apostles everywhere went into the synagogues on the Sabbath to preach; see Acts xiii. 14, xvii. 2. In this latter passage it is said, "Paul, as his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures;" and xviii. 4, Paul "reasoned in the synagogue every Sabbath, and persuaded the Jews and the Greeks." It is plain, therefore, that the Hebrew Sabbath was not a day for worldly amusement, but a day set apart for religious duties. The people, indeed, were commanded to rejoice on that day. And well they might, for it was the constant memorial of the being and goodness of God, not only as their Creator and benefactor, but as their deliverer from bondage. There is nothing ascetic or gloomy in the religion of the Bible. Men are commanded to rejoice always, to praise God with a cheerful voice. There is no doubt that the Pharisees perverted this sacred day, and burdened its observance with many uncommanded austerities; and there is no doubt that some Christians have erred in the same direction. But this is not to be laid to the charge of the Bible; and it is not the tendency of our age. All that God requires is, that the day should be set apart from worldly avocations, and consecrated to religion. The more cheerfully it is observed, the more, that is, of joyful gratitude for the blessings which it commemorates attends its celebration, the better.

The third objection to our Sunday Laws is, that admitting the Divine origin of the Old Testament, and conceding that the observance of one day in seven as a holy Sabbath to God is therein enjoined, it was a purely Jewish institution, and is not binding upon Christians.

It is on all hands admitted that the Mosaic laws include two

elements, the one designed especially for the Jews, the other designed for all men. Some of the laws of Moses bound the Jews as Jews, and therefore only Jews; others bound them as men, and therefore all men. The abrogation of the Old Testament economy, with all that was ceremonial, typical, and national, left what was moral and universal untouched. The commands, Thou shalt have no other gods before me; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not covet, are not swept away because the law of Moses is abolished. The only question is, what part of the Mosaic institutions was temporary and national, and what part is permanent and universal? In some cases, as in those just cited, the answer to this question is easy. In others it is more or less difficult. And it is to be admitted that very great evils have arisen from transferring temporary rules and principles from the national economy of the Old Testament, to the catholic economy of the New. Christianity has thus, in different forms, been corrupted by a Judaizing spirit. Whether the Sabbath belongs to the class of temporary Jewish institutions, or was designed to be permanent and universal, is therefore the question. We must here, however, repeat the remark already twice made. It is not so much the truth in this matter, as the faith of the general body of Christians we are to inquire after. Even if Mr. Fisher were right in his confident assertion that the Sabbath was a purely Jewish ordinance, still if the Christians of this country are of a contrary conviction, it is unreasonable to expect them to violate their sense of duty because some men think them mistaken. That the Christian world does consider the Sabbatical law of perpetual obligation is obvious from two notorious facts. The whole Christian world observe that law. All classes of Christians (with exceptions too inconsiderable to be taken into account) do observe every seventh day, as a day for religious worship. This is done, indeed, by different churches and persons with different degrees of strictness. But the same may be said with regard to everything else which belongs to Christians as such. It is undeniably true that the whole Christian world, whether Greek, Latin, or Protestant, comprising ninety-nine hundredths of all who bear the Christian name, do observe one day in seven for Divine worship, and have done so from the beginning. This has not been done by accident, or from motives of convenience or expediency. That precisely one day in seven, and not one in six, eight, or ten, has been thus universally observed, is proof positive of its being regarded as a Divine institution. If in any case the rule, quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, can be applied with certainty, it is to this. But there is another proof of this point. The Decalogue is incorporated into the liturgical or catechetical formulas of all the great divisions of the Christian church. The Greeks, the Latins, and all Protestants, who have a liturgy, repeat the ten commandments from Sabbath to Sabbath. In their worship the minister says, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy;" and the people answer, "Lord, have mercy upon us, and incline our hearts to keep this law;" and at the end of the repetition of the Decalogue, they say, "Lord, have mercy upon us, and write these thy laws in our hearts, we beseech thee." Here then is the testimony, uttered in the ears of God, and before all men, of the whole Christian world to their faith in the continued obligation of the fourth commandment. This being so, what Mr. Fisher or those who agree with him, have to say to the contrary, is of very little account. If Christians are to be allowed to act according to their faith, they must be allowed to keep the Sabbath, which with one voice they pray God to incline their hearts to do. And if, as even Mr. Fisher admits, there must be a principle to determine national as well as individual conduct, then Christian states must obey the law which Christian men believe binds them with the authority of God.

But it is important to inquire into the grounds on which Christians proceed in separating the permanent from the temporary in the Jewish institutions. If we observe the Sabbath, why do we not observe other festivals and rites enjoined in the Old Testament? There are three principles or criteria of discrimination. First: when any command was given before the time of Moses, and not addressed to the chosen people as such, but to all mankind, then it is certain that such command forms no part of the peculiar institutions of the Jews. Whether it was intended to be of permanent as well as universal obligation, is to be otherwise determined. The offering of sacrifices was

anterior to the Mosaic period, and was no doubt a Divine institution designed for all men; but being typical, it ceased to be obligatory when the great antitypical Sacrifice had been presented on the cross. Second: when the reason assigned for any command is permanent and universal, then the command itself is permanently and universally obligatory. The ground of the commands, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not covet, is nothing in the relation of one Jew to another, but the permanent relations of men. Those commands, therefore, do not bind Jews as Jews, but men as men. The command to worship God and not to worship idols, was not founded on any peculiar relation which the Hebrews bore to God, but on the relation which all rational creatures bear to their Creator. Therefore those laws can never be abrogated. Thirdly: when any command in the Old Testament is recognized by Christ and his apostles as obligatory on their disciples, it becomes a part of the law which binds all Christians. Thus the original law of marriage was adopted by our Lord, and is permanently obligatory upon all who recognize his authority.

It is the application of these criteria which has convinced the Christian world that the command to consecrate every seventh day to the worship of God and the duties of religion, is of permanent and universal obligation. From the beginning of the world, long before the time of Moses, and therefore for all mankind, God sanctified the seventh day, that is, separated it from an ordinary to a sacred use. This is the plain meaning of the sacred text. "God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work." Gen. ii. 3. This occurs in the account of the creation. It asserts the fact that God blessed or sanctified the seventh day from the beginning. To make this passage mean that the fact that God rested on the seventh day was the reason why, thousands of years afterwards, it was set apart as a day of rest, is to do obvious violence to the text. The language used in Exod. xx. 11, plainly teaches that the Sabbath was instituted from the beginning. "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day, and hallowed it." The reason assigned for blessing the day was a

reason which existed from the creation. This view of these passages is confirmed by the consideration that the necessity for the Sabbath was a common necessity. Whether considered as a day of rest from labour, or as a day set apart for the worship of God, it was as important before, as after the time of Moses. Besides this, we have the clearest evidence, in the history of the deluge, that time was then divided into periods of seven days. For this, no satisfactory reason can be given other than the original institution of the Sabbath. Seven is not an equal part either of the period of one revolution of the moon around the earth, or of the earth round the sun. There is nothing in nature to indicate this division of time, or to account for its early introduction. This, too, accounts for the wide prevalence of septenary observances, and for the sacredness so widely attached to the number seven. To account for these facts from the worship of the seven planets, is not only arbitrary, but unsatisfactory. There is no evidence that the knowledge of the seven planets existed at that early period, much less that the worship of them prevailed before the deluge. The hypothesis of the institution of the Sabbath at the beginning, which is demanded by the simple meaning of the sacred text, and confirmed by the considerations just stated, is consistent with all the facts of the case. It is indeed objected that we find no mention of the institution in the subsequent chapters of the book of Genesis. This, however, is not surprising, considering the brevity and the object of that sketch of the early history of the world. There is no mention of the Sabbath in Joshua, Judges, First or Second Samuel, although so solemnly enjoined by Moses. No special instance of the practice of circumcision is recorded as having occurred from the settlement of the Hebrews in Canaan to the time of Christ. The mere silence of the brief scriptural narratives therefore proves nothing. Neither is the fact that the Sabbath is said to have been commemorative of the deliverance of the people from Egypt, and a sign of the covenant between them and Jehovah, inconsistent with its institution in paradise. It was designed to answer many purposes; to keep in mind the creation of the world; to commemorate the deliverance from Egypt; and to typify the rest which remains for the people of God.

An institution originally of Divine appointment, which the nations had neglected, and therefore sunk into idolatry, was, as Nehemiah says, ix. 14, "made known" by the hand of Moses; and being thus reinstituted and enforced by additional considerations, became a distinguishing mark between the Jews and the other nations of the earth. Although thus communicated anew to the people, it would appear from Exod. xvi. 23, that it was not unknown to the chosen people. Other nations had neglected it, but the knowledge of such a day, although they have been remiss in its observance, lingered among the Hebrews. This appears from the fact that Moses, in giving directions in regard to gathering the manna, before any new command on the subject, enjoined on the people to collect a double quantity on the sixth day, for "the seventh, which is the Sabbath, in it there shall be none."

Of all classes of Protestant Christians, those who stand at the greatest remove from Brownists or Puritans, to whom Mr. Fisher refers the doctrine of the perpetuity of the law of the Sabbath, are the High-church, or Anglican, party in England, and the Lutheran element of the united church of Prussia. The celebrated Dr. Hook, vicar of Leeds, a representative of the former, in his Church Dictionary, labours at length to show that "one day in seven was in the beginning dedicated to the service of the Almighty." He says that Gen. ii. 3, proves that one day in seven was sanctified, or "set apart for a religious purpose." He teaches that this rule was given to Adam, and was "binding not on a chosen few, but upon all his descendants." As a representative of the latter class, we refer to Huebner, Professor in Wittenberg. In his edition of Büchner's Exegetisch-homiletisches Lexicon, he maintains, that the Sabbath was instituted in paradise, and says the observance of such a day "is plainly no local or temporary command, but an original necessity of the spiritual nature of man; he must suppress all aspiration after the heavenly and invisible, and sink into the earthly, and even the brutal, without the Sabbath." These are men of our day, not of the age in which witches were hung, and Quakers persecuted. It will not do, therefore, to attribute to any such age or spirit, the doctrine of the primitive institution and permanent obligation of this holy day.

The second criterion leads to the same conclusion. reason for the Sabbath is permanent, and therefore the institution is permanent. That reason as given in Genesis, in the Decalogue, and most frequently through the Bible, is nothing in the peculiar or national relation of the Hebrews to God, but the relation which men as rational creatures bear to their Creator. On the same ground, therefore, that the other precepts of the Decalogue, founded on the permanent relations of men, either to God or to each other, are of necessity regarded as binding all men in all times, the Sabbath which is placed on a similar foundation, must be considered as permanently and universally obligatory. Men are bound to worship God. They are bound to do this socially as well as privately. This worship is a necessity of their spiritual nature. It is essential to the healthful development of their powers, to the formation of character, to their well-being in this world, and their salvation in the next. Without the stated public worship of God, men lose the knowledge of his existence, and all sense of obligation. Enlightened piety gives place to superstition, fanaticism, or irreligion. Men become debased and society utterly demoralized. The institution of the Sabbath was designed to preserve the knowledge of God, and the power of religion among men.* It is God's means to that end, and wherever it has been unknown or neglected, idolatry or false religion has always prevailed. The ground on which the Sabbath rests being, therefore, an abiding necessity of our nature, common to all men, the institution itself cannot be regarded as a temporary Jewish ordinance.

The third criterion by which to determine whether any institution of the Old Testament was intended to be permanent, is the manner in which it is treated in the New Testament. If it is there represented as belonging to the old economy, it is no longer in force, but, if it is recognized as still binding, it becomes a permanent law of the Christian church. On this principle all the precepts of the Old Testament founded in the

^{*} Mr. Fisher quotes, and afterwards refers to, with evident approbation, the suggestion that the Sabbath was instituted to relieve the sore feet of the Jews during their toilsome journey through the wilderness. So low as that may men get in this nineteenth century!

essential and necessary relations of man to God, or on the permanent relations of society, are in the New Testament either expressly enjoined, or clearly recognized as of permanent obligation. Thus, while the Mosaic law itself, with all its peculiar enactments and penalties, all its rites and its ceremonies, its temple-service and ritual, is declared to be abolished; the prohibition of the worship of false gods, and of all forms of idolatry, is reiterated; all precepts relating to the relative duties of men as fellow-creatures, as husbands and wives, as parents and children, as magistrates and citizens, are recognized as still in force. Now with regard to the Sabbath, we find, in the first place, not the slightest intimation that it was regarded as a temporary institution. The various festivals of the Jews, their Sabbaths, their new moons, their great days of convocation and atonement, are declared to have passed away, as shadows of good things which had already come. But the original command anterior to the law of Moses, to separate one day in the week from worldly avocations, and to set it apart to the worship of God, is never in any way set aside. In like manner the Jewish law of marriage, with its death penalty, its permission of polygamy and arbitrary divorce, is abrogated. But the original law of marriage is re-enacted and declared to be of perpetual obligation. The abrogation, therefore, of the Jewish Sabbath, with its death penalty, its peculiar services and regulations, leaves the original law of the Sabbath untouched.

In the second place, besides this negative argument, we have abundant evidence that the original law was regarded as permanently obligatory. Our Lord on various occasions, by word and act, taught that the view of the Sabbath entertained by the Jews of his day was erroneous, but he never taught that the Sabbath itself was to be set aside. He taught that it was right to do good, to supply the cravings of hunger, and the like, on the Sabbath; but he never taught that it was right to make the day one of labour or recreation. His doctrine was that the "Sabbath was made for man, (not for the Jews) and not man for the Sabbath." It was designed to promote the physical and spiritual interests of men, and was not to be observed in any way which would sacrifice the end to the

means. With regard to sacrifices, it was not merely the spirit and manner in which they were offered, but the sacrifices themselves which were set aside or condemned; whereas it was not the Sabbath itself, but the mode of its observance that our Lord objected to. He sanctioned the religious observance of the day by attending the synagogue services; just as he sanctioned marriage by his attendance on the wedding at Cana. Christ and his apostles also on various occasions gave their sanction to the Decalogue as a permanent rule of duty. They quote it as a whole, and command that it should be obeyed. That was the law which could not be broken. The decisive fact, however, is, that the whole Christian church, under the guidance of Christ and his apostles, have from the beginning acted on the assumption that the original law requiring one day in seven to be consecrated to God is permanently and universally binding. All Christians, as before remarked, have incorporated the Decalogue, including the fourth commandment, into their standards of faith and practice. The law of the Sabbath, therefore, is written as by the finger of God on the heart and conscience of the Christian world.

The change of the day is merely circumstantial. Any day may be the seventh, according to the mode of ordering the succession. There was a reason why the seventh in the Jewish mode of numbering the days, should be observed by them, because the creation was the thing to be specially commemorated. There is a reason why the first day of the week should be the sacred day of Christians, because the new creation, the work of restoring a ruined world, is the thing we are most interested in bearing in mind. This change of the day was not made arbitrarily, or by human authority. It was made by inspired men, as is proved by the designation of the first day of the week, in the New Testament itself, as the Lord's day, and by the observance of that day by the apostles and early Christians. This circumstantial change in no way interferes with the original command. All the permanent and salutary designs of the institution are answered by the observance of the first, as well as by the observance of the seventh day of the week. It is still one day in seven; and this is the substance of the original law.

The fourth, and by far the most effective objection, so far as the popular mind is concerned, against the Sunday laws, is, that they are, as the "Free Germans" express it, a violation of the constitutional rights and religious liberty of the people. It is assumed that the separation between the church and state which prevails universally in this country, and the provision, found in most of our State Constitutions, that no man shall be molested for his religious principles, and no religious profession shall be required as a qualification for office, forbid the enactment of such laws. Those who do not believe in the Sabbath, or even in Christianity, Jews, and infidels of every grade, say they have precisely the same rights under the Constitution as any Protestant Christian. If a man chooses to labour or to dance on the Lord's day, no one has the right to interfere with him. And if any set of men choose to run their cars, or steamboats on that day, it is declared to be an act of injustice for the government to prevent it.

In reference to this plausible objection we would say, 1. That this is a Christian and Protestant country. 2. That the people have not only the right, but are bound in conscience, to act on the principles of Protestant Christianity, not only in their capacity of individuals, but as a government, in all cases in which such Christianity affords a rule for individual or governmental action. 3. That in so acting, no violence is offered to

any man's constitutional rights or natural liberty.

These are not new principles for this Journal to maintain. They have been repeatedly asserted in their application to the introduction of religious teaching into our public schools. They are developed in a masterly manner, (as we may be permitted to say,) in a communication to the pages of this number of our Review. With the principles contained in the article referred to, we heartily concur, although we may differ from our able contributor, as to the extent to which our national and state governments have in point of fact denuded themselves of their rights as Christian organizations. We propose to explain and vindicate, as briefly as possible, each of the principles just stated.

First: This is a Protestant and Christian country. This does not mean merely that the great majority of the people are

Protestant Christians. This is indeed a most important, as it is an undeniable fact. Take out of the country all who profess Protestant Christianity, and you take out of it its heart, soul, life, and essence. Still this is not a question of numbers. Turkey is a Mohammedan country, although the Christians may outnumber the Moslems. Nor does the proposition above stated mean simply that the controlling legislative and executive power in this country is in the hands of Protestant Christians. Ireland is a Celtic Roman Catholic country in spite of the domination of Saxon and Protestant England. But it means that the organic life of the country is that form of social, political, and religious life, which is peculiar to Protestant Christianity. As every tree or plant, every race of animals, so every nation has its own organic life. If you plant an acorn it develops into an oak; and as it grows it assimilates or eliminates all that comes within the sphere of its activity. So if you take a number of Chinese as a nucleus of a nation, as they multiply and form themselves into a self-governing community, not only their physical organization, but their whole individual, social, religious, municipal, and political life, is of necessity, or by a Divine law, conformed to that peculiar type. Of course the same would be true of any number of English or Frenchmen. The greater the distinction of races, the more marked the difference in the manifestations of the organic life of different communities. An African or Asiatic nation differs more from an European one, than one European nation from another. Every nation, however, has its peculiar character and usages, the product and manifestation of its organic life. This country is no exception to this law. It was originally constituted by Protestant Christians. They were not only the first settlers, but they constituted almost the only element of our population for the first hundred years of our history, which was the forming period of our national existence. These progenitors of our country being Protestant Christians, not only each for himself worshipped God, and his Son Jesus Christ as the Saviour of the world, and acknowledged the Scriptures to be the rule of his faith and practice; but he introduced his religion into his family. He associated with others for the public service of God. The people abstained

from all ordinary business on the Lord's day, and devoted it to religion. They built churches, erected schools, taught the children to read and obey the Bible as the word of God. They formed themselves as Christians into municipal and state organizations. They acknowledged God in their legislative assemblies; they prescribed oaths in his name; they closed their courts, their places of business, their legislatures, and all places under public control on the Lord's day. They declared the common law of England, of which Christianity is the basis, to be the law of the land. In this way we grew to be a Protestant Christian nation, by the same general law that an acorn becomes an oak. When emigrants who were neither Protestants nor Christians come to the country, they were either perfectly assimilated and absorbed, as the rivulets which flow into the Mississippi are lost in its mighty waters; or, from want of congeniality, they mingle with us, but are not completely of us; as a branch of one kind of tree may be engrafted upon a tree of a different kind, without altering the nature of the sustaining stem. Sometimes the difference is so great as to forbid even this partial assimilation; and these uncongenial elements become warts and excrescenses on the body politic. This is the case with the Indians, the Mormons, and the Chinese in California. It is with our religions as it is with our ethnical development. The great majority of the settlers in this country were from Great Britain. They brought with them the English language, English literature, laws, ideas, feelings, and domestic and social usages. They grew up, therefore, essentially an English people, and they so remain to this day. The accession to our population from other sources, does not change our ethnical character. Our language, laws, and institutions are as much English as they were a hundred years ago. Germans, French, Irish, Norwegians, and Danes, in the course of a generation or two, are merged indistinguishably into the mass of the English speaking and English feeling population. Not less palpable is the Protestant Christian character of our nation. It is what it is because it is the development of a germ of Protestant Christianity. This is an outstanding historical fact. It cannot be changed by denying it, by pooh-poohing it, or by cursing it. There stands an oak, because an acorn was

planted. And we stand a Protestant Christian nation, because God planted Protestant Christians as the national germ on this western continent. The sense, therefore, in which we understand this to be a Protestant Christian country is, that its organic life, that which gives it being and character, and determines its acts and destiny, is Protestant Christianity. By Protestant Christianity is meant that form of religion which acknowledges Jesus Christ, as God manifest in the flesh, to be the absolute, sovereign and only Saviour of men, and which takes the Bible, as his word, to be the only infallible rule of faith and practice, and protests against all human authority in matters of religion.

The second proposition stated above, is, that the people of this country have the right, and are in conscience bound to act on the principles of Protestant Christianity, not only in their capacity as individuals, but as a government, in all cases in which Christianity affords a rule for individual or governmental action.

This seems almost a self-evident truth. Christianity is a law of life; a law of Divine authority; it binds the conscience, it must therefore be obeyed by those who profess to be Christians. They must obey it as men, as heads of families, as magistrates, as citizens, as legislators and executive officers. They cannot deliberately violate any of its injunctions without doing violence to their own conscience, and forfeiting their allegiance to God. If they believe that Christianity forbids war, they cannot, as a government, declare war, or permit it to be prosecuted by those under their control. A nation of Quakers could not maintain a navy, or organize an army. By so doing, they would forfeit their character as Quakers, and all the benefits and blessings therewith connected. If a set of men believe in God and the moral law, it is self-evident that they must obey that law, not only as individuals, but in all the associations into which they may enter. If they form themselves into a manufacturing, or banking, or railroad company, they cannot, in that capacity, do what they believe the moral law forbids. If they cannot deceive or defraud as individuals, neither can they do it as a society. If they are bound to keep the Sabbath in their families, they are bound to keep it in their

workshops and banking-houses. It would help them very little at the bar of conscience, or at the bar of God, to say that a railroad company was organized for secular purposes, and had nothing to do with questions of morals; that those are matters to be left to every man's own conscience and to God. The man who was at once a prince and a bishop, could not get drunk as a prince, and be sober as a bishop. The principle here asserted is so clear that men who occupy the low platform presented in Mr. Fisher's book cannot deny it. Even he admits, as we have seen, that there must be a principle not only for the control of individual, but also governmental action. He and many others say, "the inner light," or every man's sense of truth and justice, is such a principle. This is giving up the whole controversy, for it admits that men must act in matters of government in obedience to what they believe to be the will of God; and therefore as the people of this country believe the Bible to be a revelation of the will of God, they must, in their governmental capacity act in obedience to the Bible. If the Bible forbids polygamy, they cannot sanction it. If the Bible prohibits arbitrary divorce, they cannot allow a man to put away his wife whenever he pleases. If the Scriptures enjoin the religious observance of one day in seven, they cannot, as a government, profane that day and be guiltless.

No one denies that men are bound to recognize the authority of the moral law in their governmental acts, that for a nation to authorize or to permit, within its jurisdiction, theft, rapine, or murder, is as atrocious as for an individual man to be guilty of these crimes. No one would dare to rise in a legislative body, and propose that such offences should be sanctioned or overlooked. No one, therefore, can reasonably deny that Christians are bound to recognize the authority of Christianity in their governmental acts. They must do it. It may be said that these cases are not parallel, because the precepts of the moral law are obeyed by governments, not as moral duties, but out of regard to the public good. This is not true. It is impossible that men with a moral nature, should not act under a sense of moral obligation. All public men are loud in their declarations that they favour or oppose certain measures because they are right or wrong, just or unjust. But even if it were possible for men to deny their moral nature, and to act always and only from selfish motives of expediency, this would not alter the case. It is expedient to obey God. If he has enjoined the observance of the Sabbath, all who recognize his authority, will feel that it is expedient, best for the interests of society, that the day should be observed. What, however, we now desire to insist upon, is the absolute impossibility of Christians ignoring their Christianity in their governmental acts. They can no more do it than they can ignore their reason or their moral nature.

But suppose they could do it, what would be the consequence? What would be the effect of carrying out the principle that religion has nothing to do with human governments, that it has no right to control their acts? Or, to state the question in a different form, what would be the consequence of adopting the principle that human governments have nothing to do with religion, and need not concern themselves whether their enactments violate the principles of Christianity or not? The first consequence of adopting this principle would be that all the Christians of the country would be disfranchised. Suppose our governments, municipal, state, and national, were to act as though there were no such thing as Christianity, or as if it had no right to determine their action. Then, as in Mohammedan or Pagan countries, all public business would go on on Sundays as on other days; all courts would continue in session, all public offices would be open; all town-councils, state legislatures, and both houses of Congress would sit without interruption on the Lord's day. It is plain, therefore, that no Christian could be a lawyer or judge, nor an office-holder of any kind, nor a member of town-council, or of a state legislature, or of Congress. The whole legislative, executive and judicial power in city, state, and nation, would be thrown into the hands of Jews, infidels, and atheists. We should have a test act of a novel character. Not religion, but irreligion would be demanded as a necessary qualification for every post of trust or power. This is the kind of liberty and equality which our "Free Germans" and Fisherites would establish in the land. This is inevitable. He that will not bow to God, must bow to Satan. There is no help for it. If we banish

religion as a controlling power, we thereby establish atheism. If we extinguish light, we introduce darkness. And for a man to profess that his object is simply to banish the light, and not at all to bring in darkness, will deceive nobody who has sense enough to understand the meaning of words.

A second consequence of divorcing Christianity from government, no less inevitable than the one just mentioned, would be that all laws which have their foundation in the Christian religion must be abrogated. Take, for illustration, the laws relating to marriage. The doctrine that marriage is a contract for life between one man and one woman, is peculiarly a Christian doctrine. It is not a Jewish, a Mohammedan, or Pagan doctrine. It cannot be said to have its foundation in natural religion, nor in the nature of man, nor in expediency. It is, indeed, the original law given before the introduction of Christianity. It is, no doubt, consonant to the higher nature of man, and necessary to the best interests of society. But these are not the foundations on which it rests. It is founded on the authority of Christ. It is received and obeyed because he has enacted it. It is the doctrine of the Christian church; and is observed and held sacred only by those who recognize Christ's authority. In other words, it is peculiar to Christian lands, and is purely a Christian institution. If, then, the government has nothing to do with religion; if Christians in their governmental capacity are not to be controlled by Christianity, then they have no right to enforce the Christian law of marriage. Any man who may choose to have more than one wife, or to put away one, and take another, may plead his natural right, and put in the plea, that government has no religion, and cannot enact laws to favour any one religious doctrine to the disadvantage of another. To this plea no answer can be made, according to the doctrine against which we are contending. If one man's religion justifies polygamy, and another condemns it. the government, according to that doctrine, has no right to interfere. If it cannot enforce the Christian law concerning the Sabbath, it cannot enforce the Christian law concerning marriage. The advocates of "free-love," have, therefore, the anti-Sabbatarians on their side, so far as the principle is concerned.

A third consequence of the theory in question would be that vol. xxxi.—No. iv. 97

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government can make no law to punish vice. We have before remarked that if deists may drive Christians to the wall, and insist that the Bible shall not be taken as a rule of life to control the action of the government, the atheists may turn their own weapons against the deists, and say that the government must not recognize the authority of natural religion, or of the moral law. It must not exact an oath, because an oath implies not only the existence, but the providential government of God, and a future state of retribution. Thus this great safeguard of life, reputation, and property, must be swept away. What right has a government divorced from religion to exact an oath, which is an act of worship, as a condition of holding office, or receiving testimony? This principle, however, would carry us much further; not only must oaths be abolished, but the moral law must be set aside. If it is unconstitutional to act in obedience to the Bible, it is unconstitutional to act in obedience to the moral law. If one man has a right to say, I am an infidel, and you cannot require me to regard the Sabbath; another may say, I am an atheist, and you have no right to make me obey the decalogue. You say that the interests of society require that the moral law should be obeyed; I say, replies the atheist, that what you call the moral law is a bugbear, set up by priests to answer their own ends. So far from promoting the interests of society, it is the prolific source of all the evils under which society has groaned for ages. Necessity is the plea of tyrants. The church in the darkest ages never ceased to say she burned heretics for the good of society. No man, or set of men, has the right to set up their "inner light," or sense of "truth and justice," as a rule of life for others. This is only carrying out to its legitimate conclusions the principle on which the Sunday laws are now so vigorously assailed. So far, therefore, from admitting that Christianity must be divorced from the government, we maintain that such divorce is impossible. If Christianity is a rule of life, it must go with us into our families, into our schools. our prisons and hospitals; into our workshops and banking houses, into railroad and canal companies, into our municipal councils, and state and national legislatures. We maintain that if this principle be denied, all Christians must be disfranchised; infidelity or atheism must be a condition of office and power; not only our Sunday laws must be given up, but all religion must be banished from our public institutions of every kind. No man can enter the navy or army but on the condition that he renounces all claim to the public worship of God. We must send forth our ships and troops without chaplains, and let our fellow-citizens live and die as heathen. In short, the demand that the government shall not be administered on Christian principles, is a demand that it shall be administered on atheistic principles. The absolute negation of religion is atheism.

The third proposition laid down above, is, that there is no violation of any man's constitutional rights, or of his civil and religious liberty involved, in making the Bible the rule of individual and governmental action in this country.

Our readers will not overlook the limitation attached to our second proposition. We said that Christians have the right, and are bound in conscience to act on the principles of Protestant Christianity in administering the affairs of government, so far as Christianity affords a rule of governmental action. Christianity enjoins on us certain truths to be believed, and certain laws to be obeyed, as men. It does not prescribe any particular form of civil government, nor any definite principles of political economy. It does not invest civil government with authority over the faith of its subjects, nor over the performance of their religious duties. It simply requires that Christians, in all their relations and associations, should have reference to the law of God as revealed in his word, as their rule of action. Carrying out this principle is perfectly consistent with the widest liberty consistent with the existence of human society.

If a number of Christians should associate to carry on any mercantile or manufacturing business, requiring the outlay of large capital, and the employment of many assistants and subordinates, they would, of course, conduct their business on Christian principles. That is, they would feel bound not only to be just, and faithful in all their transactions, but they would suspend all their operations on the Lord's day, afford their employees the opportunity to attend public worship, provide

for the education of minors and dependents, and act towards them in all respects as Christ would require at their hands. If a man not a Christian, whether Jew or deist, or an utter sceptic, should propose to join their company, they might receive him into partnership on terms of perfect equality; give him a full share in the profits of the business, and equal right in its management. If this new partner should become infected with the modern ideas of liberty, and say to his associates, I have as much right to control the business of the company as you have, the property is as much mine as yours, you have no right to bring your religion into a business concern. I insist upon it, that our operations shall not be suspended on the first day of the week, that no part of the property shall be used for religious purposes; let the parents of the children whom we employ, see to their religious training. I maintain that we must conduct our business without regard to the Bible, or anything which it enjoins. His associates would doubtless say to him, Then we must dissolve partnership. You knew we were Christians when you joined us. You knew that we could neither work ourselves on the Sabbath, nor allow our mills to run, or our workshops to be open. If you choose to work on that day, that is your own concern. But you have no right to require that our property shall be employed on the Lord's day; that our clerks, porters, or mechanics, should labour for your accommodation. You have no right to demand that a man must be willing to disregard the Sabbath as the condition of being taken into our employ. God moreover holds us responsible, not only for the physical comfort, but for the proper Christian education of the children dependent upon us. If you cannot remain with us, unless we conduct our business on infidel principles, you must transfer your capital and talents elsewhere. On the same ground that you require that we should disregard our Christianity, another man may come in and require you to disregard the moral law.

The same answer the Christians of this country give all classes of men, who demand that Christianity should be divorced from our governments, municipal, state, and national. This country was settled by Protestant Christians. They possessed the land. They established its institutions. They formed

themselves into towns, states, and nation. From the nature of the case, regarding the Bible as the word of God binding the conscience of every man with Divine authority, they were governed by it in all their organizations, whether for business or civil polity. Others have since come into the country by thousands; some Papists, some Jews, some infidels, some atheists. All were welcomed; all are admitted to equal rights and privileges. All are allowed to acquire property, to vote in all elections, made eligible to all offices, and invested with an equal influence in all public concerns. All are allowed to worship as they please, or not at all if they please. No man is molested for his religion or for his want of religion. No man is required to profess any particular form of faith, or to join any religious association. Is not this liberty enough? It seems not. Our "Free Germans" and other anti-Sabbatarians insist upon it, that we must turn infidels, give up our God, our Saviour, and our Bibles, so far as all public or governmental action is concerned. They require that the joint stock into which they have been received as partners, and in which they constitute even numerically a very small minority, should be conducted according to their principles and not according to ours. They demand, not merely that they may be allowed to disregard the Sabbath, but that the public business must go on on that day; that all public servants must be employed; all public property, highways, and railroads, should be used. They say we must not pray in our legislative bodies, or have chaplains in our hospitals, prisons, navy, or army; that we must not introduce the Bible into our public schools, or do anything in a public capacity which implies that we are Protestant Christians. Those men do not know what Protestant Christians are. It is their characteristic, as they humbly hope and believe, to respect the rights of other men, and stand up for their own. And, therefore, they say to all-infidels and atheists-to all who demand that the Bible shall not be the rule of action for us as individuals, and as a government, You ask what it is impossible can be granted. We must obey God. We must carry our religion into our families, our workshops, our banking-houses, our municipal and other governments; and if you cannot live with Christians, you must go elsewhere.

SHORT NOTICES.

The Ancient Church: its History, Doctrine, Worship, and Constitution, traced for the first Three Hundred Years. By W. D. Killen, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Pastoral Theology to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. New York: Charles Scribner. 1859, pp. 656. 8vo.

SINCE a portion of this number was in type we have received this noble volume, which we welcome both as an additional and interesting proof of intellectual activity in our mother-church, and as a further bond of union with ourselves, by tending to promote the knowledge and the love of our common principles and institutions. We are glad to learn from the prefatory notice, that the prompt appearance of the work is owing to the liberal encouragement received from a New York publisher, an office-bearer in our own communion. This edition, although published in New York, is from the famous press of Ballantyne in Edinburgh, and will, no doubt, attract many by its sumptuous and almost immaculate typography. In keeping with this external dress is the simple and transparent style, sometimes rising into chastened but impressive eloquence. We are also justified, even by a cursory inspection, in giving the work credit for the more substantial qualities of solid learning, iron industry, and sound Presbyterian principle. The author appears equally familiar with the ancient and the modern literature of the subject. While he draws directly from original authorities and sources, there are few recent works, either English or German, which have any bearing on his theme, that are not quoted or referred to in the margin. Even where the facts are perfectly familiar, it is really refreshing to encounter them, expressed in native English, and in good old Presbyterian phraseology. But over and above these merits which will no doubt give the work, though somewhat costly, an extensive circulation, it contains original and novel views, especially in reference to the genesis of Prelacy, and the genuineness of the writings of Ignatius, upon which it would neither be respectful to the author, nor expedient for ourselves to pass a hasty, unpremeditated judgment.

- The Greek Testament: with a critically revised text: a Digest of various readings: marginal references to verbal and idiomatic usage: prolegomena: and a critical and exegetical Commentary. For the use of Theological Students and Ministers. By Henry Alford, M. A., Vicar of Wymeswold, Leicestershire, and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. [Now D.D., and Dean of Canterbury.] London. Vols. I.—IV. 1849–1859. 8vo.
- The Greek Testament with English Notes. By the Rev. Edward Burton, D. D., some time Canon of Christ Church, and Regius Professor of Divinity. Fourth edition. Oxford, 1852. 8vo.
- The Greek Testament with Notes Grammatical and Exegetical. By William Webster, M. A., Assistant Master in King's College School, late Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge; and William Francis Wilkinson, M. A., Vicar of St. Werburgh's, Derby, late Theological Tutor of Cheltenham College. Vol. I. containing the Four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. London, 1855. 8vo.
- The New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, in the Original Greek: with Notes. By Chr. Wordsworth, D. D., Canon of Westminster. Parts I.—III. 1856-1859. London. Small folio.

It is greatly to the credit of the Church and Universities of England, that they have maintained the study of the original New Testament as an indispensable prerequisite, not only to ordination, but to graduation. Hence the large space occupied by this one subject in the College lectures and examinations, both at Cambridge and Oxford. Hence, too, the multitude of books upon this part of Scripture, originating at the University, but often carried on amidst the pressure of parochial duty, and completed after the attainment of cathedral dignities. The four works named above are probably but samples of a whole class published within the last ten years. The authors are all Anglican clergymen, and have been Fellows at Oxford or Cambridge; one a Regius Professor of Divinity, and two now holding high positions in the ancient chapters of Canterbury and Westminster. When we add that Dr. Trench, another labourer in the same field, although not in the same form, is at the head of one of these establishments, as Dr. Alford is at that of the other, we have said enough to show how zealously this part of biblical learning is cultivated in the highest places of the English church, at least since Lord Palmerston began to fill them with incumbents really distinguished for professional accomplishments, as well as personal character. The earlier works of this class, (such as Bloomfield's, Valpy's, Trollope's, and a host of others) had a peculiar English type of scholarship and exposition, derived from the usage of the great schools, and the universities, and much more grammatical than theological, or even historical. This was partly owing to the want of thorough theological training in the Church of England, which has made

the classical attainments of its members far less useful, than they might be in the exposition of the Scriptures. Within a few years this prescriptive usage has been greatly modified by German influence, which, in some cases, has extended even to the inspiration of the books. In others, it has generated an obscure and mystical doctrine, neither orthodox nor infidel, and not very easily defined or apprehended. One peculiar English fashion, still adhered to in the works before us, is the constant publication of the Greek text in an elegant and costly style, to which the notes are mere appendages, frequently (as in the case of Burton's) bearing but a small proportion to the text. The editors never seem to dream of the student's being already in possession of the Greek text, and requiring only something to assist him in the study of it. Thus a young clergyman, or candidate for orders, who desired to avail himself of all these recent helps, would be under the necessity of purchasing four sumptuous editions of the text, at a price which in America amounts to a prohibition. showy style of publication, without any regard to cheapness, or the circumstances of the class of readers most immediately interested, seems to indicate that in England learning is still rather a luxury than a necessary of life. The evil in the present case is aggravated by the fact, that all the valuable matter in these volumes might be readily reduced to one. Under this description we do not include Alford's ostentatious apparatus criticus, which occupies a space entirely disproportioned to its value, and is not regarded as authoritative out of England. Both these expensive features are retained in the American edition, which is thereby put beyond the reach of most American students. This is the less to be regretted as the work is far more showy than substantial, deriving its chief value from a hasty deglutition, rather than digestion, of the latest German books, and often giving signs of what in England is expressively called "cramming." The author's judgment is, at best, by no means his most shining gift, and is never more at fault than when he is most positive; as, for instance, in his scornful treatment of all harmonizing methods not exactly in accordance with his own foregone conclusion, which is itself nowhere clearly or distinctly stated. By far the best part of this work is to be found in the Introductions, where a great amount of useful information is laboriously compiled, and conveniently arranged. In other respects, we think it less deserving of republication than the other works which we have here associated with it, and especially than Canon Wordsworth's, which displays far more original ability and varied learning, with a

higher or, at least, a clearer doctrine as to inspiration, and the harmony of Scripture. The other two works are of less pretension, and less real merit, although full of valuable matter, and impressed with the peculiar stamp of English scholarship and mental culture. We sincerely wish that what is really important in these four works, and some others of the same class, could, with the authors' leave, be put within the reach of the American student at a reasonable price, without the needless repetition of the text, and the vain show of critical elaboration.

The Greek Testament Roots, in a selection of texts, giving the power of reading the whole Greek Testament without difficulty. With Grammatical Notes, and a Parsing Lexicon, associating the Greek Primitives with English Derivatives. By G. K. Gillespie, A. M. London, 1858. 12mo.

This is another fruit of the attention paid to the Greek Testament in England as a necessary part of education. It is not a labour-saving substitute for regular grammatical study, which it presupposes and endeavours to assist, by a novel and ingenious plan sufficiently indicated in the title. In addition to the matter thus described there are two long notes, one giving a new explanation of the apocalyptic number (666,) and the other vindicating the new word telegram, as no less regular and legitimate in its formation than the classical and well known terms parallelogram and monogram.

The Revival of the French Emperorship anticipated from the Necessity of Prophecy. By G. S. Faber, B. D., Master of Sherburn Hospital, and Prebendary of Salisbury. Fifth edition. London, 1859.

This is a republication of a prophecy uttered by the venerable author nearly forty years ago, as the result of his apocalyptic studies. Without referring to the exegetical and polemical details, with which the tract is chiefly filled, we may gratify some readers who have not yet seen it, by transcribing the prophecy itself, originally published in 1818. "On these solid grounds, I deem the future destiny of the Individual, who now wears out his hours on a sea-girt rock in the midst of the Atlantic, quite beneath the particular regard of the Prophetic Muse. Whenever the French Emperorship is revived, it is less than of the least consequence, whether it be revived by Napoleon himself, or by the son of Napoleon, or by any other military adventurer. THE NAKED FACT OF ITS REVIVAL is, I fear, but too plainly foretold by the Voice of Inspiration; but THE TIME WHEN, and THE PERSON BY WHOM, are alike uncertain." (P. 67.) The italics and capitals are the author's own.

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The Principles of English Punctuation, preceded by brief explanations of the Parts of Speech. By George Smallfield. New edition. London, 1852.

This is, in one respect, the best of several recent treatises on nunctuation, namely, as the shortest. It is still unknown to multitudes of readers and some writers in this country, that the English punctuation is a uniform and settled system. proof of this is furnished by the perfect similarity of all the great reviews and other periodicals of England, and indeed of all the better class of publications, except where an unpractised author undertakes to do the work himself, a circumstance immediately detected by a more experienced eye. It is a curious fact, though easily accounted for, that while the uneducated point too little, the tendency of scholars is to point too much, and especially to multiply the comma. This, with the profuse use of the dash, a punctuation which belongs to the newspapers rather than to books, should be carefully avoided by all writers for the press. The remedy for such faults is not the invention of new rules, however plausible, but close adherence to the best contemporary usage, which is so far uniform that most books can be read without observing at the moment whether there are any stops at all.

The Typology of Scripture; Viewed in connection with the entire scheme of the Divine Dispensations. By Patrick Fairbairn, D.D., Professor of Divinity, Free Church College, Glasgow. In two volumes. From the third Edinburgh Edition. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut Street. 1859. Pp. 399, pp. 451.

There is no material difference between this edition of the Typology and the second. It is already a standard work, with which our readers are well acquainted. It need only be commended to theological students and our younger ministers, as a very valuable work on a most important branch of scriptural interpretation.

The Knowledge of God subjectively considered. Being the second part of Theology considered as a science of positive truth, both inductive and deductive. By Robert J. Breckinridge, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Theology in the Seminary at Danville, Kentucky. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. Louisville: A. Davidson. 1859. Pp. 697.

Few books from the American press produced so deep an impression on the public mind, as the first volume of this work. Whatever diversity of opinion existed as to its merits in some aspects, it was felt and acknowledged to be a work of extraordinary power, and a noble exposition and vindication of divine truth. It was regarded, indeed, very extensively as rather a series of eloquent discourses or orations on theology, than a

system of theology itself. It is probable the same judgment may be passed on this volume. But should this be true, although it may impair the value of the work as a book for teaching theology, it will probably extend the sphere of its usefulness, by bringing it to bear on a larger class of men than students of theology.

Annals of the American Pulpit; or, Commemorative notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of various denominations, from the early settlement of the country to the close of the year 1855. With Historical Introductions. By William B. Sprague, D.D. Vol. VI. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. Pp. 858.

Dr. Sprague's Annals of the American Pulpit is probably a work which no other man in our country could have so successfully executed. Not only the excessive labour required, but the catholic spirit and amiable temper, as well as varied mental excellencies necessary for its accomplishment, place such a work beyond the ability of any ordinary man. He has certainly the satisfaction of having executed a most difficult and delicate task, to the general satisfaction of the multitude of readers, whose personal and family feelings, as well as their taste and judgment were to be consulted. These six massive volumes will not only remain a monument of his tact and industry, but a storehouse of interesting and important information to coming generations.

An Exposition of the Apocalypse. By David N. Lord. New and revised edition. New York: Franklin Knight, 348 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 542.

Clearness, force, and confidence are the leading characteristics of all Mr. Lord's writings. He is, therefore, a man formed for a leader, especially through dark and intricate paths. He has chosen such a career for himself, and he is certainly doing a great work. Whether it will stay done, is another question. We suspect that the paths which he is cutting through tangled woods will, in another generation, be overgrown and obliterated, as so many other paths through the same region have already been.

The Great Exemplar: or, The Life of our ever blessed Saviour Jesus Christ. By Jeremy Taylor, D.D., Bishop of Down and Connor. In two volumes. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 489, pp. 388.

There is a difference between "The Life of Christ" and "The Life of our ever blessed Saviour Jesus Christ." This difference in title is indicative of a difference in spirit and design. It is refreshing to turn from the historical, critical,

polemic, or sceptical discussions of the evangelical records, to the devout exposition of their incidents and doctrines; from the dry, matter of fact method of many modern writers on the subject, to the affluent style, the rich and varied imagery, and religious fervour of Jeremy Taylor, the Chrysostom of the English church. This is a book for the cultivated and refined, as well as for the devout. It is an altar of incense to the Lord and Saviour of all Christians.

Memoir of the Rev. James MacGregor, D. D., Missionary of the General Associate Synod of Scotland to Pictou, Nova Scotia; with Notices of the Colonization of the lower provinces of British America, and of the social and religious condition of the early settlers. By his grandson, the Rev. George Patterson, pastor of the Presbyterian congregation at Greenhill, Pictou, Nova Scotia. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street, below Chestnut street. 1859. Pp. 533.

Dr. MacGregor was one of the pioneers in the establishment of Presbyterianism in Nova Scotia; a man of apostolic labours and sufferings, and amiable Christian character. The history of his life is the history of an important branch of the church on the American continent during the incipient stages of its career. The work, therefore, has an interest and importance beyond that which attach to the memory of any one man. Mr. Patterson, the grandson of the subject of this memoir, has devoted much labour to the preparation of the work, which is in every way worthy of its subject.

Christ and His Church in the Book of Psalms. By Rev. Andrew A. Bonar, author of the Memoir of the Rev. R. M. McCheyne, etc. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. Pp. 457.

It is an old remark that some men find Christ everywhere in the Old Testament, and some men find him nowhere. The former err in the right direction. Our Lord himself said, Search the Scriptures, for they are they which testify of me. Modern criticism to a great extent proceeds on the assumption that the future was as dark to the prophets of old as to others of their generation, and therefore it admits only of infrequent and indefinite aspirations after a coming deliverer. Such works as this of Mr. Bonar are, therefore, specially seasonable, and important not only to the devout Christian, but to the critical student.

The Immortality of the Soul, and the future condition of the Wicked carefully considered. By Robert W. Landis. New York: Published by Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. Pp. 518.

This work is designed as a refutation of the doctrine of the "Annihilationists." It discusses the question in its philosophical, as well as in its scriptural aspect. It, therefore, begins

with the question of materialism, and quotes largely from the statements and argument of the advocates of that system. The writer evinces a range of reading much beyond the ordinary standard, and his work should be cordially welcomed as a defence of important truths.

Expository Thoughts on the Gospels. For Family and Private Use. With the text complete, and many Explanatory Notes. By the Rev. J. C. Ryle, B. A., Christ Church, Oxford, Rector of Helmingham, Suffolk, author of "Living or Dead," "Wheat or Chaff," "Startling Questions," "Rich or Poor," "Priest, Puritan, and Preacher," etc. St. Luke, Vol. I. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 390.

This volume is a continuation of a work, two volumes of which are already in the hands of our readers. The work is designed to meet the wants of heads of families, and of Bible readers, and visitors of the sick, as well as students who have not access to more extended expositions of the Bible.

The History of the Religious movement of the Eighteenth Century, called Methodism, considered in its different denominational forms, and its relations to British and American Protestantism. By Abel Stevens, LL.D. Vol. II. from the death of Whitefield to the death of Wesley. New York: Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. London: Alexander Reylin, 28 Paternoster Row. 1859. Pp. 520.

This, with the volume already published, forms a complete work. The subsequent volumes are to be issued as a distinct publication, for readers who may wish only the "Life and Times of Wesley." Methodism is so important a manifestation of the religious life both of England and America, and its history is so rich in incidents interesting in a psychological, as well as in a religious aspect, that an entirely trustworthy history on the subject, written by a Methodist, is of great value to every student whether of psychology or of religion. As such, this elegantly printed, and scholarly work of Dr. Stevens can be confidently recommended.

The Essentials of Philosophy; wherein its constituent principles are traced throughout the various departments of Science; with Analytical Strictures on the views of some of our leading Philosophers. By Rev. George Jamieson, M. A., one of the ministers of the Parish of Old Machar, Aberdeen. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Aberdeen: L. & J. Smith. 1859. Pp. 260.

This is a work of which no judgment can be expressed in a short notice. It deals with the profoundest problems of human thought. The author is evidently a man not only of powerful mind, but familiar with the whole range of modern philosophical speculation. He argues with and against Sir William

Hamilton as equal with equal; and shows the confidence which is so often an incident of consciousness of strength. He believes that he has in good measure met "the great want of our time, an exposition of the true philosophy of existence—an interpretation of ontology, on principles of universal application, throughout all the departments of natural law." Whether this is so or not we are not prepared to say, but we have no doubt that the work is entitled to, and will command the serious attention of those addicted to such investigations.

Ishmael; or a Natural History of Islamism, and its relation to Christianity. By the Rev. Dr. J. Muehleisen Arnold, formerly Church Missionary in Asia and Africa, and late Chaplain of St. Mary's Hospital, London. London: Rivingtons, Waterloo Place. 1859. Pp. 524. The proceeds of this work will be devoted to establishing a society for propagating the gospel among the Mohammedans.

This work consists of two parts, the history of the rise and progress of Mohammedanism, and a contrast between that fanatical system and Christianity. It is a timely work, written by a man who has had special opportunities to become acquainted with the spirit and working of the religion which he describes.

Our Christian Classics: Readings from the best Divines. With Notices Biographical and Critical. By James Hamilton, D. D., author of "Life in Earnest," "Mount of Olives," "Royal Preacher," etc., etc. In four volumes. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1859.

Dr. Hamilton's design in this work is to give those who have not access to the great "masters in our Israel," or not leisure to consult their massive folios, some knowledge of their spirit and sentiments. The biographical and historical notices constitute more than a third of the entire work, and are among its most interesting portions. The specimens are given in chronological order, beginning with the Anglo-Saxon period. Our readers are too familiar with the attractions of Dr. Hamilton's mode of writing, to need any special commendation of any new production of his pen.

Magdala and Bethany. By the Rev. S. C. Malan, M. A., Rector of Broadwindsor, Dorset, England. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 201.

The author of this small volume is the eldest son of the celebrated Doctor Malan, of Geneva, Switzerland. He married an English lady, and was appointed Professor of Oriental Languages in the Bishop's College, Calcutta. He subsequently spent much time with the Arabs, and became familiar with their language. It is said that he speaks twenty-six distinct

languages, and reads with ease one hundred and twenty-two languages and dialects. This volume is a graphic description of some of the scenes connected with our Saviour's earthly life.

A Treatise on Theism, and on the Modern Sceptical Theories. By Francis Wharton, author of "A Treatise on American Criminal Law;" "A Treatise on the American Law of Homicide;" "A Treatise on Medical Jurisprudence;" "State Trials of the United States," etc.; and Professor in Kenyon College, Ohio. Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott & Co. Trübner & Co., London. 1859. Pp. 395.

The author first presents a demonstration of the being of God, and then discusses the various modern anti-theistic theories, such as Positivism, Fatalism, Pantheism, Development. The argument is presented with all the precision of a legal treatise, and conducted with singular clearness and force. It is an unusual and most gratifying spectacle, when a young lawyer devotes his leisure and talents to the vindication of those great truths which lie at the foundation of all religion, and of the social and political well-being of man.

Memoirs of the Life of James Wilson, Esq., F. R. S. E., M. W. S. of Woodville. By James Hamilton, D. D., F. L. S., author of "Life in Earnest," "Mount of Olives," etc. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 399.

This volume designs to delineate a Christian gentleman, and to show "how honourably and usefully an accomplished mind may fill up a life of leisure." The subject of this memoir is sure to shed the light of his example on thousands who never heard his name while living, since he has found such a delineator as Dr. Hamilton.

Bible History, in connection with the general History of the World. With Notices of Scripture localities, and sketches of social and Religious Life. By the Rev. William G. Blaikie, A. M., author of "David, King of Israel." London: T. Nelson & Sons, Paternoster Row. Edinburgh: and New York. 1859. Pp. 470.

The outline of Bible history is given in this work under distinct heads, with illustrations derived from modern researches and travels, and with descriptions of the more important cities and countries mentioned in the sacred narrative. There is continuous reference to the contemporaneous events in profane history, and a condensed history of the Jews during the interval between the close of the Old Testament canon, and the gospel era. The same plan is pursued in reference to the evangelical and apostolic period. The book is compactly printed, and contains much valuable knowledge.

The History and Habits of Animals: With special reference to the Animals of the North American continent, and those mentioned in the Scriptures. By Peter Walker. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 320.

The intention of the author in preparing this volume was to give an outline of zoology, and lay a foundation for the more systematic study of the subject. It is prepared with intelligence and skill, elegantly printed, and adorned with numerous illustrations. Everywhere, when occasion serves, the author is careful to refer to the Scriptures, and to elucidate what is said in the sacred volume by what is learned from other sources of the nature and habits of the animals therein mentioned. The work is creditable to the writer, and in a high degree entertaining and instructive.

Paul the Preacher; or, A popular and practical Exposition of his Discourses and Speeches, as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. By John Eadie, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature to the United Presbyterian Church. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 453.

This volume is more than the title promises. It is not merely an exposition of the discourses of Paul as recorded in the Acts, but it is a description of the places in which these discourses were delivered, and such an exhibition of the attendant circumstances, that a reader becomes, as it were, a hearer, whether at Athens, Corinth, or Rome. This is the best of Dr. Eadie's books which we have seen. His commentaries are apt to be cumbered with too much learning, and to run out into homilies. But in this work we have the fruits of his learning without the roots and stems which produced them. Everything is to the point. We regard it as a very readable, as well as valuable book.

Letters of John Calvin. Compiled from the Original Manuscripts, and Edited with Historical Notes. By Dr. Jules Bonnet. Vol. I. and H. Pp. 483, pp. 454. Translated from the Latin and French Languages. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 821 Chestnut street.

In the preface to these volumes, Dr. Bonnet gives us much valuable information in relation to Calvin's letters; the disposition made of them after his death, the various collections hitherto published, and an account of his own labours in the preparation of the present work. About six hundred letters of the great Reformer have been gathered together, which will make four volumes of the size of those already published. Two volumes were translated and printed in Edinburgh, when the

progress of the work was arrested. A gentleman in New York interposed, and had the copyright transferred to our Board of Publication, under whose auspices these volumes are issued from the press. Letters bear to biography the relation that a photograph bears to a painted portrait. The latter is the work of the artist, and varies according to his style and skill, the former, although somewhat rude, is the man himself. No biography of Luther reveals the man as he is self-revealed in his letters. It is not only, however, as a revelation of the author that such a collection, and especially this collection, is of interest and value. It is contemporaneous history. Events are narrated as they rose by those who were either actors or spectators. We need say nothing to commend such volumes from such a source to the religious public.

A Familiar Compend of Geology. For the School and Family. By A. M. Hillside. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. 1859. Pp. 150.

It is difficult to make compends at once intelligible and attractive. They are apt to be like skeletons. The authoress of this little volume, for it is the production of a mother of a family, has, we think, overcome this difficulty. The subject cannot be taught without a good scientific terminology, for the subjects treated of have no other than scientific designations. This terminology itself is a thing to be learned, and a knowledge of it is becoming more and more important to persons of general education. This work has stood the test of experiment. It has been successfully used in communicating the elements of Geology to young students; and as far as we are capable of judging, it is well adapted to this purpose.

Lectures for the People. By the Rev. Hugh Stowell Brown, of Liverpool.

First series, with a Biographical Introduction by Dr. Shelton Mackenzie.

[Authorized edition.] Philadelphia: Published by G. G. Evans, No. 439 Chestnut Street. 1859. Pp. 414.

Mr. Brown is the pastor of a Baptist church in Liverpool. He began life as an engineer on a railroad. Determining to study for the ministry, he passed three years at King's College, Douglas, the capital of the Isle of Man, intending to take orders in the established church. His views of baptism undergoing a change, he became a Baptist minister. He is a man in prime of life, and a popular preacher. These lectures were delivered to audiences composed principally of mechanics and artisans. They are clear, pithy, homely, and to the point. They are not sermons in the ordinary sense of the term, but discourses on practical subjects, mostly on proverbial sayings, such as "Penny wise and pound foolish." "Take care of num-

ber one." "Cleanliness is next to godliness." "Waste not, want not," &c. Some of these lectures have had an immense circulation in the form of tracts. From two to three thousand working men are said to attend his Sunday afternoon lectures. He is, therefore, doing a great work. This volume has a mezzotint engraving of the author, which must be a likeness.

Revival Sketches and Manual. In two parts. By Rev. Heman Humphrey, D.D., Pittsfield, Mass. Published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York. Pp. 476.

The venerable Dr. Humphrey, who has had so wide and protracted experience in the office of the ministry, and amidst revivals of religion, has given in this volume, first, a history of revivals; secondly, a collection of addresses such as he had himself delivered during such visitations; and, thirdly, pastoral conversations, as held with different classes of inquirers. From this account of the book, the reader will at once see that it is one which the young pastor must welcome as a guide in the discharge of some of his trying duties.

Theopneustia. The Bible: its Divine Origin and Inspiration, Deduced from Internal Evidence, and the Testimonies of Nature, History, and Science. By L. Gaussen, D. D., Professor of Systematic Theology, Oratoire, Geneva. New and revised edition, with Analysis and Topical Index. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard, 39 West Fourth Street. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1859. Pp. 365.

An improved edition of a well known and popular work.

Sermons by the Rev. John Caird, M. A., Minister of the Park church, Glasgow. Author of "Religion in Common Life," a sermon preached before the Queen. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1858. Pp. 398.

Queen Victoria has the honour of having conferred celebrity on Mr. Caird. Sovereigns may confer titles of nobility, but they can only direct attention to the claimant to literary distinction. It is well for Mr. Caird that the royal favour has served in his case to reveal merits which might otherwise have passed, at least for a time, unknown to the general public.

Historical Sketches of Hymns. Their Writers, and their influence. By Joseph Belcher, D. D., author of "William Carey: A Biography;" "George Whitefield: a Biography;" "Religious Denominations of the United States," &c. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1859. Pp. 415.

Our literature is very far from being well furnished with works on Hymnology, in itself one of the most interesting departments of literary history. This work of Dr. Belcher gives in the first sixty-nine pages, a brief historical sketch of the use of hymns in public worship; then notices of writers of hymns, many of which notices are only a few lines in length, occupying about two hundred and twenty pages; and, thirdly, illustrations of the usefulness of hymns, which is a collection of anecdotes.

Deutsches Gesangbuch. Eine Auswahl geistlicher Lieder aus allen Zeiten der Christlichen Kirche. Von Philipp Schaff, Doctor und Professor der Theologie. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. Shafer & Koradi. Berlin: Wiegandt & Grieben. 1859. Pp. 663.

Dr. Schaff has in this work given us five hundred choice German hymns, arranged under ten general divisions. To the several hymns is prefixed a heading giving its history, its author, date, mode of publication, translations, &c. To readers of German it will prove an acceptable present.

History of the Old Covenant. From the German of J. H. Kurtz, D. D., Professor of Theology at Dorpat. Vol. I. Translated, Annotated, and Prefaced by a condensed abstract of Kurtz's "Bible and Astronomy." By the Rev. Alfred Edersheim, Ph. D., author of "History of the Jewish Nation;" Translator of "Chalybaus' Historical Development of Speculative Philosophy," etc., etc. Vol. II. Translated by James Martin, B. A., Nottingham. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street, London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson. 1859. Pp. 380, pp. 426.

We noticed the second volume of this valuable work in our last number. It may be of service to some of our readers to be informed that the standard works composing the "Foreign Theological Library," published by T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, are on sale at Smith and English's, and Lindsay and Blakiston's, Philadelphia.

Twelve Lectures on the great events of Unfulfilled Prophecy, which still await their accomplishment, and are approaching their fulfilment. By Rev. Isaac P. Labaugh, Rector of Calvary church, Brooklyn, New York. Published for the Author. 1859. Pp. 288.

Mr. Labaugh belongs to the class of writers who believe that the design of prophecy is to make men prophets. These lectures are his predictions, and will prove interesting to those who can be persuaded to adopt his principles.

Scenes in the Indian Country. By the author of "Scenes in Chusan," "Learn to Say No," and "How to Die Happy." Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 283.

The writer of this book spent a year as a missionary among the Indians, whose habits and country are herein described. The work, therefore, has the interest and value belonging to the testimony of an eye-witness. The Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ. A Practical Exposition of Matt. xvi. 13-28, xvii., xviii.; Mark viii. 27-38, ix.; Luke ix. 18-50. By the Rev. William Wilson, Minister of St. Paul's Free Church, Dundee. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1859. Pp. 453.

This is neither an exegetical nor a prophetical book, but a doctrinal and practical exposition of several important passages of Scripture relating to the nature and functions of the church of God.

Memoir of John Griscom, LL.D., late Professor of Chemistry and Natural Philosophy; with an account of the New York High School; Society for the Prevention of Pauperism; the House of Refuge; and other Institutions. Compiled from an Autobiography, and other sources. By John H. Griscom, M.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 427.

Dr. Griscom, a member of the Society of Friends, devoted his long and useful life to science, and to benevolent institutions, of several of which he was the principal author or founder. He was a man widely known and revered for his various excellencies far beyond the limits of the religious association of which he was a distinguished ornament.

The Works of Philip Lindsley, D. D., late President of the University of Nashville. Vol. I. Educational Discourses. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. Nashville: W. T. Berry & Co. 1859. Pp. 588.

Dr. Lindsley's name is associated with the cause of education from one end of the country to the other. First Tutor, then Professor, then Vice-President of the College of New Jersey, of which Institution he was elected President, afterwards for many years President of the University of Tennessee, his whole life was devoted to the work of training youth in the higher departments of knowledge. He was a man of fine bearing, of popular address, of diversified attainments, and of great energy and zeal. His numerous pupils, both east and west, cherish his memory with affectionate respect, and will welcome the publication of his discourses as a memorial of an honoured instructer and friend.

Political Economy: Designed as a Text-Book for Colleges. By John Bascom, A. M., Professor in Williams College. Andover: Published by W. F. Draper. 1859. Pp. 366.

We can only speak of the externals of this book. It goes over the whole ground in a logical order; the matter is perspicuously arranged under distinct chapters and sections; it is a compendious exhibition of the principles of the science, without prolonged disquisitions on particular points, and it is printed in the style for which the Andover press has long been deservedly celebrated.

The Crucifixion of Christ. By Daniel II. Hill, Superintendent of the North Carolina Military Institute, and late Brevet Major in the United States Army. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut street. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1859. Pp. 345.

This is an elaborate collation of the several narratives of the Evangelists, with a view not only to their elucidation but confirmation. Major Hill treats the sacred historians as witnesses in a court of justice, and endeavours to show how the testimony of one supplements and confirms that of the others. We have already had occasion to welcome the author of this volume as a valuable co-labourer in the defence and propagation of sound doctrine and Christian piety. We cheerfully commend this new production of his pen to the religious and reading public.

A Pastor's Selection of Hymns and Tunes, for worship in the church and family. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1859. Pp. 191.

This volume is the production of a gentleman of cultivated mind, versed in the science, and skilled in the art of music, and beyond all others, we presume, familiar with hymnology. It comes, therefore, with the highest recommendation such a book can have.

Theodore Parker's Experience as a Minister, with some account of his early life, and education for the ministry; contained in a letter from him to the members of the Twenty-Eighth Congregational Society of Boston. Boston: Rufus Leighton, Jr. 1859. Pp. 182.

Theodore Parker is a man of brilliant gifts and of noble traits. But he leans to his own understanding. He is his own Lord, Master, and Saviour. He has undertaken to do for himself what God alone can do for him. He is, therefore, a warning, and not a guide.

A Little Thing Great; or, the Dance and the Dancing School. Tested in a few plain sermons by John T. Brooke, D.D., Rector of Christ Church, Springfield, Ohio, formerly Rector of Christ Church, Cincinnati, Ohio. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 116.

Professing Christians moving in the more refined classes of society, whose children associate more or less freely with worldly and fashionable people, are often at a loss to know whether to allow them to join their companions in dancing, or to restrain them from all participation in that amusement. They are

strongly tempted to the side of indulgence. The thing is so common; the young are apt to be so urgent in their solicitations to be allowed to do as others do; the refusing of invitations to dancing parties, when other social reunions are attended without scruple, is so awkward; the argument "there is no harm in dancing" is so plausible, that many parents yield to the wishes of their children in this matter without a due consideration of the consequence. To all such persons we recommend this book of Dr. Brooke. It is addressed to Christians. It takes for granted that those to whom it speaks desire to live a godly life, and to bring up their children in the fear of the Lord. It is a faithful, forcible, scriptural argument; without exaggeration or extravagance. It does not make things indifferent to be sinful. But it brings home to the conscience the conviction that men cannot serve two masters; that they cannot merge themselves in the world, and yet live above the world. The question is not whether there is any sin in dancing, but whether in the present state of society, a Christian can join in such amusements without throwing his influence on the side of the world, and running the risk of being engulphed by it.

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Letters on Psalmody: A Review of the Leading Arguments, for the exclusive use of the Book of Psalms. By William Annan. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut Street. 1859. Pp. 216.

Jesus Only! By J. Oswald Jackson. Philadelphia; William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut Street. 1859. Pp. 72.

A Physician's Counsels to his Professional Brethren. By a Practising Physician. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut Street. Pp. 103.

Anna, the Leech Vender. A Narrative of Filial Love. By O. Glaubrecht. From the German. By Mrs. Clarke. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 821 Chestnut Street. Pp. 142.

May I Believe? or, the Warrant of Faith. By Alfred Hamilton, D.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. Pp. 138.

The Child a Hundred Years Old. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. Pp. 120.

Infidelity against Itself. By Rev. B. B. Hotchin. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. Pp. 100.

Profits of Godliness. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. Pp. 114.

Stories about Africa, a Farewell Address to Sunday-school Scholars. By Rev. Robert Moffat. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. Pp. 72.

John F. Oberlin, Pastor of the Ban de la Roche. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. Pp. 72.

The Protestant Theological and Ecclesiastical Encyclopedia: being a condensed translation of Herzog's Real Encyclopedia. By Rev. J. H. A. Bomberger, D.D. Part IX. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston.

We have repeatedly called attention to this work, which continues to appear regularly in numbers of one hundred and twenty-eight double column pages, at fifty cents a number. Nowhere can the same amount of valuable information be obtained for the same price.

CORRECTION.—In the remarks on the Revision of the Book of Discipline in our last number, copied from one of the weekly newspapers, the paragraphs beginning on the 12th line of page 602, and ending with the first word of the 30th line, have been separated from their proper place—which is near the end of Dr. Humphrey's speech, on page 601.

END OF VOL. XXXI.







